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Abstract
ALL THAT IS AIR TURNS SOLID: THE CREATION OF A MARKET FOR
SINKS UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
by
María Gutiérrez

Adviser: Professor Marc Edelman

Countries with greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol on climate change may invest in projects in developing countries that reduce or
remove CO2 and take credit for the reductions. Since vegetation absorbs CO2 through
photosynthesis, trees in one place could offset gases emitted elsewhere. For this purpose,
trees are known as carbon sinks, and as such they entered the new market in emission
reductions.
This dissertation analyzes this new commodity and how it works on the ground. It
describes problems encountered by UN negotiators when they abstracted, isolated and
quantified a process such as breathing, which takes place naturally everywhere, anyway.
It details the UNFCCC negotiations, which created not only the commodity, but also the
demand, the supply, and the rules governing its trade, and thus the scarcity conditions for
the market to work.
Using the filières or commodity chain approach, this dissertation follows the
commodity from producers to consumers. Based mainly on field work in Costa Rica, the
only country with a nationwide system to sell offset credits from sinks, it finds that small-

v
scale producers are excluded from the market, even though it makes sense to include
them given that they often live in environmentally vulnerable areas with limited
agricultural potential. The most important commodity in a case of fictitious capital like
this one is the production of credibility, provided here by certifying agencies. This case
study contributes to filières or commodity chains analysis by drawing attention to time
and risk (alongside space) as critical elements in determining who has access to a market.
My main argument is that the creation of a carbon market for sinks is a case of
capital involution, as used by Goldenweiser (1936), Geertz (1963) and Katz (1998) to
refer to instances where a narrow pattern persistently repeated leads to ever increasing
complexity but, instead of evolving into something new, it generates increased
entrapment, making the pattern more pervasive in its domination. Insofar as the new
market for sinks reproduces uneven development, it results in involution and is not
socially transformative.
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Introduction

The first time I ever heard about it was in Chiapas, Mexico. In the spring of
1997 several indigenous Tzeltal farmers had received the first payment for what was a
three-year agreement to offset the emissions of carbon dioxide from Formula One
motor sport. The farmers’ pledge was to develop and preserve a sustainable forest and
agricultural system that would absorb the 5,500 tons of carbon emitted every year by
the racing cars. In the process, significant areas of “cloud” forest would be preserved,
and with them several rare species such as the resplendent quetzal, ocelots and howler
monkeys.1
Around the same time, seedlings from the Klinki pine -a relic from the Jurassic
period found only in the remote mountains of Papua New Guinea- were being planted
in central Costa Rica, as part of a plan to convert up to 6,000 hectares of pastures into
farm forests that would absorb a total of 3.3 million metric tons of carbon dioxide over
a period of forty years. As with the deal between the Chiapas peasant farmers and
Formula One racing cars, these reductions in atmospheric carbon dioxide were intended
for sale to companies that needed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Like
similar projects being established worldwide, the idea was to turn “carbon
sequestration” by trees –as this form of emissions offset is known- into “a new crop for
farmers in the tropics.”2

1

Although common in nearby areas of Central America, howler monkeys are considered rare
in this part of the southeastern tropical forests of Mexico.
2

See Klinki Forestry Project, United States Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI), June
4, 1998. Note that carbon sequestration (and also carbon capture) was often used earlier on to

2
That was in 1997. In 2004, when delegates to the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) finally agreed on the rules and procedures to govern
the market in emission offsets from forestry, it became clear that the aforementioned
projects, as they stand, would not be able to compete. The cost of validating,
registering, monitoring, verifying and certifying will most likely make it prohibitively
expensive for all but the largest projects and those with the simplest corporate
structures to participate in the new market. Given the long-term and non-permanent
nature of carbon sequestration by trees, projects have to be implemented for at least
twenty years. To ensure accountability and credibility, the whole process entails many
complex, time-consuming, and technically expensive steps. For these reasons, the
involvement of small-scale peasant farmers in any significant number is now
considered too costly and too risky. To address this bias, the Conference of the Parties
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
introduced a special category of small-scale projects implemented by low-income
communities. Capitalizing on this new market “niche,” the World Bank recently
inaugurated a Community Development Carbon Fund to help small projects with the
transaction costs. Their motto is “Carbon with a Human Face.”

The story of how this strange idea came to be and what some of its implications
might be is the subject of this dissertation. In following the UN climate change
negotiations as they established the operative rules for accounting emission reduction
credits from carbon sequestration by trees -known as carbon sinks- and simultaneously
refer to carbon uptake by trees and vegetation. But now carbon sequestration and capture (and
more precisely carbon capture and storage) refer to geological storage of carbon, while carbon
sequestration by trees and vegetation is referred to as sinks.

3
studying the establishment of projects on the ground in Costa Rica, my goal has been
to understand the creation of a market made literally “out of thin air.” Creating this
market entailed not only producing the new commodity but also the demand, the
supply, and the rules and institutions to regulate its trade. Because this was a very
specific process, it was possible to closely follow the main actors and issues –from the
policy makers in the international arena to the decision takers of the projects on the
ground. Only by acquiring a sense of the structures of opportunity and constraint under
which people in the international negotiations operate, generate knowledge and make
decisions, is it possible to understand the many contradictions and absurdities that
plague projects once they hit the ground, where in turn other structures of opportunity
and constraint dominate.
The main question I seek to answer is: what is it that produced this idea and
what is it that this idea serves to produce?3

A case of involution
I originally conceived the research as an opportunity to better understand
capitalism and how it produces nature. Being present at the very creation of a
completely new commodity and a new market was a unique occasion to see the precise
ways in which markets produce inequality. As the research progressed, it became
increasingly clear that the market for emission reductions from carbon sinks was a
variety of involution, as understood by Goldenweiser (1936), presented by Yengoyan

3

See Harvey 1974: 268.
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(2001), and used by Geertz (1963) for explaining the sawah system of agriculture in
nineteenth-century Indonesia,4 and particularly by Katz (1998) in the specific case of
capital and the production of nature. Following their lead, I take involution to refer to
instances in which a pattern becomes dominant and internally more and more complex,
but instead of unfolding and evolving into something different, it in-folds and becomes
increasingly pervasive and convoluted. Although the process leads to continuous
elaboration, the escalating complexity is not transformative but instead inhibits the
development of new structures.5
Although Goldenweiser was writing in 1936 about patterns in the development
of “primitive cultures,” the process he described reflects what I saw emerging out of
this new market for carbon sinks, in terms of how capitalism transforms our relation to
nature and to the land. Using as an example the decorative art of the Maori,
Goldenweiser explained how even though the entire object is “pervaded” by the
decoration, upon closer analysis the unit elements of the design are few. The
complexity of the design is the result of a “multiplicity of spatial arrangements of one
and the same unit. The pattern precludes the use of another unit or of other units, but it
is not inimical to play with the unit or units. The inevitable result is progressive

4

The sawah system of agriculture refers to wet rice terrace cultivation.

See also Yengoyan, who explains it as follows: “a pattern becomes dominant and internally
more and more complex, but […] this complexity cannot be transformed into a different or
new structure. The structural parameters of the pattern become dominant and continually
yield elaborations, but each of these changes is internal to the crystallized pattern […] which
becomes virtually a straightjacket for future developments. […] Within this crystallization the
cosmic order is never transformed; it only becomes more internally complex and also more
persuasive in its domination (Yengoyan 2001: xi; italics mine).
5

5
complication, variety within uniformity, virtuosity within monotony. This is
involution” (Goldenweiser 1936: 103).6
As the making of the market for carbon sinks progressed, what I saw was
precisely on the one hand enormous complexity and, on the other, a very familiar
pattern being repeated. Although of course it was a new form -and in that, an incredibly
ingenious one-in a very basic sense it seemed at every turn, in spite of the
elaborateness, I was discovering nothing new: as capitalism reworked nature as an
accumulation strategy (Katz 1998: 46), the same reproduction of inequality occurred as
had resulted from the production and trade of so many other commodities.7 And this
was done, as before, by means of the state, this time under the international United
Nations community of states.8
I see involution in two senses. In the sense pointed out by Katz, it is akin to
capital’s requirement of something “outside of itself” –in this case, pre-existing
(Harvey 2003: 141)- to ensure continuous accumulation, expanded reproduction and

6

Goldenweiser used it to understand ideologies of violence as well as late Gothic art and
Bach’s fugues.
7

Granted, this would not surprise any Marxist, and I did expect to see it happen to some
degree. But I wanted to see it in concrete detail and I was amazed by the extent to which the
case replicated the theories.
8

A lot could be said about the relationship between state and capital in this instance; how the
state acted on behalf of capital yet against it, and in competition with capitals from other
states, while also juggling other interests (environmental concerns and public opinion). An
important point in this regard is that capital was also divided (the same way that states
differed in their standing for capital interests) and that the evolution of these various
relationships critically marked the process. There was a great difference for example between
the position of BP or Shell, and Exxon Mobil Oil, the same way there was in that of the
Clinton administration (which in many ways is the mind behind it all), and the Bush
administration -to do in turn with their relation with different kinds of capital and businesses.

6
9

stability. Only that the outside is very much collapsed inside. But in reading
Goldenweiser’s description and attending to the details of the new market, involution
applied also to the entanglement that resulted from commoditizing something like
carbon sequestration from trees and vegetation, a process which happens naturally
everywhere, anyway. This ensnarement affects humans’ relation to nature in a more
cultural sense; it is a concrete example of the production of nature both as a physical
reality and in the realm of ideas.
I explain: because I am interested in how uneven development is constantly
reproduced, this research focuses mostly on carbon sink projects undertaken in
developing countries in exchange for emission reduction credits advanced to developed
countries under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).10 Yet it
also includes a brief look at the accounting of carbon sinks that industrialized countries
must carry out as part of their national annual inventory of greenhouse gas emissions.
The instructions and methodological directives for doing this accounting cover more
than five hundred pages.11 It implies accounting for emissions and removals of
greenhouse gases that result from land use, land use change and forestry activities

9

In contrast to Rosa Luxemburg’s argument on the need for capital’s stability to have some
field “outside of” itself that it can feed upon, the case of carbon sinks points to fields for
accumulation inside of itself, assured by previous historical uneven development and the
availability of labor surpluses (in this case, subsistence peasants -underutilized “latent
reserves” marginal to the system). This is something closer to what Harvey calls
“cannibalistic” forms of accumulation by dispossession as opposed to external.
10

To understand processes of uneven development it is not necessary to compare developed
and developing countries (it would suffice to stay in a rich country in the North in any one
city). But I was interested in global inequalities at the national or regional scale, or between
developed and developing countries, produced by a world market.
11

IPCC. 2003. Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
(LULUCF). See Chapter 4.
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(LULUCF), including afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, and also under
certain limits possibly forest management, cropland management, grazing land
management, and re-vegetation.12 It involves, for example, calculating at a national
level the carbon emissions from the conversion of forest land and grassland to wetland,
settlements or other land, together with the methane emissions that have resulted from
burping and farting cattle and sheep. The level of complexity that this implies will
hopefully become clear in the following chapters, as I revisit the history of the
negotiations and the details that had to be sorted out. I also hope to make clear how this
“scientific virtuosity” and “technical hairsplitting”13 obscures the fundamental concern
of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions that lead to climate change (the bulk of
which are the result of fossil fuel use), and how it serves to create a very small number
of experts, amounting to a handful for the whole world, and a highly specialized field.
Yet the Byzantine complication results from the development of a simple idea
or pattern within capitalism: to abstract, single out, privatize, assign value, account and
trade anything you can think of. It illustrates Goldenweiser’s comment that,
If the pattern were less narrow, or if there were no pattern, the change might
have been an unfoldment. Within the narrow possibilities determined by the

12

As defined under the UNFCCC, afforestation is “the direct human-induced conversion of
land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested land through
plating, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources.” Reforestation
is “the human-induced conversion of non–forested land to forested land through planting,
seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land that was
forested but that has been converted to non-forested land. For the first commitment period,
reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation occurring on those lands that did not
contain forest on 31 December 1989” (Decision 11/CP.7). Reporting on emissions and
removals from the last four activities is an option for countries where they imply a significant
percentage of the greenhouse gas inventory (Protocol Article 3.4) (see Chapter 4).
13

Goldenweiser 1936: 103.
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pattern, the change can only be an elaboration, leading, as an ultimate limit, to
seemingly insane complexity (Goldenweiser 1936: 103).
It is precisely this seemingly insane complexity that the chief UK negotiator on
this issue referred to in recent negotiations, when he likened himself and his colleagues
to “medieval philosophers discussing angels dancing on the head of a pin.”14 And
although I want to avoid taking this idea of involution too strictly, since it is too
naturalistic and appears to preclude change (the last I thing I would rule out), it seems
to me that it does reflect this instance of the production of nature under capitalism,
exemplified by the case of a market for carbon sinks. It certainly is not a case of
evolution.

Carbon sequestration appeared as a simple idea in principle. Trees and
vegetation absorb carbon from the atmosphere through the process of photosynthesis.
This carbon can be measured, albeit not always with great accuracy. With
deforestation, the carbon is released back into the atmosphere, contributing to the
greenhouse effect -as well as to loss of water retention by the soil and other processes
often leading to environmental degradation. Because the problem of climate change
was early on conceived “from the point of view of the atmosphere” (see next section, on
ecological modernization), it did not matter where in the world a reduction in emissions
took place. Thus trees and vegetative growth in one place could offset carbon emitted
anywhere else. It also happens that areas primarily suitable for forests15 in developing

14

15

Personal notes, Bonn, May 2004, SB 20.

This refers to land most aptly and naturally suited to forest and where any other land use
would require substantial amounts of inputs and transformation.
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countries tend to be populated by the poorest peasant farmers, because they are
isolated and often located on steep hill sides and are difficult to work, and because the
soil cannot productively sustain intensive agriculture without a great amount of
agricultural inputs; attempts to extract something out of this land usually lead to
increased land degradation and poverty. So even though it was always recognized that
carbon sequestration was just a temporary solution of limited effect,16 investing in
carbon sinks appeared as a simple and inexpensive solution that addressed both the
increase in greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation -two major environmental
problems- at the same time.
Yet once the idea of accounting for carbon sinks in the context of a market was
accepted, an interminable list of problems appeared. Already creating a market for
emission permits implies serious questions of equity and moral dilemmas. It requires
assigning property rights so something can be bought and sold. This in practice means
assigning rights to pollute.17 How does one distribute rights to change the earth’s
climate for generations to come? Because climate change is the result of cumulative
greenhouse gas emissions for which industrialized nations are historically responsible,
it wasn’t possible to start from scratch. Per capita emission rights sounds like a fair and
reasonable idea in principle, and was propounded most vocally by NGOs from India

16

Even large areas of forests have relatively small effects in relation to the amount of daily
carbon emissions. In 1994 the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
calculated that an area of forest larger than France would need to be planted every year to
compensate for the existing rate of fossil fuel emissions (UNCTAD 1995: 12).
17

Although the Marrakesh Accords negotiated in 2001 state that the “Kyoto Protocol has not
created or bestowed any right, title or entitlement to emissions of any kind on Parties included
in Annex I” (countries with quantitative commitments under the Convention and the Protocol;
see Chapter 2), this provision has more to do with a legal concern to avoid claims in the case
of possible infringement if Kyoto units are regarded as property rights (see Yamin 1999).
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and some other developing countries. But that would place limits on developing
necessary infrastructure in areas with low-population density, such as small-island
states and countries with high emigration rates.
These difficulties are compounded in the specific case of assigning rights to
carbon sinks. Most basically, who owns the carbon that trees necessarily absorb in the
process of photosynthesis? The answer varies even where land tenure and property
rights are clear. Costa Rica has set up a system in which the carbon sequestered by trees
is the property of the private owner of the land where the trees stand. Meanwhile
carbon sink projects in Bolivia established on public land regard carbon sequestration
as a public good (like clean air or a healthy environment) and therefore proceeds from
its sale go to the state, regardless of who the forest managers are.
Moreover, since trees and vegetation absorb carbon dioxide as they grow and
release it back into the atmosphere as they decay and die, how does one account for the
non-permanent reductions of carbon? What if after twenty or thirty or sixty years (the
time allowed for projects), once the credits have been sold and used, the plantation
catches fire or succumbs to a disease, releasing the stored carbon back into the
atmosphere? Who is liable for this re-emission of carbon? Because agricultural and
silvicultural economic activities do not take place in a vacuum, establishing a
plantation in one area may lead to deforestation in another, resulting in an increase in
carbon emissions. How can one assure this does not happen, and if it does, how does
one account for the possibility and deduct from the credits? Since this is part of a
United Nations international environmental and sustainable development agreement
which, it is mandated, should be public and transparent, the market has to be credible

11
and legitimate. Real offsets in emissions have to be proven to have taken place,
because for every credit bought in a developing country, an equivalent amount of
greenhouse gas will be emitted into the atmosphere in an industrialized one.
In order to sort out these problems of accounting and assure the credibility of
the market, delegates at the UN came up with an incredibly complex set of rules for
sink projects. To enter the market, project developers must submit an application which
includes a carbon accounting methodology, for which they must pay upfront. Given the
complexity of the rules, the transaction costs are so high that only the largest projects
that already have the surplus money to invest, or those that manage to have the
transaction costs covered by an NGO interested in the project for reasons other than the
sale of emission reduction credits, will be able to participate. Moreover, since the
definitions and rules were politically negotiated, and were intended to apply to the
whole world, they hardly fit the diverse reality on the ground. A recent analysis by
ENCOFOR18 of the global implications of the definitions that apply to projects showed
that much of the land area eligible for the projects in developing countries is
agricultural, has a high density population, is 80 percent below 1000 meters, is for the
most part agriculturally productive, and 75 percent of it is in Asia (Zomer et al. 2005).
So while you would have thought that the idea was to use the sale of emission credits to
reforest poor areas of primarily forest aptitude where land degradation is a serious

18

ENCOFOR stands for “Environment and Community based Framework for designing
Afforestation, Reforestation, and Devegetation Projects in the CDM: Methodology
Development Case Studies.” It is a project funded by Europe-Aid “for the design of
sustainable CDM forestry projects” and coordinated by the Face Foundation and the K.U.
Leuven Laboratory for Forest, Nature and Landscape Research. See
http://csi.cgiar.org/encofor/forest/
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problem and economic opportunities scarce, the areas that apply are those that are
already agriculturally productive and, most likely, comparatively rich.
Moreover, because the rules are so complicated and require highly specialized
technical knowledge and material, only a few entities have been accredited to review
them –almost all of which are based and staffed, predictably, in the richer industrialized
countries (see Chapter 5). As a simple commodity chain will show, the greatest profit is
likely to be made by these few accredited overseeing agencies who verify and validate
the product.
What this hints at is that, in a market of fictitious capital such as the one for
emission reduction credits from sinks, perhaps the most valuable commodity is the
production of credibility. As Harvey says, fictitious capital is "no mere figment of the
imagination. To the extent that it brings about profitable transformations of the
productive apparatus, running through the whole cycle of money being transformed
into commodities and back into the original money plus profits, it ceases to be fictitious
and becomes realized. But to do so it always depends on a basis in expectations, which
must be socially constructed" (Harvey 2001: 23). Like other forms of fictitious capital,
for example the credit based on paper assets and promissory notes created by the state
(see Harvey 2003: 113; see also Harvey 1999 [1982]), the Certified Emission
Reduction (CER) units created under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto
Protocol are based on the faith that someone will pay. In this case it will not be the
government, but someone looking to offset their emissions to comply with state
regulations. The social construction of these expectations is what Chapters 2 to 5 of this
dissertation, focused on the international negotiations, are about. How those who
uphold the social expectations that uphold the market (that is, the validating and
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certifying entities that give credibility to the trade) retain the most valuable asset, is
the subject of Chapters 6 and 7, focused on market access and distribution.19

It should be noted that the complexity and difficulty that characterize the
market for emission reductions from sinks satisfies neither most state Parties to the
Protocol, nor capital investors, nor NGOs and other observers to the climate change
negotiations -all for different reasons. Repeated calls have been made to rectify it and
make the market for sinks more accessible. With just a few methodologies and only
one project approved so far, it is often pointed out that the complex rules and high
transaction costs are not in the interest of either buyers or sellers, and they do not
make the Protocol look good after so much controversy and work went into it.20 Most
people expect that, over time, Parties to the Protocol will make adjustments and
correct this market “weakness.” Already a lot of money has been allocated by
industrialized countries for “capacity building” in developing countries so they can
host more projects,21 and several initiatives have been launched to promote sink
projects whose stated aim is to contribute to sustainable development at the
19

A fundamental advantage of fictitious capital is that it breaks free from the limits placed by the
spatial range of a good (Harvey 2002) –both in terms of commodity transport and labor power.
Instead, it comes to depend upon credibility, which needs to be socially produced. The social
process of the production of credibility that allows the circulation and profit-extraction of
fictitious capital takes place in the realm of the “web of life” (Lefebvre’s “everyday life”) and
proceeds dialectically with the system of capital accumulation.
20

The only A/R project approved to date, involving reforestation for Guangxi watershed
management in the Pearl River Basin, China was registered on November 10, 2006 (see
Chapter 6).
21

See, for example: “CD4CDM” by UNEP/RISOE, financed by the Netherlands; the BASIC
Project, for capacity building, in Brazil, China and South Africa, funded by the EU (see
http://www.basic-project.net/); or Finland, establishing projects and funding it all themselves
just to “create capacity” and allow “learning by doing” (KK, personal communication).
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community level. Only in this way can there be a competitive market –that is, one
that is credible yet with prices that are low.
This in turn points to another key problem. Perhaps the most important
expression of a market is the creation of conditions of scarcity that ensure that the
goods have value. Although vital, this has proved especially complicated in the case
of something like carbon sequestration carried on by trees and vegetation, which, as
noted earlier, happens anyway, everywhere. As will be explained in Chapter 5, a
number of measures were introduced in the rules and definitions to ensure that sink
credits would not “flood the credits market” (from a cap on CDM sink credits that can
be used for compliance with countries’ emission reduction commitments, to the
restriction to afforestation and reforestation project activities). But scarcity was also
assured by making the rules complex, the modalities difficult to apply to projects, and
the transaction costs high (see Chapters 5 and 6 and the Conclusion).

The problem of complex rules that ensure credibility but incur high transaction
costs and exclude those who need it most does not apply only to sink projects. Energy
22

See, among others: ENCOFOR (footnote 14); Plan Vivo, under the Edinburgh Center for
Carbon Management (ECCM); The Forest Carbon Alliance, coordinated by Forest Trends
and The Katoomba Group; the World Bank’s Bio Carbon Fund; and the FORMA Project
(CATIE). See also “Carbon as a Non-Timber Forest Product,” by the Lead Institute,
University of Twente, Enschede, the Netherlands, funded by “the Netherlands Directorate of
Development Cooperation under a programme for capacity building for climate change.” The
question of capacity building is key for its role in sustainable development and to develop the
market, and was identified as such under the UNFCCC, leading to numerous decisions and
initiatives. Some of these, such as the European Capacity Building Initiative at Oxford,
specialize in building negotiating capacity among developing country delegates. Among the
more interesting undertakings are two publications: “The Diploclimatic Passport,” or
“ClimPass: Climate Change Negotiations Passport for LDCs and SIDS,” written and
produced by Fry (2003) and “On Behalf of My Delegation: A Survival Guide for Developing
Country Delegates to the UNFCCC” by Gupta (1999). See section On the UN and The
Elusive Fairness in Chapter 8. See also references to capacity building among the AOSIS
group of countries, in Chapter 2.
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projects under the Protocol’s CDM (see Chapter 3) are also highly biased against
anything that smells of social benefits. CERUPT for example, the credit-buying arm of
the government of the Netherlands, rejected an energy project that involved a 10,000farmer cooperative in India for an equal and in many ways less efficient project that
involved a single private company.23 Any consideration of real sustainable development
as an “additionality” (the requirement that projects be additional to what would have
happened in a “business as usual scenario”) is overridden by investors’ fear of risk.24
These are of course the rules of the market. But when it is observed that there might be
a contradiction with the goal of sustainable development inscribed in the UNFCCC and
the Protocol, this concept simply gets re-defined in terms of the host country’s macroeconomy –which has little to do with the needs of local people.
Thus the inbuilt inequality in the creation of a market that Marx, Polanyi, and
countless others have described can be seen slowly but clearly emerging as carbon
sequestration went from the novel (if also controversial) concept of a payment by
industries for the environmental service that peasant farmers in developing countries
provide in maintaining forests, to the present state where carbon accounting and a safe
investment take precedence over every other social or environmental consideration. In
the process, a new enclosure in the environment was conceived, so that a new
commodity could be sold at a profit. Capitalism here again recalls Goldenweiser’s
description of late Gothic art, whereby
“Expansive creativeness having dried up at the source, a special kind of
virtuosity takes its place, a sort of technical hairsplitting. No longer capable of
23

Personal communication with CS 2004; see also Sutter 2003.

24

See Chapter 6.
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genuine procreation, art here, like a seedless orange, breeds within itself,
crowding its inner structure with the pale specters of unborn generations.”
(Goldenweiser 1936: 103).

On time and uneven development
The new market in emission reductions can only be conceived in the context of
uneven development. Its logic and justification make sense solely in a situation of
geographical and politico-economic difference, and the Kyoto Protocol’s ‘flexible
mechanisms’ are designed precisely to take advantage of this difference.25 Costeffectiveness is mentioned as a principle already in the Convention itself: “(…) taking
into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be costeffective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost” (FCCC Article
3.3). The question is whether this market further deepens the differences. Proponents
of Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms argued that a market-based approach would contribute
to the goal of sustainable development inscribed in the Convention and the Protocol,
and facilitate technology transfer to developing countries. An important objective of
my research was to evaluate if, and under what conditions, this might be the case.
I therefore sought to identify the general logic and process by which uneven
development is created and recreated. I found that, besides the spatial dimension of
uneven development (which is generally well understood), in the case of the market for
emission reduction credits from carbon sinks it was the temporal dimension that stood
out. This first became clear in Costa Rica, where one of the main complaints by peasant
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See Chapter 3.

17
farmers had to do with time. Because trees take years to grow, land gets locked-up
in waiting for the first thinning and the first cut. Even in the case of fast-growing species,
money can only be made after at least ten to fifteen years. For a small landowner who
depends -or hopes to depend- on income from the land to make ends meet, this period of
time seems eternal. Juan López, one of the beneficiaries of the Payment for
Environmental Services (PES) program established in Costa Rica, and thereby a producer
of carbon credits, confided to me that very often he had to keep himself from taking the
ax and chopping down “all those stupid trees.” He said he could have planted pineapple,
or palm, and have gained money already five times since he established the plantation.
Instead, all he got from that hectare and a half were the few hundred colones that the
Ministry of Environment paid as part of the PES once a year –which are not even enough
to cover the expense of the plantation. Although it is often the case that farmers are led to
plant something that in the end does not return the investment made –either because
everybody planted the same thing and there was overproduction, or because the price was
good when they planted but bad when they collected- they have to keep trying and hope
one day the return will be fair and worthwhile.
The point is that productive activities with long-term returns tend to be
concentrated in developing countries. Because labor and rent are cheap there, adding
days or months is not that much of a problem and compensates for the cost of waiting.
In contrast, activities with rapid or immediate returns are almost always the specialty of
rich countries. In the case of the market in emission reduction credits, the consulting,
monitoring and trade itself –activities designed to never take more than a couple of
months and that can be combined with other productive pursuits- are done by
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companies from Europe, the United States and Japan. So in addition to cornering
the market of high returns, they corner that of immediate returns, liberalizing time and
resources to find returns that are higher and more immediate still. In the meantime,
producers in Costa Rica are detained in an exclusive activity in which they can only
realize earnings a long time down the road. This is a temporally magnified version of
“the geographical fixity that arises in the midst of geographical mobility” (Harvey
2002) and thanks to which capital is released for its further circulation and
reproduction.

On Filières or commodity chains and access mapping
The analysis of filières, or commodity chains, was originally developed by the
French school of industrial economy to analyze the formation of prices of a
commodity in its process from raw material to finished product (see Ribot 1998).27
More recently, researchers at the French Agricultural Research Center for
International Development (Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche
Agronomique pour le Développement, CIRAD) and the National Institute for
Agricultural Research (Institute National de la Recherche Agronomique, INRA)
studying the political economy of food systems in the United Kingdom and North

26

It can of course be claimed that the time investment necessary to undertake such consulting
activities is high (including higher level studies and technical preparation). Still, I would say
that this kind of investment is for the most part subsidized. And although a good argument on
this would require more than what I’m allowing here, I think the idea holds for how uneven
development is reproduced, particularly in the case analyzed here.
27

Ribot points to the use of the word filière in French literature since 1829 to refer to “the
succession of states to go through, levels to achieve, formalities to complete, before arriving
at a result.” (Ribot 1998: 307).
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America have combined the filières method with the analysis of social relations and
institutions that structure economic life and markets and their historical change. This
analysis is characterized by the study of real markets (as opposed to the abstract
models of the market characteristic of economic theory) with an emphasis on
questions of power in the functioning of markets: its sources, its deployment and its
effects. In this manner, the filière approach illuminates the social and cultural
dynamics that shape markets, from the influence of kinship, compadrazgo, or religion
in the formation of interest groups, to cultural forms and meanings that contribute to
the trade and consumption of specific products. All this is done in a multi-sited
manner, geographically locating the sites that configure a market across borders
(ibid.).28
The concept of filière is very close to that of a global commodity chain
developed by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994) and used by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz
(1994) and others (Smith 2005, Gibbon 2001, others) as a network of labor and
production processes whose end result is a finished commodity. The main difference
between the two concepts has to do with their diverse origins and goals. While the
anglophone global commodity chain approach focused on industrial commodity
chains in the context of globalization and World-System Theory (Wallerstein 1974),
and was developed as a theoretical framework closely related to dependency theory,
the older francophone filière approach originated in technocratic agricultural research,
and developed more as a practical tool for “down-to earth” applied research (Raikes et
28

An excellent example of a commodity chain is given by Conroy, Murray and Rosset (1996)
for the production of melon in A Cautionary Tale: Failed U.S. Development Policy in Central
America. They show that the structure of the nontraditional agricultural export industry
promoted in Central America by USAID undermines small farmers, who are squeezed
between suppliers of inputs and buyers of their produce. See also Feder 1977.
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al. 2000). Besides, filière analysis has been influenced by an anthropological
tradition dating from the 1970s and by the French regulation school (a descendent of
French Marxist thinking). As a result, whereas work on global commodity chains has
tended to focus on distinctions between producer-driven versus buyer-driven
processes in the context of the world economy, filières analyses have more often paid
attention to history and power.30
An example is “Theorizing Access: Forest Profits along Senegal’s Charcoal
Commodity Chain” (1998), in which Jesse Ribot develops the idea of access mapping
which, together with the model of commodity chain or filière, exposes access to the
benefits of the production and commercialization of charcoal in Senegal. The focus on
access is most useful in the case of carbon sinks because it is precisely the lack of
access to the market for sinks that results in small landowners and poor people being
excluded from a potentially profitable activity. The consequences of such exclusion
could be severe for poor farmers and affect their secure tenure or productive options,
as the introduction of a new commodity stands to trigger competitive pressures for
land and resources. Moreover, the focus on access allows for a more dialectical
approach, where process is emphasized over structure. I therefore prefer thinking of
access mapping over global commodity chain analysis on the grounds that access (a
verb) emphasizes process and historical change, whereas the analysis of global
commodity chains (a noun) hints at something more static and could tend towards
reification.

29

This empirical approach is important because it allows to treat even property as an
empirical question (see Ribot 1998: 334-338), not to be taken for granted.
30

For a more detailed comparison between the two approaches, see Raikes et al. 2000.
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Moreover, the focus of filières analyses on real markets and on the
employment and distributive effects of power implies in turn a concept of regulation
not as a legal or administrative element, separate from the “natural” functioning of
markets, but as an inherent part of these. Regulation thus explains how markets are
structured both in their conditions of existence and in their internal functioning; it
means thinking of “better” or “worse” regulation instead of “more” or “less” (Ribot
1998). It is precisely this understanding of regulation that will be developed here.
Because the development of the market for emission reduction credits is still
at an early stage and sink projects are individually negotiated, it is not possible to
clearly define costs and earnings at the different nodes of the chain for all projects. It
is, however, possible to see where most of the profits relative to time invested will
likely be made. The resulting skewed distribution of profits is largely a result of the
high transaction costs that result from market regulation. This is hardly news. As
noted in Chapter 8, overregulation is one of the most insidious problems affecting the
relation between poor people and forests –limiting their access to forest markets and
leading ultimately to increased marginalization and increased deforestation (see
Kaimowitz 2003, and Scherr et al. 2005, among many others). Here once more, the
definitions adopted and the rules and procedures established for the market for sinks
will further contribute to the exclusion of most forest producers, except the well
capitalized and those who already have land and time to spare.

Still, there are two factors that are often overlooked or are insufficiently
incorporated in both commodity chain analyses and in mapping access approaches,
and which are salient in the case of the market for sinks: time and risk. First, because
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commodity chains and mapping access approaches each implicitly emphasizes
space (the idea being to geographically locate where accumulation takes place or
power is exercised, offering insight into the reproduction of uneven development,
with maps and chains as quintessential spatial metaphors), the time factor often goes
unaddressed. But, as noted earlier, in pursuing how access to the market for carbon
sinks is gained, one aspect that stands out as determinant is time –as in time invested
and turnover time. This is so in two senses, related to the two products that the market
analyzed here covers: trees and emission reduction credits. In the case of trees, as
noted earlier, one of the main problems is the time that trees need before they can be
logged and capitalized on. When established as unmixed plantations, they “sequester”
the land on which they are planted for a couple of decades at least, as practically no
other productive activity may take place on the same space. Small landowners hardly
have the luxury of leaving their land unproductive for such long periods. It is
normally medium-size and big companies with access to credit and large tracts of land
and time (allowed by additional or parallel sources of income) that can afford to
establish these types of plantations. In this sense, the time necessary to capitalize on a
monoculture plantation becomes a factor that by itself excludes small landowners and
poor peasant farmers from this kind of activity.
But analyzing access to the market for emission reduction credits also
highlights time as a discriminating factor in the sense that, as fictitious capital, it is
highly dependent on financial credit and the creation of credibility. Plotted as a filière
or commodity chain, it is not so much the income at each node of the chain that
counts (how much each participant in the development of a project gets paid or gets in
return), but the time that has to be allotted for each activity and the rate of return on
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that investment. There is a big difference between the time devoted by project
developers to the preparation and implementation of a project, and the time spent by
consulting agencies in validating or certifying the project vis-à-vis eventual proceeds.
Project developers need substantial amounts of up-front resources to cover the project
until the end (which is anywhere between 20 and 60 years), or until they can sell the
emission reduction credits. In contrast, established certifying agencies from developed
countries will cash in on their consulting services almost immediately, freeing time
and resources for further investment. For those organizations not already established
and those from developing countries applying now to become certifying agencies,
there is a need to invest considerable capital that they will not recover until quite far
down the line. It is therefore as much a matter of how much as it is of when. In cases
of fictitious capital like the one analyzed here, credit, and credibility, become key
resources. And both are tightly linked to time.
Risk is the other factor that is often overlooked in commodity chains analyses
and in mapping access approaches, but which clearly affects who has access to the
market for sinks and how profit is made. In the case of the CDM, risk is a central
feature of the mechanism and pervades all types of projects to a greater or lesser
degree. Projects may fail not only technically in their implementation, but at any of
the stages in the application and certification process. This risk of failure is again
more insidious in sink projects than in most energy projects, given their nature, the
complexity of the rules and the length of time that trees need to grow. When
analyzing the sinks market, risk emerges as a key discriminator, foremost because it
affects the price of credits. Since buyers exercise more power that sellers, the price of
emission reduction credits for projects where the brunt of risk is mainly borne by the
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buyer is lower than those where the risk is borne by the seller. That is, a seller has
to assume the risk of failure to sell credits at a good price, with the price of credits
increasing in tandem with the level of risk that the seller is able to assume. Clearly,
risk is a critical factor determining who may access the market since most poor
peasant farmers cannot afford to take the level of risk required. They lack the back-up
infrastructure or reserve resources to draw on in case of failure.31 Focusing on how
the burden of risk is shared is essential to understand markets and power, and
determining who bears the brunt of risk in any particular project illuminates how
inequality is reproduced.
This dissertation heeds Ribot’s call for extending the analysis of commodity
chains by spinning out their historical dimension, tracing out and explaining the
historic origins of these arrangements (Ribot 1998: 337). It was the unique
opportunity of being present in the creation of the new market for carbon sinks from
the start that triggered and hopefully justifies this account. Explaining how it was that
sinks were defined in the way they were and describing the negotiations behind the
modalities and procedures applicable to sinks CDM projects at a moment when all the
options appeared possible and before they closed (almost one by one), has been one of
my main goals.

On ecological modernization
“The Kyoto Mechanisms have created an architecture and framework for
market-based management of the global atmosphere.”
World Bank and IETA 2006: 1
31

A number of anthropological studies, for example Frank Cancian, show how poor peasant
farmers specialize on hedging risk and how much this consideration affects their decisions.
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What has allowed climate change to be approached the way it has is its
conception as a technical problem, a question of management subject to a technological
fix, independent of social institutions. Akin to Descartes’s “mind in a vat” as described
by Latour (1999), a most common image is that of humans undertaking a dangerous
experiment with the planet –as if we were not inside the test tube (Revkin 1992).
Already in 1957 Revelle and Suess wrote that “human beings are now carrying out a
large-scale geophysical experiment of a kind that could not have happened in the past
nor be reproduced in the future.” The idea was taken up and repeated many times. For
example, a report by NASA in 1986 stated that “we are conducting one giant
experiment on a global scale” (quoted in Ross 1991: 211), and Margaret Thatcher,
speaking to the Royal Society in London, warned that we may have “unwittingly begun
a massive experiment with the system of this planet itself.”32 In a more dramatic tone,
the statement from the 1988 Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere
declared that “humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive
experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war”
(see Chapter 2).
Helping to leave humans out of the picture is the use of computerized general
circulation models of the atmosphere (GCM), which serve today to understand and
predict climate change. These models are extremely sophisticated three-dimensional
representations of the atmosphere, and include all kinds of feedback mechanisms and
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See “Thatcher gives support to war on pollution” September 28, 1988. The Times, London.
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ocean-atmosphere interactions. But, unlike the tropical island of the seventeenth
century that served as a metaphor for human-induced climate changes in the early
colonial times (see Grove 1995), these models do not include human interaction
(Demeritt 2001). They make it easier to conceptualize a solution not at the level of
social institutions but of “resource management,” through “efficient” technologies.
This is a solution based on engineering and management with no involvement of local
populations.
The convenient distancing is also evident in the negotiations today, where one
of the most often repeated and persuasive arguments is “seeing the problem as the
atmosphere sees it.” It is this rationale that allows for equating all emissions from all
countries, whether they result from fulfilling basic human needs or from unnecessary
luxuries. It allows equating methane from rice cultivation in Vietnam with carbon
dioxide from sport utility vehicles with the lowest efficiency standards used in US
cities. At one point it also allowed for equating nuclear energy with renewables (since
they are both “clean” energy sources in terms of greenhouse gas emissions), although
after much discussion and negotiation, the Protocol calls for refraining from using
emission reductions from nuclear facilities under the “flexible mechanisms” (they are
not sustainable because disposing of nuclear waste is unresolved). It is likewise the
reasoning behind accounting for sinks and emissions from land use and forestry, as if
they were the same as cutting emissions at the source by phasing out fossil fuels.
Overall, it is the rationale for the market approach under the Kyoto Protocol. As Ross
says, the “budgetary way of looking at the world [..] is continuous with the scientific
perspective of quantitatively dominating the physical world” (Ross 1991: 208). This is
33

See Wetherald and Manabe 1975. See also Demerit 2001.
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clearly not simply another way of looking at things, but reflects the view from
above of a dominant minority accustomed to assessing and managing and of instituting
political projects to further regulate problems that might arise.
This management is tied to the processes of audit and accountability which have
become “a now taken-for-granted process of neo-liberal government and contributing
substantially to its ethos” (Strathern 2000: 3). As Strathern notes, in these processes the
social complexity of outcomes is less important than the strategies that may be
measured by performance indicators. In all, they constitute a specialized kind of
knowledge, that is, expert knowledge, that serves as a crucial aid for government and
commerce -what Weber [1948] observed as one of the objectives of modern
bureaucracy (ibid.: 284).
This approach is consistent with Hajer’s (1995) and Harvey’s (1996)
description of ecological modernization, the dominant policy-oriented discourse that
emerged in the 1980s and which Hajer defines generally as “the discourse that
recognizes the structural character of the environmental problematique but nonetheless
assumes that existing political, economic and social institutions can internalize the care
for the environment” (Hajer 1995: 25). In short, ecological modernization assumes
economic activity is systematically harmful to the environment, and that this harm is
irreversible (Harvey 1996: 377). This poses a situation of permanent ‘risk’ (see Beck
1992), threatening not only our well-being but the options of future generations. Yet
this does not spell doom. On the contrary, given human ingenuity, a proactive stance
and preventive regulation, it represents a major opportunity to increase economic
efficiency and assure a safe future for all. Economic growth and ecological problems
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are therefore intimately linked according to the utilitarian logic that “pollution
prevention pays.”34 Once nature, which is no longer perceived as a “free” good but a
“public” good, not a global commons but a resource, is properly managed,
environmental protection becomes a “positive-sum game,” a “win-win” solution. The
greatest challenge to such proper management is collective action, and if only every
individual, organization or country participated, life would be environmentally sound
(Hajer 1995: 26).35
The idea is encapsulated in the concept of sustainable development, famously
defined in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development’s
Bruntland Report “Our Common Future” as “development that meets the needs of
present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs.” All that can be clearly inferred about this formulation is the existence
of unknown but certain limits to development. The rest –the definition of development,
what needs are and how they might change over time, and so on- is left open to
interpretation. This lack of definition is precisely why the concept is so useful and
popular. It also disarms the opposition: as Harvey notes, nobody can possibly be in
favor of unsustainability (Harvey 1996). The discussion then centers on how to balance
the “three dimensions” of sustainable development: the economic, environmental and
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For just one among thousands of the examples, see UNEP’s press release headline for the
GEO Year Book 2006, An Overview of our Changing Environment: “Cutting air pollution
delivers ‘Big Bang for your Buck’” (found in www.unep.org).
35

As is well known, the US has used this line of reasoning to reject the Protocol on the
grounds that developing countries do not participate with reduction commitments and that
therefore the Protocol is unfair and self-defeating. Australia then claimed the same because
the US is not participating.
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social dimension. The response can vary conveniently in scale and composition
according to the argument for which it is used.
Sustainable development is central to the climate change discourse. It is
inscribed as one of the principles of the Convention and is defined as one of the twin
objectives of the Clean Development Mechanism. Its long-term outlook fits with the
long-term consequences of climate change; its all encompassing objective can contain
the many thorny ethical issues implicit in a global regime aimed at reducing unevenly
distributed greenhouse gas concentrations that result from very different processes.
Most importantly, it allows for the challenge to be non-threatening to existing social
institutions. On the contrary, it reinforces many of them –in particular the managing
role of the state and the power of capital.
Several eco-modernist techniques and ideas present in the climate change
discourse have contributed to this safe containment and enhancement. Here I address
four of them which touch on different aspects of the discourse and are, in my view, for
better or worse, particularly open to contestation and further elaboration in the future.36
These are the quantification of costs and benefits, a shift in the burden of proof in the
legislative discourse, the role of science in policy-making, and new participatory
practices. Although they all have been extensively analyzed elsewhere (see references
under each section), I want to briefly highlight some relevant aspects and specific
examples.

1. Calculation of costs and benefits
36

By this I mean spaces from which change can be expected given different interests involved
and the complexity of the issues they include.
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A key characteristic of ecological modernization is the introduction of
concepts that pretend to quantify environmental degradation, which are then combined
with monetary units to provide cost-benefit analyses (Hajer 1995: 26).37 This has
allowed for calculations that compare the cost of adapting to climate change to the cost
of reducing fossil fuel consumption and switching to renewable energies, leading some
to argue that to a certain extent it is more convenient to assume climate change (since
some of it is already inevitable) and to adapt to it, rather than to try to change the basic
energetic infrastructure. This argument is ethically highly problematic (to say the least),
since most of the damage is expected in the poorest countries and small island states
with scant resources, while mitigation should take place in the richer industrialized
ones.
But probably the most disturbing case of this kind of quantification took place
when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)38 Working Group III
attempted an economic valuation of climate change impacts –including human lifefor the Second Assessment Report. Based on the available literature on the “value of
statistical life,” the IPCC reflected the economists’ calculation that human life is
valued differently in developed and developing countries, since risk of death is not
valued equally between countries –mainly based on the “willingness to pay”
approach. When developing country delegates reacted with indignation at the
suggestion that human lives in their countries were somehow worth less than in rich
37

What is interesting is that, as Gupta notes, while it is frequent and legitimate to talk about
social costs of climate change, political costs are hardly ever addressed (Gupta 2001: 134).
38

The IPCC is the international scientific body whose role is to assess peer-reviewed and
published research on climate change in order to inform the policy-making process (see
Chapter 1).
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countries, the economists involved responded by saying that it is inconsistent to
propose that risk of death should be valued equally between countries when assessing
climate damages, when so valued when it comes to other issues (Grubb 2001: 20 and
303-308; see also Grubb 1995).39 The discrepancies were such that in the end,
although governments accepted the chapter, they changed the Summary for
Policymakers in such a way that it implicitly criticized the underlying chapter. In
angry response, the IPCC authors dissociated themselves from the Summary.

2. Statistical correlation and unlimited liability
Like the early industrial days when dirt and pollution signified wealth, the
Yorkshire saying of “Where there’s muck, there’s brass”40 might still hold –only that
now the money is to be made from litigation. This has to do with a change in the
legislative discourse whereby the burden of proof about environmental damage is
shifted from the wronged or prosecuting party to the individual polluter (Hajer 1995:
28). Three eco-modernist ideas played a central role in this change: the idea of the
environment as a public good that is not to be squandered, the precautionary principle,
and the win-win framework, the latter two leading to the expectation that firms are
supposed to prevent pollution since it pays to do so.41 In this situation, where the
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Grubb explains it as follows: “Economists sought to defend themselves by pointing out that
the observed value of statistical life does unquestionably differ enormously between
countries: it would indeed be absurd for India to try to put the same resources into modern
medical services as the United States, when its people suffer many more basic threats to life
and health” (Grubb 2001: 306).
40
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In Hajer 1995: 64.

On the precautionary principle, see Liverman 2007; Martin 1997; Hammitt 2000;
O'Riordan and Cameron 1994.
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responsibility to establish the proof of wrongdoing lies with the offending party,
statistical probability and correlation become the basis for collective and unlimited
liability (Hajer 1995: 28). And although climate change would probably make the
hardest case, much has been written about its legal possibilities.42 Based on the
international principle that countries undertake not to injure other nations by actions
in their own territories, this understanding enables talk, if not action, on the potential
of lawsuits under the international court, or the US Alien Tort Claims Act by small
island states suing the United States and Australia (which is the world’s highest per
capita emitter) for not having ratified Kyoto, or to car makers and oil firms and
industries in these countries. The small island state of Tuvalu, as well as Greenpeace,
have explored the possibility, and even though they know well that it could be very
expensive and that they stand to lose the case, it is contemplated as a pressure strategy
given predictable support of the public. Other examples abound. US NGOs, for
example, have filled suits against the United States for its failure, as a signatory to the
UN World Heritage Convention, to protect areas such as a the Waterton-Glacier
Peace Park, the Sagarmatha National Park in the Himalayas, the Belize Barrier Reef,
and the Huascaran National Park in Peru.43 In August 2005, a US federal court ruled
that two environmental groups and four US cities could sue US federal agencies
which finance overseas projects that contribute to global warming.44 The status of
42

See for example: “Climate change: Let the lawyers sue for you,” May 31 2006. New Straits
Times. See also Michael Christie, “Lawsuits may be next weapon in climate change fight.”
Reuters. March 6, 2002. There are many others.
43

See Richard Black, “US conservation groups have begun a new legal case aimed at forcing
government action on climate change.” BBC News. 18 Feb 2006.
44

The lawsuit was brought by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the cities of Boulder,
Colorado, Santa Monica, California, Oakland, California and Arcata, California, against two
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‘environmental refugees’ has also been a matter of discussion. In any case, with
entire small island nation states expected to disappear, it would be interesting to see
how much could be claimed for the loss of a whole nation, including its land, history
and culture.

3. Science as policy
Science acquires a new and powerful role with the expectation that it is to
inform policy. This expectation affects the way the questions are framed, and how the
problem is presented: certain matters are attended to at the expense of others; some
questions are identified as political and removed from inquiry, while others are
addressed as if they were merely technical and had no political implications.45 Because
science is not neutral and free floating but is very much located in a context of
competing domestic interests and institutions, its work and its influence tend to reflect
this context. These problems are intensified when the discussion moves to an
international level. Clearly the questions that are interesting to developed countries are
not the same as those interesting to developing countries, yet the latter depend on the
science done in the former for the articulation of legitimate solutions. The framing and
basic assumptions are also determined in this way; as Gupta notes, it could be argued
that the whole approach to the problem of climate change was permeated by
industrialized countries’ ideology of political realism: that the world is as it is and one

federal agencies: Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the
United States. Apparently, this was the first time that a federal court had specifically granted
legal standing for a lawsuit exclusively alleging injury from global warming (see “Court
allows suit linking US aid, global warming” August 25, 2005, Reuters News,).
45

See Fairhead and Leach 2003; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Wynne 1994; Miller and
Edwards 2001; and Kwa 1994, among many others.
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should focus on what is possible rather that on what should be achieved (Gupta
1997). This is one among many examples of the processes of exclusion through which
industrialized countries eliminate the perspectives and positions of developing
countries.
Besides, some aspects of science do not translate well into policy-making. The
most obvious case is how “uncertainties” in climate change science have been used
politically to question the assertion that fossil fuel burning has contributed to climate
change.46 But uncertainty is the engine of science; it is what keeps scientific inquiry
alive. It is also part of a scientific culture where almost nothing is stated without
qualifications, and observations and theories are only right until proven wrong.
In any case, the new role of science in coaching environmental policy has
greatly reinforced the independent status of science, and its credibility depends on how
neutral it is perceived to be. The public is sensitive about being influenced by special
interests. Conversely, given the influence of science, the government is sensitive to the
opinion of scientists and may attempt to control them (the United States under the
George W. Bush administration is full of examples of this.47) The concern with science
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For an account of the involvement of the Global Climate Coalition (a business coalition) on
the debate over detection and attribution in the 1996 IPCC SAR, see Edwards, P. and S.
Schneider. 1997. “The 1995 IPCC report: broad consensus or ‘scientific cleansing’” Ecofable/
Ecosci I: I pp. 3-9.
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Just one was the controversy at NASA, reported by Andrew Revkin in The New York
Times. (see “Climate experts says NASA tried to silence him.” January 29, 2006, and “NASA
Chief backs agency openness” February 4, 2006, as well as subsequent reports and letters to
the editor). What made the news noteworthy was the repeated attempts by government
appointed officials to control scientists’ statements. On the importance of scientific
independence, Dr. James Hansen said "Communicating with the public seems to be essential,
because public concern is probably the only thing capable of overcoming the special interests
that have obfuscated the topic." For a similar case, this time in Australia, see Jo Chandler,
“Greenhouse critic says views cost him his job.” February 13, 2006, Sydney Morning Herald.
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standing for special interests is well founded, and breaches in sovereignty are often
newsworthy, as business and industry may in effect form alternative ‘epistemic
communities’ by paying scientists and funding research organizations.48 These cases
have sparked the creation of a number of NGOs whose mission is to disclose scientists’
connections and links as a way to assure transparency in information. There is now
SinksWatch, CDMWatch and CarbonTradeWatch, in addition to ExxonSecrets and
others. Environmental groups also gain legitimacy from employing established
academics to prepare reports on specific issues.49
Science then both informs policy-making and shapes public opinion. And part
of this job includes establishing the levels of damage that can be endured. Thus the
UNFCCC establishes as its ultimate objective to achieve “stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (FCCC Article 2; italics mine).
The IPCC, or panels of scientists at the national level, then calculate what this level
48

See for example the case of a well-financed campaign in the US by the petroleum industry
to recruit scientists who were skeptical about global warming to help convert journalists,
politicians and the public to their views. In 1998, the draft plan by the industrial group
proposed spending millions of dollar in a campaign against the Kyoto Protocol. It called for
giving scientific dissenters “the logistical and moral support they have been lacking” and for
spending $5 million over two years to “maximize the impact of scientific views consistent
with ours on Congress, the media and other key audiences.” A proposed media-relations
budget of $600,000, not counting any money for advertising, would be directed at science
writers, editors, columnists and television network correspondents. Among the tasks was ‘to
identify, recruit and train a team of five independent scientists to participate in media
outreach.” The plan was drafted by a group of people working for big oil companies, trade
associations and conservative policy research organizations, meeting at the Washington office
of the American Petroleum Institute. The document listed representatives of the Exxon
Corporation, the Chevron Corporation and the Southern Comp as being involved. The plan
was given to The New York Times by Phil Clapp, president of the National Environmental
Trust, who said he obtained the papers from an industry official (John H. Cushman Jr.
“Industrial Group to Battle Climate Treaty.” New York Times, Front page. April 26, 1998).
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See, for example, WWF’s various commissions on biodiversity, extreme weather events,
and effects of climate change, or Greenpeace (2000) on coral bleaching in the Pacific.
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might be. Most recent scientific literature indicated that in order to stay at safe
levels there should not be an increase of more than two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels–a target that has been adopted by the European Union and others.
But then that, according to a recent report commissioned by the UK government,
might already be too high, with two degrees perhaps enough to trigger melting of the
Greenland ice sheet.50 As Myles Allen, a lecturer on atmospheric physics at Oxford
University quoted in the BBC news of the report said, assessing a "safe level" of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was "a bit like asking a doctor what's a safe number
of cigarettes to smoke per day" –a metaphor that speaks of surrendering important
decisions to the specialist, who can come up with a technical solution that does not
imply any radical change in habitual behavior but rather certain adjustments.

4. New participatory practices
In contrast to the antagonism that characterized the relationship between
environmental activists and the state in the early days of the environmental movement,
eco-modernism is characterized by close collaboration between government, business
and industry, and the major environmental organizations.51 Based on the idea that the
environment is a comprehensive problem, requiring the participation of all (“the
solution is each one of us”) new forms of participation have emerged. In the case of
50

The report, titled “Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change,” is based on evidence presented
by scientists at a conference hosted by the UK Meteorological Office one year earlier, which
had two principal objectives: to ask what level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is too
much, and what the options are for avoiding such a level. See Richard Black. “Stark warning
over climate change.” BBC News. Monday, 30 January 2006.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4660938.stm
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For analyses of the relationship between NGOs and climate change, see Carpenter 2001;
Gough and Shackley 2001; Paterson 1996; and Newell 2000.
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climate change, the collaboration is such that NGOs have been subsumed as part of
the climate change “epistemic community” –that is, the “a network of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992a: 3;
see also Gough and Shackley 2001; Paterson 1996).52 This situation has been partly
explained as having to do with the nature of climate change itself and the difficulty
faced by NGOs to engage the public (their ‘constituency’) in an issue whose
consequences are long-term and hard to define, and whose causes are global in origin
and difficult to isolate. The history of the Protocol and the US rejection of it might have
also played a role in this, as more radical calls for action by NGOs were gradually
replaced by support for “the only show in town” –however imperfect it seemed. The
fact is that the main NGOs abandoned ethical and overtly political questions on climate
change (even while they maintained them on other issues such as GMOs for example53)
and replaced them with support of scientific assessments, calls for precautionary action,
and joint ventures with business and government to demonstrate exemplary behavior.54
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According to Haas, in the case of negotiations leading to the Montreal Protocol for
example, the epistemic community played a crucial role in the timing and stringency of the
regulations banning chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). It did so by forming a consensus that
influenced individuals and groups, defining the limits of acceptable action and infiltrating
various decision-making channels. The epistemic community was especially successful by
influencing the two major actors -the United States and the Du Pont company- and in doing
so, they “changed the external environment in which policies were made by other
governments and firms” (Haas 1992a: 4). Here, epistemic community somewhat resembles
Kuhn’s sociological definition of paradigm -“an entire constellation of beliefs, values,
techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community” which governs “not a
subject matter but a group of practitioners.”
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Interestingly, this was much less the case in their positions at the national level; see Gough
and Schackley 2001.
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Although this change has been widespread, it has not been without debate and rift among
environmental NGOs. When the Global Commons Institute (GCI) objected to the IPCC
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Clear attempts at forming part of this epistemic community include the positioning
of NGOs as “facilitators,” commissioning reports and compiling work done at different
universities around the world.
Moreover, the complexity and technicalities of the Kyoto Protocol are such that
NGO representatives following the negotiations have turned into true experts. In this
guise they are often consulted and contribute to policy and scientific assessments,
separate from their political position as NGO representatives. As individuals, they
switch places easily, alternating between the pink batch of delegates and the yellow
ones of NGOs.55 As organizations, they work closely with governments and businesses,
undertaking consultancies and getting involved in projects as partners.56 They also
participate in academic and policy-informing exercises.57 Increasingly, NGO funds
come from governments and business.
Of course not all NGOs are equally invited to participate. In order to have
access to the negotiations and start the process of possibly becoming part of this
epistemic community, NGOs have to become “accredited observers” to the UNFCCC.
For this, they have to meet several requirements. Once there, NGOs are grouped as
Working Group III’s report on the ‘statistical valuation of life,’ the Climate Action Network
(CAN) criticized it for ‘upsetting the apple cart’ and possibly delaying publication of the
IPCC’s Second Assessment Report (Gough and Schackley 2001: 332).
55

Just to cite one among many examples, the Greenpeace person in charge of LULUCF issues
until Buenos Aires, in particular sinks under the CDM, was with the German delegation at
Montreal for COP 11/ COP-MOP 1.
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One example of this “subcontracting” was the organization by IUCN and FAO, in
collaboration with the UNFCCC Secretariat, of two workshops to discuss rules and modalities
of sinks under the CDM (see Chapter 5). On new partnerships, see how the Pew Center
helped Shell become green [add ref.]
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See Greenpeace with the Dutch National Institute of Public Health and the Environment
(RIVM) development of the “safe landing concept” (Gough and Shackley 2001).
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either ENGOs, RINGOs, or BINGOs -Environmental NGOs, Research NGOs, and
Business NGOs respectively.
The fact that there is a category of Environmental NGOs and not Development
NGOs is a result of the dominance of NGOs from developed countries. Although there
are signs of slow change, only two of the major NGO players, the Center for Science
and Environment (CSE) and the Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI), are from
developing countries (in this case, both from India); the rest are from developed
countries (amongst the most prominent ENGOs are IUCN, Greenpeace, WWF, and
Friends of the Earth). It reflects the definition of the problem as an environmental and
not as a development one –which would have been the case had developing countries
been more influential.58 Most of the NGOs from developing countries are considered
mainly research NGOs, and many of them specialize in specific areas –forestry being
the most popular. This has to do with the availability of external funding in developing
countries and different priorities among their publics. Among development NGOs the
most vocal are humanitarian agencies (such as Christian Aid); these have increasingly
gotten involved as attention has turned to adaptation to climate change, and now even
Red Cross International has a climate change program. In contrast, ENGOs focus on
impacts on biodiversity and natural ecosystems, tend to have a strong conservationist
slant, and are more prone to propose “limits to development.” Their influence has been
particularly felt in the negotiations on sinks in the CDM. There is no one group to
represent the interests of “stakeholders” on the ground.
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The CSE has portrayed climate change as “a ‘bandwagon’ of scientists, government
officials and industrialists, pursuing a wealthy countries’ agenda, yet attempting to get
everyone to foot the bill” (Gough and Shackely 2001: 336).
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Business and industry NGOs deserve special mention not only because they
have become an integral part of the process, but also because, since 1992, they have
managed to shape the way the environment and development are looked at, presenting
themselves as the solution rather than the problem (Chatterjee and Finger 1994). The
only mention of corporations in the final Agenda 21 text is regarding their promotion
of sustainable development; there is no mention of their role in the pollution of the
planet.59

The market becomes nature, nature becomes a market
Costa Rica’s Payment for Environmental Services is based on the idea that
owners of forests provide services to the world that are not recognized and for which
they receive no compensation. Because of this, the costs of maintenance of these
natural resources are borne by private landowners or the government, with uncertain
results. This is in fact presented by the government as a “market failure” –some sort of
technical detail that can be fixed in order to have the machine or the system working
properly. As the first government brochure on “Market Instruments to Mitigate Climate
Change and Conserve Biodiversity” states:
The market failure to compensate Costa Rica for the value of its conservation
and reforestation efforts and resulting benefits, such as carbon sequestration and
biodiversity conservation, has inspired novel policies. These can be viewed as
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The history of this involvement has been the subject of various analyses. Pulver (2004) for
example analyzes the split within the oil industry to explain the change in dynamics in the
Protocol.
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initial attempts to correct such market failures by harnessing the market to
compensate Costa Rica for the environmental services it offers the world.60

In the negative then, the market appears as a machine that sometimes
malfunctions and therefore needs adjustment. But in the positive, the market is a force
of nature that can be “harnessed” to “unleash” an inherent original energy that has
enormous potential. This is the general metaphor used in most discussions of the Kyoto
Protocol’s “flexible mechanisms” (again, the machine reference). Nobody stated this
more clearly than President Bill Clinton when giving a speech about emissions trading,
saying the plan would “create a wealth of opportunities for entrepreneurs at home,
uphold our leadership abroad, and harness the power of free markets to free our planet
from an unacceptable risk” (Passel 1997; italics mine).61
It is a perfect combination: in both cases the market is non-human, non-social.
But whereas in the negative it is something over which humans have technical control,
in the positive it is something over which we have no control, which is supra-human,
and endowed with an enormous creative potential.
Moreover, a role reversal takes place. Where nature becomes a simple
commodity, a matter of technical supervision and management, the market becomes
60
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MINAE & FUNDECOR 1998.

A lot more could be added on this, including on all the engineering and plumbing metaphors
that go with the technological approach. On the machine metaphor, the Earth has been routinely
likened to a spaceship and, more mundanely, to a car, as when a US Senator pointed that,
“when we have a car problem, we take the car to a repair shop or fix it ourselves using the
operator’s manual. For the global environment, however, there are no mechanics or manuals.”
So we must “obtain the knowledge we need to train the mechanics and write the manual before
this global machinery is irreversibly damaged” (quoted in Pielke 2005: 550). See also the
control panel metaphor –such that it is possible to stabilize atmospheric concentrations so
there’s no more than a two percent temperature increase (also in Pielke 2005: 550).
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nature. Note that the market has also become singular, paralleling the way Raymond
Williams (1983 [1976]) describes the transformation of the word nature. Williams
explains that the emergence of Nature in the abstract singular form is historically and
structurally related to the emergence of a God from the gods or a god, with the
acquired meaning of “the inherent force which directs either the world or human beings
or both” (ibid.: 219). It is a single prime force, a universal directing power. Like the
market. And like nature, the market is green.62

This role reversal is clear in the approach to climate change and is perhaps
what, more than anything, makes this case unique: the Kyoto Protocol is not about
‘regulating’ or controlling a global environmental problem. It is about regulating or
controlling the market. If one were to take a step back and recall that the problem is
about stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at a certain level to
avoid the unknown effects of a permanent change in the climate system, one would
expect the negotiations to address the source of emissions. One would then anticipate
talk of cutting subsidies for fossil fuels, or putting controls on aviation and maritime
transportation for example. Other environmental treaties have done something along
those lines: the Montreal Protocol for example phased out ozone-depleting substances
in developed countries, and legislation on acid rain directly regulates emissions of
sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and ammonia (NH3) (see Hajer 1995).63
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The same thing has happened with “the environment.” As Haila (2005) notes, the
environment as a totality, in singular, is a recent invention. Instead I, like Harvey and Haila,
take it that the relationships between societies and their surroundings -their environmentscannot be understood in general, but only in specific (Haila 2005: 24).
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Of course, these two environmental problems were easier to address and responded to
certain contingent conditions (see Chapter 2).
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Yet the text of the Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent decisions that make it
operational have rising emissions merely as a background. Instead, the lion's share of
the negotiations is taken up by attempts at controlling the market, setting the rules of
the game such as how much one can trade, what can be traded for what, what the
penalties are for not complying, how to send the right “market signals,” 64 and avoiding
“perverse incentives.”65 Not only is there nowhere text addressing subsidies for
reducing fossil fuels or emissions from aviation and maritime transport,66 but instead
there are several articles dealing with “impacts of response measures” –that is, the
negative economic impact in energy exporting countries (mainly OPEC’s eleven
members) of a reduced demand in fossil fuels.67 In contrast, as Farhana Yamin noted,
only two percent of all decisions by the UNFCCC in a ten-year period have focused
specifically on sustainable development.68
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This was a great preoccupation at COP 11 and first COP/MOP in Montreal in December
2005, where improvements to the CDM –including the possible restructuring of its Executive
Board- was one of the key issues on the agenda.
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On this last question of avoiding “perverse incentives” there are various cases. The most
interesting of these is perhaps the question of awarding credits under the CDM for the
destruction of HFC-23, which is a by-product of the production of HCFC-22, an ozone
depleting substance regulated under the Montreal Protocol. The problem is that the global
warming potential of HFC-23 is so high (more than 11,000 times that of carbon dioxide), and
the cost of destroying it so low, that it is possible to make business by artificially producing
HFC-23 to sell credits, in which case there is an incentive to continue producing HCFC-22
against Montreal Protocol regulations. This is a simplified account of the problem and there
are a number of details that further complicate the question. See Chapter 3 (see also
FCCC/SBSTA/2005/INF.8).
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These have been effectively blocked by the OPEC group of countries and others, and so the
agenda item keeps being pushed forward to the next meeting.
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See Article 4.8 and 4.10 of the Convention, and articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Protocol.

Personal notes from Chatham House conference, June/July 2006. Similarly, Pielke (2005)
draws attention to the fact that today the Kyoto Protocol is more discussed in terms of its
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Structure and chapters
How all of this came to be and some of its foreseeable implications are the
subject of the following chapters. Part I, on the creation of a market, consists of the
history of climate change as an issue, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Chapter 1
thus starts with a description of the greenhouse effect and human-induced climate
change: what it is, how it was discovered, and how it moved from a scientific question
to a political issue. This is followed in Chapter 2 by the history of the climate change
negotiations leading to the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and eventually to the Kyoto Protocol. Chapter 3 explains
the Kyoto Protocol’s “flexible mechanisms,” in particular the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), the only one of the three mechanisms that involves investment by
industrialized countries with reduction commitments (so-called Annex I Parties) in a
developing country (non-Annex I), in exchange for emission reduction credits.
In Part II, on the creation of a commodity, Chapter 4 details the history of the
negotiations on sinks and what is known as land use, land use change and forestry
(LULUCF). 69 Chapter 5 then relates the creation of the rules for the market under the
CDM and the issues that had to be sorted out to come up with a tradable commodity.

significance for international relations and diplomacy (especially between the United States
and Europe) than for its ability to address climate change (Pielke 2005: 551).
69

Under the Protocol, LULUCF activities are allowed to count towards meeting Annex I
Parties’ reduction commitments –that is, not only emissions from fossil fuels are counted, but
also changes in land use that result in carbon removals or emissions (from forest, cropland
and grassland management for example). These are different from carbon sinks projects
undertaken in developing countries under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
because different rules apply to each. See Chapter 4.
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Finally, Part III describes access to this new market on the ground. Chapter 6
first reviews the state of the market in general and, using the filière approach, explains
access to the market for carbon sinks given the rules and procedures established for
sinks projects. Chapter 7 then describes Costa Rica’s Payment for Environmental
Services (PES) program, under which small and medium landowners sell their right to
sequester carbon to the state, which then sells the carbon offsets as credit to foreign
companies with reduction commitments. The chapter shows how the PES in may ways
parallels the market for carbon sinks under the UNFCCC, in that small-scale
landowners and poor peasants are not only further excluded from the new market but,
potentially, are at risk of losing their land. The conclusion discusses the implications
of this study for understanding the production of nature under capitalism and the
reproduction of inequality.

Mapping access to the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) in Costa Rica:
Research Methods
In order to map access to the PES using the conceptual tools of filière or
commodity chain analysis, I undertook a study of land tenure in the Northeast of
Costa Rica, between the San Juan river and La Selva biological station. I chose this
area because it is where most of the PES have been granted. It is also one of Costa
Rica’s few remaining lowland tropical forests, and a relatively recent area of frontier
colonization by poor peasant farmers. As such it is also rapidly being cleared or
degraded by unsustainable logging practices. The area is also the site of a long-term
proposal for the creation of a biological corridor to assure the protection of the Great
Green Macaw and its rainforest environment. There is plenty of scientific data on the
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area, as well as some basic information on social composition and economic
activities.
The land tenure study included:
a) The mapping of all properties that have received the payment for
environmental services (PES) in that area since 1997 (in some cases 1995), as
well as others not in the program but that have requested logging
permissions.70 For each property, I recorded the name of the owner or
company, legal representative, telephone, address, occupation, total area of the
property, area under the PES program, the kind of payment,71 forestry
engineer in charge, date of entry into program and amount received to date.
More than one hundred properties were thus documented in order to see the
distribution of resources from the program. This made it possible to compare,
for example, landholders who live in the urban centers and who have
occupations in sectors other than the agrarian, with those living in the area and
who describe themselves as peasant farmers.
b) The maps also include areas belonging to the Institute for Agrarian
Development (IDA) as part of an older but ongoing land redistribution
program. These are occupied by small landholders (usually the poorest
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The maps were made using xeroxed copies of so-called “cartographic” maps (in Spanish,
“mapas cartográficos”) on translucent paper. The exact location of the property on these
cartographic maps is one of the requisites to apply for the PSE program, so I reviewed every
file in two regional offices of the Ministry of Environment (Conservation Areas) and copied
the property unto my translucent maps. Since the last agronomic census undertaken in Costa
Rica is from 1984, these files represented the most up-to-date and relatively accessible source
of information on land tenure (they also have the number of the property in the National
Register and the Plano catastrado.)
71

Whether payment for plantation, conservation or management of forests.
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farmers and peasants) who in most cases do not have legal title to the
property –which precludes their access to the PES program (for the first
fifteen years after the land is distributed it officially remains in IDA’s hands).
For each area or settlement I retrieved information on total acreage, number of
families, date of purchase, and the name of the former owner and of the estate.
Some of these areas originally had their own forest reserves, but many
forested hectares –if not most- have gradually disappeared.72
c) On the same maps, I incorporated the location of all reserves and protected
areas, biological stations, and ecologically-sensitive sites, as well as
administrative divisions. Because the maps include physical geographical
information (rivers, altitude, roads, and so on), they are informative even to
someone not familiar with the area. The same maps and scale are used for
studies of land-use and land-aptitude, allowing me to juxtapose further
information, compare cases and to share results with others in Costa Rica and
elsewhere.
d) The maps were then digitized at the Department of Geography of the
University of Costa Rica using MapInfo, with links to the associated data in
Excel tables.

To complement this, I conducted forty-one structured interviews with various
stakeholders in Costa Rica, from peasant farmers to directors of environmental and
agrarian government agencies and non-governmental organizations, as well as
72

I copied the IDA maps from the regional IDA office in Sarapiquí, and revised and
completed the information in the central office of the IDA in San José. I used the same system
to copy the IDA areas as the PES, so everything appears in the same corresponding map.
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innumerable other non-formal consultations. Many of the latter took place as I
participated in meetings of all sorts, from the Costa Rican National Peasant Forestry
Congress to the local asentamiento (IDA’s settlements) meeting on the improvement
of the water reservoir and sewer system.
Moreover, I spent several days in the archive of the National Assembly in San
José reviewing the eleven volumes about the most recent Forestry Law. This is a
fascinating source for understanding the context in which the law was created and
locating the main actors –as well as discovering who was left out. The volumes are a
transcription of all the discussions and speeches from August 1990 to 1996, when the
law was passed.
While in Costa Rica, I also participated in a week-long international course on
“Climate Change Projects in the Forestry and Energy Sector: Development
Opportunities for Latin American Countries,” organized by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) and the Center for Tropical Agronomic Research and
Training (CATIE). The course was conceived for representatives of government and
organizations in charge of climate change programs and included the design of actual
projects. It was an ideal opportunity to discuss the issues with representatives from
local climate change government offices from most of Latin America, including
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Cuba, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and
Uruguay. Some of them then went as part of their country’s delegation to the UN
climate change meetings, thanks to which we have kept in touch.
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This refers only to the interviews done in Costa Rica between 2000 and 2001. It does not
include the interviews, both formal and informal, done at UN climate change meetings and
others done elsewhere.
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Fieldwork at the UNFCCC
I have attended all meetings of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) and
the Kyoto Protocol’s Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties
(COP/MOP) since 2000 except for two (COP 8 in New Delhi and COP 10 in Buenos
Aires), as well as most UNFCCC Subsidiary Body meetings, IPCC meetings, and
many UNFCCC workshops.74 I have also attended a number of forestry meetings,
covering the fourth session of the UN Forum on Forest (UNFF 4) and a preparatory
workshop on decentralization in forestry in Interlaken, Switzerland.
I was there as part of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) team, for which I
have been a writer and editor since 2003. ENB is the main product of the International
Institute for Sustainable Development-Reporting Services (IISD-RS), and consists
usually of a one-page, two-sided publication that is distributed each morning to
participants at UN negotiations with a full but concise report of the negotiations.
Besides the hard copy, ENB is also available for free in electronic format (at the IISD
Reporting Services’ website “Linkages”75) and distributed by email to a large
international audience. IISD-RS has an established reputation for providing an
independent and objective report of the UN negotiations on environment and
sustainable development, and is widely considered an essential source of information
for government officials, UN staff, policymakers, NGOs, IGOs, business, industry
and academia interested in the outcome of negotiations. Its mission is to ensure
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Among others, on emission scenarios, on the five-year programme of work on adaptation
under the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), and
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Linkages Update, with information on international environmental and development
negotiations and issues, reaches an estimated audience of 45,000 people. See
http://www.iisd.ca
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transparency and wide-access to the negotiations on environment and sustainable
development under the UN. Besides a small permanent and part-time staff, it relies on
sixty consultants from thirty-two countries, most of whom are Ph.D.s, Ph.D.
candidates or lawyers specializing in multilateral environmental agreements and
international environment and development relations. It maintains offices in Geneva,
Switzerland, and near the UN headquarters in New York. It is funded by donor
countries and intergovernmental organizations and specialized agencies of the UN.
Because ENB is not an NGO, ENB writers are given the same badge as members of
the UN Secretariat, which allows them right of entry to all open (and sometimes not
so open) consultations.76 I have therefore had an extremely privileged access to the
climate change negotiations, and was able to observe the negotiations first-hand and
record countries’ positions -in particular those on carbon sinks and all matters related
to LULUCF, as well as adaptation. I have also come to know many of the delegates,
UNFCCC Secretariat staff, and others involved in the process. Much of the
information included in this dissertation comes from this direct observation and from
a number of formal and many informal interviews with participants.
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Chapter 1
Understanding Climate Change

A couple of years ago, a farmer riding his tractor in Soria, Spain, found a
35.27-pound bloc of ice that had fallen from the sky on a clear day.77 Another ice
meteor was found in Brazil, this one weighing 440 pounds. These “megacryometeors”
are formed as one level of the atmosphere gets colder and the other gets hotter.
Although they have been known to rip holes through houses and smash car
windshields, only a fifth of them are ever found. They are one of the not-so subtle or
gradual effects of climate change.
Another not-so subtle effect was described in The New York Times on July 20,
2001, under the heading “Tuvalu: Country Ready to Pack Up.” The island was hoping
to resettle its entire population of 11,000 people as rising sea levels threatened to
engulf their homes –something they expect to happen in just 50 years. The
government had asked New Zealand and Australia to provide them with shelter. New
Zealand had apparently accepted, but there were no guarantees from Australia.78

You’re getting warmer….
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“Scientist Says Ice Meteors a Sign of Climate Change” October 1, 2002. Reuters News,
Emma Ross-Thomas.
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“Tuvalu: Country Ready to Pack Up” July 20, 2001. The New York Times, World Business
Briefing, page W1.
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Since the late nineteenth century the average surface temperature of the
earth has increased by 0.6ºC ± 0.2ºC.79 The 1990s was the warmest decade since
records began being kept in 1861, and of all the nine warmest years occurred in that
decade. With the exception of 1997-1998, when El Niño produced exceptionally high
temperatures, each year has broken the previous year’s record.80 Overall, the increase
in surface temperatures in the twentieth century is thought to be greater than for any
other century in the last ten thousand years.
At the same time, according to the Third Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), precipitation has increased 5 to
10 percent over the century in most land areas and become heavier in the mid and
high latitudes, while the frequency and intensity of drought in parts of Africa and Asia
has also increased; El Niño events have become more frequent, persistent and intense
compared to the last 100 years, further contributing to increased coral reef bleaching.
Moreover, ocean temperatures and sea levels have risen at an average rate of 1 to
2mm. during the twentieth century. There has been a worldwide retreat of mountain
glaciers, snow cover has decreased by 10 percent, and the Arctic sea-ice has thinned
by 40 percent and decreased its extent by 10 to 15 percent since the late 1950s. Also
in the last 40 years the growing season has lengthened by one to four days per decade
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The figures and data in this section come from the 2001 IPCC’s Third Assessment Report
(TAR). Preliminary reports from the Fourth Assessment Report (4AR), to be released in
November 2007, make the link between observed climate changes and anthropogenic
emissions significantly stronger and clearer. See http://www.ipcc.ch/index.html
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The high temperatures recorded in 2002 and most likely throughout 2003 have to do with
the onset of El Niño –just like the record-high temperatures in 1997 and 1998. This is because
oceans absorb (or sequester) more carbon when cool. As equatorial Pacific sea-surface
warms, causing the onset of El Niño, oceans absorb less carbon, leading to a rise in both
global temperatures and CO2 concentrations.
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in the northern latitudes, plant and animal ranges have shifted upward (both
towards the poles and up in elevation), and there is earlier breeding, flowering and
migration.
It is the combination of these factors, the collective picture, that makes
scientists confident that what they are observing is the result of a global warming.

This chapter sets out to provide the background for understanding the problem
of climate change, and how it went from a scientific issue to a political one. After a
brief history of the findings that led to the discovery of global warming, the chapter
explains how the greenhouse effect works. This is followed by an account of how
emissions have risen and where, including some basic data on projections for future
emissions in different countries. The chapter then ends with a description of the IPCC,
the internationally recognized body of experts in charge of assessing what we know of
climate change.

A brief history of the science of climate change81
The term “hothouse effect” was first used in 1827 by French mathematician
Baron Jean Baptiste Joseph Fourier in what is generally taken to be the earliest
argument about the role of the atmosphere in determining the earth’s surface
temperature, distinct from the heat of the sun and that of the earth’s core. He
compared the atmosphere to a “glass vessel” in that it lets sunlight in, but keeps the
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Many accounts now exist of the discovery of global warming. See for example, Fleming
1998; Weart 2003.
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resulting warmth from leaving. The idea was taken up in the 1850s by British
scientist John Tyndall, who went ahead to measure the heat-trapping properties of the
atmospheric components. Tyndall discovered that the two gases that compose 99
percent of the atmosphere –nitrogen and oxygen- have no trapping ability. It is the
remaining 1 percent of water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and the
other trace gases that keep the planet warm. Without them the planet would be 59º F
colder.82
These theories established the basic physics of the earth’s heat-trapping effect.
Yet the idea that human activities were changing the composition of the atmosphere
and therefore affecting the climate came only when the industrial revolution was at
full steam. In an 1896 essay in the London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical
Magazine, Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius theorized that burning coal, charcoal
and wood would release millions of tons of carbon dioxide into the air, causing “a
change in the transparency of the atmosphere” that would, in turn, lead to a warming
climate. In an often-quoted statement, Arrhenius wrote, “We are evaporating our coal
mines into the air.” He also wrote, optimistically, that “we may hope to enjoy ages
with more equitable and better climates.”83
This idea of human-induced climate change received continued interest and
scientists undertook several experiments in the following years. In 1938 George
Callender, a British coal engineer, published the results of temperature readings taken
over several decades from dozens of weather stations and from sea captains who
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In a 1863 article entitled “On Radiation Through the Earth’s Atmosphere,” Tyndall
calculated that water vapor holds about 16,000 times as much heat as does oxygen and
nitrogen, the main components of the atmosphere (Paterson 1996: 17).
Arrhenius would later be awarded one of the first Nobel prizes in chemistry for his work on
ionization. See Arrhenius 1896.
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brought up buckets of sea water to take its temperature. The averaged results
showed a steady rising trend, which he ascribed to increased concentrations of carbon
dioxide in the air. But then the northern hemisphere went through a prolonged cold
period, and Callender’s ideas were largely forgotten.

The International Geophysical Year and the Keeling Curve
By the middle of the twentieth century, then, scientists were well aware of the
increase in heat-trapping gases being released into the air. Like Arrhenius, most of
them, including Callender, thought this was a lucky event that could make the world a
more comfortable place. Given basic laws of gas exchange, they also assumed that
any excess carbon dioxide was being harmlessly absorbed back into the oceans, where
it would remain locked safely in sediments in the sea floor.
This assumption was shaken in 1957 when Roger Revelle and Hans Suess,
from the Scripps Institute of Oceanography in La Jolla, California, published the
results of their analysis of the chemistry of seawater. Their study showed the oceans’
limited capacity to absorb carbon dioxide. The assumption broke down even further
when readings at the top of the Mauna Loa volcano in Hawaii in 1958 revealed
increasing amounts of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
These experiments were all part of the first and most ambitious project in the
history of the earth science until then: the 1958 International Geophysical Year. With
hundreds of geologists, chemists, climatologists and other specialists from more than
seventy countries involved, this was the first all-round check-up of the Earth, when for
eighteen months, everything measurable around the world was measured.
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The Mauna Loa readings were made with a new instrument called a
manometer, developed by Charles David Keeling. For two years, Keeling had gone
around California taking samples of air and measuring the concentrations of
atmospheric CO2. His instrument was the first to detect concentrations on the order of
one part per million (ppm), and he found that his flasks of air contained, on average,
315 ppm of CO2. This was already an increase of 13 percent above pre-industrial
levels.
The manometers could record the biosphere “breathing” (Revkin 1992: 93).
They depicted concentrations of CO2 falling in spring and summer as new growth
from trees and plants “sequestered” carbon, and rising in the winter when leaves fell
and fruit decayed, releasing the carbon back into the air. Keeling kept the instruments
reading this breathing for over three decades. When added together, the pattern of
yearly soft increases and decreases of CO2 crept slowly but steadily up -every year the
concentrations were a little higher than the year before. This climbing snake shape is
known as the Keeling Curve.
Still, with temperatures seemingly stable -and actually falling until the mid
1970s- concern remained for the most part theoretical. Although the World Climate
Conference in 1979 concluded that climate change was a real threat,84 and several
scientific meetings during the following decade confirmed this assessment, the
problem generated little public interest.
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“[T]he Conference finds that it is now urgently necessary for the nations of the world … to
foresee and to prevent potential man-made changes in the climate that might be adverse to the
well-being of humanity” (quoted in Gupta 2001: 12).
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This all clearly changed by 1988, when record-high temperatures scorched
crops from China to Canada, and national parks in France and the United States went
up in flames. While an estimated 10,000 “excess” deaths were linked to heat stress in
the United States, 25 million people were left homeless in Bangladesh when 80
percent of the country was inundated in late August. This was Bangladesh’s fifth such
flood in eight years. It resulted, in time, in the migration of 10 million Bangladeshis to
India.85
That same year, in two separate studies, scientists at the University of East
Anglia in England and at NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies reported that
the global average temperature of the planet had risen 0.5ºC (1ºF) in the last hundred
years. Although the rise was still within natural variation, the speed at which it
happened was without precedent in the last 10,000 years. And it matched the steadily
rising shape of the Keeling curve.

The greenhouse effect: how it works86
The Earth’s surface absorbs radiation from the Sun, which enters as visible
light. Since dark colors absorb a lot of light, the oceans, plants and soil warm up and
redistribute the energy via atmospheric and oceanic circulation. This radiation is then
re-emitted back as heat, at longer –infrared- wavelengths (because it occurs at the
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For one of the most complete and authoritative reviews from one of the word’s leading
climate scientists, see Houghton 2004 [1994]. For a most readable version, see Revkin 1992;
for a simple, informed and well-written introduction, see Spence 2005.
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invisible –the infrared- part of the spectrum). It is equivalent to a rock in a
campfire: heated by the flames, it is still hot long after the fire is out. The heat that
radiates from the rock the morning after is infrared radiation (see Revkin 1992: 63).
This infrared radiation is trapped on its way out by the so-called greenhouse
gases. While the molecules of these gases are not sensitive to energy transmitted as
visible light (it passes right through them), they are very sensitive to infrared
radiation, which they absorb and re-emit, warming the atmosphere close to the Earth.
This is an extremely well documented and robust effect, straightforwardly measured
in laboratories and by earth-orbiting satellites.
As noted earlier, the two most common gases in the atmosphere, oxygen and
nitrogen, have no heat-trapping capacity, so that 99 percent of the atmosphere has no
insulating properties. It is water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, and a few other
gases, measured in parts per million, that make this planet warm. They are called trace
gases because they exist only as a trace: water vapor for example constitutes 1 percent
of the atmosphere; CO2 a mere 0.35 percent. Yet without them, instead of the
comfortable average of 15ºC (59ºF), the planet would be –18ºC (0ºF) –something
closer to Mars.
The minuscule amounts of these gases relative to their warming capacity
makes evident their potency: a small change in their concentration can lead to big
changes in the Earth’s climate. Now it seems that we will be doubling their amounts
in a matter of decades.

Feedback effects and consistent relations
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As Revkin (1992) notes, the earth’s atmosphere is something of a paradox:
it is in constant flux, yet remarkably predictable: warm air rises, water evaporates,
condenses into clouds, and falls as rain or snow; and then there are the seasons. Yet
the weather is impossible to predict more than two weeks ahead.
The climate is different. Although it is hard or even impossible to know with
precision the details, certain scientific fundamentals are beyond dispute. There is no
dispute for example that greenhouse gases trap heat near the earth’s surface. Also
undisputed is the fact that concentrations of these gases are rising due primarily to
burning fossil fuels and other human activities; that this rise is likely to lead to overall
warming of the earth’s temperature; and that the rise will come with significant
variations at the regional level. Beyond these fundamentals, the question becomes less
precise because of the incredible complexity and the enormous number of variables
that influence the global atmospheric system –from natural feedbacks to outside
influences, both natural and human.
To have a sense of the dynamics and feedback effects, take the simplest
example: water vapor and CO2. Although water vapor is by far the dominant
greenhouse gas in terms of direct trapping of outgoing infrared radiation, a decrease
in CO2 will reduce the atmosphere’s ability to hold water vapor, which will in turn
lead to a drop in temperature. In other words, as the climate warms because of an
increase in CO2, the holding capacity of water vapor increases; as it cools, it
decreases. This is similar to what happens in very humid weather patterns, or when
cloud cover suppresses nighttime cooling. Thus, water vapor acts as a ‘positive
feedback’ gas, that is, it amplifies the warming effect caused originally by CO2
(Mahlman 2000: 31).
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The consistent relation between carbon dioxide in the air and the average
temperature of the planet was confirmed when mile-long cylinders were drilled and
extracted from glaciers in Antarctica. The frozen water sections showed a remarkable
record of atmospheric carbon dioxide and temperatures going back 160,000 years: as
temperatures dropped to 5ºC (9ºF) during an ice age, carbon dioxide levels dropped to
ca. 190 ppm. When temperatures rose during warm interglacial times, CO2 levels rose
to 280 ppm.
Yet, while the concentration of CO2 fluctuated between these two amounts
during those 160,000 years, it never rose much higher. That came only with the
Industrial Revolution and the burning of fossil fuels. Already before the end of the
nineteenth century, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were close to 300 ppm. And
they have kept steadily rising, to the actual level of 372.9 ppm.

Rising emissions
It is by now well established that the atmospheric concentration of CO2
remained at 280 ppm in the years between 1000 and 1750, but then went from there to
368 ppm in 2000 (31 ±4 percent), and kept rising to 372.9 ppm two years later for a
total of 6.44 billion tons of carbon in 2002. This represents an increase of 18 percent
just from 1960 to 2002.87
Concentrations of methane (CH4), which is 20-30 times more efficient at
trapping heat than CO2, have increased about 150 percent since 1750. That is more
than double the highest level in 160,000 years. Methane is generated naturally by
bacterial decomposition when there is no oxygen. It is common in landfills, rice
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paddies, and the guts of cattle and termites. Its explosive increase has to do with the
explosion of human population, which has brought with it an explosion of livestock
(1.3 billion head in the world in 1982). Cattle belch methane about twice a minute.
Emissions also result from coal and oil drilling: it is the gas that burns in the flares
above oil rigs. Methane concentrations may be released as soil warms up and
permafrost thaws in the Arctic tundra. A problem with this gas is that it is locked up
in cold sediments in the floor of the sea that could be released with higher global
temperatures, creating a positive feedback and making real the worst-case scenario
(see Leggett 2001).

On the rate of change
It is, as Revkin says, like a watch that gains a few seconds every month. The
increase is imperceptible day by day, yet the cumulative effect is significant.
Unfortunately, the climate system does not follow a simple linear, progressive
pattern. Because the deep oceans have a large heat capacity, and ice sheets are
dynamically adjustable, the climate system can respond to changes on a long timescale, in the range of decades to centuries. In other words, changes in the climate
system can take many years to become evident. Yet many scientists talk of reaching a
“threshold” that would change the inertia of the system and radically alter it in an
irreversible way. That same adaptability of oceans and ice sheets would be a problem
once changes are underway. It will be very hard to quickly return to ”normal” mode.
Regarding things happening suddenly, as opposed to gradually, it is instructive
to remember the discovery in 1985 of the hole in the ozone layer. Scientists knew
well before then that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) would deplete the ozone shield, but
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expected this to take place gradually –on the order of 2 percent over the next
hundred years. Nobody anticipated that clouds of ice crystals and a spinning vortex of
winds in the poles would suddenly create a real hole. Although the hole appeared
annually in satellite scans of Antarctica, it was rejected by the computer as a strange
instrument error.
Once discovered, the hole was perceived in the atmosphere above the North
Pole. The ozone layer diminished even in the mid-latitudes. More importantly, it was
all accelerating twice as fast as anticipated. Because it can take many years for the
CFC molecules to travel to the stratosphere where the ozone shield is found, the hole
we see today is the result of CFCs pumped years ago. In the meantime, additional
millions of tons of these chemicals have been released. Their effect is yet to be felt
(Revkin 1992: 113-115).88
In little over a century, humans have added some 850 billion tons of CO2 to the
earth’s atmosphere. The whole atmosphere weighs around five million billion tons, and it
does not take that much carbon dioxide to warm the climate (ibid: 90). Between 1870 and
1970 burning fossil fuels added 400 billion tons of CO2 –only to add another 400 billion
in the next 19 years. Sixty million tons are added every year. This acceleration is the
biggest problem.
On reaching a threshold, José Lutzenberger, Brazil’s first Secretary of the
Environment, put it succinctly: “A complicated system can take a lot of abuse, but you
get to a point where suddenly things fall apart. It’s like pushing a ruler toward the edge of
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the table. Nothing happens, nothing happens, nothing happens. Then, suddenly, the
ruler falls to the floor” (quoted in Revkin 1992: 23).

Common but differentiated responsibilities
Accounting for cumulative carbon emissions over the last hundred years (from
1900 to 1999), shows that industrialized countries, with 20 percent of the world’s
population, are responsible for 63 percent of net carbon emissions from fossil fuels
and land use changes. North America accounts for 25 percent and Europe for 21
percent approximately. The rest, more or less 140 developing countries, account for a
combined 37 percent. Of these, China is responsible for 7 percent and India for 2
percent. They are home to 40 percent of the world’s population.89
As for present-day carbon emissions, the vast majority comes from twenty
countries (all of which, except for four, are rich industrialized nations),90 while 135
small and poor countries contribute to less than 5 percent of the total. The United
States, with approximately 8 percent* of the world’s population, accounts for 25
percent of the global total, and the emissions from the electric power sector alone in
that country are higher than the combined annual emissions of Argentina, Brazil,
Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea. Together, China’s and India’s
emissions amount to three-fifths of those of the United States.91 In per capita terms, a
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person in the United States emits 5.6 tons of carbon on average –that is, 20 times
the average of an Indian and 10 times that of a Chinese.
The Contributors to Climate Change
Percent of Cumulative Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Industrial
Sources and Land Use Changes, 1900-1999
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Source: World Resources Institute.
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Future emissions are notoriously tricky to calculate, since they imply dubious
projections of growth and for the most part business-as-usual scenarios. But a rough
estimate can be given based on countries’ own projections. The US government under
the George W. Bush Administration, for example, forecasts a 35 percent increase in
emission levels by 2020 (including a 25 percent increase in the consumption of coal which is the highest carbon fuel).92 This is 20 percent more than that expected at that
time for China, the second largest emitter.93 Despite faster growth of emissions in
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developing countries relative to industrialized countries, it is expected that India
and China will together add 570 million tons of carbon emissions from fossil fuel
combustion by 2010. This is still four-fifths of the US total, even though China and
India will account for more than 2.2 billion people –eight times the population of the
United States.94
1999 Carbon Emissions and Expected Growth by
2010

2100
1800

Expected growth
2000-2010

1500
1200

1999 Emissions

900
600
300
0
U.S.

E.U.

China

Russia

Japan

Latin
America

India

Africa
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: U.S. DOE, Energy Information Administration,
International Administration,
International Energy Outlook 2001.

These figures clearly suggest serious equity and moral issues that have been
difficult to address. They were recognized early on in one of the most important
principles subscribed by all countries under Article 3.1 of the 1992 UN Framework
Convention in Climate Change: that all countries should take action to protect the
climate system “in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities.”95
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in 1988
by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), is the authority in charge of assessing what we
know to date about climate change based on the most widely accepted scientific,
technical and socio-economic information available.96 Sources are mostly peerreviewed journals, but include also industry literature and traditional practices.97
Approximately 1,000 experts from 120 countries have been involved in drafting and
revising the IPCC reports, in addition to the 2,500 who participate in the review
process. The IPCC meets once a year in plenary sessions conducted in the six
languages of the UN and is attended by hundreds of participants.98 The IPCC is said
to be “probably the most extensive and carefully constructed intergovernmental
advisory process ever known in international relations” (Grubb 1999: 4).
The experts that compose it are nominated by governments based on their
scientific qualifications and published record.99 They are divided in three working
groups headed by two co-chairs -one from a developed country and one from a
developing one- and a technical support unit. Working Group I (Science) deals with
the scientific aspects of climate change; Working Group II (Impacts and Adaptation)
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looks at the vulnerability of both human and natural systems and their possibilities
of adapting to climate change; Working Group III (Mitigation) addresses the options
for limiting emissions and mitigating climate change –including costs and benefits of
actions and socio-economic issues. Their technical support units are in the US, the
UK and Netherlands respectively. Besides the three working groups there is also the
Task Force on National Greenhouse Gases Inventories based in Japan. The ViceChairs of the three working groups, together with Co-Chairs, three Vice-Chairs and
the Co-Chair of the Task Force on inventories, constitute the IPCC Bureau, which is
headed by the IPCC Chair.
Clearly, the leading positions are highly political. Around the time of the
Third Assessment Report, in 2001, the United States pressed hard to remove the Chair
of the IPCC, US Prof. Robert Watson. Behind this move was heavy lobbying from the
US energy industry and some Republican elected officials (Revkin, April 3, 2001).
Watson was one of the most respected atmospheric scientists working on climate
change and had successfully chaired the IPCC for six years. While at NASA, he had
headed the team that proved the link between CFCs and ozone depletion in the
Antarctic (see Leggett 2001: 7). He was also an outspoken advocate for action to curb
global warming. In what is a clear sign of the shape things took as negotiations on
climate change progressed, Watson was replaced by Indian Rajendra Pachauri, not a
scientist but an engineer and economist, with little grounding in atmospheric science.
Though criticized by some, this move fit a treaty that was less and less a matter of a
safe environment, and more about ‘sound’ economics and technical management.
The IPCC does not undertake research of its own, but evaluates existing peerreviewed published research and comes up with a policy-oriented consensus view.
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When writing the reports, policy-makers are consulted to identify key policyrelevant issues. Once finished, reports go through two review processes: one from
experts and specialists in the field, and a second one from governments. Because the
reports will be accepted as the official knowledge, the actual wording is intensely
debated and negotiated. This has often been a matter of criticism and debate.100 Critics
and skeptics also argue that the IPCC reports are not scientific because they present
consensus views (see Boehmer-Christiansen 1993). The final reports, however,
remain the responsibility of the lead authors.
Although the IPCC was recognized early on to be excessively dominated by
developed countries, with just a few scientists from India, China and Brazil playing a
role, efforts are continuously made to give the IPCC a more balanced geographical
representation. The IPCC also tries to incorporate a range of scientific, technical and
socio-economic views and expertise, and calls are made on every occasion, and in
particular at the UNFCCC meetings, for governments to nominate experts and for
scientists from developing countries and social scientists, besides economists, to get
involved.101
Despite these efforts at balance, scientists from industrialized countries
dominate the discussions. No doubt this is a reflection of inequalities in the world at
large, but the implications are important -particularly when they touch on equity and
other social aspects. The influence the IPCC exerts on the process and the aura of
authority make it highly contested ground. Developing countries have been suspicious
100

101

See Grubb 2001; Gupta 2001.

At COP-6 in The Hague in 2000 for example, the IPCC Chair at the time, Prof. Robert
Watson, emphasized in his address to Plenary that they “needed anthropologists” and made a
call for governments and organizations to nominate or suggest some. Personal observation.
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of it back from early convention negotiation days. At the second meeting of the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC 2) (the body in charge of negotiating
the text of the UNFCCC) in Geneva in June 1991, the Secretariat had used as topic
headings the same elements listed in the IPCC legal mechanisms report but then had
to withdraw the document. The reason was developing countries’ objection that it
gave too much weight to the IPCC’s work thereby prejudging the structure of the
Convention (Bodansky 1993: 485). This suspicion also surfaced when the question of
who should organize and conduct the negotiations came up. Throughout 1989 and the
beginning of 1990, it was assumed that it would be a negotiating committee under the
joint auspices of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the UN
Environment Programme (UNEP). Accordingly, these two organizations took the lead
in the initial preparations for negotiations. But as developing countries got more
actively involved, the option of a special conference authority under the UN General
Assembly came to prevail. As Bodansky notes,
western countries tended to support the former option, while many developing
countries, who felt excluded from the IPCC, preferred the second option.
Developing countries approached climate change as a development and not
merely environmental issue, and as such a political and not just technical
issue. Consequently, they felt it should be addressed under a political body
such as the UN General Assembly, and not under technical agencies such as
WMO and UNEP. This led to the adoption of resolution 45/212 and the
establishment of an ad hoc secretariat” (Bodansky 1993: 4774).

Criticism by some developing countries, notably Brazil and Mexico, regarding
the lack of representation by developing countries in the IPCC, led to the creation in
1989 of the Special Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries. In 1990

70
Brazil, almost preventing the adoption of the IPCC First Assessment Report,
introduced a note to the preface stating “It should be noted that the Report reflects the
technical assessment of experts rather than government positions, particularly those
governments that could not participate in all Working Groups of the IPCC” (IPCC
FAR 1990). This is seen as a preview of later North-South debates in the negotiations
(see Bodansky 1993: 470).
Still, the three Assessment Reports published by the IPCC, in 1990, 1996 and
2001, have all had a powerful political impact. The first one called to start the
negotiations that would later become the UNFCCC.102 The second one became the
basis for negotiations in Kyoto. The third one provided the impetus for the ratification
of the Protocol in a majority of countries and eventually its adoption. And now the
fourth one, coming up in 2007, is scheduled just in time to coincide with negotiations
on a revision to the Protocol and the UNFCCC (see Chapter 8).

IPCC Findings: The Assessment Reports
Even after significant watering down from intense negotiations, each
assessment report of the IPCC has stated more emphatically and in less ambiguous
terms that the world’s climate was changing, and most importantly, that the change is
consistent with increased concentrations of greenhouse gases from human
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The figures for the First Assessment Report (FAR) and the accompanying scenarios were
variously received: while John Houghton, the British scientist who chaired the report, was
invited to present the finding in the UK cabinet and in various developing countries, the
United States officially protested to the British Foreign office when the conclusions were
published in book format before final approval by the whole IPCC (Benton 1994: 177).

71
activities.

103

This had been the main dispute over the years and the one that had

serious political consequences. 104 Once established in the Second Assessment Report
that ‘the balance of the evidence suggests there is a discernible human influence on
global climate,’ (IPCC SAR 1996) the problem ceased to be merely scientific and, for
the first time appeared in the front pages of the leading newspapers in the US.
The most influential -and therefore controversial- section is the one prepared
by Working Group I on Science. Already the First Assessment Report (FAR) in 1990
clearly stated that rising concentrations of greenhouse gases were consistent with
increased global average temperatures and, if left unchecked, could lead temperatures
to rise further at around 0.3ºC (±15%) per decade –a rate not seen in the past 10,000
years at least. At the time, that warming was seen as possibly still within natural
climate variability and could not be clearly attributed to human activity. But as
research continued and climate modeling improved, the projections of increases in
globally average temperatures over the period 1990 to 2100 themselves increased to
1.0º to 3.5ºC in the Second Assessment Report (SAR), and further to 1.4º to 5.8ºC in
Third Assessment Report (TAR). To get a sense of what this might mean, it helps to
know that the difference in global temperatures between now and the last ice age is
between 4 to 7ºC.
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The Second Assessment Report stated that “the observed warming trend is unlikely to be
entirely natural in origin,” and the Third Assessment Report that “[T]here is new and stronger
evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human
activities.”
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The technical summary of Working Group I in the Third Assessment Report (2001) reads
in the first section, “Is the earth’s climate changing? The answer is unequivocally ‘Yes’.” See
Albritton, D.L. and Meira Filho, L.G. et al. 2001. Technical Summary: A report accepted by
Working Group I of the IPCC but not approved in detail. 2003. (The subtitle further reads:
“‘Acceptance’ of IPCC reports at a Session of the Working Group or Panel signifies that the
material has not been subject to line by line discussion and agreement, but nevertheless
presents a comprehensive, objective and balanced view of the subject matter.’”)
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In sum
It is worth recalling the convention that truth emerges from nature through
science, while power is negotiated in the realm of politics (Robinson and Shaw 2004).
What is interesting about the IPCC is that it is not even necessary to engage in this
distinction, given its dual nature: a scientific body where the final assessments are to a
certain extent politically negotiated. According to Robert Watson, the negotiated
nature of the IPCC reports –which combines scientific credibility and political
approval- strengthens the international treaty-making process, making it “a more
efficient and unified experience” (Robinson and Shaw 2004: 146). In Watson’s view,
“The SPM [Summary for Policy Makers] provides a framework for nations to
negotiate their particular concerns, reactions and interpretations of the same scientific
information in an open forum” (ibid.). While there is truth to this and many
government officials would agree, the role of a network of experts and professionals
such as the IPCC has continued to be a matter of contention. Given developing
countries’ limited resources for conducting research, negotiators often have to rely on
foreign researchers. Scientific controversies have highlighted how (foreign)
researchers select certain research questions, theories, methods, and assumptions that
are apt to favor industrialized countries’ interests. This has tended to make developing
countries’ negotiators suspicious of the foreign research results. Although the network
of this epistemic community is widespread, it is also locally positioned in a context of
competing domestic interests and institutions. The power it gains from devising
policy options is necessarily connected to a particular state’s situation. As noted by
Gupta (1997) and mentioned already in the Introduction, the whole approach to the
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problem of climate change was dominated by industrialized countries’ ideology of
political realism and pragmatism: that the world is as it is and one should focus on
what is possible instead of getting sidetracked on what should be done. This in many
ways already serves to exclude developing countries’ positions. And as Gupta makes
clear, “[T]o the extent that developing countries will always be behind in the research
on problems signaled by industrialized countries, there will be a structural imbalance
in knowledge which will affect the negotiation process” (Gupta 1997: viii). It is to this
negotiation process that the following chapter turns.
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Chapter 2
Negotiating climate change: the UNFCCC

In 1972, at the time of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment in Stockholm, there were a few dozen multilateral treaties that dealt with
environmental issues. Twenty years later there were more than nine hundred
international legal instruments, either directly aimed at environmental protection or
dealing with it in an important way. Many of them were binding.105
Today, a sign of our times is not only the proliferation of binding multilateral
environmental agreements, but their nature, which may include, as the Kyoto Protocol
does, market mechanisms to trade in environmental problems. This chapter sets out to
describe the history of the negotiations that gave rise to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change in 1992, and which set the principles for the Kyoto
Protocol. A first section therefore outlines the context and episodes that gave rise to
international environmental policy. This is followed by an account of the negotiation
process leading to the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), and then by a brief description of what the UNFCCC contains, in
particular on Principles. The chapter ends with a brief overview of the main groups
and players in the negotiations.

Historical background: The rise of international environmental policy
The explosion in environmental treaties has to do with the birth and growth of
the modern environmental movement in the industrialized countries starting in the
105

See Jacobson and Weiss 1997; see also Thomas 1992.
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mid- 1960s and early 1970s. The first environmental ministries within
governments, dealing mostly with pollution problems, were established at this time,
largely as a result of the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in
1972. Extensive national environmental legislation followed. Several of the more
radical and publicly active environmental organizations in the United States were also
founded then (such as the Environmental Defense Fund (1967) and the Natural
Resources Defense Council (1970)), while the more traditional and established ones
(Sierra Club and the National Audaubon Society) saw their numbers surge. Groups
like the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, with closely
linked national organizations and chapters in various countries, became the first
pressure groups to engage in action in the international arena. This fast-growing and
expansive enterprise came together in the United States on April 22 1970 for the first
“Earth Day,” with the participation of 20 million people. Coverage of the
environment in the press went from eighth among fourteen major issues in 1960, to
top domestic issue in 1973.106 It was the same in France, Germany, the Netherlands,
UK and throughout the developed world, including Japan and New Zealand (Benton
1994; Thomas 1992).
However, with the exception of movements against nuclear power, which
were often transnational, the leading concerns were mostly local and regional in
character. They had to do with toxic and chemical pollution, such as pesticide use,
urban air pollution and waste dumping.107 They were also for the most part considered
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Springer and Constantini 1974, in Benton 1994: 21.

The publication in the US in 1963 of Silent Spring, by Rachel Carson, was a major event
and is always cited as a wake up call and trigger.
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in isolation and subject to technical fixes (as in the case of the “high chimney
policy” to disperse stack emissions in the UK (see Thomas 1992)), with little attention
to their secondary effects or interrelations. Likewise, international agreements
addressed for the most part particular cases, such as migratory bird species and ocean
pollution concerns (Grubb et al. 1993).
This all started to change in 1967 after the well-publicized spill of 100,000
tons of crude oil in the English Channel as a result of the Torrey Canyon tanker
accident, which set the precedent for disaster-prompted environmental negotiations in
the world of international relations. Affecting both England and France, the Torrey
Canyon spill made clear the gaps in international law to deal with such calamities, and
three treaties were negotiated in quick succession distributing responsibility and
establishing a compensation fund. Several states also introduced national regulations
on dumping wastes in the sea, and the North Sea and northeast Atlantic and
Scandinavian states set up regional cooperation agreements in cases of oil spill
emergencies. All this activity culminated in the Oslo Convention of 1972 limiting and
regulating ocean dumping, which includes regular meetings of the parties to update on
information and tasks.108
As regulating domestic policies became law in one country, attempts were
made to extend the regulations to other countries to stave off competition from
unregulated contenders -a clear indication that environmental concerns are economic
concerns. This is an important reason why international treaties come into being.
International conferences are also a cheap but highly visible way to deal with
complicated environmental matters in the face of intense public concern (Brenton
108

This pattern of action is now common to most international environmental negotiations.
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1994). Thus, increasingly, the need for an overarching and inclusive international
meeting on the environment became clearer.
The first concrete proposal was formally placed before the UN General
Assembly in 1968 by Sweden, which attempted to bring attention to its problem of
acid rain caused by industries elsewhere in Europe. After two years of preparations
and 100,000 pages of preparatory documents, with attendance by all member
countries and all UN agencies, the UN Conference on the Human Environment was
held in Stockholm in 1972. Although it is still debated whether its effects have been
more symbolic than substantial -with the notable exception of the creation of the UN
Environmental Programme (UNEP), based in Nairobi, Kenya- the Stockholm
conference did much to establish the regime of international environment
negotiations. Most importantly, as a conference on the whole “human environment,”
which included the participation of representatives from 113 countries and 400 NGOs
and IGOs, it exposed clearly the gulf between rich and poor countries on questions of
environment and the impossibility of discussing environment without reference to
development (see Grubb et al. 1993: 4-5).

Towards a climate change convention: from a scientific question to a political
issue
The climate change issue has also developed rapidly in the course of the past
two decades.109 As recently as 1985, when a major international scientific workshop
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The best account of this process and of the making of the UNFCCC is given by Bodansky
1993.
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was convened in Villach, Austria, the US participants went without specific
instructions. Three years later the IPCC was established, largely at the insistence of
the United States, which chaired a major working group within it. And four years
after that, in 1992, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
was adopted and signed (Bodansky 1993: 458).
Although at the time many people expressed disappointment in the lack of
targets and timetables for reducing emissions, the adoption of the UNFCCC can only
be seen as a remarkable achievement given the stakes and complexity of the issue.
First, the emissions that lead to climate change touch on every aspect of the world’s
economy and pretty much every aspect of human activity. They involve every sector,
including energy, industry, agriculture, transport, construction and forestry, in both
developed and developing countries. Second, although now we know much more
about what to expect, the effect of an increase in concentrations of greenhouse gases
was not very clear then, either in terms of magnitude or local effects. Moreover, the
projections are made for the next fifty and one hundred or more years, which easily
disguises the urgency of the problem. Third, negotiations involved 151 states -that is
virtually every nation in the world, with their extremely divergent positions and
circumstances. This includes large, rich countries that depend solely on the production
of fossil fuels, as well as small islands states at risk of disappearing. And although it
is often repeated that everybody loses in the end, for some countries the doubt
remained that the cure would be worse than the disease as winters become more mild
and more land for agriculture becomes available in Northern latitudes. Lastly, the
world-wide reach of the negotiations meant that it was not just about seeking
agreement between countries in the industrialized North, or between those and the
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developing South, or just within the South, but amongst all. In other international
negotiations, such as the Vienna Ozone Convention, the involvement of developing
countries had taken place in a second step, once the initial agreements had been
accepted. But in the case of climate change, important developing countries such as
Brazil, India, China and Saudi Arabia were heavily involved almost from the
beginning alongside the small island states and the least developed countries, not just
disagreeing generally with the North but also, unsurprisingly, among themselves
(Bodansky 1993: 478).

The negotiation process
In 1979 the first World Climate Conference, held in Geneva, Switzerland, had
concluded that climate change was a real threat to humankind, and set up the World
Climate Research Program with the purpose of stimulating and focusing further
research. Almost ten years after that, at the end of 1988, the process to negotiate an
international climate change treaty was officially started when the United Nations
General Assembly, at the request of the government of Malta, with the support of
many other countries, adopted resolution 43/53, “Protection of the global climate for
present and future generations of mankind.”110
By then there was already an active international scientific community dedicated
to the study of the biosphere and human influences upon it, making use of the

110

The original Maltese request referred to climate as “the common heritage of mankind” –a
concept that had been previously applied to mineral resources in the seabed and to the moon
(in “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,”
December 5, 1979. UN G.A. Res. 34/68. UN Doc. A/34/664.) But many countries opposed
the reference in the context of climate and the final resolution refers instead to “common
concern of mankind” (G.A. Res. 43/53) (italics mine).
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network of monitoring stations established as part of the 1957 International
Geophysical Year (see Chapter 1), and collaborating under the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO).
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the monitoring stations had conclusively proven
that concentrations of CO2 had been steadily increasing. Then, in the 1980s,
atmospheric chemists started measuring as well the heat-trapping capacities of other
trace gases -such as methane, nitrous oxide, and CFCs- and discovering that their
warming effect was roughly equal to the effect of CO2, thus magnifying the problem.
With the advent of super computers capable of complex and more realistic general
circulation models, the credibility of climate change predictions further increased.
Despite the limitations and uncertainties in the models, consensus emerged among
scientists that the predictions justified precautionary action by governments.
The emerging consensus coincided with the period, starting in 1975, when global
average temperatures started to steadily increase, after they had settled and even
dropped slightly following a steep and steady rise in the first four decades of the
century. In the 1980s every year seemed to be breaking the record. The scientific
understanding that had started to coalesce around the idea of global climate change as
a result of greenhouse gas emissions in the mid `70s was thus well-established by the
late 1980s.
This was reflected in a number of meetings and workshops that marked the
end to the first, purely scientific phase on climate change. They were the so-called
“Villach-Bellagio” workshops, held under WMO and UNEP auspices in Villach
(Austria) and Bellagio (Italy) between 1985 and 1987. In what the Wall Street Journal
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described as “an audacious piece of international policy entrepreneurship” (see
Benton 1994: 165), the Villach conference statement recommended that since “the
understanding of the greenhouse question is sufficiently developed, scientists and
policy makers should begin an active collaboration to explore the effectiveness of
alternative policies and adjustments” (see Bodansky 1993: 460).
And yet, besides the part played by scientists in actively raising public
awareness of the issue and engaging policy makers,111 other factors were needed for
climate change to gain the momentum it did. These were, first, the discovery of the
ozone hole and the subsequent approval of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987. Signed initially by 24 countries which committed
themselves to an eventual phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the Montreal
Protocol was a remarkable achievement and became a most important influence for
all atmospheric pollution negotiations, including climate change. At the time of its
signing, it still was not clear what the causes and effects of ozone depletion were.
Scientific confirmation that industrial CFCs were responsible came only in early
1988. As a consequence, the ‘precautionary principle’ employed to make a case for
the Montreal Protocol emerged as a solid and compelling rationale that was hard to
refute when negotiators turned to climate change (Benton 1994: 165).112 Also in 1987,
the World Commission on Environment and Development published “Our common
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See Haas 1992 on the role of epistemic communities.

The definition of the problem as a North/South issue was also evident in the ozone treaty
negotiations. In that case, the developing countries resisted the US proposals and were slow to
take a position. As with climate change negotiations, they objected to retarding economic
growth as they industrialized by, for example, restricting their access to air conditioning and
refrigeration (Haas 1992: 207). Still, cooperation in relation to climate change will be much
harder to achieve than in the case leading to the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion
because the total economic costs of abatement are much higher.
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future,” also known as the Brundtland Report, which advanced the concept of
sustainable development and received wide exposure.
A second factor boosting popular support for addressing climate change was
the 1988 summer heat wave and the severe drought in the South and Midwest of the
United States, which prompted Senator Tim Wirth, Democrat from Colorado, to call a
hearing on global warming on June 23. Wirth had previously called the National
Weather Service to make sure the date of the hearing would be a hot one, and it was
101º F.113 James E. Hansen, the director of NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space
Studies, told the committee that it was 99 percent certain that the warming trend was
not a result of natural variation but of the increase in human-made gases. The New
York Times put the story on its front page, and quoted Hansen saying: “It is time to
stop waffling so much and say that the evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse
effect is here.” A sign that climate change had emerged as a political issue is that even
the first President Bush had to address it in his election campaign.114
Most importantly, all of this coincided with a period of economic prosperity in
the majority of industrialized countries and widespread support for environmental
protection. The incorporation of the former Eastern Bloc in Europe and of many
developing countries into the global economy seemed to presage increased
international co-operation and regional integration. This was also seen as necessary to
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See “Struggling to Scare a Contented World,” Andrew C. Revkin, September 28, 1997.
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Bush’s words were “Those who think we’re powerless to do anything about the
‘greenhouse effect’ are forgetting about the ‘White House effect’. As President, I intend to do
something about it” (see Weiner 1990).
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compensate for the perceived loss of sovereign state control as economies opened
up to the “free” global market (Yamin and Depledge 2004: 6).

Accordingly, in 1988, at the request of governments, UNEP and WMO
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) with the mandate
to “provide internationally coordinated assessments of the magnitude, timing and
potential environmental and socio-economic impact of climate change and realistic
response strategies.” A governmental initiative (mainly of the United States), the
IPCC was meant to reassert control on an increasingly political issue at a time of
proliferating reports and environmental activism through the creation of an
international government-sanctioned authoritative and balanced source of information
of the state of knowledge. Although dominated by developed countries who occupied
most of the leadership positions, some scientists and policy-makers also recognized
the importance of creating a scientific body that incorporated to the extent possible
the views of scientists from the South if these countries were going to get involved in
good faith.115 Eventually, pressure from developing countries resulted in a somewhat
more balanced representation (see Chapter 1).
That same year, upon invitation by Canada, more than 340 scientists, government
officials, industry representatives and environmentalists from 46 countries met in
Toronto at the “World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for
Global Security” to discuss the possibilities of a reduction in carbon dioxide
emissions. This was the first time that talk turned to preventive action, and the
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See Professor Bert Bolin’s (first chairman of the IPCC) comment in this regard (in
Bodansky 1993: 464, footnote 82).
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conference ended with a final statement calling for a 20 percent reduction in global
CO2 emissions in relation to 1988 by 2005 (a global goal which included a rise in
emissions in developing countries; see Bodansky 1993: 462). The 20 percent target
(known as the “Toronto target”) was based not on economic calculations of any sort,
but was taken from the Montreal Protocol on a political calculation of what would
seem doable and not dismissable as impossible by governments –even though it was
already clear that that would not be enough to stabilize the concentration of CO2 in
the atmosphere.
In setting the objective as a near-future reduction in the volume of emissions, the
Toronto conference was to have a lasting effect on subsequent negotiations. This
approach was used a decade later to oppose the Kyoto Protocol on the basis that it did
not include a long-term strategy or consider mitigation costs (Anderson 2000: 6). But
its legacy includes also the recognition that the “main responsibility” to take
abatement measures lies with industrialized countries, and that these measures include
transfers of financial resources and technology to developing countries.
For these reasons, the Toronto conference is regarded “as the high water mark of
policy declarations on global warming” (Bodansky 1993: 462). Because it was not
officially governmental in nature, the conference statement was not a negotiated
document. More significantly, it was also perhaps the last instance (together with the
Noordwijk conference a year later) when the discussion was dominated by
environmental agencies and ministries, before other ministries –particularly the
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economic, finance and energy agencies- took their place.
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Only the United States,

at odds with the rest of the Western countries, approached the issue from a domestic
policy perspective from the beginning –something particularly evident in its emphasis
on the costs of response measures and its aversion to reduction targets and timetables.
This had to do with the fact that the coordination of all international environmental
issues after 1987 in the United States was undertaken by a working group of the
White House Domestic Policy Council, where the EPA had to share the work with the
Departments of Energy, Interior, and Commerce, the Office of Management and
Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers (to the clear disadvantage of the
environmental viewpoint) (Bodansky 1993: 464).117
Other international conferences followed in 1989, along with workshops and
meetings by the IPCC working groups. Among these there was one held in New Delhi
in early 1989 to address climate change, this time from the perspective of developing
countries, emphasizing the North-South dimensions of the problem. There was also a
summit in The Hague, attended by 17 heads of state (but not the United States nor the
Soviet Union, which were not invited), jointly sponsored by the Netherlands, France
and Norway, calling for “new institutional authority” to address climate change and
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In step with the change of constituencies attending the meetings, the issue moved
increasingly towards an intergovernmental arena where the statements and commitments were
gradually more cautious.
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The move was apparently the result of dissatisfaction at the EPA’s and State Department’s
role in the Montreal Protocol negotiations, which the White House felt had been too
aggressive and without consultation from other affected agencies. In late 1989, high-level
interagency coordination was transferred to the Working Group on Climate Change of the
Domestic Policy Council, chaired by the President’s Science Adviser.
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for an ‘Atmospheric Fund’ to help developing countries.

118

Climate change was

also addressed that year at the G-7 Economic Summit in Paris, the US-Soviet summit
in Malta, and the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Belgrade, among others.
The issue reached the highest political agenda in November, when
Netherlands Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers called heads of state to a Ministerial
conference in Noordwijk. Although economic considerations were increasingly
brought up, climate change was still predominantly an environmental concern, and
those in attendance were mostly environmental ministers.119 The political declaration
that resulted from Noordwijk, signed by environmental ministers from 67 countries
(roughly divided between developed and developing), clearly stated that
industrialized countries had the responsibility to lead action to reduce their level of
emissions, and to assist countries ‘financially and otherwise’ to adopt policies and
measures ‘with due regard to their development requirements and within the limits of
their financial and technical capabilities,’ ‘taking into account the need of developing
countries to have sustainable development’ (Article 7, Noorwijk Declaration on
Climate Change 1989). The declaration even set a forest growth target of 12 million
hectares per year by 2000. This target was meant mainly for developing countries,
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The call for “new institutional authority” involving non-unanimous decision making was in
effect a partial renunciation of sovereignty –a radical proposition that suggested the
seriousness with which the issue was taken by some heads of state (Bodansky 1993: 466).
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A most revealing sign of this change is Saudi Arabia’s statement at the Noordwijk
conference, characterizing global warming “as a life or death issue for considerable areas of
the earth,” and recognizing that there is “no argument” that the “main culprit” is carbon
dioxide, because of which the need to move to non-greenhouse gas emission energy
production and consumption systems and to stabilize and reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases. (Bodansky 1993: 467). This is perfectly at odds with Saudi Arabia’s position since
1990, which has been consistent in stressing the uncertainties in science and persistently
opposing any move forward on targets and timetables (and accused every time of doing
everything possible to block the negotiations).
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whose resistance to adopting emission reduction commitments was still not so
strong, possibly for the same reason that others were more radical in their
pronouncements –that is, that the delegates negotiating came mostly from
environmental ministries and not from development or foreign affairs departments
(Bodansky 1993: 468).
But in spite of the forceful statements, differences among developed countries
became apparent in Noordwijk, with the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union
opposing the adoption of quantitative targets or timetables to stabilize emissions. This
opposition would not be overcome until the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol eight
years later (at this moment only the United States continues to reject them, even
though the Clinton administration supported them). Positions were actually hardened
in the following meetings. In particular, while the United States insisted on “national
programs and strategies,” many countries adopted national targets and timetables
unilaterally. By the time of the Second World Climate Conference in 1990, the
European Community (EC) had agreed on an EC-wide goal of stabilizing emissions at
1990 by 2000.
The Second World Climate Conference called, in a Ministerial Declaration,
for “negotiations on a framework convention on climate change to begin without
delay.” This call was an endorsement of the IPCC First Assessment Report (FAR),
issued a few months earlier. The work of more than 400 scientists, the IPCC FAR was
a clear and authoritative statement intended for policy makers, warning that although
there were uncertainties, human activities were leading to increased concentrations of
CO2 in the atmosphere and, unless emissions were substantially cut back, the climate
could be subject to warming unprecedented in human history. The IPCC FAR
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mentioned as well that given the complexity of the climate system, surprises could
not be ruled out, and that much more rapid warming was a possibility.
The Second World Climate Conference is also noteworthy because it was the
first time that the developing countries participated fully as equal partners in the
discussions, making it clear that climate change could not be discussed as an
environmental question alone, but that it was also a development issue. This greater
involvement also brought up differences among developing countries, particularly
between oil producing countries (which increasingly questioned the science and the
need for response measures), and small island states. As a result, the latter organized
themselves at the conference into the Association for Small Island States (AOSIS).
Despite their lack of power in the world’s economy, this association would play an
important role in the negotiations to come (see Chapter 3).
On December 21 1990, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 45/212,
launching negotiations on a climate change convention led by an Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee (INC), to be completed in time for the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro (also known as the Earth
Summit) in early June 1992.
Between 1990 and 1992 most developed countries and the EC as a collective
announced domestic targets to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, often based on
the “Toronto target” or the Noordwijk Declaration on stabilization of CO2 emissions
at 1990 levels by 2000. Many of these targets were quite ambitious.120 By mid 1992,
twenty-four of the twenty-six members of the OECD had adopted national targets.
Only the United States and Turkey had not.
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Although deadlock appeared at the fifth session of the INC in February
1992, the domestic national targets adopted by the majority of OECD countries, a
supplementary report by the IPCC, and the political momentum of the 1992 Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro carried the deal forward to a resumed INC fifth session in
May. With Rio a few weeks ahead, the INC Chairman pieced together a number of
mismatched positions and texts spelling out the key objectives and principles,
procedures, and initial commitments of a climate change agreement. Thus, in fifteen
months, the final text to the Convention was completed.

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
The text of the treaty was opened for signature on June 4 1992 during the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (officially the UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED)), together with four other major international instruments for
environmental protection.121 It was signed there and then by 154 states and the
European Community, including the United States. To date, 189 countries have
ratified the Convention. This means all the countries in the world except for six (the
exceptions are Andorra, Brunei Darussalam, the Holy See, Iraq, Somalia and East
Timor). As such it has one of the highest participation rates of any multilateral
environmental agreement.
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These were: the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); The Rio Declarations on
Environment and Development; The Non-Legally Binding Statement of Principles on Forests;
and Agenda 21 –which gave rise to the Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) in 1994
and to the Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 1995.
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The text defines the overall objective of the regime, and establishes
principles, general rules of procedure and the institutional machinery of the
Convention. It is the basis on which the Kyoto Protocol rests.
As its ultimate objective, which also applies to the Protocol, the Convention
identifies:
“to achieve […] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed
in a sustainable manner.”

What “dangerous anthropogenic interference,” the “time frame to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally” and the rest actually mean remains predictably and
pragmatically undefined.
Several articles specify the essential institutions governing the Convention.
The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the “supreme body” of the regime, charged
with sorting all issues not resolved in the interim of meetings and the only body that
can adopt decisions as to what, when and how things happen. The first meeting of the
COP was set to take place within a year of entry into force of the Convention and
every year thereafter unless decided by the COP itself. Two parallel subsidiary bodies
-both composed of government representatives- were also set up to assist the COP:
The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). SBSTA was to “provide the Conference
of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other subsidiary bodies, with timely information
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and advice on scientific and technological matters.” SBI would “assist the
Conference of the Parties in the assessment and review” of actions being taken to
implement the Convention. A permanent Secretariat, based in Bonn, was charged
with the daily running of the Convention, including preparation and transmission of
reports and organization of the meetings. SBI subsequently assumed the responsibility
to oversee the Secretariat’s role in reviewing Parties’ National Communications,
which includes making country visits.
The text also specifies commitments for all Parties, dividing them into those
included in Annex I and Annex II of the Convention, and those non-Annex I Parties.
Annex I Parties, which are OECD countries and those with “economies in transition”
(EITs), have the specific “aim” to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. Annex II,
which lists OECD countries only, must provide financial assistance to developing
countries and promote technology transfer to both developing countries and EITs.
Non-Annex I Parties are all the rest, mostly developing countries, which assume
general commitments -most significantly reporting obligations.
But in terms of the issue at stake -reducing greenhouse gas emissions and
increasing the sinks that store carbon dioxide- the UNFCCC was to many people a
grand disappointment. From the beginning, the United States firmly opposed any
fixed targets even though the Europeans, backed by most developing countries, the
scientific community and NGOs, pressed for early action and strong cuts.122 The
United Kingdom offered to write a compromise text in a language that would express
122

See quote by Admiral James D. Watkins, Secretary of Energy, from a speech in
Washington in 1990 defending the Bush’s National Energy Strategy as a policy reflecting the
wishes of Americans: “They really do believe the Bill of Rights gave them unleaded regular
for $1.06 a gallon, and they better get it or, by God, they’ll get the bums out of office” (in
Revkin 1992: 120).
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commitments but no quantifiable targets. The final wording is so ambiguous that it
is hard to know what it actually says (see UNFCCC Articles 4.2a and b). The result is
a toothless treaty that calls for voluntary action but which in fact led to no reductions
at all (emissions increased, as they have continuously until now), although it did set a
precedent for future negotiations.123

Principles
Precisely as a problem of precedents, a serious matter of contention was the
inclusion of principles -a term that in the language of law has the very precise and
legally-binding meaning of values that guide future decisions. Developing countries,
which are typically at a disadvantage in the negotiations and distrust the more
powerful countries based on shared experience, wanted to see principles declared that
would establish the rules of the game in advance. The developed countries, preferring
a case-by-case approach without constraints of precedent, resisted for the most part
their inclusion. Principles such as the “polluter pays” principle, or the “common but
differentiated responsibilities,” were hotly debated. In the end, in a manner that is
characteristic of how the final documents of such nature are shaped, the word
‘principles’ was removed from each of the principles in Article 3 of the Convention
and put in the title. In a subsequent meeting, at the request of the US delegation, a
footnote was added that stated that titles were merely there to assist the reader. This
was meant to preclude any notion of abiding standards. The avoidance of the word
principles was later carried over into the Kyoto Protocol (Gupta 2001: 59).
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See Mintzer and Leonard 1994.
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Still, five sets of principles were adopted, which ‘shall’ guide countries’
actions. These are:
(a) that parties be guided by ‘equity and in accordance with [States’] common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly,
the developed country Parties should take the lead’;
(b) that the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country
Parties –especially those that are particularly vulnerable to climate change
(this includes both low-lying island states and the primary fossil fuel
exporters)- be taken into account;
(c) that the need for ‘precautionary measures in the absence of full scientific
certainty’ (also known as the “precautionary principle”) be recognized, but
that the policies and measures ‘should be cost-effective so as to ensure
global benefits at the lowest possible cost’; they should be
‘comprehensive,’ and ‘cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of
greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors’;
these efforts may be collectively carried out
(d) that countries have a right to sustainable development and that ‘economic
development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change’;
and
(e) that parties ‘should cooperate to promote a supportive and open
international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic
growth (…) particularly developing country parties’, and that measures not
be used as ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’ (Article 3. 1-5,
UNFCCC).
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Two of these principles would prove to be particularly problematic in the
years to come. The first one is regarding the need for developed countries to take the
lead. As Grubb notes, although there was wide agreement on this principle at the time,
the reason why this should be so was less widely shared. Developing countries and
many others maintained that the main problem stemmed from accumulating
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, for which industrialized countries were
responsible. This amounted to a “historical debt’ by these countries, and the idea that
they had ‘monopolized the available environmental space of the planet’ (Grubb 1999:
38). In contrast, the United States argued that current generations should not be held
accountable for past emissions, and that the need for developed countries to take the
lead is only due to their greater capacity to do so. This is still the argument made by
the United States when insisting that developing countries should take up
commitments to reduce emissions. It is a question that will come up whenever
protecting the climate system ‘on the basis of equity’ is discussed.
The second one was the requirement to help meet the ‘specific needs and
concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate
change and/or the implementation of response measures.’ In the text, this included
countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change, as well as ‘countries
whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production,
processing and export and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energyintensive products.’ Although what follows says that the COP ‘may take actions, as
appropriate, with respect to this paragraph,’ this agenda item on ‘response measures’
was carried over into the Protocol, and has proven surprisingly pervasive in the
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negotiations. It has continually divided developing countries, whose strength
derives mainly from their unity under the G-77 group. It surfaced clearly already at
COP-1 in Berlin, where, according to Grubb, “the resulting politics in the G-77 were
not pretty; one can imagine the kind of response that Bangladesh or the East African
states were inclined to give to OPEC pleas of impending poverty” (Grubb 1999: 49).
And it has resurfaced again and again.124
The Convention text also includes, in five sentences, a reference to Protocols
that may be adopted by the Conference of the Parties. It states these should be selfcontained instruments that bear only on those Parties committing to them. As Grubb
notes, this is an acknowledgement that the decisive step was still to be taken, and the
Parties could see it coming in the near future (Grubb 1999: 43).

Although, as noted earlier, the Convention was found at fault for its lack of
binding commitments to reduce emissions, it did establish the basic international legal
framework to address climate change as a serious issue. It established some basic
principles agreeable to all countries, particularly the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities that implies that it is the responsibility of industrialized
countries to lead in action. It also set in place a system for reporting and reviewing
information on emissions, and mandated it be open to public scrutiny. Significantly, it

124

It is striking to see how this has been carried on for such a long time. For example, in the
twentieth session of the Subsidiary Bodies meeting in Bonn in June 2004, Saudi Arabia,
which has been blocking advances on policies and measures (P&Ms) for years, spoke “on
behalf of the G-77 and China.” Opposed by the EU, Japan, Australia, the US and most other
Parties, the Saudi delegate insisted on making particular reference to the adverse impacts of
response measures. When he asked for time for consultation, the other members of the G-77
and China with whom he consulted were Iran, Kuwait, and Nigeria. Although most
developing countries would object to the reference –in particular AOSIS members, who are
part of the G-77- no other developing country was there to dissent (personal observation).
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did all this always qualified by the stated precedence of economic growth, free
trade, and development.125 How this was carried over and took life in the Kyoto
Protocol is the subject of the next chapter.

The main groups and players
The most basic opposition occurs between developed and developing
countries. In 1990, when negotiations first started, OECD countries were responsible
for more than half of the total global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. This, together
with the 20 percent coming from central and eastern European countries in the former
USSR, meant that a quarter of the world’s population accounted for more than threequarters of fossil fuel emissions and more than half the total of global greenhouse gas
emissions. As noted in Chapter 1, per capita emissions are on average over ten times
greater in developed countries than in developing ones –and more so in Africa and the
Indian subcontinent.
This difference is also reflected as a clear difference of perspective. As Gupta
(1997) notes, developed countries tend to view climate change as a global,
environmental problem per se, subject to technical solutions. In contrast, developing
countries perceive it as part of a larger historical, systematic and ideological problem
to do with distribution. As such, it is not global (there is no objective definition for
this), but it is rather a problem largely of industrialized countries -caused by them and
therefore for the most part their responsibility. So while developed countries focus on
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It all seemed in accordance to US President George Bush’s infamous declaration upon
arriving at Rio that “the American way of life will not be compromised.”
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cost-minimization, developing countries –which are more vulnerable- tend to focus
on risk-minimization.
In fact, at the beginning of the negotiation process, climate change was seen
by many developing countries as an issue whose primary significance derived from its
conceivable potential to re-articulate the demands for a New International Economic
Order and to press for the financial aid and technology transfer that had been denied
to them in other fora (Gupta 1997). Almost all developing countries sent delegates to
the first rounds of meetings, and eventually Kyoto broke records of attendance. But as
soon as it became clear that very little additional money was going to be provided,
and that participation in the new market under the Protocol was going to be limited by
the stringent regulations affecting most projects, interest for the most part faded. Still
today the argument is usually one between developing countries’ prerogative of
sustained economic growth and lack of resources and the insistence that industrialized
countries must act first according to their historic responsibility on one hand, and the
insistence of some developed countries, in particular the United States, that all
countries should undertake commitments based on the expected increase in emissions
given estimates of population growth.
Besides this broad categorization, under the UN countries unite in political
negotiating coalitions according to common interests and geographic, economic and
cultural similarities, and it is these groups that allow for a better understanding of the
negotiation process. These coalitions are necessary for more than 180 Parties to
negotiate the complex technical and political issues dealt with under the UNFCCC
and the Protocol. They are specially important for small countries who have little
power and resources to keep up with the negotiations on their own. But they do
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become another arena in which to deal with power relations. And although political
coalitions derive strength from their numbers, arriving at cohesive positions takes
time and energy which in a way reduces their ability to influence the negotiations.126
Although countries have sometimes switched positions and groups on specific
issues, since the negotiations started in 1990 the key groups and players have been:
•

The European Union.
As a political grouping, the EU is the most cohesive coalition in the negotiations.

It is comprised of 15 member states and the European Community (represented by the
European Commission) and since April 2003, the accession states from central and
eastern Europe. They all speak with one voice, which is that of the rotating EU
Presidency (except when someone has particular expertise on a given issue) and
seldom make statements individually.127 With a political culture more attuned than the
United States to international and environmental responsibility (in particular in the
North) and accustomed to government regulation, the EU has played a leading role
launching and pushing forward the climate change negotiations. Because they are also
net energy importers, the Union has assumed a leadership role in climate change
126

Besides the negotiating blocs, there are within standard practice under the UN system, five
recognized “regional groups”: Africa, Asia (including the Pacific), Central and Eastern
Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean (known as GRULAC: Group of Latin American
and the Caribbean), and Western Europe and others (which include Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the US). In the case of the climate change negotiations, these divisions serve
mostly as the basis for electing members of the Bureau and other specialized bodies, such as
the CDM Executive Board.
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The EU Presidency rotates every six-months, and receives support from the European
Commission and the forthcoming presidency –a trio known as the “Troika.” For a more
detailed explanation on the EU’s institutions and policy-making process, see Yamin and
Depledge 2004: 16-18. See also Climate Policy, 2003. Special Issue: EU –Implementation
challenges. Volume 3(1). Several observers have noted the problems associated with this
quick succession of Presidencies, one of them commenting sardonically on the need for
capacity building among the European delegations (from personal observation and informal
interviews).
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moved by the perceived benefits of improved energy efficiency and technological
leadership (Grubb 1999: 30; see also the 1993 European Commission White Paper on
Competitiveness and Employment, Luxembourg: EC). At Kyoto the EU originally
proposed a 15 percent cut in emissions and opposed the unrestricted use of the
flexible mechanisms and of credits from LULUCF activities. In particular, it
represented the main opposition to the United States before it withdrew, in terms of
the latter’s insistence on no limits on emission trading, arguing instead that a major
percentage of the emission reduction must be accomplished by domestic sources.
The EU aims to make important emissions reductions through a set of common or
coordinated measures, and has established an internal market for emission reductions
known as the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) (see Chapter 6). It shares its own
target internally on the basis of the EU itself as a party.128 But doing so is not easy,
and negotiations inside the EU parallel those outside the group: there is even a
North/South dimension to the problem, separating the more developed northern
European States from their southern counterparts, whose emission commitments
represent an increase relative to 1990 levels, and which is compensated by higher
emission reduction commitments from other member States in order to achieve the
EU target (see Chapter 3, on the EU bubble). Germany, the UK and France,
responsible for the highest greenhouse gas emissions, dominate the internal politics of
the group.
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An early attempt to impose a community wide carbon/energy tax failed, killed by
European energy-intensive industries who made the tax conditional upon the adoption of
similar measures by industrial competitors such as Japan and United States, in addition to
“some of the fiercest lobbying ever seen against an EU proposal by the fossil fuel industries”
(Newell 1997: 40; see also Newell and Paterson 1998).
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•

JUSSCANNZ and the “Umbrella group”.
The “Umbrella group” is a loose coalition of non-EU developed countries

characterized by an interest in the broad use of flexibility mechanisms (that is, the
three market mechanisms under the Protocol: emission trading, Joint Implementation,
and the Clean Development Mechanism) and, for varying reasons, by greater
difficulty in reducing emissions below 1990 compared to the EU. It evolved from the
JUSSCANZ group, a long-standing coalition active throughout the UN (with certain
variations in membership), which comprises Japan, the United States, Switzerland,
Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand (JUSSCANNZ).129 The current
membership of the Umbrella group includes Australia, Canada, Iceland, New
Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States, and
although they rarely make statements together, they share information and meet once
or twice during negotiating sessions.
Some of these countries have played a key role in what Young (1997) calls
“entrepreneurial leadership” in promoting emissions trading, particularly the United
States. An important initiative was Japan’s investment in about twenty Russian power
plants and factories, in what became the first greenhouse gas emissions swap.130 This
was the first instance of two countries reaching an agreement for Joint
Implementation. Japan’s Trade Ministry was allocated nearly $20 million in the
budget to help Japanese firms carry out feasibility studies prior to implementation. As
part of their interest in the flexible mechanisms and attention to cost-effectiveness, the
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Emissions in all of these countries had risen since 1990 for different reasons.

“Japan and Russia Conclude Landmark Greenhouse Gas Swap” April 19, 1998.
Reuters News Service.
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members of the JUSSCANNZ group also hold a common position in support of a
wide range of LULUCF activities under the Protocol.
There are, however, important differences between the members of the group
based on their national circumstances, with Iceland, Japan, New Zealand and Norway
characterized by low per capita emissions and high levels of energy efficiency.131
There are also important differences between the environmental culture and approach
to international issues of Iceland, Norway and Canada, from that of the United States,
Australia and Japan for example.132 As such, their solidarity has been seriously tried
several times, and members have dissociated themselves from the group’s statements
on a couple of occasions.133 With the United States’ withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol, several members of the Umbrella Group, particularly the Russian
Federation, but also Canada and Japan, were able to secure an advantageous deal from
the EU. These countries, together with Australia, made things very hard at COP 7 in
Marrakech. Still, with large concessions won, they eventually agreed and the Protocol
went ahead without the United States.

•

Group of 77 and China (G-77/China)

131

Japan has one of the world’s most energy efficient economies (especially in its industrial
sector) and most developed technology sectors, and is wholly dependent on imported fossil
fuels. New Zealand and Norway are low per capita emitters due to their hydro-dominated
economies. This makes it harder for them to reduce emissions than it is for the historically
coal-based EU economies (Grubb 1999: 33).
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Although Canada and the United States share a highly energy-intensive economy and
growing populations, Canada has a long tradition of involvement in international
environmental issues.
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In particular at COP 7 on acceptance of the Marrakech Accords and on compliance.
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Developing countries work mostly through the G-77 to develop common
positions on emissions-reduction commitments and financial and technological
transfers. However, they have widely differing interests: China and India for example
have enormous coal resources on which they depend for economic development; the
once-called Asian “tigers” (in particular South Korea) are concerned about being the
next in line for setting emissions-reduction targets; and African countries are
generally concerned about vulnerability and impacts. Other countries with large
forestry sectors such as Brazil and Indonesia are concerned about the implications of
treating forests as carbon sinks. And so on. These divisions, in addition to those
outlined above (fossil fuel producing vs. small island states, etc.), weaken the G-77
plus China considerably as a group.

•

“Countries with economies in transition” (EITs)
Included here are the industrialized countries of Central and Eastern Europe and

the former Soviet Union. Sometimes referred to as the Central Group 11, it is
composed of eleven central and eastern European countries with emissions reductions
targets under the Protocol and common views on some issues. They are Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia.134 Thanks to economic restructuring after the fall of the
USSR, these countries will probably manage to keep their emissions overall below
1990 levels through 2000, but afterwards their emissions are expected to rise. This
poses the problem of “hot air”: reductions that were already made or would be made
anyway as industries modernize, and therefore not the result of mitigation
134

Some of these countries are now part of the EU.
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commitments under the Protocol. For a long time the problem of “hot air” was a
serious matter of debate resulting in several clauses being inserted into negotiations to
avoid them. Now it is mostly a matter of will whether countries will face adverse
publicity for selling these spurious credits or whether the credits sold will be treated
as the result of real, additional emission reductions.

•

The Alliance of Small Island States.
The AOSIS played a prominent role in securing support for the Convention,

more dynamic and influential than is normally possible for such tiny countries. They
are particularly vulnerable to sea level rising and therefore support rapid action to
reduce emissions. Because of their lack of resources and capacity, they are often
supported by environmental NGOs from industrialized countries in a strategic alliance
to push for stronger action, both through capacity building and through direct
representation in the negotiations. The UK Foundation for International
Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) has been particularly active in this
relation. As a result, AOSIS representatives are often better prepared and have better
developed positions than other richer developing countries.

•

The Organization of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC).
Concerned mostly about the impact on their economies if other countries reduce

their use of oil, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others have been leading the argument
about scientific uncertainty and urging –when not forcing- a slower pace for the
negotiations. There is a good collection of anecdotes and jokes about the strategies
they use to delay any possible agreements. They are so persistent that some Parties
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even made a proposal to have countries be accountable for their own emissions for
a specific period, say after 1990 or 1998 -during negotiations. Given the threat to their
fossil fuel-dependent economies, their representatives are often highly qualified
lawyers who are deft at using the rules of procedure to holdup the process or to insert
references to their vulnerable economies. Like the alliance between environmental
NGOs and AOSIS, the OPEC group has close ties to US oil companies, to the point
where company representatives may sometimes write their interventions and assist
them in preparing their position papers.

•

ENGOs, BINGOs and RINGOs
Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) have been active from the beginning -though the

story of their participation has to be reviewed with the one of business and industry
(see Introduction). The majority of green groups and NGOs are from developed
countries.135 Business and Industry NGOs (BINGOs) have also played a critical role.
The first business groups to attend the climate talks as observers represented energyintensive firms concerned about the negative implications of limiting greenhouse gas
emissions. More recently, other business sectors have become active in the process,
including the insurance sector and clean energy firms, which see market
opportunities. The role of the insurance sector is expected to be particularly
important. From about 1993 on insurance companies have become involved in
political debates on global warming, concerned about the effects of large-scale
payouts caused by weather-related disasters, which could lead to serious risks of
135

See Carpenter 2001; Gough and Shackley 2001; Newell 2000; Paterson 1996; and
Rowlands 1995. See also Introduction.
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collapse for the business.

136

So not all businesses are opposed to the Protocol.

Some of the most important industries and corporations (including B.P. Amoco, Shell
and Mobil Oil) have come together to play a more active role and their influence has
been clearly felt (see Chapter 6 on the “capture theory of regulation.”). But then there
is also the question of image and the many accusations of “green washing.”137
Business and industry deserve special mention because not only they have
become an integral part of the process, but also since 1992 they have managed to
shape the way the environment and development are looked at.138 Led by the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), a coalition of more than
180 international companies with a stated “shared commitment to sustainable
development through economic growth, ecological balance and social progress,”139
they have presented themselves as the solution rather than the problem. The fact that
the crisis was portrayed as a North-South issue also played right into the hands of
business interests since it further questioned the delegitimated image of governmental
actors. In the end, the only mention of corporations in the final Agenda 21 text is
regarding their promotion of sustainable development; there is no mention of their
role in the pollution of the planet. This earned the WBCSD the nickname of
“Sustainable Council for Business Development” (ibid. 105).
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Insurance companies provide about 22 percent of investment in stock markets; they
underwrite commercial development and are clearly an important factor in the global
economy as a whole. See Newell and Paterson 1998.
137

As noted in the Introduction, a number of organizations have been established solely to
track greenwashing in regards to climate change and the Protocol. Examples include
SinksWatch, CDMWatch and CarbonTradeWatch.
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For a sharp critique, see Chatterjee and Finger 1994.
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In spite of the crucial role they play, research NGOs (RINGOs) have been
slower to organize and do not present a coherent front as ENGOs and BINGOs do.
However, a number of them are very influential (see references in footnote 135).

•

Local authorities
This group is primarily represented by the International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI). Many cities and states around the world have
launched climate change plans that are more ambitious than those of national
governments, in particular in the United States. Urban governments are clearly
crucial given their role in energy utilities, road construction, public transport and
other emissions-producing activities of the public sector. There are many
examples of this and they are increasingly taking center stage.
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Chapter 3
The Kyoto Protocol: how it works

The Kyoto Protocol has been widely hailed as the greatest achievement of
modern environmental diplomacy. With a total of 156 Parties, the Protocol is said to
represent “a pinnacle of trends towards globalization in economic and environmental
policy” (Grubb 1999: xxxiii).140 Others, however, have famously dismissed it as
“fundamentally flawed,” as US President George W. Bush said when he announced his
decision not to seek the Protocol’s ratification. Still, if there is one thing on which there
is consensus, it is on its complexity. Stuart Eizenstat, chief US negotiator at Kyoto,
referred to it as the most complex issue apart from disarmament (see Ott 2001: 258).
Grubb noted that “Grappling with the more fundamental economic issues raised by
climate change can feel like trying to understand modern cosmology with the tools of
Newtonian mechanics” (Grubb 1999: 323). Every aspect of it was a challenge.
This chapter summarizes the basic elements of the Protocol and points to some
of the contradictions it entails. After a brief introduction describing the road that led to
its adoption, the chapter outlines the basic structure on which the Protocol rests,
explaining how shares are allocated, the time frame of operation, and the main players
in the negotiations. Because the aim of the section is to explain the creation of a market
for emission reductions, special attention is paid to the introduction of flexibility in the
system. This flexibility has two forms. One is explicit flexibility in the three
institutionally established market mechanisms: Emissions Trading, Joint
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All the countries in the world except for six have ratified the UNFCCC (see Chapter 2); of
these, 80 percent are also Parties to the Protocol.
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Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism. The other is not explicit
but is inherent in the rules of what counts as a reduction and how it is to be achieved.
This more tacit flexibility includes the sharing of emission reduction commitments by
the member countries of the European Union (known as “the EU bubble”), the
inclusion of a “basket of gases” made equivalent as sources of emissions, and the
accounting of removals from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF).141 Of
these, LULUCF, which is in many ways the ultimate flexible mechanism, is the subject
of a more detailed discussion in the following chapters.

Kyoto
The 1997 Kyoto meeting was a phenomenal event, attended by almost 10,000
people, including the Vice-President of the United States, Al Gore, the UK Deputy
Prime Minister, and many heads of state. The US official delegation alone was almost
one hundred people. It was the biggest and most high profile international event on
the environment since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.
But the mood had dramatically changed since Rio. As Yamin and Depledge
(2004) note, instead of the optimism and anticipation of economic growth that
prevailed in 1992, many developing and developed countries at the end of 1997 had
already started to suffer the effects of the global free market. The financial crisis in
Asia and in Argentina had hit hard. It was a time of economic recession in many
OECD countries and depression in many of the rest, as globalization delivered few
and skewed gains and international institutions seemed to be ineffective at best. In
141

The inclusion of “hot air” from central and eastern European countries with
economies in transition (EITs) could also be said to be among the implicit flexible
mechanisms.
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this context of economic vulnerability, the idea of international solidarity and aid
to developing countries was not popular.
In addition, as Grubb points out (1999: 61), the meeting at Kyoto was not
about raising awareness or establishing principles but about undertaking binding
commitments, in the recognition that previous voluntary measures and aims had not
resulted in much. This involved defining, distributing and monitoring greenhouse
gas emission reduction commitments in a manner that over one hundred eighty
Parties with extremely divergent interests would agree to. The enormous
complexity of this task is hard to grasp.142

From Rio to Kyoto
Under international law, any international agreement needs to be ratified by a
minimum number of countries’ domestic legislatures in order to enter into force and
have legal authority. Only by this mean can agreement acquire the status of a legal
commitment by the ratifying countries.
With over 50 ratifications, the UNFCCC entered into force in March 1994. A
year later, as mandated, the first COP met in Berlin, among other things, to “review
the adequacy” of Annex I Parties’ commitments. These were predictably found to be
not adequate. A round of negotiations on “a protocol or other legal instrument” was
consequently launched as part of the “Berlin Mandate,” conducted by the Ad Hoc
Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM). In 1996 COP-2 took place in Geneva at the
time of the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report. Given the IPCC’s conclusions noting

142

And still, the inertia was set and, as a seasoned observer noted, once these processes are
initiated, they are remarkably hard to kill (personal communication from CBD functionary).
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“a discernible human influence on global climate” (see Chapter 1), this
coincidence gave the process a renewed boost, even if the Geneva Ministerial
Declaration endorsing the IPCC’s findings was not formally adopted. But then, the
following year at COP-3, in Kyoto in December 1997, after 8 meetings of the AGBN,
round-the-clock negotiating sessions, many “calls to capital” for further instructions,
and a final marathon session that started on 11 December at 1 am and ended at 1 pm,
36 hours after the official deadline, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted.143

How it Works
Only countries with emission reduction targets have “quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments,” known as QELRCs, calculated and quantified
as “assigned amounts.”144 The total amount of emissions that each country with
QELRCs can release over 2008-2012 (the first commitment period) must not exceed
its assigned amount.145 The QELRCs cover emissions of six greenhouse gases listed
in Annex A of the Protocol, measured according to their Global Warming Potential
(GWP), expressed in terms of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CO2e). Because Parties
143

For a report of the meeting, see Earth Negotiations Bulletin. 1997. Report of the Third
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC: 1-11 December 1997. Volume 12, no. 79. An
excellent and highly enjoyable account of the Protocol, including the negotiation process, its
background and implications is given by Grubb 1999. On the early politics of emissions and
negotiations, see Agarwal and Narain 1990.
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The word “target” does not appear in the Protocol given sensitivities in the United States
to anything that recalled binding commitments (Yamin and Depledge 2004: 120). Likewise,
“budget” or “cap and trade” references used by the United States, with property rights
connotations or which raised issues of equity to do with historic emission levels, were
removed at the insistence of developing countries.
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That is, these are restrictions on their level of emissions, based on voluntarily adopted
targets that collectively amount to a five percent reduction relative to emissions in 1990.
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with QELRCs have to account for emissions and removals from the LULUCF
sector, any removal by LULUCF activities can be subtracted from the Party’s
reduction target. These are known and inscribed as Removal Units (RMUs). A total of
thirty-nine countries (mainly the advanced industrialized countries and members of
the OECD) have QELRCs, and they are listed in Annex B of the Protocol with their
respective targets. They are also referred to as Annex I countries because they are
listed in Annex I of the Convention.146 As explained in Protocol Article 3(1), Parties
shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not
exceed their assigned amounts calculated pursuant to their quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitment inscribed in Annex B with a view to
reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below
1990 levels in the commitment period 2008-2012.

Three kinds of mechanisms allow Parties with reduction commitments to
achieve their targets by undertaking, financing, or purchasing emissions reductions
generated elsewhere. The three mechanisms, known as the flexible mechanisms, are
emissions trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) (see below). An emission reduction under any of these mechanisms generates
a specific kind of unit that may be added to or subtracted from a Party’s assigned
amount. The possibilities are: assigned amount units (AAUs), generated under
emissions trading; emission reduction units (ERUs) under joint implementation; and
146

All countries in Annex I of the Convention are listed with their reduction commitments in
Annex B of the Protocol, except for Turkey and Belarus, who had not ratified the Convention
in 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was agreed. Still, when speaking of commitments under the
Protocol, reference to Annex I is more common, as it is contrasted with the rest, non-Annex I
Parties.
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certified emission reductions (CERs), under the CDM. All of these units, together
with RMUs, are fungible.147 If a Party exceeds its reduction target by cutting back on
its emissions more than the amount specified in its QELRCs, it may use its excess
units as carry over to the next commitment period.148

Allocating shares
“Making the priceless valuable”149
One of the most interesting questions to be posed in any study about the
creation of a market like carbon emission reductions is that of the allocation of rights
and resources. How does one distribute the right to emit? Does each human being –
wherever in the world they may be- have the same right to emit? This is attractive and
reasonable as a philosophical principle. It is what some countries such as India and
China and others in Africa and elsewhere proposed to have implemented. But, what
happens to an independent island state with a small population, such as Micronesia?
Accounting for rights to emit on a per capita basis might limit the ability of such a
state to build roads and infrastructure. This was made clear in one of the side-events
at COP 6 in The Hague in 2000, when the presentation by a well-known Indian NGO
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They have different names so they can be traced in the International Transaction Log, kept
by the UNFCCC secretariat.
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This is known as “banking,” and not all units are bankable because developing countries
argued at Marrakesh (COP 7) that it could provide a disincentive to reduce emissions at
source and give Annex I Parties accumulated budgets for the future. RMUs for example are
expressly not bankable, and CERs and ERUs can be carried-over only up to a limit of 2.5
percent of a Party’s assigned amount. The problem is that, since all credits are fungible, it is
possible for a country to use the non-bankable credits for complying, and the rest as carryover.
149

Title of a conference organized by the Katoomba Group on jumpstarting environmental
markets.
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representative arguing for the equal rights emission approach was criticized by a
delegate from a small island state. Strong opposition to this approach comes as well
from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, with high emigration rates and
whose GNP depends almost exclusively on fossil fuels (Rahman and Roncerel 1994:
262).150
Among the different viewpoints and rationales on what is a fair allocation and
distribution of rights are:
1) the “polluter pays principle,” which can refer to either current or historically
accumulated emissions -and even future ones, as in the US insistence on targets for
developing countries with strong projections of growth;
2) the “equal entitlements approach,” based on the belief that all individuals have an
equal right to “the atmospheric commons” and that therefore emission permits should
be allocated on a per capita basis (as mentioned earlier, an idea supported by many
developing countries and particularly promoted by some NGOs and objected to by
some representatives of small island states and others);151
150

Although there was for a while a lot of debate on the equal rights emission approach, this
option was never seriously discussed in the negotiations -in part because it worked against
the developed countries and in favor of some developing ones, and because it implied huge
changes which, as Grubb says, were “far greater than countries were willing to
contemplate” (Grubb 1999: 71).
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Another interesting matter is that related to the population and limits to growth argument the political nature of which was highlighted clearly in the climate change negotiations.
During a meeting of NGOs at the time of the Third Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) in 1991 in Nairobi, southern NGOs
responded to a concern voiced by a Northern NGO that the population problem was
essentially in the North, because a single person born there consumes more on average than
three or four in the poor countries of the South (Rahman and Roncerel 1994: 263). Even now,
the United States has used the population growth claim as a basis to reject the Protocol,
alleging that it is biased for expecting the industrialized countries to assume all the burden
when countries such as Brazil, China and India do nothing (but forgetting to mention that
what is now being ratified is only a first phase of commitments that correspond to historical
responsibility for emissions).
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3) the “willingness to pay” logic (derived from welfare economics), whereby
based on their situation, each party is responsible for a “comparable” burden;
4) the position that the distributional implications of any agreement be taken into
account (based on John Rawls, 1973, A Theory of Justice); and
5) the conservative argument that present emitters have established, by way of
common law right, the right to continue to use the atmosphere as they do (see
Paterson 1996: 3).
Overall, the Kyoto Protocol adopted the “polluter pays principle” on the basis
of historically accumulated emissions (sometimes called the “grandfathering
principle” –though the United States has consistently opposed this principle.) This
means that for the first commitment period (2008-2012), only industrialized countries
that figure in Annex I to the Convention have commitments to reduce their emissions.
The commitments are however based on voluntary targets, averaging 5.2 percent in
reductions from what was emitted in 1990. So a certain “willingness to pay” logic has
also been incorporated.152
But the specific country commitments were in the end mainly the result of
heavy political wrangling and momentum. While the EU pushed for a flat reduction
of minus 10 to 15 percent below 1990 levels, the United States and Japan proposed
reductions of 0 to minus 5 percent, contingent on the level of flexibility allowed.153
Some countries strategically pegged their numbers to those of others, as was the case
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These principles and rules might change as we enter unto the second commitment period
and, as is hoped, developing countries undertake voluntary commitments of some sort to
reduce their emissions.
153

As explained in Chapter 4, the United States calculated that the inclusion of sinks would
enable it to add three percentage points, so while committing to a 5 percent reduction, they in
fact only had to achieve a 2 percent reduction from 1990 levels to achieve the target.
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with some EIT countries aspiring to EU or OECD membership. Canada had to
remain aligned with the other G-7 countries and, like Japan, accepted higher
commitments than it thought viable. Australia instead felt no such obligations and
resisted everything but a large allowance. As Grubb (1999: 116) says:
The numbers can only be understood as the outcome of a highly political
process arising from the clash between competing numerical aims, structural
visions, and root conceptions of political imperative –all combined with the
personal and political dynamics of the final days at Kyoto.

Determining the time frame
Once countries jointly agree in an international treaty to binding
commitments to cut back greenhouse gas emissions by a certain date in the future,
what should the timetable to do so be? Given countries’ different contributions to
the problem and different histories of energy use, what should be the reference from
which to start counting? What would be a fair deadline for all to demonstrate
progress and comply?
Already the idea of taking a specific year as a reference was a carry-over
from the 1992 Framework Convention, inscribed in the “grandfathering principle,”
whereby responsibility lay in historic contributions to the accumulation of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The reference year used in the Convention was
1990 because it was the year when, in endorsing the IPCC’s First Assessment
Report, the international community had formally recognized for the first time that
climate change was a problem that had to be dealt with. The choice of 1990 as a
baseline favored some countries and injured others: it didn’t recognize Japan’s and
France’s move towards reduced emissions before 1990, from more efficient energy
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use and nuclear power substitution programs respectively. Conversely, the fall of
the Soviet Union and the transition from centrally planned economies to a market
economy left many countries in Eastern Europe already with a 20 to 35 percent
lower level of emissions in 1995 than in 1990 –and up to 50 percent in the Baltics
and Ukraine. Even in Russia, where restructuring was slow (partly because of
continued subsidies and non-payment of domestic energy production; see Grubb
2001: 83), 1994 emission levels were 30 percent below those in 1990. This trend
had more or less stabilized by 1995, and emissions in many states of eastern and
central Europe had started to show an increase again in 1996. Still, with emissions
trading in place, this meant there was a bundle of free credits that were not the
result of deliberate cutbacks in emissions but a mere matter of economic
restructuring. As noted above, this came to be known as the problem of “hot air,”
and it has hardly been resolved.154 But these were all part of the trade-backs in the
negotiations, and in the end, the baseline year of 1990 was maintained to avoid
rewarding countries who had done nothing to limit emissions since the Convention
process was begun (Grubb 2001: 72).155
As to by when, the 1992 Framework Convention centered on reductions by
a specific target year. Yet emissions fluctuate from year to year, depending on the
weather and economic cycles. An average over several years made more sense, but
how many and when? Three years seemed too short to even out variations; four
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Fear of repercussions affecting the public image of buyers has tempered so far the sale of
hot air: many countries are shying away from buying what are commonly perceived as fake
credits. However, this might change as the commitment deadline nears in 2012.
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Still, some eastern European countries were allowed to declare a base year other than 1990
(Protocol article 3.5), and 1995 was established as the base year for the three “trace industrial
gases”: hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)
(Protocol article 3.8).
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years would coincide with the United States political cycle. Moreover, the
deadline had to be far enough in time to allow countries to adopt the changes but
not so far that it escaped electoral cycles and industry planning. The European
Union, AOSIS and others pushed for early action, but the United States, with a
recalcitrant Senate and heavy industry lobbying, knew it would be impossible to
implement the necessary political and institutional adjustments any time soon. The
United States therefore proposed a series of budget periods starting in 2010 and the
possibility of “banking” and borrowing unused credits from future commitment
periods. Although the idea of borrowing from the future was rejected, the proposal
of several commitment periods and the possibility of banking were retained. The
final compromise date was set for a first commitment period between 2008 and
2012, and a clause was inserted whereby “demonstrable progress” had to made by
2005.156

Introducing flexibility
The basket of gases
Although CO2 is the main and most widespread greenhouse gas, methane
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) , as well as so-called trace industrial gases
(Hydrofluorcarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PCFs) and Suphur hexafluoride
(SF6) ) have important and pervasive impacts on climate change. The first three
gases had in fact been considered together for a long time. The latter three received
increased attention given their very long atmospheric lifetimes and rising emissions.
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A telling example of the difficulty of negotiations was the initial opposition by developing
countries to this extended period partly because of a misunderstanding in the US’s use of the
words “budget period,” with its monetary references. See Grubb 2001: 69.
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During the negotiations, Parties generally agreed that all greenhouse gases
not covered elsewhere should be included. A precedent already existed under the
Montreal Protocol, which considers a “basket” of gases measured according to their
“ozone depleting potential.” The United States argued, under its “comprehensive
approach,” that including the aggregate level of the six greenhouse gases, measured
according to their global warming potential (GWP), had both economic and
environmental benefits.157 Instead, concerned about the technical difficulties and
any advantages this might give the United States, the EU favored a basket of only
the first three greenhouse gases, with the three industrial trace gases regulated
separately. Japan and AOSIS proposed regulating them all separately.158
The problem is that calculation of the GWP for the six greenhouse gases is
not precise. Besides, the industrial trace gases have extremely long atmospheric
lifetimes, going from between 1.5 and 264 years for HFCs, to between 2,600 and
50,000 years in the case of PCFs, and 3,200 years for SF6. But GWP is calculated
on the basis of one hundred years. Another problem is that calculating emissions
from the various gases varies considerably between countries and sources. In the
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Global warming potential is an index describing the radiative characteristics of different
greenhouse gases based on the combined effect of the time that they remain in the atmosphere
and their effectiveness in absorbing outgoing infrared radiation, relative to carbon dioxide
(IPCC 2001, TAR Synthesis Report: 155).
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Amongst developed countries, only Japan initially opposed the inclusion of a basket of
greenhouse gases, since carbon dioxide in Japan accounts for more than 94 percent of these.
In comparison, in the US and most of Europe, non-fossil fuel CO2 emissions account for
15-20 percent, and reach up to 50 percent in some developing countries. Besides, the
growth in CFC replacements in Japan as a result of regulations under the Montreal Protocol
also meant that the inclusion of the three industrial trace gases, HFC, PFC and SF6, was to
Japan’s disadvantage (Grubb 1999: 75).
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case of methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture, the differences between their
estimates can run as high as 50 percent (Grubb 1999: 74).
Still, the efficiency argument was hard to resist, in particular since the
inclusion of different greenhouse gases together in a “basket” made it easier to
adopt stronger emission targets than if only carbon dioxide were considered especially so in the case of methane, a gas that is easier to control and the emissions
of which were already declining in several industrialized countries.159 The ethical
problem of equating “survival emissions” from methane that result from subsistence
agriculture for example, with all other non-vital ones, was only raised during the
negotiations by some developing countries (Gupta 2001). But the apparently
pragmatic allure of the approach meant that it was hardly discussed and was soon
widely accepted as common sense.160

The “EU bubble”
Another intrinsic element of flexibility was introduced with the sharing of
reduction commitments by the countries under the European Union. As a collective,
supranational institution, and party to the UNFCCC, the European Union had
adopted a collective emission reduction target of 10 percent, which, given the
European common market and common laws, was to be shared by the EU member
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They had grown in the United States, Canada, Norway, and Greece in 1995-96 relative to
1990.
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The problem with imprecision in calculating the GWP potential was resolved with the
political decision to adopt 1995 GWP values provided by the IPCC in its Second Assessment
Report, which are based on the greenhouse effect of the different gases over a 100-year time
horizon. In addition to these, other time horizons may be used by Parties for information
purposes only (Decision 2/CP.3)
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countries. At the time of the negotiations, in 1996-1997, emissions had declined in
Germany and in the UK relative to 1990 levels.161 But they had increased in most
countries of the EU, other than in France, where they had remained stable. When
the allocation of reduction targets for each member country was completed there
was a huge variation in the distribution, with decreases of 25 percent for some
countries such as Germany, Denmark and Austria, and an allowance on emission
increases relative to 1990 for the poorer states, which went up to a 40 percent
increase in emissions for Portugal. Strategically, although this presented
complications for convincing some developing countries to engage in reduction
commitments,162 the United States backed this as “zero-cost emission trade,” and in
so doing, obliged the EU to accept emissions trading (Grubb 1999: 86). In other
words, while the EU conceived of the bubble as a non-market allocation, the United
States saw it as trade, and by reframing the language in this way, disarmed the EU
of reasons to reject emissions trading.

The flexible mechanisms
As noted earlier, the Protocol created three linked flexible mechanisms to help
Parties achieve their reduction commitments. These are:
161

These reductions were largely to do with factors other than climate change policy: in the
case of Germany it was the integration of the former Democratic Republic of Germany, and
in the UK the so-called “dash for gas” which went alongside electricity privatization (Grubb
1999: 81).
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At that time, with a 40 percent increase allowance in emissions relative to 1990 for
Portugal and allowances for Spain and others, the adoption of emission reduction targets for
large developing countries needed more argument and convincing. Part of the problem was
that the EU had been pushing for a flat emission reduction target for all countries, and was
unable to secure it even for itself. In the end, countries adopted wide ranging reduction targets
that responded less to any reality and more to political bargaining and will during the Protocol
negotiations at Kyoto.

121
1) Emissions trading, which allows for trading of assigned amount units (AAUs)
between Annex I countries (or more precisely, between Annex B countries with
reduction commitments). Because trading in emissions may be highly profitable, and
given that enforcement of compliance under an international environmental regime
could be weak, countries agreed to maintain in their inventories a certain level of
credits as a reserve (called the Commitment Period Reserve). To ensure that breaches
are minimized, all trading is recorded in the International Transaction Log kept by the
UNFCCC secretariat.
2) Joint Implementation allows for receiving credits from an emission reduction
project in another Annex I country. It applies mainly to projects implemented in one
of the countries with economies in transition (EITs) in Eastern Europe, and results
in Emission Reduction Units (ERUs). Because both Parties involved –the host
country and the buyer of credits- have reduction commitments, the rules applied are
less complicated than for CDM projects, where the host country has no reduction
commitments.

3) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), also called “the Kyoto surprise,” allows
for Annex I countries to invest in an emission reduction project in a non-Annex I
country and use the resulting credits to meet their commitments.163 The credits
acquired under the CDM are called Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). As
stated in Protocol article 12,
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This actually refers either to the Annex I countries themselves, or to private or public
entities within those countries.
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The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties
not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties
included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their commitments under
Article 3.
This is the only mechanism with a world reach and its stated primary
purpose is that of contributing to sustainable development in developing countries.
As such, the CDM is supposed to orient the future development of the less
industrialized countries down a more sustainable path, and to prepare developing
countries to contribute to mitigation without undertaking binding commitments.
However, because the market offer is potentially unlimited and developing
countries have no reduction commitments, both seller and buyer have an incentive
to inflate the emission reductions achieved. It was the most innovative creation to
come out of Kyoto and the most complex one.
The history of how the CDM came about is worth recounting. Shortly after
the 1992 Earth Summit a number of countries had started to experiment with an
early form of joint implementation, in particular after the Berlin Mandate
established a pilot phase for these so-called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ).
Most notable was the United States, which formed the US Initiative on Joint
Implementation (USIJI), and financed twenty-five projects representing a total
investment of $450 million (Grubb 1999: 101). The majority of these projects were
in Latin America and involved sinks (see Chapter 7). Other pilot projects were
financed by the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, France, and Japan. This was also
the time when the World Bank created the prototype Global Carbon Fund to
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provide funding for initial project costs. AIJ projects were still pursued after
Kyoto, and by 1998 there were more than one hundred approved. And although
several developing countries were in favor of the idea, the G-77 and China as a bloc
opposed it, mainly on the basis of principle. They suspected this would be a way for
industrialized countries to buy their way into compliance, without taking action at
home. Many also feared that the easiest emission reduction projects would be taken
up by Annex I countries, so that when in the future they were faced with reduction
commitments, only the more expensive options would be left. These fears were
aggravated when contemplating sinks, which appeared as industrialized countries
occupying land in developing countries and taking it away from agriculture or other
productive activities while continuing their emissions of greenhouse gases, all of
which prompted accusations from some quarters of “carbon colonialism.”
Meanwhile, in a totally different context, Brazil tabled a proposal for a
Clean Development Fund whereby Annex I countries which were found in default
of their reduction commitments would pay a penalty that would be used to support
projects in developing countries. The idea of a financial penalty for non-compliance
was unacceptable to Annex I countries, in particular to the United States, but the G77, though still unsure about the details of the proposal, supported it. Then, as
Grubb says, “a remarkable twist on the proposal had occurred to one or two key
people” (Grubb 1999: 102).164 It involved undertaking a project in a developing
country for the equivalent amount of carbon in default. The United States
delegation, seeing the similarities of this approach to joint implementation, which
they had for years tried to have accepted, went quickly down to Brazil. They came
164

Among these was clearly the head of the Brazilian delegation.
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back, and the proposal that was once a penalty for not complying had become
investment contributing to compliance and, as such, “the idea of a penalty on
governments was transformed into a mechanism for investment by companies”
(Grubb 1999: 103). A levy of 2 percent of the number of CERs issued for every
project is to go to an adaptation fund for vulnerable countries. Projects undertaken
in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as well as small-scale projects are exempt
from this levy. To ensure transparency and accountability, the whole mechanism is
subject to control by the CDM Executive Board, which in turn responds to the
COP/MOP. And so the joint implementation that developing countries had fiercely
resisted was suddenly, in the last hours of Kyoto, the one mechanism for their
participation and what the US had always wanted to expand the range of
opportunities for mitigation.165

In sum
There is not one simple way to explain how the Kyoto Protocol with its
flexible mechanisms came to be. Clearly, political and economic reasons go far in
explaining how the final result resembles closely the US proposal. But it is also true
that the more the United States pressured developing countries, the more resistance
it generated, so that in the end there was no agreement at all on future reduction
commitments on their part.166 It is also true that the US industry, with all its might,
165

Humphreys et al. (1998) call it “the original flexibility mechanism,” meaning the
acceptable version of the original Joint Implementation not accepted by developing
countries.
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The lack of an article addressing developing countries’ reduction commitments is probably
the only significant issue where the United States did not achieve its purpose. Almost
everything else in the Protocol was envisaged in the US negotiating position. The basic
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opposed the process, and still the process went through.

In this respect, Grubb

draws attention to the fact that, for all the talk of the state’s dismissal, the Protocol
was very much a creation of nation-states. In the face of opposition by industry on
reduction commitments on the one hand, and by NGOs on market mechanisms on
the other, governments struck a deal against all odds.
Still, from the reduction numbers agreed upon to the CDM, it was all very
much a surprise, impossible to predict only weeks ahead. Besides the political and
economic realities, and the hegemony of efficiency as a value in and of itself among
the political class negotiating the Protocol, there was a lot of personal creativity,
vision and strategic maneuvering. This was evident from the Brazilian proposal and
twist, to the political savvy of Chairman Raúl Estrada, who more than once brought
the gavel down on political heavyweights like India, China and the EU as they
raised their flags to oppose the adoption of one or another paragraph, like when
adopting the article on emissions trading (see Grubb 1999: 96). Reportedly, Estrada
also ignored requests from the floor when the time to adopt the whole Protocol
came, stating a rotund “it is so decided” and gaveling down before OPEC had the
chance to object. Only this way could there have been an agreement.

structure of the Protocol is thus very much a creation of the United States, in particular of the
Clinton administration. This is another great irony of the process: that the main proponent and
architect of the Protocol became its strongest and most daunting opponent. Yet the turn
around and dismissal of the process by this most powerful player enhanced cohesion and
determination among the rest of the players to ratify the Protocol, almost as a matter of pride.
167

Grubb (1999: 112) notes that they threw probably $100 million into fighting it. Some
people have pointed out that other industries, in particular the insurance industry, were in
favor of a deal (see, for example, Newell and Paterson 1998). It is arguably a split among
industry, and the allegiances of that faction with those in government, that allowed the
Protocol to go through. One US administration later and different allegiances, the Protocol
was rejected.
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On a more theoretical note, it is possible to see that, given this approach to
the problem of climate change, the seeds were sown for what I refer to as capital
involution. A simple idea in principle, that of creating commodities out of nature
and a market to trade them, became a pattern that at every repetition and turn would
get more and more elaborate and more rigid and ensnared. The history of defining
and accounting for sinks –the ultimate flexible mechanism- which followed from
the package of decisions adopted at Kyoto, is a good example of this ensnarling.
The next chapters are an attempt to trace this process of involution.
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Chapter 4
Negotiating sinks
When Parties agreed at Kyoto to a Protocol committing industrialized
countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to a percentage of what they
emitted in 1990 by the period 2008-2012, they decided to allow accounting for the
sources and removals of carbon dioxide by trees and vegetation under a category
known as Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). In counting towards
their reduction targets, industrialized countries would have to add but could also
subtract the tons of carbon removed from the atmosphere by these terrestrial ‘sinks’
from the tons of carbon emitted by all other sources. This was done in the spirit of
pragmatism, as part of the “comprehensive approach” to climate change, justified by
cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Yet it is clear now that the inclusion of sinks was
everything but straightforward or practical. When the time came to define the
modalities and rules for how this would be done, three years after Kyoto, the inability
to agree on what exactly to count as a removal by a sink and how many of these could
be used to cancel out emissions led to the total breakdown of the climate change
negotiations.
To salvage the Protocol and allow countries to move forward, a “negotiating
package” was put together six months later. For the purpose of meeting a country’s
national reduction commitments, the so-called “Bonn Agreements for the
Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action” included a decision to allow
accounting for forest management, cropland management, grazing land management
and revegetation. A cap for each country was established on forest management -
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although, at the request of Russia, this cap may be reconsidered. A deal was also
struck to exclude avoided deforestation from the CDM and allow only afforestation
and reforestation project activities. A limit was placed on the amount of emission
reductions an Annex I country could claim from these projects under the CDM,
amounting to a maximum of 1 percent of the country’s base year emissions for each
of the five years of the commitment period (or roughly 20 percent of the country’s
target -see Aukland et al. 2002). Governing all these decisions, a number of principles
were agreed upon, with the goal of deterring abuses from LULUCF accounting
activities. These principles included, among others, the need to exclude the mere
presence of carbon stocks from the accounting, and the need to contribute to the
conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of natural resources. So even
though in effect the decision brought down the reduction commitments agreed to at
Kyoto from 5 percent to possibly 2.5 percent compared to 1990 levels if all provisions
were used,168 and even though the United States –the largest emitter and strongest
supporter of sinks- had by then withdrawn from the Protocol, the matter of which
sinks to include, and up to what limit, was settled in principle.
But the technical details and unresolved questions appeared more daunting the
more negotiators got into it. Some of the basic questions that had to be resolved
included: How does one define a forest in a way that applies to all countries and
contexts? Even the common definition of forests has changed in the last few years,
having evolved from notions that included the idea of climax, to references to
ecosystem, and most recently images of an “erratic, shifting mosaic of trees.” But
then what about savannas and woodlands? And short shrubs, mangroves, or
168

See Gillon 2001; see also Ott 2001.
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marshland? And forest transitions? And similarly, how does one define
afforestation, reforestation and deforestation? Other equally tricky questions were:
What makes the removal ‘human-induced’? How does one set apart natural
regeneration or fertilization from other natural processes or past practices? What
happens when the carbon reverts back to the atmosphere as a result of forest fires,
pests and other natural disturbances? Will setting aside land as carbon stock result in
other areas being affected from the displacement of previous activities? How does one
interpret ‘since 1990’? Is it fair to use the same baselines for all countries? How does
one verify and ensure accuracy? Clearly these questions were hardly just technical. In
fact, any call to distinguish between political and technical issues on LULUCF
matters was quickly considered politically motivated.169
Many of these questions have now been resolved through a mix of legal and
accounting niceties. Some of them have not been settled, and will still be discussed
several years down the road. But there is one thing on which everybody agrees: that
the matter of sinks under the Protocol and the final language on LULUCF is
“complex, disjointed and inaccessible” (Yamin 1998: 119). The best way to
understand it is to attend to the history of the negotiations in detail. This is what this
chapter is about. After a brief summary of the carbon cycle and some notes on the
negotiation process, the first section goes into the history of the negotiations, starting
with the inclusion of sinks under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and their ensuing incorporation under the Protocol. There is then a section
exploring some of the problems that had to be resolved in defining sinks before
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negotiations could advance further, and the resolution of some of these problems
in the negotiations. The chapter thus recounts the incorporation of sinks within the
Protocol, a process that has been called by a seasoned observer and negotiator as “one
of the less inspiring examples of the development of international environmental law”
(Fry 2002: 159).

An explanatory note on sinks under the UNFCCC and the Protocol
Under the UNFCCC, all countries are expected to count their emissions and
removals from land use change and forestry in their national inventories. Under the
Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries with binding commitments (known as Annex
I countries) may count towards their reduction target the emissions and removals from
certain land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities.170 These
provisions are covered in Protocol Article 3.3, 3.4, and 3.7.
Under Article 3.3, in meeting their reduction commitments in the first
commitment period (2008-2012), Annex I countries shall take into account the
removals from afforestation and reforestation, and the emissions from deforestation
(ARD).171 Under Article 3.4 (referred to as “additional activities”) these countries
may also count emissions and removals from “additional categories of humaninduced activities in agricultural soils in the land-use change and forestry sector” in
the first commitment period if such activities have taken place since 1990. Otherwise,
they will apply only in future commitment periods. These additional activities are:
170

The reduction target for most parties is a percentage of what their emissions were in 1990 called the base year or baseline -except for Bulgaria (whose base year is 1998), Hungary
(1985-87), Poland (1988), Romania (1989), and Slovenia (1986).
171

Article 3.3 is often short handed as “ARD” for afforestation, reforestation and
deforestation.
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forest management, cropland management, grazing land management, and revegetation. Article 3.7, which applies mainly to Australia, is a special provision that
allows a country to deduct from its emissions in 1990 those that resulted from land
use change and forestry.172
Besides, removals from sinks that may count towards a Party’s reductions
commitments can also be the result of “project-based activities” under the two
“flexible mechanisms” created by the Protocol: Joint Implementation, and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). Joint Implementation refers to projects undertaken
jointly by two Annex I countries. These are usually projects financed by one of the
richer industrialized countries in a central or eastern European one, where the cost of
reducing emissions is considerably lower (see Chapter 3).
All other projects undertaken in developing countries fall under the CDM.
These projects have special provisions because developing countries have no binding
commitments to reduce their emissions under the Protocol, and as part of a market
mechanism, a reduction in the host country allows for an emission in the buyer
country. Moreover, the purpose of this mechanism is, besides mitigating climate
change, to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development. Given
the complexities and particularities of including carbon stored in trees in an
accounting system (such as non-permanence, the risk of leakage and others -explained
below), in the land use change and forestry sector only afforestation and reforestation
projects are allowed in the first commitment period. Moreover, to limit the credits
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In all other cases, when they establish their base year emissions in 1990, countries count
only emissions from sectors other than LULUCF –without removals. But to meet their targets
at the end of the commitment period, they count emissions minus removals from LULUCF
(the so-called “gross-net” approach).
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from projects in developing countries and ensure that there are meaningful
reductions of emissions at the source in industrialized countries, there is a ceiling
determining the maximum number of credits that can be gained.173

The Scientific Understanding Of Sinks174
Carbon is present in the universe in more compounds than all other elements
combined. From the most massive stars to the smallest creatures, it is the central
element in most compounds of which organisms are composed. It alone accounts for
18 percent of a human’s body weight. And it is this same carbon that is used in
archaeology and geology, as radioactive element Carbon 14, to determine the age of
objects and natural remains. Combined with silicon in the 1940s, it produced the
computer semiconductors that revolutionized global communications (Christianson
1999: 30).
Of the approximately 400 Gigatonnes175 of carbon (Gt C) that have been
released into the atmosphere in the past 200 years from fossil fuel burning and land
use change, only about half has remained in the atmosphere. The other half has been
absorbed back by the Earth in what are known as carbon reservoirs or ‘stocks’-mainly
carbon minerals in rocks, carbon stored in the oceans, organic matter in the soil, and
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See Introduction and Conclusion on the creation of scarcity.
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For a clear and concise summary of the carbon cycle and sinks, see Gillon 2001 (Gillon
was formerly a physical sciences editor at Nature magazine).
175

One Gigatonne (Gt) = 1000 million tons.
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living vegetation. Insofar as they "drain away" atmospheric carbon, these are
known, in the words of the UNFCCC, by “the unglamorous term of sinks.”176
This draining is part of the global carbon cycle, a process that started with the
emergence of life on earth and the conversion of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
and the oceans into innumerable organic and inorganic compounds on land and in the
sea (IPCC 2000: 29). Over millions of years different ecosystems evolved to establish
patterns of carbon flows through the global environmental system. This natural
exchange of carbon between the atmosphere, the oceans and terrestrial and freshwater
systems varies from one place to another and between seasons, years, decades and
centuries. While carbon in rocks and sediments takes thousands of years or more to
settle, the rate of absorption and release of carbon from oceans, soils and vegetation is
in the range of a century or less, in line with short- and medium-term fluctuations in
the climate.177
Oceans contain about fifty times more carbon than the atmosphere in the form
of mostly dissolved inorganic carbon created when microorganisms and other forms
176

See http://www.unfccc.int under “What can be done?” and “Expanding Forests.” October
2004. The IPCC defines sinks as “any process or mechanism which removes a greenhouse
gas, an aerosol, or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere. A given pool
(reservoir) can be a sink for atmospheric carbon if, during a given time interval, more carbon
is flowing into it than is flowing out” (IPCC 2000, Special Report on LULUCF. Appendix III,
Pg. 20). In that sense, sinks is more of a verb than a noun (in that it indicates an action), since
it refers to carbon reservoirs that are accumulating carbon from the atmosphere faster than
they are releasing it. If, instead, the reservoir starts releasing carbon faster than accumulating
it, the same reservoir becomes a ‘source.’ This is the case of fossil fuel reserves, depleting
thousands of times faster than the geological process at which they form.
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According to the IPCC report on LULUCF, from 1850 to 1998 approximately 270 (±30)
Gt C were emitted into the atmosphere from fossil fuel burning and cement production, and
136 (±55) Gt C from land use change, mostly from forest ecosystems. More than half of the
total of these (ca. 230 (±60) Gt C) have been taken up by oceans and terrestrial ecosystems in
approximately equal amounts, leaving about 43 percent retained in the atmosphere. Thus
oceans and terrestrial ecosystems have been, on balance, a comparatively small net source of
carbon during this period (IPCC 2000: 29).
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of higher life that consume phytoplankton die and settle deep down in the ocean
waters. There, carbon is stored for relatively long periods –that is, until the oceans
turn over. This turn over happens slowly but constantly, in cycles of about 1000 years.
Surface waters, where most of the carbon from the atmosphere is dissolved, move
downwards (mainly in the North Atlantic and Southern Oceans), and in so doing carry
dissolved carbon dioxide to the deep. Because carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
dissolves near the surface of the oceans, the greater the concentration of carbon in the
atmosphere, the greater its concentration in surface waters –to a limit, when these
water become saturated.
This two-fold process of carbon uptake –through microscopic marine plants or
phytoplankton, and through the mixing between surface and deep waters- is how 75
percent of the carbon released from human activities has been stored. Yet, as noted,
this uptake of atmospheric carbon is limited by the solubility of CO2 in seawater
(IPCC 2000: 31), and by the slow rate of water turn over compared to the rapid
increase in anthropogenic emissions. This ‘sluggishness’ makes oceans a ‘buffer’
against climate change.
In contrast, although terrestrial vegetation and soils contain only three and one
half times as much carbon as the atmosphere, their exchanges are much more
dynamic, and it is the terrestrial biosphere that largely drives inter-annual variations.
These exchanges of carbon between land and the atmosphere depend mainly on the
balance between carbon uptake through photosynthesis and plant growth, and carbon
release through respiration of plants and microbes in the soil and decay. Through the
process of photosynthesis plants absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and with
water, turn it into glucose and oxygen to grow (as noted in the UNFCCC website, the
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proof for any skeptic of the potential of solar power ). Some of this carbon is
released back into the atmosphere through the complementary process of respiration,
as plants break down organic compounds to derive energy. The rate of absorption
continues until plants reach maturity, and then it more or less stabilizes. Once plants
decay, burn or are cut, carbon is released back to the atmosphere.
Thus, the dynamics of the terrestrial ecosystem are influenced by a variety of
biogeochemical cycles, in particular the carbon cycle, the nutrient cycles and the
circulation of water –all of which are constantly modified by direct human activities
as well as indirectly by climate changes. This way, changes in climate and climate
variability have an effect on the uptake and release of CO2 from vegetation and soils,
and vice versa.
This more dynamic system results in greater fluctuations in the rate of
absorption, which varies even from year to year. So that while oceans appear to be
absorbing carbon at a relatively constant rate of around 2 GtC/yr, carbon uptake by
land can go from being negligible as it was in the 1980s, to averaging between 1 and
2 GtC/yr in the 1990s (IPCC TAR 2001). These fluctuations in the rate of absorption
by land may be associated with El Niño events every four to seven years, when warm
and dry weather makes forests act as net emission sources. Then, in the intervening
years, cool and wet weather makes forests become sinks again. Recent El Niño events
(1983, 1987 and 1998) for example, were correlated with high atmospheric CO2
growth and a lower than normal uptake of CO2 by oceans and terrestrial

178

See www.unfccc.int

136
ecosystems.
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Then, between 1991 and 1993, the trend was reversed (IPCC 2000:

32).
Overall, the IPCC Special Report on LULUCF calculates that between 1980
and 1998 terrestrial ecosystems have served as a small net sink for carbon dioxide.
This was so despite the fact that deforestation and changes in land-use during this
period, mainly in the tropics, were responsible for around 1.6 and 1.7 Gt C emitted
per year. The reasons for this balance are not clear, but include natural regrowth,
indirect effects of human activities such as atmospheric CO2 fertilization and nutrient
deposition, and climate change itself, both natural and human-induced (IPCC 2000).
This uptake of atmospheric carbon by forest ecosystems is likely to continue
for a number of decades as an indirect result of human activities. However, precisely
because of climate change, the sink capacity of forest ecosystems may diminish to the
point where forests become a source of CO2. This is due to possible limitations in the
capacity of ecosystems for additional uptake given nutrients and other biophysical
factors, and limitations in the rate of photosynthesis of some plants, which may
instead increase heterotrophic respiration as a result of higher temperatures. Some
recent studies have further pointed out that the sink capacity of terrestrial systems
may be much more limited than was previously thought. Instead of decades and
centuries storing carbon, trees in the Amazon seem to be quickly transferring carbon
to rivers where just after five years much of it is released back into the atmosphere
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This is so even as changes in ocean circulation that result from El Niño prevent offgassing
from deep waters, and thereby increase the sink capacity of oceans (see Gillon 2001).
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(Mayorga 2005).

This loss of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere will likely be

amplified by the general ecosystem degradation expected from climate change effects
(IPCC 2000: 1.3.3).
Similarly, the biological uptake of carbon by oceans will probably increase in
the near future as sea surface temperature and chemical changes lead to an increased
growth of marine plants and algae. However, this increase would be offset by a
further slow down of the downward movement of carbon–rich surface waters under a
warmer climate.
It is crucial to note that, on the whole then, most researchers expect the sink
capacity of both land and oceans to diminish. For land sinks, this may be a matter of a
few decades, and some believe that terrestrial systems may disappear as sinks as early
as 2050 and then turn into a source. This would increase exponentially the overall
effects of climate change. In any case, it is clear that as long as carbon dioxide
emissions continue at their current level, sinks will probably never lead to a decrease
in atmospheric carbon dioxide (Gillon 2001). In the meantime, all possibilities are
explored, including fertilizing the oceans with iron ore to promote the growth of
phytoplankton that absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.181
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Note the plumbing metaphors: rivers are explained as ‘pipes’ carrying some of the carbon
stored in the Amazon basin to the Atlantic –another important ‘sink’ of carbon. Trees are also
referred to as “biological scrubbers.”
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A couple of companies in the United States have started experimenting in this area and
acquiring the patents, with the hope that they may one day sell the emissions reductions (one
of the companies, Planktos Foundation, uses the Ragland, a historic wooden boat owned by
rock star Neil Young.) And although ocean researchers warn that such schemes could disrupt
marine ecology, there is no international law against ocean fertilizing (Schiermeier 2003).
The case recalls cloud seeding in the 60s and 70s.
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Negotiating sinks
With the exception of tropical forests, the carbon stock is much more
prevalent in soils than in vegetation. The soil of boreal forests for example contains
five times more carbon stock than its vegetation, and in the case of temperate
grasslands the carbon stock ratio is 32 times more in soils relative to that in vegetation
(IPCC 2000: 31). This has been advanced by some as an advantage of carbon
sequestration by sinks to mitigate climate change, in the sense that in counting mainly
trees, the actual carbon uptake is in fact larger than what is accounted for (see
Fearnside 2001).182 Others, however, point to the reversibility of the carbon uptake
capacity of sinks and the complex and delicate feedback mechanisms that regulate it
to argue against their usefulness in achieving quantified emission reductions
objectives.
The inclusion of sinks in the Protocol has been a most divisive issue, breaking
alliances or weakening joint positions among otherwise negotiating partners and
sharply splitting the environmental movement (Fearnside 2001). These differences
were such that, together with limits to the flexible mechanisms, they led to the official
breakdown of COP negotiations in The Hague in 2000.183 What follows recounts the
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As Fearnside (2001) states, “More carbon can be maintained in the forests than the amount
of carbon credit granted. In this way, even if the carbon in the forests is temporary, at some
point a net benefit exists for the climate from having the forest project instead of a smaller
reduction in fossil-fuel emissions” (Fearnside 2001: 3).
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In the words of Jurgen Trittin, German Environmental Minister, “The refusal of some
industrialized nations to give climate protection priority at home caused the failure. It also
failed because industrialized countries wanted to count too much of their natural forests as
sources of human-made reduction, rather than actually cutting greenhouse gases” (quoted in
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negotiating process –a process which, according to an experienced observer and
participant, was “typified by confusion, manipulated science, obfuscation and poor
decision making” (Fry 2002: 159).

Notes on the negotiation process
Before going into the history of the negotiations, there are two key aspects of
the climate change regime that help to understand how sinks came to be included in
the Protocol. One is that the decision of what counts is first negotiated by Parties at
UNFCCC meetings, then converted into legal language in the drafting process, and
only later is science called upon, via the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), to define and elaborate on the means to make the decision operational. That
is, there is first a politically negotiated decision, then a consensual legal rule, and then
a scientifically-based definition -three different languages and thought processes,
governed by different concerns, building one upon the other, rather disjointedly. The
political decision results from and reflects power relations. In order to make this
decision agreeable to all (part of an international treaty agreed to by consensus), this
political outcome has to be translated into treaty language –that is, legal text made up
of an uneven combination of very ambiguous and very precise text. And out of these
the scientific clarification is supposed to come up with fair, neutral and simple
definitions applicable to all.
Arriving at consensus decisions at the UN therefore requires the combined
work of politicians, who lack technical knowledge, and specialists and technocrats,
Agarwal et al. 2001: 255) (See also Grubb and Yamin 2001, Ott 2001, and several others on
COP 6).
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who lack a political mandate. Given time and size constraints (the fact that there
are more than 180 Parties, divided in groups, speaking different languages), this
combined work has to be finely tuned, and the way one process feeds into the other is
key to achieving agreement and is part of the UN rules of procedure.
Thus the decision that sinks could be used by a country to meet its
commitments under the Protocol was made as part of a negotiating package at Kyoto
in December 1997 in the overall context of negotiations on emissions reduction
commitments. In the drafting process sinks were included as those “resulting from
direct human-induced land use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation,
reforestation and deforestation since 1990” under Protocol Article 3.3, and as
“additional human-induced activities (...) in the agricultural soils and the land-use
change and forestry categories” under Protocol Article 3.4.
It was then up to the IPCC to decipher the compromise text and come up with
a set of definitions for those activities which had already been decided. These had to
be applicable to all Parties, simple, subject to verifiable accounting and measures,
based on existing and readily available data, and consistent with the aims of the
UNFCCC and the Protocol (IPCC 2000 [SPM]: vii). Although the writing of the
IPCC’s Special Report on LULUCF was not devoid of political wrangling –on the
contrary, the text was as difficult to negotiate as many other items under the Protocol
and its status as an impartial piece of scientific writing remains controversial (see
below)- it was still a matter of defining and giving sinks scientific credibility. This
had to be done in such a way as to accommodate a political decision that had little to
do with workable science and more to do with trade-offs between different States’
perceived interests in competition with each other, and which was further transcribed
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in legal text couched in ambiguity in order to make it palatable to all. Critical
questions that the IPCC had to resolve included how to distinguish direct humaninduced from indirect human-induced activities and natural environmental variability
affecting carbon uptake and release; the implications of different definitions or sets of
definitions; and differentiating between direct human activities before 1990 and after
1990. At least one of these questions –that relating to distinguishing between direct
human-induced, and indirect and natural effects, also known as “factoring out”- was
simply not resolved (see section on The problem with sinks).
Yet once back at the negotiating table, the IPCC’s findings are not necessarily
taken into account. This is so in spite of the fact that many of the delegates approving
and authorizing the IPCC texts are also those negotiating the decisions at the COPs.
At COP 6 in The Hague, for example, countries made precious little use of the IPCC
Special Report on LULUCF, as demonstrated by the size of the caps that some of
them proposed, and the complete lack of sense of the implications of their proposals
for reporting and compliance procedures. As Grubb and Yamin (2001) note, the final
negotiations came down to “pure ‘horsetrading’” and any relevant technical
information was only used to further reinforce original positions.
A second related aspect about sinks is that they are mainly a negotiating tool
in the wider context of overall emissions reduction commitments. For the largest
emitters and several other countries with important forestry or extensive agricultural
sectors (the United States, Australia, and Canada, as well as Russia, Norway and New
Zealand for example), including sinks in overall accounting allowed them to assume
the commitment to cut emissions much more easily. For the United States, including
broadly defined sinks in the accounting meant that its reduction target went down
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from 7 percent to 4 percent (CSE 1999: 72). Sinks were thus the ultimate flexible
mechanism. And these countries negotiated accordingly (see below).
But sinks were also of interest to many Latin American countries and some
African ones, which saw them as a potential source of income in a sector where
foreign investment is scarce, and where the challenge is compounded by international
pressure for forest conservation. For some poor African countries, whose emissions
from fossil fuel burning account for less than 2 percent of the global total, they
represented the only opportunity to participate in the Kyoto market (see Goetze 1999).
And precisely because they meant so much for some of the largest emitters,
countries like the small island states with no reduction commitments but with serious
concerns for the effects of climate change sometimes used sinks as a bargaining chip
to press for more substantive action on other issues, such as emissions from aviation
and maritime transport. A representative of the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS) referred informally to sinks as “the only leverage we have” (personal
communication).
In fact, sinks were used as a negotiating token when at COP 6 in The Hague,
in a last minute attempt to save the negotiations, the United States offered the EU to
settle for no sinks under the CDM if they were allowed under Protocol Article 3.4
(additional LULUCF activities) -even if in doing so, the United States was betraying
its Latin American partners (Fry 2002: 167; CSE 2001: 256). And today, as Parties
carefully initiate talks on the second commitment period as mandated in Protocol
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Article 9.2 (review of the protocol), some delegates will refuse to talk about sinks
until the rest is also on the table.184
Yet in many ways this bargaining chip grew out of proportion as people
started the work of trying to delimit and make carbon sequestration from land use
change quantifiable and verifiable. There is the widely held sense (based on many
personal interviews and casual comments) that very few people had any idea what
they were getting into. In the words of Fry, “[it] was like walking through a jungle
full of legal pitfalls, blind passages and tangled vines ready to trip the unwary
venturer at every step” (Fry 2002: 159). Simply, some of the technical challenges are
insurmountable. Something as fundamental as clearly distinguishing direct humaninduced changes from indirect and natural ones –something which, as Jenny Wong,
from the UNFCCC Secretariat, said, “will haunt us forever”- cannot be resolved
scientifically, and will have to go back to the negotiating table to find a political
solution.
These two aspects of the making of the climate change regime result in
significant disjunctures, holes and contradictions. Some of them are patched along the
way as negotiations continue and as practice becomes custom. But they mean that the
best way to understand how sinks came to be included in the Protocol is to revisit the
negotiation process and not to expect much coherence in the final outcome.

Sinks under the UNFCCC
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Personal communication with non-Annex I country delegates. Bonn, May 2005 (SB 22).
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Together with emissions trading, carbon sinks appeared very early on
under the “comprehensive approach” to climate change. Even before negotiations
started for the convention, the US government had included them as “negative
emissions” in “Concept Papers” prepared for the IPCC Response Strategy Working
Group in December 1989 (Bodansky 1993: 517).185 The United States also presented
them in a high-level government seminar held during the IPCC meetings in
Washington in 1990 (Grubb 1999: 77).
The “comprehensive approach” entailed collectively accounting for removals
as well as emissions of different greenhouse gases and measuring them according to a
single metric –that of their global warming potential (GWP).186 Until the Unites States
brought it up in 1989, sources and sinks had been considered separately. Both the
Toronto and the Noordwijk Conferences had focused on carbon dioxide emissions
from the energy and transport sector. Only the Noordwijk Declaration had
additionally called for a separate global target for forest growth of 12 million hectares
per year by the beginning of 2000, but this target was soon deemed politically
unviable given that any timetable or target for forest sinks was expected to affect
mostly developing countries (Bodansky 1993: 520; see Chapter 1). In fact, no
international environmental treaty –not the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF), nor the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) or the Convention to Combat
Desertification (CCD)- includes a mandate to increase forest cover or reduce
185

U.S. Concept Paper: Comprehensive Greenhouse Gas Approach to Addressing Climate
Change. December 29, 1989 (unpublished). See Bodansky 1993: 517.
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As noted earlier, global warming potential (GWP) is an index used to approximate “the
time-integrated warming effect of a unit mass of a given greenhouse gas in today’s
atmosphere, relative to that of carbon dioxide” (IPCC 2001, TAR Synthesis Report: 155)].
See Chapter 3.
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deforestation, as this is considered a “sovereignty issue” impinging on a country’s
right of use of its natural resources. Developing countries, in particular Brazil, have
been very successful at making this clear, and of all the international environmental
instruments to come out of the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the UNFF
is the one that most clearly has gone nowhere.187
The US position on sinks was also influenced by studies by Battelle, an
environmental management firm that promoted the use of sinks and changes in land
management practices (such as zero-tillage farming and erosion control) as quick
technological fixes which could provide affordable and efficient means to offset
emissions by enhancing the carbon storage capacity of soils (Lanchberry, personal
communication). Accordingly, the US proposal was for full carbon accounting.
Besides the United States, the “comprehensive approach” to climate change
was supported in the negotiations by Canada, Australia and New Zealand (the CANZ
group), as well as the majority of the Nordic countries and those under OPEC. Most
everybody else also approved of the approach in theory. Its clear advantage was that it
allowed countries to choose the most cost-effective emission reductions.
Instead, the discussions focused on whether to count gross greenhouse gas
emissions, that is emissions from all greenhouse gas sources without removals (or
emissions) from sinks, or whether to use net emissions, which count removals (or
emissions) by sinks in the calculation of total emissions. Again, the United States,
CANZ, OPEC and Finland, together with Brazil, supported the net emissions
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For a critical review of the various international environmental treaties, negotiations and
institutions, see Center for Science and Environment (CSE), Global Environmental
Negotiations Vol. 1 and 2.
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approach. Switzerland, Germany and Austria among others opposed it, citing the
lack of certainty in the accounting of removals by sinks (Bodansky 1993: 519).188
This matter also brought up the highly contentious question of accounting for
and allocating sinks under the global commons such as oceans. India suggested
allocation on a per capita basis -which, given its large population and low emissions,
resulted in negative net emissions- while Pacific islands proposed instead allocating
sinks based on a country’s exclusive economic zone. Given the impossibility of
agreement, the principle of equal rights to ocean sinks was left out, and sinks were not
defined by the INC (Bodansky 1993: 520).
In the end, in its typically “constructively ambiguous” way, the final text of
the Convention has a bit of everything. The fourth paragraph of the Convention’s
preamble, right after the recognition that the largest share of historical and current
greenhouse gas emissions originated in developed countries, notes it awareness “of
the role and importance of terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of
greenhouse gases.” UNFCCC Article 3 on Principles then calls for policies and
measures to “cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases.”
More precisely, UNFCCC Article 4.1 (d) requires all Parties to “promote sustainable
management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as
appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial,
coastal and marine ecosystems.” But the main obligation on sinks stems from
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There is a gap between the atmospheric uptake and carbon dioxide. As stated in the IPCC
1990 Scientific Assessment report: “the current quantitative estimates of sources and of sinks
and of CO2 do not balance; the atmospheric increase is less rapid than expected from carbon
cycle models.” (see Bodansky 1993: 519).
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UNFCCC Article 4.1 (b), which calls all Parties “to formulate, implement, publish
and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes
containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing emissions by sources
and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.” That is,
all Parties to the Convention are required to report annual emissions from sources and
sinks, and to implement mitigation measures that address them. Still, when referring
specifically to targets and timetables (or quasi-targets and quasi-timetables) for
developed countries in UNFCCC Article 4.2, the Convention text mentions only
emissions. 189

But accounting for sinks as part of quantified mitigation commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol was something else, and depending on the definitions and
modalities allowed, their effect could be as broad as to make any emissions limitation
unnecessary. According to the IPCC, terrestrial ecosystems now sequester globally an
average of 2.2 GtC per year through natural regeneration. If countries received credit
for even half of these not-human induced, indirect effects of sinks,190 they could meet
their commitments without any additional measures (IPCC 2000: 80). It was only in
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UNFCCC Article 4.2, specifically on developed countries commitments, states that Annex
I Parties "shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of
climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting
and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.” But later (subparagraph (b)), it
continues: “[…] with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol.” Consequently, in reviewing compliance, the UNFCCC Secretariat
prepares a report with aggregate trends for each country and across Annex I countries both
without and with sinks, but exclude sinks from the aggregate totals when addressing the
quantified aims of UNFCCC Article 4.2. (Yamin and Depledge 2004, Ch. 4, pg. 9).
190

Mainly naturally occurring carbon or nitrogen fertilization.
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the later stages of negotiations to the Protocol that countries realized how much
was at stake. This realization turned sinks into one of the most complicated and
controversial issues in the whole process.

Sinks under the Protocol
Although calculating removals from sinks is far from accurate, when numbers
began being crunched they showed that for most of the Scandinavian countries as well
as New Zealand, the United States, the Russian Federation and some Eastern
European countries, annual domestic sinks accounted for at least 10 percent of
national gross emissions alone, even without any direct policy to promote them. In
New Zealand, Sweden, Latvia and possibly Finland, for example, total net sinks could
absorb more than half of their total emissions (in Latvia accounting for sinks brought
down overall emissions in 1996 to 15 percent of their base year level)
(FCCC/CP/1998/INF.9; see also Grubb 1999: 78). The case was very different for
most of Western Europe, where high population densities and intensive land use
patterns limited the potential of domestic sinks to trim down emissions accounts.
Many developing countries under the G-77 saw sinks as yet another loophole
by some industrialized countries to avoid cutting back on emissions while giving the
impression of doing so. The inclusion of sinks under the CDM also brought up
sovereignty concerns relating to land use (see for example Brazil’s and Indonesia’s
sensitivity towards anything to do with regulating forests at the global level). But as
noted earlier, many countries, mainly Latin American ones, also saw the possibility of
additional resources and investment in the forestry sector or in conservation. In any
case, the United States made it clear that the inclusion of sinks allowed its offer of
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stabilization of emissions to be more significant, and with New Zealand, Canada
and others, forcefully argued that, “from an atmospheric point of view,” it made no
sense to exclude them under the Protocol.191

The road to Kyoto
Negotiations on the issue began in earnest only at the eighth meeting of the Ad
Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM 8) in October 1997.192 The negotiating
text, prepared a few months earlier (April 22, 1997), included a note on the range of
views on sinks. Some Parties advocated a “net” approach (Brazil, Iceland, Norway,
Russia Federation, United States); others included in their proposals “removals by
sinks” (Australia, the EU –though the EU later proposed that sinks be excluded from
the Kyoto target until additional research was available); and yet others explicitly
excluded sinks or omitted them (AOSIS, Czech Republic, Hungary et al., Japan and
Switzerland). The proposal by G-77/China, Peru and the Philippines on quantified
targets referred only to emissions, although sinks were mentioned in the chapeau
paragraph introducing the targets; meanwhile, Canada’s proposal covered both
sources and sinks. Only New Zealand proposed early on that sinks from certain listed
categories be added to a Party’s emission “budget”193 (Depledge 2000: 48, para. 226).
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As noted earlier, the inclusion of sinks allowed the United States to add three percentage
points to its reduction commitment (Grubb 1999: 117).
The AGBM was set up to start negotiations on a “protocol or other legal instrument.” It
met nine times between the first COP in Berlin in 1995 and COP 3 in Kyoto in 1997. See
Chapter 2.
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During informal consultations on the treatment of sinks by COP 3 Chairman Estrada, New
Zealand, not present at the consultations, faxed a proposal based on its previous submission,
containing the so-called “gross-net” approach -whereby sinks would not be included in a
193
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To get a clearer sense of countries’ positions, the Chair of the informal
contact group on sinks, Antonio La Viña from the Philippines, prepared a
questionnaire which was circulated by the UNFCCC Secretariat during the final
meeting on sinks at AGBM 8, and which was to be submitted by Parties by November
12th. The questionnaire covered the range of basic questions on sinks, including which
land-use change and forestry activities to account, and whether there should be a limit
on the amount of sinks that count towards quantified emission limitations and
reduction commitments. More than 85 pages of submission were received in response
to the questionnaire.194
The results of the questionnaire are telling of how, with the exception of a few
countries that had a clear policy (in particular the United States and the CANZ group,
which basically wanted all sinks with as much flexibility as possible), positions one
month before Kyoto were for the most part ill defined. The EU for example said that
limits on the use of sinks should be determined at the first COP/MOP,195 although
there was no chance that countries, in particular the United States, would ratify the
Protocol without knowledge of what exactly they were committing to. Japan
responded that it was premature to include sinks given lack of sufficient information –
Party’s baseline, but the removals would be credited to in its “budget” (Depledge 2000: para.
227).
194

See Parties’ submissions under document FCCC/AGBM/1997.MISC.4 and Add.1-2, and
compilation of responses by the UNFCCC Secretariat in document
FCCC/AGBM/1997/INF.2. The Secretariat also prepared a technical paper with information
on land use change and forestry from national communications and in-depth reviews from
Annex I Parties, which appeared as document FCCC/TP/1997/5.
195

As explained in Chapter 3, COP/MOP stands for “Conference of the Parties serving as the
Meeting of the Parties” to the Protocol. While COP is the decision making body of the
Convention, COP/MOP is the decision making body of the Protocol. Its first meeting, now
that the Protocol has entered into force, was held 28 November through 9 December 2005 in
Montreal, Canada.
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a point of view that changed radically at Kyoto weeks later (apparently to do more
with internal departmental differences than with matters of principle [Fry 2002: 160]).
On which land use change and forestry activities to include, the fifteen countries that
responded covered the whole range of possible answers: the United States, Australia
and Norway wanted them all; Kenya, the Marshall Islands and Uzbekistan none; the
EU, Iceland and others emphasized only those which were anthropogenic and
quantifiable, while Peru specified only forest and woody biomass (see
FCCC/AGBM/1997/INF.2).
More significantly, there was little understanding of what the terms exactly meant.
A common mistake, still made today, was to assume that land use change and forestry
refers only to sinks –that is, removals- and not to sources –that is, emissions from that
sector. Even the UNFCCC Secretariat notes in its compilation that:
“The terminology associated with the issue of sinks can be confusing. For
example, ‘sinks’ is sometimes used synonymously with removals by the landuse change and forestry (LUCF) category. As defined in Article 1 of the
Convention, a sink means ‘any process, activity or mechanism which removes
a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or precursor of a greenhouse gas from the
atmosphere’ and a source means ‘any process or activity which releases a
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the
atmosphere.’ The LUCF category has emissions and sinks, as defined in the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Revised 1996 guidelines
for inventorying national GHGs, and has four subcategories: forests and other
woody biomass, land conversion, abandoned land and other.”
(FCCC/AGBM/1997/INF.2 paragraph 6; emphasis in the original).
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Similar confusion was noted on the use of the terms “gross emissions” and
“net emissions” (ibid., paragraph 7), to the point that the Secretariat felt compelled to
emphasize, in bold, that “precision in the use of terminology will be very important in
the continuing discussion of ‘sinks’”(ibid).
With the results of the questionnaire, consultations continued by email during
the inter-sessional period, so that before AGBM 8 part II in late November 1997
Chair La Viña put forward four different options for the treatment of sinks. But
Parties could not agree on any of these. Negotiations continued almost round the
clock at Kyoto without Parties still being able to reach agreement despite the pressure
of knowing that there would be no Protocol to sign, with specific binding
commitments, until the treatment of sinks was agreed upon. COP 3 Chairman Raúl
Estrada thus put forward an alternative text on Saturday, 6 December, which elicited a
strong response (acceptable by AOSIS but unacceptable to many in the JUSSCANNZ
group) and moved the discussion forward as Parties went back to their previous draft
negotiating text. The main issues under discussion were which LULUCF activities
would be allowed in the first commitment period, and whether and under what
conditions to include other categories in the future (Depledge 2000: para. 232; see
also ENB COP 3 report).
After intense debate, Parties finally agreed to allow for afforestation,
reforestation and deforestation activities (ARD) for the first commitment period under
Article 3.3 -but there was no agreement on how to treat forest harvesting for example.
They also resolved to leave for later the decision on how and which additional
activities to include in future commitment periods. Although some Parties expressed
reservations, a text was provisionally agreed and presented to the plenary of the
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Committee of the Whole (CoW) that evening. There, language was inserted
stating that additional activities would only apply in future commitment periods. But
then Japan, in a last minute intervention during the final CoW Plenary on December
10th, proposed an added sentence whereby additional activities could also be applied
in the first commitment period as long as they took place after 1990 -a radical reversal
of its earlier stated position that any decision on sinks was premature (see above). The
proposal brought back discord and Chairman Estrada rejected the insertion, but was
subsequently informed that the Japanese proposal had gained the support of the EU
and the United States (Depledge 2000: para. 233). The proposed insertion was
therefore included, making this article, with all the vacillations and last minute
changes, a good example of what makes the text on sinks particularly confusing.196
But there were also other inconsistencies. Annex A of the Protocol, which lists
the sectors or source categories of greenhouse gases that are covered under the
Protocol, includes some agriculture and waste sources (such as agricultural soils, rice
196

See Protocol Article 3.4:
“Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall
provide, for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice, data to establish its level of carbon stocks in 1990 and
to enable an estimate to be made of its changes in carbon stocks in
subsequent years. The conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable
thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which,
additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas
emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the
land-use change and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from,
the assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I, taking into account
uncertainties, transparency in reporting, verifiability, the methodological
work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the advice provided
by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in
accordance with Article 5 and the decisions of the Conference of the Parties.
Such a decision shall apply in the second and subsequent commitment
periods. A Party may choose to apply such a decision on these additional
human-induced activities for its first commitment period, provided that these
activities have taken place since 1990.”
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cultivation, manure management, prescribed burning of savannas, and field
burning of agricultural residues) but not land use change and forestry. There is no
reference to sinks either in Protocol Article 3.13, which allows countries to save their
excess emission reductions for subsequent commitment periods (commonly known as
“banking”). This omission wasn’t even noticed until COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001,
when it was pointed out by the G-77 /China (Fry 2002: 161). More problematically,
sinks are specifically mentioned in relation to projects undertaken in countries
undergoing a transition to a market economy (EITs) under Joint Implementation
(Article 6), but not in relation to projects in developing countries under the CDM
(Article 12), warming up the already heated debates on this issue (see Chapter 5).

In sum, under the Protocol text, sinks appeared as follows:
•

Article 3.3 (ARD): Under Protocol Article 3.3, net changes over the
commitment period in emissions and removals resulting from direct human
induced afforestation, reforestation and deforestation activities (ARD) may be
counted towards a Party’s commitments. Both emissions and removals from
these activities count towards the reduction targets if those activities
commenced since 1990, the net changes in carbon stocks can be measured for
each commitment period, and are transparent, verifiable and subject to review
in accordance with Protocol Articles 7 (submission by Parties) and 8 (expert
review of implementation). To count them, each Annex I Party must provide,
before the first COP/MOP, data to establish its level of carbon stocks in 1990
(Article 3.4). This work began in August 2000. (Yamin and Depledge 2003:
49).
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To account for activities under Article 3.3 (ARD), Parties agreed to use a
gross-net approach. This means that gross emissions (without removals or
emissions from sinks) are used for calculating the quantified commitments or
assigned amounts, but net emissions (including removals by sinks) are counted
at the end of the commitment period, allowing Parties to get credits from sinks
in meeting their targets. For sinks under Article 3.4 (additional LUCF
activities), a decision taken subsequently under the Marrakesh Accords
established a capped net-net approach.197

•

Article 3.4 (Additional activities): Article 3.4 states that a decision will be
made at the first COP/MOP or as soon as practicable thereafter regarding how
and which additional activities from the LUCF sector and agricultural soils
may count towards Parties’ commitments. Accommodating those opposed to
the use of sinks, the article mandates that this decision take into account
uncertainties, transparency in reporting and verifiability. It must also take into
account the methodological work of the IPCC, advice from SBSTA on
inventories and reporting, and decisions by the COP. Furthermore, this
decision by the COP/MOP shall apply in the second and subsequent
commitment periods, but also, if a Party chooses, in the first commitment
period as long as these activities have taken place since 1990. This last clause
in effect brought forward the use of LULUCF activities and much dissension.
It is further explained below (see COP 6 and the Marrakesh Accords).
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An open net-net approach is only allowed under Article 3.7 for Parties for whom land use
change and forestry was a source of emissions in 1990 (that is, they shall include emissions
from deforestation in calculating their base year emissions). See below, under Article 3.7.
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•

Article 3.7 (The “Australian Clause”): Another last minute insertion of text
was made by Australia under Protocol Article 3.7, also known informally as
“the Australian clause” (Yamin and Depledge 2003: ch. 5 pp. 9-10). This
article allows Parties who had net emissions from LUCF in 1990 to add these
emissions to their baselines in order to determine their assigned amounts (the
so-called “net-net approach”). All other Parties must determine their baselines
by counting only emissions from those sources of greenhouse gas categorized
in Annex A of the Protocol, i.e.: energy, industrial processes, solvent and other
product use, agriculture, and waste sectors -that is, not LUCF. Only Australia,
the UK and Greece reported emissions from LUCF in 1990, but the article has
no policy implications for the UK and Greece because their emissions from
that sector that year are minimal compared to their emissions from other
sources. However, for Australia it means a substantial emission allowance.198

This article is worth expanding on because it provides a good example of the legal
dimension at play. It states, in its second sentence, that:
Those Parties included in Annex I for whom land-use change and forestry
constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 shall include in their
1990 emissions base year or period the aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide
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Under the Protocol, Australia had committed to limit its projected increase in emissions to
+8 percent by 2008-2012. In its first national communication, Australia reported 86,500
Gigagrams (Gg) of net emissions (including removals) from LUCF in 1990 (its base year
emissions in 1990 were 430.45 MtCO2e/yr, of which 19.8 percent were from the LULUCF
sector) and 51,867 Gg in 1995, while projecting net emissions of 121,992 Gg in 2000 -that is,
a 25 percent increase of national CO2 emissions when taking into account LUCF in 1990 and
a 17 percent in 1995, which results in a minus 6.8 percent from the baseline (a larger removal
in 2000 than the base year, or a decrease in net emissions) (see FCCC/TP/1997/5).
Meinshausen estimates that this results in an allowance from deforestation in Australia’s base
year of 30.2 percent (Meinshausen 2004: 7).
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equivalent emissions by sources minus removals by sinks in 1990 from
land-use change for the purpose of calculating their assigned amount.

When this article was written, the definition of forest had not yet been adopted
and it was not clear whether or not it would include dry woodland clearing. As Fry
(2002) explains, it so happens that in 1990 Australia was in the middle of large-scale
dry woodland clearing for agriculture; but it was also establishing large pine
plantations that it did not want to include as removals in its baseline net emissions.
Including the removals from these growing pines would mean it had less emissions
then, and therefore the target reductions (which are a percentage of 1990 emissions)
would be harder to achieve. Because of this, the first part of the text of Protocol
Article 3.7 mentions both land-use change and forestry, but the last part of the text
mentions only land-use change and not forestry (Fry 2002: 161).

Thus the issue was settled in principle with all the ambiguities necessary for
agreement, but the work of precisely defining activities and the rules and procedures
that would apply had only started. Three years later this work led to the total collapse
of negotiations, which had to be suspended and resumed six months later. And it
would be a long time before it was done.

The road after Kyoto
At the next subsidiary bodies meeting, six months after the Protocol was
adopted, SBSTA 8 requested the IPCC to prepare a report “examining the scientific
and technical state of understanding for carbon sequestration strategies related to
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land use, land use change and forestry activities and relevant Articles of the
Kyoto Protocol” (FCCC/SBSTA/1998/CRP.3). Although all Parties agreed on the
importance of the report, its content was hotly debated, starting with its timing (see
ENB report of SBSTA 8; see also CSE 1999: 70). The United States and Japan
wanted an early deadline, while the EU and the G-77/China, with support from most
NGOs, argued for a later date, allegedly to ensure the quality of the report. It was
finally agreed to request it for late 2000, in time for COP 6 in The Hague.199
In the meantime, some Parties pushed ahead with the agenda on sinks, even
though the definitions were not yet settled and it seemed no formula could be found to
suit all Parties. For example, in November 1998 at COP 4 in Buenos Aires, the
accounting start date for changes in carbon stocks was set for January 1990; the
decision included language on adjustments to a Party’s assigned amount based on
whether it was a net sink or net emission.200 This reference to net emissions from
sinks led some Parties to realize that, depending on the definitions adopted, they
might appear as net emitters under Article 3.3, as would be the case for some Nordic
countries with large forests but with limited afforestation, reforestation and
deforestation (ARD) lands (Fry 2002: 162). And so debate and negotiations
continued, as everything under land use and forestry was considered -from low and
zero-tillage crop methods under Protocol Article 3.4, to avoided deforestation and
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See Qaiyum 1998.

Assigned amount is the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions that each Annex B
country has agreed that its emissions will not exceed in the first commitment period. This is
calculated by multiplying the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 by five (for
the 5-year commitment period), and then by the percentage it agreed to and which appears
listed in the Annex B of the Protocol (for example, 92 percent for the European Union, 93
percent for the United States, etc.) (see IPCC Synthesis Report 2001: 149). See Chapter 3.
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forest management under the CDM- and with Parties still not knowing the
implications of what they were negotiating.
Still, Parties adopted the “Buenos Aires Plan of Action,” a one-page umbrella
decision covering seven decisions on financial mechanisms, technology transfer,
adverse effects of climate change/implementation of response measures, joint
implementation, flexibility mechanisms, and preparations for COP/MOP (including
reporting and review, policies and measures, compliance and LULUCF). This was a
political deal whereby all these issues would be addressed in parallel. The deadline to
resolve them was set for COP 6 in The Hague. In hindsight, the magnitude and
complexity of the issues included appear as presenting an impossible task to be
completed in two years. This unrealistic agenda was an important factor in the
collapse of negotiations at COP 6.
At COP 5 in Bonn, Robert Watson, Chair of IPCC, presented an overview of
the draft of the Special Report on LULUCF. The event was attended by 300 delegates
and NGO observers, and lasted a full four hours. Watson noted that key decisions
would have to be made regarding definitions, accounting, monitoring and reporting
systems, and inventory guidelines for the Protocol to be implemented (see ENB COP
5). Given the void of information and its explosive implications, including on
country-specific data to establish baselines for additional LULUCF activities under
Protocol Article 3.4, COP 5 adopted a work program and elements of a decisionmaking framework to address LULUCF with a view to adopting a decision by COP 6
(FCCC/CP/1999/L.16). The work program requested Parties’ submissions on a whole
range of LULUCF matters, including on methodologies that countries intended to use
to measure and report on LULUCF activities. The COP then also decided to
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undertake consideration of the IPCC Special Report on LULUCF by SBSTA 12,
and to include an in-depth review at that session (see ENB report of SB 12).
The main fear was that Protocol Article 3.4 (additional activities) could create
a bigger loophole than “hot air” (as expressed by CAN and others –see ENB report of
COP 5) as the United States and other Umbrella Group members called for extensive
accounting of carbon in managed lands, which would result in a considerable
lowering of their reduction commitments. Besides, many developing countries were
increasingly vocal on allowing for sinks under the CDM, notably as avoided
deforestation -that is, accounting for avoided emissions in conservation projects. Most
Latin American countries, with the significant exceptions of Brazil and Peru, joined to
support the concept of promoting and accounting for forest projects, including
conservation, restoration, and sustainable forest management (Goetze 1999). The
African Group similarly expressed support for afforestation, reforestation and
reclamation/preservation of wetlands to feature highly among the CDM projects (see
ENB summary report of COP 5). All options seemed to be open for consideration,
making negotiations all the more difficult (Krugg, personal communication). The
amount of items on the agenda piling up for COP 6 and the complexity of the issues
was such that in the run-up to The Hague, countries had spent all their time trying to
figure out their positions and had had little time to understand those of the other
countries and find possible middle grounds.

Collapse in The Hague (or “sinking the Protocol”)201

201

For an excellent account of failure at The Hague, see Grubb and Yamin 2001, or Ott 2001.
See also Paterson 2001.
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Key to understanding sinks in the Protocol is the United States’ situation.
As Grubb and Yamin (2001) explain, emissions in the United States in 2000 were at
13 percent above 1990 levels. Even assuming strong mitigating action took place,
they would probably be up to 10 to 20 percent above 1990 by the end of the first
commitment period in 2012 (or 5 to 15 percent equivalent for the multi-gas basket).
Given the inertia of the United States’ energy infrastructure, and the fact that
legislation can be held up in Congress for a long time, the chances of the United
States meeting its commitment under the Protocol of - 7 percent compared to 1990
levels were slim. To do so would require radical changes in energy investment, in
addition to emission credits for more than 200 million tons of carbon a year (MtC/yr),
acquired either through the flexible mechanisms or through sinks (Grubb and Yamin
2001).
In fact, the United States had always assumed full net-net carbon accounting
of sinks in its calculations, and had included them when it took up its minus 7 percent
commitment. In January 1998 the State Department explained in a fact sheet that 4
percent of the 7 percent reduction would come from “certain changes in the way gases
and sinks are calculated,” so that the US commitment amounted to “at most” three
percent in real reductions. A change in the baseline emissions from LULUCF was
supposed to account for three of the four percentage points that were going to be
solved in accounting (see Schlamadinger and Marland 2000: 44). But the definition
and accounting of sinks kept changing as negotiations proceeded, which meant that
countries kept having to reposition themselves as they recalculated how their targets
and commitments were affected.
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In August 2000, in the wake of COP 6 negotiations in The Hague, the
United States thus tabled a proposal to include all managed lands under Protocol
Article 3.4 (additional activities). Given the assumption that all lands in the United
States are managed, this amounted to an estimated 300 MtC/yr (mostly soil carbon
from shifts in agriculture to no-till methods (see Kaiser 2000)). This would make any
additional efforts to reduce emissions almost unnecessary. The US proposal incensed
NGOs (which responded, in one case, by smashing a pie on the face of the US
delegate), as well as most countries, which already resented the profligate use of
energy in the United States and were scandalized at a proposal that made nothing of
the spirit of the Protocol and the principle that sinks be credited only for specific
additional activities undertaken since 1990. As a result, the EU ended up opposing the
inclusion of all sinks under article 3.4, even if this contradicted its otherwise favorable
position towards incentives for good land and forest management (ibid.).202
This stalemate led to the collapse of negotiations at The Hague. On the one
hand, the United States’ over-ambitious and insensitive position could not have been
better calculated to alienate most countries. It focused all its attention on costeffectiveness, and forgot the long-term goals of the Convention. On the other hand,
the EU’s defensiveness turned to obsession, and in its discourse it assumed all
flexibilities as environmental weaknesses (ibid.: 273). This prevented it from
accepting a harsh political reality and looking for possible compromises.
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According Berg (2002), the EU was only willing to give 0.5 percent, or 27 MtC/yr for
additional sinks activities, compared to the US request of 7 percent (or 450 MtC/yr). COP 6
President Jan Pronk proposed 150 MtC/yr as a compromise, but this was not found
acceptable.
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The standoff also affected the discussion of sinks under the CDM, which
deeply divided the G-77 and needed to be handled with care. As Grubb and Yamin
(2001) further note, because sinks are a fundamental piece of the Protocol’s
architecture and affect developing countries as much as countries with commitments,
any decision on sinks could not have been taken in back rooms by a few friends of the
friends of the Chair. Developing countries had already expressed frustration at having
been practically shut out from the negotiations at The Hague. And then, in a last
minute effort to save the negotiations, bilateral discussions between the United States
and the UK resulted in a single sheet of paper circulated to a limited audience
containing an agreement by the United States to exclude all sinks from the CDM in
exchange for greater allowances on article 3.4 (Fry 2002: 167; CSE 2001: 256; Berg
2002). Under this Saturday morning deal, the United States would be allowed to count
on 250 MtC/yr, or roughly 5 percent, for additional activities under Protocol Article
3.4, and would get other concessions on a range of issues (including
supplementarity203 and compliance). As a trade off there would be no nuclear projects
nor sinks under the CDM (Berg 2002).
This controversial US-UK deal fell short for various reasons, not the least of
which was developing countries’ possible opposition. In the final bickering, the
British blamed the French for failing to defend them in front of the rest of the EU
group; other Europeans said the British, headed by UK Deputy Prime Minister John
Prescott, never had a mandate to seek a deal, and what was presented went too far,
203

This refers to the requirement that the Kyoto mechanisms be “supplemental” to domestic
action. This had been a matter of disagreement between the EU and the United States for a
long time, with the EU proposing a flat ceiling of credits that could be gained in international
transactions (in the form of a percentage of a country’s obligation), and the United States
adamantly opposing any such limit.
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conceding to demands of the Umbrella group on sinks and supplementarity, and
was ambiguous. In any case, a follow-up meeting with ministers from the EU and the
Umbrella Group in Ottawa shortly after the failed negotiations at The Hague revealed
that there were still radical differences in understanding, in particular regarding the
role of sinks in the CDM (Grubb and Yamin 2001: 264). By then, the United States
had announced the result of the elections confirming George W. Bush to the
presidency.
Once the heat dissipated and countries were able to take a cool look at the
situation, the United States had withdrawn, and in doing so had given great leverage
to the other countries –in particular the Russian Federation and the Umbrella groupto continue to press for sink allowances. Without the United States it was no longer a
matter of ensuring the environmental integrity of the Protocol, but of securing support
for its survival. Ironically, US withdrawal served to strengthen the commitment to
multilateralism and for a while it brought the EU and the G-77 and China closer
together in an “informal alliance” (Ott 2002). The release in the spring of 2001 of the
IPCC Third Assessment Report also gave added urgency to the problem. So when
negotiations resumed in May 2001 in Bonn, political agreement on the dividing
‘crunch issues’ at The Hague was hailed as a big success, even if in reality it had
meant halving the reduction commitments originally agreed at Kyoto.

The Bonn Agreements and the Marrakesh Accords
When negotiations resumed in Bonn in May 2000, LULUCF was addressed in
a closed contact group co-chaired by two of the best known and experienced chairs:
Harald Dovland from Norway and Philip Gwage from Uganda. Subsequent drafting
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consultations were conducted by Andreas Fischlin from Switzerland and another
highly-regarded facilitator, Halldor Thorgeirsson from Iceland.204 Still, Ambassador
Raúl Estrada who had gaveled the Protocol at Kyoto, was called in for the closed
negotiations during the ministerial session. Although some countries continued to call
for limited credits from additional sinks activities, and others continued to oppose
them as a loophole and an opening up of commitments agreed to at Kyoto, by this
time the issue was straightforward. In order to obtain agreement at the resumed COP
6 session, Australia, Russia, Japan, and Canada were allowed to offset over half of
their emissions with carbon sinks under article 3.4 (see FCCC/CP/2001/L.11/Rev.1).
An Appendix Z attached to the annex to the decision specified the Annex I Party
maximum credits from article 3.4 forest management and LULUCF activities under
Joint Implementation during the first commitment period. And still, after the political
negotiations had settled the issue but before the final decision was adopted, the
Russian Federation called to amend its Appendix Z cap on forest management credits.
As a result, a new paragraph was inserted allowing countries to request from the COP
a revision of their caps in Appendix Z no later than two years before the beginning of
the first commitment period.205 This is known as “the Russian Fix.”
Together with sink allowances under article 3.4, agreement on penalties for
non-compliance and the establishment of new funds for assistance to developing
countries, the package deal agreed at Bonn (Decision 5/CP.6) contained limits to
sinks in the CDM. For the first commitment period, avoided deforestation was left out
of the CDM and only afforestation and reforestation would be allowed. These were
204

Thorgeirsson later became Chair of SBSTA.
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For a detailed account of the negotiations see ENB report of COP 6 II.
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capped for each Annex I party at 1 percent of its base year emissions times five
(that is, for each of the five years of the commitment period)206 (see Chapter 5). The
decision also included the definitions as well as the rules, modalities, and guidelines
that were to apply to LULUCF under the Protocol (see the problem with defining
sinks, below). These political decisions were further technically clarified and
translated into legal text at COP 7 six months later, and became known as the
Marrakesh Accords (Decisions 2-24/CP.7).207
An important part of this package of decisions was the inclusion of a set of
principles that should govern all LULUCF activities under the Protocol -and in
particular, although not explicitly stated, all CDM project activities (Krugg, personal
communication).208 These were proposed by Brazil together with the G-77/China, and
although initially opposed by many industrialized countries, they were eventually
included in an annex to Decision 11/CP.7 on LULUCF. Because the occasional
reference to human-induced reductions does not preclude that credits will be taken for
actions that had nothing to do with climate change mitigation, these principles were
meant to assure that any reductions claimed for removals from LULUCF are real and
additional to any that would have happened anyway, and to avoid perverse incentives
from LULUCF activities. They state that LULUCF activities should be based on
sound science and contribute to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of
natural resources; that their accounting be consistent over time, with any reversal of
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See Meinshausen 2004 for the implications of this cap for each Annex I Party.
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The final COP decision on LULUCF is Decision 11/CP.7: Definitions, modalities rules
and guidelines relating to land use, land use change and forestry activities under the Kyoto
Protocol. Marrakesh, 2001. COP 7. (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1).
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Krugg was then part of the Brazilian delegation and later served as Co-Chair of the contact
group on sinks in the CDM. See Chapter 5.
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removals being accounted for at the appropriate moment, and that their accounting
not imply any transfer of commitments to the future; that the mere presence of carbon
stocks be excluded from accounting, as well as removals resulting from high CO2
concentrations, indirect nitrogen deposition and other natural effects of past practices
on the land (later known as the problem of “factoring out” –see section on the
problem with sinks); and that their accounting not change the goal of the Protocol to
reduce overall emissions by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in 2008-2012
(FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1).

Thus in spite of a number of provisions and principles, the final decision on
LULUCF in effect meant that of the average 5.2 percent emission reduction target
that had been agreed at Kyoto, only about 2 percent would actually come from
reductions in fossil fuel burning (see Gillon 2001; Ott 2001). This allowance on sinks,
together with concessions on the tradability of emissions rights, led some
commentators to conclude that Kyoto had been reduced to mere symbolic policy of
little environmental effectiveness, codifying more or less business-as-usual emissions
and making it cheap to comply with any commitments (Böhringer and Vogt 2004).

Defining the Decision: The IPCC Special Report on LULUCF
Meanwhile the IPCC, whose mandate is to produce “policy-relevant” but not
“policy prescriptive” scientific information, was expected to insert science into this
highly politicized process (Fry 2002: 162). This proved to be a most difficult task, and
accusations that the IPCC had taken to policy prescribing were soon being heard.
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Although the report could not fail to note the uncertainties of accounting for
carbon from LULUCF activities, many noted several instances where sinks appeared
in a rather too positive light.209
Questions were raised in particular about the authors of the Special Report.
Fry for example notes that most of them were forestry scientists, aware that the Kyoto
Protocol, in contrast to failed attempts by other UN processes (in particular the
UNFF), “was breathing new life into the forestry industry” (Fry 2002: 162).
Suspicions were also hard to avoid when one of the three coordinators of the Special
Report, appeared at COP 6 in contact group discussions on sinks as part of the
Australian delegation (as mentioned earlier, Australia always supported the inclusion
of sinks) (ibid.; see also FCCC/CP/2000/INF.2). The World Rainforest Movement
published an article highlighting the connections of some of the authors to companies
that stood to benefit from sink projects (WRM 2000). The article pointed that Sandra
Brown was a Senior Program Officer for Winrock International, a nonprofit private
organization with a department of ecosystem services specializing in “measuring and
monitoring carbon and other eco-assets” and “providing high quality resource
surveys and analysis at an affordable cost.”210 Brown, one of the three lead authors of
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An example given by Fry (2002) of a statement that could be interpreted as lacking
objectivity is from the IPCC Chair’s report on key findings, where it reads, in bold, that:
“LULUCF activities and projects can have a broad range of positive environmental, social
and economic impacts if the projects are appropriately designed and implemented.” Robert
Watson, “A report of key findings from the IPCC Special Report on LULUCF”, Bonn, June
2000 (in http://www.ipcc.ch/press/sp-lulucf.htm); see Fry 2002: 162)
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In its web-page presentation, Winrock International explains: “We use innovative
approaches in agriculture, environmental protection, renewable energy, leadership
development, and policy to increase long-term productivity, equity, and responsible resource
management. Our mission is to help the poor and disadvantaged. Our workplace is the world”
(http://www.winrock.org 2005).
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Chapter Five on project activities and among the authors of Summary for
Policymakers, is the contact person at Winrock International for the Noel Kempff
Carbon Offsets Verification Project in Bolivia, with funding from The Nature
Conservancy.211 The article also pointed to another one of the lead authors of Chapter
Five, Pedro Moura Costa, founder and director of EcoSecurities Ltd. -in their own
words: “World market leaders in sourcing, structuring and trading carbon credits
since 1996.”212 There is also Dr. Mark Trexler, review editor of Chapter Five, and
founder and president of Trexler Climate and Energy Services, “an internationally
recognized leader in the emerging field of climate change risk management.”213 The
WRM article further identifies an author who had worked for the Société Générale de
Surveillance (SGS) Forestry of Geneva, the company that certified Costa Rica’s
Certified Tradable Offsets (CTOs), and another author with Monsanto Corporation.
And then there is Richard Tipper, among the lead authors of Chapter Five, from the
Edinburgh Center for Carbon Management (ECCM), and whose first project was the
Scolel Te project in Chiapas, in charge of offsetting emissions from Formula One
international car races (see Introduction).214
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The project description notes that “results will be used to build the confidence of the
Government of Bolivia to certify and potentially sell its share of offsets.”
(http://www.winrock.org 2005)
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See: http://www.ecosecurities.com (dated 7/8/2005).
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Trexler Climate and Energy Services is presented as “The natural resource for climate
change mitigation services” with more than 13 years experience on, among others,
“understanding and forecasting the behavior of the greenhouse gas market” and “identifying
mitigation opportunities and evaluating and developing carbon offset projects.” They
specialize in the provision of services to the private sector. See:
http://www.climateservices.com (visited 8/7/2005).
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The long list of expert reviewers of the IPCC Special Report on LULUCF includes also
well known critics of sinks such as Bill Hare from Greenpeace, Larry Lohmann of The
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Whatever the role and influence played by the individual authors and their
connections, it is clear that it was mainly government pressure that finally determined
the tone of the Special Report, with discussions on the final text of the Summary for
Policymakers at the IPCC XVI Plenary in May 2000 as intense as some COP
negotiations (Fry 2002: 162).215
To understand how LULUCF is perceived, it is instructive to note the cover of the
IPCC Special Report on LULUCF. Against a purple background and yellow letters
for the title, there are only three pictures: one is a ground view of an agricultural field
under conservation tillage, courtesy of The Monsanto Company; the other is an aerial
view of land-use change in the Department of Santa Cruz, Bolivia, courtesy of The
Nature Conservancy; the third is an aerial view of a forest stand, courtesy of the
American Forest and Paper Association. All three are very large scale; two of the
three are a view from above (recalling “the atmosphere’s point of view”); and all three
are monocultures, courtesy of big industry and multinationals. Similarly, the
Summary for Policymakers of the LULUCF Special Report has a picture of two large
agricultural machines working a large extension of yellow grass, and this picture is
placed on top of what appears to be a map of the world. There is nothing here to recall
forest biodiversity or small-scale conservation or community forestry –not even
agroforestry. There is practically no green in the pictures.

Corner House, as well as Daniel Lashof of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Youba
Sokona of ENDA-Tier Monde, and Jennifer Morgan of the World Wildlife Fund –though it is
unclear what influence they had.
215

See the draft report of the IPCC on its Sixteenth Plenary session, and the statement by
Australia on the complexities and political nature of the Special Report on LULUCF.
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The problem with sinks
What follows is just a sample of the issues that had to be sorted out before
anyone could envisage what the decision of including sinks in the Kyoto Protocol
entailed. Because sinks were to work as a quantifiable and tradable unit, and
eventually as a commodity, they had to be very clearly defined. This meant
abstracting, isolating, carving up, and putting a figure on the highly complex organic
process of terrestrial carbon exchange and the even more complex social one of land
use change. The IPCC Special Report prepared to address sinks covers almost 400
pages, and there is hardly a page that does not mention the word “uncertainty.” Most
of the problems were somehow resolved through a combination of definition and
accounting techniques. But as with the invention of private property and the owning
of nature, once the rules are known and we live by them, it is hard to remember that
they were once far from obvious and to recognize what was lost with their adoption.

Defining forests
The first and most important question that had to be settled was the definition
of forests and the related meaning of afforestation, reforestation and deforestation. As
noted earlier, the definitions had to be applicable to all Parties, simple, based on
accessible data, and subject to verifiable accounting. They also had to be consistent
with the aims of the Protocol. Clearly, this was no easy task. The IPCC report cites an
article listing 240 definitions of forests used by countries, depending on their social
and economic structures and biogeophysical conditions –and these are just some

172
216

official ones (Lund 1999, in IPCC 2000: 63).

The definitions are often based on

legal and administrative requirements -such as “Any lands within the XYZ
jurisdiction”-, or on land use and cultural considerations –typically: “An area
managed for the production of timber and other forest products or maintained as
woody vegetation for such indirect benefits as protection of catchment areas or
recreation” (IPCC 2000: 64). These definitions have for the most part little to do with
carbon content.
A general definition of forest used by the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) is based on land cover, establishing a threshold of minimum canopy cover –
that is, the proportion of ground area covered by tree crowns. But again, this is not a
widely applicable or accepted definition. Globally, about 50 percent of wooded land
has a canopy cover of less than 20 percent, and can vary at the national level between
10 and 70 percent (IPCC 2000: 64).217 Variations between regions and between
countries are also great. One can have a closed canopy moist forest in one place, and a
sparsely treed, low canopy cover savanna in another.
In pure carbon accounting terms, establishing a precise and global definition
simply based on canopy cover is highly problematic. If the threshold is low, say a 10
percent canopy cover, a dense forest could be seriously degraded and result in high
carbon emissions without qualifying as forest loss or deforestation. If the threshold is
high, for example 70 percent, significant areas could be cleared without the resulting
216

See Fairhead and Leach (1998) for a fascinating account of contested ideas of the forest
and their implications in Africa. See also Dove (1992) for another fascinating account of the
etymology of the word jungle in Pakistan in relation to the physical environment and cultural
values (it went from referring to ‘savanna’ to ‘forest waste’).
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In the definitions covered by Lund (1999) the minimum canopy projected cover to be
included as forest varied between 10 to 70 percent.
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loss of carbon being accounted for. Conversely, any increases in the canopy cover
beyond 10 percent (up to 90 percent) would not comply with the definition of
reforestation or afforestation and would not accrue credits for carbon sequestration.
There is also the problem of measuring actual canopy cover without consideration
of potential canopy cover. Since definitions under the Protocol are about a change in
land use –from forest to non-forest in the case of deforestation for example- a
definition of a forest based strictly on actual canopy cover could lead to harvesting
and shifting agriculture falling under deforestation, or to natural regeneration being
referred to as reforestation -and thus allowing for undue credits. Similarly, if potential
canopy cover at maturity under planned land-use practices was the basis of the
definition, carbon loss from harvesting or carbon sequestered from regeneration
activities might not be counted (IPCC 2000: 6).
This points to the problem of timing, i.e., the great asymmetry in the rates at
which carbon is released into the atmosphere and the rate at which it is recaptured as
the forest grows again –decades and centuries, depending on the species of trees and
site conditions.218 Yet the carbon uptake needs to be tallied by a specific date to count
towards fulfillment of commitments under the Protocol. A regenerating boreal forest
stand, which could require decades for its canopy cover to reach the definitional
threshold, would reach this maturity level well beyond the five year commitment
period established by the Kyoto Protocol.
This problem of time and accounting for harvesting also comes up in defining
afforestation and reforestation. Reforestation is defined as “the establishment of trees
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For time factor, see Fearnside et al. 1999.
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on land that has been cleared of forest within the relatively recent past” or, in
terms of operational forestry, land that has just been harvested. Afforestation
commonly refers to land that has had no forest for much longer (20-50 years or more)
and was under a different land use. But if the definition does not include harvesting,
credits may be awarded in spite of carbon loss, even though credits from regeneration
are given. And this accounting has to somehow be in line with the five-year
commitment period during which verification takes place.
A worst-case scenario resulting from this paradox was reported recently in
New Zealand (RNZ/TVNZ June 14 2005). According to the Forest Owners
Association there, foresters have begun felling their immature forests to avoid
penalties under the Protocol. Because they expect to be subject to liability for trees
planted before 1990 and felled after 2007, new plantings have likewise all but
stopped.
During the negotiations opinions varied widely as to how to solve the problem
of defining forests. Canada supported a “pick-your-own” approach; the EU proposed
a modified version of the FAO definition based on canopy cover; and AOSIS called
for a biome-based set of definitions. The latter would address ecosystem differences
setting out the tree height and crown cover for particular forest types. It would require
countries to identify their lands according to the forest types, and would be thus more
ecologically sound and more easily verifiable. Developing this set of definitions
however, was not considered to be feasible for the first commitment period (Yamin
and Depledge 2003: 5.52).
In September 2000 at SBSTA 13 negotiations started revolving around a
modified FAO definition including a minimum tree canopy cover. To avoid the
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problem of selecting a low canopy cover that would let deforestation pass without
notice, AOSIS proposed a maximum assessment unit for a forest of no more than one
hectare. This was strongly opposed by the United States and Canada, which preferred
to aggregate data rather than account for each hectare of forest. As a solution, a
decision text outside the definition of forest states that for the purposes of determining
deforestation under Article 3.3, the spatial assessment must not be greater than one
hectare (Annex to draft decision -/CMP.1 (LULUCF) (FCCC/CP/2001/13.Add.1)).
Another creative solution was found to address perverse incentives to cut
down ‘natural’ forests in order to install fast growing plantations. This had been a
major concern of several environmental NGOs, whose leaders had campaigned loudly
against sinks for this reason.219 The solution entailed defining forests as being either
natural or a plantation. That way, cutting down a forest to establish a plantation would
not be considered reforestation as they are officially both “forests.”

In the end, the definitions were finally settled in Marrakesh in 2001, at COP 7
(Decision 11/CP.7). There, a forest was defined as follows:
A minimum area of land between 0.05 and 1.0 hectares with tree crown cover
(or equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30 percent with trees with the
potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 meters at maturity in situ. It may
consist either of closed forest formations where trees of various storeys and
undergrowth cover a high proportion of the ground, or open forest. Young
natural stands and all plantations which have yet to reach a crown density of
10-30 percent or tree height of 2-5 meters are included under forest, as are
areas normally forming part of the forest area which are temporarily unstocked
219

Together with the fear of ‘alien’ species and GMOs, this image of cutting ‘pristine’ forests
to make space for fast-growing monoculture plantations to gain carbon credits was used
effectively by ENGOs against sinks.
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as a result of human intervention such as harvesting or natural causes but
which are expected to revert to forest.

This definition of forest, contrary to common perceptions of what a forest is,
contains no mention of biodiversity, for example. Nor is there reference to sustainable
use of natural resources, which one would expect of an international environmental
treaty dealing with forestry activities.

Problems defining forests
This whole dissertation could have been written on the problems of defining a
forest for the purposes of the Protocol. Here I want to point to those that received
most attention during the negotiations. Many of these are particularly problematic in
the context of CDM projects in developing countries.
First is the distinction between a forest and a plantation. The FAO definition
of forest, like the definition under the Protocol, included both “natural forests and
forest plantations” (FAO 2000). Yet there is indeed a difference between a multispecies forest ecosystem and 10,000 hectares of fast growing eucalyptus, pine or
gmelina, genetically modified to produce higher yields of more uniform woods. To
equate these two has serious policy implications, and the lack of distinction in the
words serves to promote monoculture plantations as an effort to counter deforestation
or advance reforestation by “increasing forest cover.” Furthermore, big monoculture
plantations usually have negative impacts on the soil, water, plants and wildlife, they
create very few jobs, mostly low quality, and do not generate wealth at the local level
–canceling out more options for the local people than creating them.
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This has been the flagship argument for those ENGOs opposing sinks.
They point out that it is not only that plantations cannot substitute forests, having such
contrasting environmental impacts, but plantations usually mean the cancellation of
the possibility of natural forest regeneration. More than “green deserts,” plantations
are therefore referred to as “green wastelands,” because “there is more biodiversity in
a few square meters of the Namib desert than in an entire plantation” (Carrere 2004:
2).
This is a good argument. Under an international environmental treaty that
speaks of sustainable development, it would be an aberration to prize large-scale
plantations for the carbon stored in tree trunks while the soils and the flora and fauna
are depleted. But this is about carbon accounting as an offset of greenhouse gas
emissions.
The problem is not if a tree or a forest is planted or not, but the scale at which
either of these takes place. There is a wealth of studies to show how the dichotomy
between investing human labor on the land, versus the idea of untouched or “virgin”
forests that require fencing off from humans to survive, is misguided, historically
untenable and politically devious, part and parcel of the history of enclosures
(Williams 1980; Cronon 1983; Fairhead and Leach 1996, 1998; Dove 1992). From its
beginnings, environmental conservation of forests has been the prerogative of the
state and/or the upper class. In his history of environmental conservation, Grove
(1995) shows how institutional conservation, as a “legitimate concern” of the state,
develops largely as part of the colonial enterprise, directly linked to control of
valuable resources (wood for the royal navy as well as control of territories and
population). Meanwhile in Europe, in the two most important early works in the
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history of forestry -John Evelyn’s Silva: A Discourse f Forest Tress, from 1664,
and Colbert’s French Forest Ordinance of 1669, forestry is clearly a matter for
gentlemen, not rustics, hence the importance of fencing for preservation against “rude
Commoners” (Glacken 1967: 487 and 491). It is revealing that the word “paradise”
derives from the old Persian word for “enclosure,” and that it takes in turn the
meaning of garden in Greek and Latin (Merchant 1989).220
In that sense, it is interesting to note how ideas of ecosystem and climax are
differently applied in Europe and in the colonies. While Sir Arthur Tansley (18711955), the Oxbridge botanist who coined the term “ecosystem” in 1935, rejected the
idea of climax vegetation in England because it implies lack of human agency, the
idea was always applied in the colonies, in particular after the work of F. E. Clements,
the American plant ecologist who wrote on the progression toward “climatic climax”
(Cameron 1999: 13). This has to do with the convenient failure to acknowledge
indigenous peoples’ agency in the colonies (“the people without history” [Wolf
1982]) whereas in Europe at that same time this agency would be impossible to deny
(it is what distinguishes Europeans, “the people with history”).

Direct versus indirect effects
Both the Protocol and Decision 9/CP.4 make clear that for LULUCF activities
to count as carbon sinks or sources and generate credits, any change in land use has to
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On the idea of a past golden age in human’s relation with nature going back and back,
always receding –William’s escalator ride- to Hesiod in Greek times (at least), the theme
repeated by Seneca, Ovid, Varro and Virgil, see Glacken, pp. 130-134. A sure sign of it being
a popular myth is reflected in the funny parodies by Greek comic poets of this innocent
golden age -when people not only possessed “physical and moral superiority, but the fertility
of the soil was so great that it supplied men with food without the need of tillage” (131-2).
The myth includes already the notion “that the soil is most fertile when it is least interfered
with by human art.” (132). See also Cronon 1995; 492, fn 8.
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be the result of a “direct human-induced” action. However, distinguishing what is
a natural event from a human-induced one is far from easy. Even the most common
example of a natural cause of sink reversal, forest fires, is tricky. These can be the
result of a natural event such as lightning, or of a direct or indirect human act, such as
accidental fire, arson or prescribed burning and its escape. The causes are in many
cases not simple to attribute.
A definition that assumes forest fires as carbon loss might not even be
consistent with the long-term maintenance of forests or the increase of carbon stocks.
Fire is in fact a natural part of many forest ecosystems, as well as a forest
management tool. Natural or prescribed, fires work as breaks that reduce the chances
of more intense fires spreading. So even though they are beneficial and necessary, in
the short time of a commitment period they appear as carbon loss. In this case, carbon
accounting could serve as a disincentive to the sustainable management of the forest.
To complicate things a little more, it appears that the fire regime in parts of the world
is changing, due possibly to direct and deliberate human manipulation, as well as
indirect manipulation –including climate change (IPCC 2000: 68). Fire regimes will
thus vary with rapid climate change or in response to El Niño pattern changes.
Furthermore, forest fires do not always result in complete tree mortality -or in
deforestation as commonly defined. In eucalyptus and some pine forests, most mature
trees will survive even intense fires. Most trunks and large branches will regrow full
canopies in a few years -but probably not in time for the verification process during
the commitment period.

In sum
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There is a difference between the many and varied values attached to
forests and the one monetary value attached to carbon. Carbon is only one commodity
-and that is, only for some people, and only provided it is measured, registered and
validated as such-, while the forest provides a range of commodities –both material
and ideal. Even the IPCC warns that:
“…promotion of carbon over other forest values could impoverish people who
benefit from the diversity of products and non-carbon services. This problem will
be greatest where livelihoods are at stake, especially where food security is
threatened (Ogle 1995) as well as where the interests of forest-dependent people
are poorly represented (Tipper and de Jong 1998). This factor is particularly
important in countries with low per capita incomes that are not self-sufficient in
terms of growing food and have a low capacity to finance food imports” (IPCC
2000: 112).

This is tied to the idea of involution and to problems resulting from the
compartmentalization of nature, or its production in discrete units (carbon here,
biodiversity there, people farther away, and so on), which work at cross-purposes and
become unecological, inefficient, and result in the continuous reproduction of uneven
development. The level of complexity that resulted from this fragmentation will, I
hope, become clear in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Sinks in the CDM: Creating the rules of the market
“Invest in Forest Carbon; Promote the Millennium Development Goals: Fight
Hunger and Poverty, Enhance Biodiversity”
Forest Trends and The Katoomba Group.
“Forest Fraud: Say No to Fake Carbon Credits.”
FERN and SinksWatch.
These two appeals could be read next to each other in equally glossy
brochures on top of strategically placed tables in the conference center in Milan on
the occasion of COP 9. There were many others, such as one by the BioCarbon Fund
of The World Bank, which read “Harnessing the carbon market to sustain ecosystems
and reduce poverty,” or another one advertising “Carbon as a Non-Timber Forest
Product” from the “Action Research to Bring Community Based Forest Management
Projects under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.”
The messages from the various groups supporting and opposing sinks in the
CDM could not be farther apart. While those in favor made it seem like an absolute
win-win situation, an opportunity “to save the tropical forest” and fight hunger and
poverty (see quotation above), those against spoke of green deserts, dispossessed and
displaced rural populations, and “forest fraud.”221 This disparity of views was shared
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For arguments in favor, see for example the Innovations Report, 2006. Noting that tropical
forests are “currently disappearing at a rate of fifty tropical football fields a minute,” the
report announces that “Developing nations may save the tropical forest,” (and that the “New
initiative is an alternative to destruction of their forests in order to develop economically.”)
http://www.innovations-report.com/html/reports/environment_sciences/report-57982.html
Last checked April 13, 2006. For arguments against, see www.fern.org, www.sinkswatch.org,
www.carbontradewatch.org
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by the Parties negotiating the modalities and procedures for sinks in the CDM,
making the negotiations arduous and sometimes tense. Some small and poor countries
in Africa and elsewhere were distressed because sinks in the CDM represented
practically the only chance to participate in the Protocol’s mechanisms, given their
low potential for emission reductions in the energy sector, limited industrial capacity
and largely rural economies. The result was a decision full of compromises that, the
moment it was adopted, everybody hailed as a finely crafted balance. As time passed
however, it became clear that the rules adopted presented more challenges than
opportunities, in particular for small-scale projects aimed at low income populations.
This chapter details the history of the negotiations on sinks in the CDM, from
the early discussions considering avoided deforestation to the final decision on smallscale afforestation and reforestation. It describes the various methodological and
technical issues that had to be sorted out to make removals from sinks credible as
emission credits, the various countries’ positions, and the compromises made. Some
of what follows on the negotiation history is fairly detailed and technical. I wanted to
include it because I had the opportunity to observe it first-hand and because so much
of it is not found elsewhere (the UNFCCC secretariat makes a report of the meeting,
but some of the discussions in informal contact groups and the proposals circulated
are not noted or kept or not easily available). The implications of these decisions on
the ground will be further explored in the next two chapters.
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Sinks or toilets?
‘”Why should African governments let their land be used as a toilet for
absorbing emissions from Americans’ second cars?”222
Already in 1977, in what is often considered the earliest paper on sinks and
climate change, Dyson suggests that, provided they are planted on a sufficient scale,
trees could offset the global annual increase in emissions in the face of an imminent
ecological disaster from increasing CO2 levels. To make this economically feasible,
he suggests plantations be carried out “by labour intensive methods in countries
where labour is cheap” (Dyson, 1977: 290).
Twenty years later, arguments for including sinks in developing countries in
the Kyoto regime have become more sophisticated. There is less explicit reference to
cheap labour and instead, in line with prevalent neoliberal economic ideas (that each
place should specialize and produce what it can do best and trade the rest), the
argument revolves mainly around the suitability of the land. The IPCC’s Second
Assessment Report and the LULUCF Special Report thus note the great difference in
the rate at which forests grow in the tropics and sub-tropics compared to temperate
areas, and from that observation derive that the projected costs of establishing
forestation schemes to act as sinks is between once cent of a dollar and $20 per ton of
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The metaphor of toilet, as recounted by Grubb in noting the “depth of feelings” and
complexities surrounding the issue, was used by an African attendant to a meeting in the early
1990s. It was in response to a talk by an economist from a US environmental NGO, who
elaborated on the advantages of Activities Implemented Joint (the pilot-phase for flexible
mechanisms before the creation of the CDM and JI) and the reduced costs of absorbing CO2
in Africa compared to limiting emissions in the US. “Shaking with anger, an African present
arose and asked ‘why should African governments let their land be used as a toilet for
absorbing emissions from Americans’ second cars?’” (Grubb 1999: 99).
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carbon in the tropics, compared to $20-$100 per ton of carbon in non-tropical
countries.
Other influential arguments for the inclusion of sinks under the CDM stem
from the surge of public interest in forest conservation. This represents a large and
extremely well-funded enterprise in developed countries. Meanwhile, most
developing countries lack the resources to undertake and maintain forest conservation,
even if under pressure by international grant and loan awarding organizations. Many
have also bet on tourism as a source of foreign income, and publicized natural
resources among the national attractions. To them, the sale of emission reduction
credits from sinks appeared as a potential source of sustained income in a sector
where “no-strings attached” investment is practically non-existent. The money so
gained could be used to assist conservation efforts and even possibly contribute to
rural development.
This view was very much promoted by what is known as the conservation
lobby. This was composed of a number of powerful ENGOs, mainly from the United
States, who had already invested in carbon sequestration projects, knew that they had
a major role to play as intermediaries, and saw many potential benefits from their
inclusion under the CDM. Although they were less vocal regarding tree plantations,
groups such as The Nature Conservancy, the Union of Concerned Scientists,
Conservation International, Environmental Defense Fund, and others argued that,
with clear rules, sinks projects in the CDM could deliver social and environmental
benefits, promote biodiversity and help developing countries in the conservation of
forests.
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As negotiations began on the issue expectations ran very high. There was
talk of billions of dollars going South for the sale of reduction emission credits. In the
words of a Costa Rican in charge of the national climate change program, “it could
imply, for once in over 500 years, resources flowing North to South instead of the
other way around.”223
But these expectations were not shared by all. As noted earlier, many
countries opposed the inclusion of sinks in the CDM based on the uncertainty of the
reductions which, they claimed, could threaten the “environmental integrity” of the
Protocol. This was the official position of the EU, AOSIS and others, as well as of a
number of powerful international ENGOs such as Greenpeace, the World Wildlife
Fund, Friends of the Earth, and others grouped under the Climate Action Network
(CAN). Besides, the EU’s opposition to sinks in general was arguably also a matter of
economic self-interest. In almost every country in the EU the price of gasoline is at
least double that in the United States, presenting a real problem of competitive
advantage. So they naturally opted for options that could increase US fossil-fuel
prices and thus indirectly promote the development of alternative energy sources -in
particular, those technologies which they posses (see Chapter 3).
Another persuasive and important argument against sinks projects is that they
deliver little in terms of technology transfer to developing countries. Moreover,
because the assumption was always that forest projects presented a cheap option to
acquire reduction credits, it was feared that if they competed with energy projects
under the CDM, they would divert investment that would otherwise be directed at
223

Personal communication, July 1999. Similarly, Boyd (2003) quotes a delegate at the
climate change meetings saying “I overheard the representative of Colombia saying that there
were millions of dollars for sinks in the CDM.”

186
improvements in energy efficiency and at developing renewable energy. China for
one stood much more to gain from energy projects and was not really interested in
sinks. The small island states grouped under AOSIS, knowing that they would be the
most directly affected by climate change and with few chances of implementing sinks
projects, also opposed sinks, wanting rather to ensure that emissions would be
reduced at the source.224
Brazil’s position was mystifying to many people, who a priori assumed Brazil
had most to gain from a market in sinks -in particular, from avoided deforestation.
Yet while Brazil did support the inclusion of plantations and agroforestry under the
CDM, it adamantly opposed including avoided deforestation. Sovereignty concerns
are commonly used to explain this position, as Brazil, like Peru, resisted any strategy
that would tie up land that could be used for the country’s national development.
Some have even referred to the Brazilian government’s fear of “‘internationalization’
of the Amazon using environmental protection as an excuse” (Fearnside 2001: 174).
Moreover, there seemed to be a discrepancy of views within the government about
this (differences between the Ministry of Foreign Relations and that of the
Environment, as well as differences among and between state and federal
governments [ibid.]).225 But at the negotiations the Brazilian delegation never
wavered in presenting avoided deforestation as creating an enormous loophole for real
reduction commitments in industrialized countries, knowing too well how precarious
forest conservation is and how difficult it is to monitor. And given the remarkable
224

Also opposed to sinks in the CDM was the Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate
Change, which presented a declaration (see Boyd 2003). Yet the influence of this group in the
negotiations was effectively insignificant.
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See letter from the governor of Amazonia at Montreal 2005 (copy in file of author).
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negotiating skills of the Brazilian delegation, these supposed national differences
were never manifested and its position was never questioned.
In contrast, sinks appeared to many developing countries as a development
opportunity to address soil erosion, degradation of land and loss of forest cover. They
welcomed what they saw as an opportunity to deal with natural resource conservation
as free as possible from the intervention from international agencies and
environmental lobby groups.226 Sustainable land-use policies and practices were very
much part of their sustainable development goals –in particular insofar as they
implied erosion prevention and improved water quality- and they thought the CDM
could provide inputs in research and capacity building activities to assist them in this
goal. They argued that assigning a price to carbon was one of the few ways that
sustainable land or forest management and conservation could compete with
alternative land uses and avoid further land degradation. Costa Rica, Colombia and
several other countries were already coming up with such policies at the national
level, but as usual, lacked the funding.
The role of Costa Rica, together with other Latin American countries, was
particularly noteworthy: as a group they had hosted 15 out of 20 LULUCF projects
under the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) pilot phase (UNFCCC 2002). When
SBSTA 16 requested submission from Parties to begin consideration of the modalities
and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM,
almost half the submissions received by the Secretariat (9 out of 20) were from Latin
American countries, including a common submission from Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Uruguay.
226

This is not the case with the other options, such as debt-for-nature-swaps.
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Similarly, for many African countries with little prospect of investments in
energy efficiency, sinks projects represented the only possibility of participating in
the Kyoto Protocol. And of course some Annex I countries, in particular those in the
Umbrella Group, viewed sink projects under the CDM as a relatively inexpensive way
to meet their reduction commitments, potentially while also meeting other
international environmental and economic goals. More to the point, since emissions
from land use change and forestry account for an important part of emissions from
developing countries, it was argued that improving forest and land management in
developing countries would eventually contribute to stabilizing concentrations of
greenhouse gases –the ultimate objective of the Convention.

The inclusion of sinks in the CDM was, like LULUCF in general, a most
divisive issue, splitting sharply not only developed countries, but more significantly
the G-77/China and the environmental movement –which are normally expected to
negotiate as a group and hold uniform positions (Fearnside 2001). Like all accounting
for LULUCF, sinks under the CDM have problems of uncertainty, leakage, nonpermanence, and others. But unlike LULUCF under article 3.3 and 3.4 or under Joint
Implementation, where the uptake of carbon is added as a credit and the loss of
carbon is deducted as a debit in a national account, what makes sinks in the CDM
particularly tricky is the fact that developing countries have no commitments under
the Protocol. Once a project is completed, any loss of carbon from that project in the
host country goes unaccounted for, even while it has enabled an added ton of a
greenhouse gas to be released in the buyer country. This presented the possibility that
sinks in the CDM could ultimately result in increased greenhouse gas emissions
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instead of reductions. Still, supporters of sinks argued that the environmental
benefits of sinks projects outweighed deficiencies in carbon accounting precision. In
any case, dealing with this problem was going to be a most creative exercise.

Negotiating sinks in the CDM
One of the most suspicious inconsistencies of the Kyoto text is the lack of
reference to sinks under the CDM (Article 12). This was apparently to do with the
“text clean-up process” which deleted all footnotes in the text at Kyoto after COP 3.
But there are suspicions as to whether this was deliberate. (Depledge 2000: para. 76;
Fry 2002: 161). It is more likely that the omission of sinks was because Parties –in
particular the G-77/China- could not agree on the issue. 227 For one, Ambassador
Estrada had very clear views on this. In a UNDP text written soon after Kyoto on
issues and implications of the CDM, he observed that:
“Article 6 on Joint Implementation includes both reduction of
greenhouse gases emissions and removals of greenhouse gases; it explicitly
refers to ‘projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or
enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks.’ However, Article 12 on the
CDM instead only refers to reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases and
says nothing about removals of greenhouse gases. It is only logical to
conclude that different wording reflects different meaning, and it is against
any legal methodological interpretation to hold that different wordings in the
same legal text have equal meaning. It has been suggested that there was an
understanding among negotiators to make the texts of Articles 6 and 12
uniform on this point. That was never brought to my knowledge, neither
during the negotiations nor after the negotiations in the Committee of the
Whole and before formal approval by the Conference. Delegates involved in
227
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the negotiations were well-experienced diplomats, scientists, and
professional staff, and nobody should be induced to error. If a negotiation ends
with ‘we’ll revisit this text later’ and that ‘later’ never comes, it is because the
will to revisit the text did not exist. At the end, in this as in other matters, the
only real truth is the political will of governments, and sequestration will be
included in the CDM or not according to that will” (Estrada-Oyuela 1998).

But political will there was –at least among a significant group of countriesand the issue was brought back to the negotiating table as soon as the next meeting
was held. The United States, together with Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and others, argued that the original intent had always been to include sinks in the
CDM and that this had been clear at the time. But the G-77/China had no unified
position. As noted earlier, most Latin American countries -with the notable exceptions
of Brazil, Peru and Argentina- as well as the EITs and some African and Asian
countries, were in favor. But G-77 heavy-weights Brazil, India, and China, together
with Peru and Argentina, as well as the EU, AOSIS and some other African and Asian
countries, opposed them.
In many ways, negotiations started in earnest with the IPCC Special Report on
LULUCF, which generated heated debate on whether sinks were portrayed in too
favorable a light. Chapter Five of the Special Report on LULUCF on project-based
activities was the subject of intense discussions when the IPCC Plenary XVI met in
Montreal in May 2000. On that occasion, Brazil, Peru, China and others expressed in
unequivocal terms their opposition to unqualified positive references to sinks -in
particular regarding avoided emissions from deforestation, with Brazil noting that it
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could alone offset every ton of carbon under the CDM by conserving the Amazon
basin (Fry 2002: 167).
The reactions to the LULUCF Special Report varied greatly. AOSIS for
example called for “a significant revision” of the report and gave detailed word-byword comments on where and why it should be revised. While recognizing the
enormity of the task and congratulating the numerous contributors for their efforts,
“particularly in dealing with a complex subject with significant political
implications,” AOSIS notes in its comments to the report that “there are some
fundamental omissions, inaccuracies, biases and misconceptions” including “inherent
biases and factual inaccuracies or unsubstantiated generalisations.” AOSIS further
notes that even though “[I]t is fully recognised that any scientific discussion is prone
to errors or differences of interpretation. […] It would appear that some of these
inaccuracies relate to inherent biases of some of the authors. We would hope that it
does not reflect positions of certain Parties.”228
In contrast, in a statement to be recorded with the report of the meeting once
the Special Report and the Summary for Policy Makers had been adopted, Australia
noted that “[t]here have been sessions of the IPCC in the past where the political
environment was just as intense as it has been here over the past week but none where
the pressures on the scientific integrity of the end result have been as great,” adding
that the Summary for Policy Makers was balanced and objective, due to the “the
superb scientific and analytical work of the Coordinating Lead Authors and Lead
Authors who have worked tirelessly on the report under enormous pressure and
228
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maintained the integrity of the science through their highly professional handling
of the debate in this forum.” Australia further congratulated the IPCC, and in
particular Chair Robert Watson, “for the way [you and your co-Coordinating Lead
Authors] have protected the overall scientific integrity of this Summary for Policy
Makers through your absolute insistence that, ultimately, its scientific content must be
supported by the Lead Authors and by the underlying report” (see IPCC XVI [draft]
report).229
At the UNFCCC negotiations the issue was handled as a “hot potato”
according to Fry, passed back and forth between the mechanisms and the LULUCF
working groups, with none of the co-chairs wanting to take responsibility for it (Fry
2002: 167). Towards the end of COP 6, President Pronk came up with a compromise
solution whereby avoided deforestation would be considered under the Adaptation
Fund, but not as a credit generating activity under the CDM, leaving only
afforestation and reforestation as eligible activities. The proposal mentioned nonpermanence, social and environmental effects, leakage, additionality and uncertainty
as important concerns of some Parties (such as the EU and AOSIS) (Note by the
President of the COP, 23 November 2000). This represented a good middle ground
and came close to being the final decision (ibid.). But then COP 6 was suspended.

The draft IPCC report of the Sixteenth session is found under
http://www.ipcc.ch/meet/p16.pdf. The Australian statement further notes that: “We all knew
that much of the debate and rewriting of the Summary for Policy Makers would be based on a
balance of the interests of the Parties to the Convention and the Protocol rather than from the
sole perspective of maximising the scientific integrity and clarity of the Report. But the fact
that, even in those circumstances, after 7 days and nights, we’ve approved by consensus a
balanced and objective Summary for Policy Makers and accepted, with minimum changes, an
extremely comprehensive underlying report, is an enormous tribute to the professionalism,
integrity and good will of many people.”
229
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When negotiations resumed at COP 6 part II, a note by the co-chairs of the
negotiating groups outlining key outstanding issues and options to be resolved by
ministers and senior officials at the high level segment again included all possible
options on LULUCF credits under the CDM: from no LULUCF activities credited
under the CDM, to all LULUCF activities credited, including simple afforestation and
reforestation as a set of LULUCF activities, but also possibly including them with a
number of provisions, such as specific modalities and limited crediting by various
mechanisms and caps (FCCC/CP/2001/CRP.8).
In the end, like many important issues under the Protocol, the decision was
taken as part of a compromise political package known as the Bonn Agreements. As
usual on this matter, it was mainly Brazil that brokered the final deal (Krugg, personal
communication) in which, not surprisingly, avoided emissions was left out of the
CDM and included under adaptation (Decision 5/CP.7).230
The final decision was adopted in Marrakesh and included in the Marrakesh
Accords (Decision 11/CP.7 on LULUCF). This decision states that only afforestation
and reforestation (A/R) are to be eligible LULUCF project activities under the CDM
during the first commitment period, and that their implementation shall be guided by
the LULUCF principles; eligible LULUCF activities in future commitment periods
are to be decided in negotiations on the second commitment period. The decision
further states that the definitions and modalities for including A/R project activities
are to be developed by SBSTA with a view to adopting a decision at COP 9 in Milan
230

For a more detailed discussion on how avoided deforestation was excluded from accruing
emission credits under the CDM see Boyd (2003). On Brazil’s “tremendous influence in
international climate negotiations” see Fearnside 2001). See also Dutschke 2000 in Ciencias
Ambientais, Universidade de São Paulo (quoted in Fearnside 2001).
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in 2004, and that this new Decision shall be in the form of an annex on modalities
and procedures for A/R project activities for the CDM reflecting, mutatis mutandis,
the annex to Decision 17/CP.7 on modalities and procedures for the CDM. Issues that
had to be taken into account included “non-permanence, additionality, leakage,
uncertainties, and socio-economic and environmental impacts, including impacts on
biodiversity and natural eco-systems” (Decision 11/CP.7, para 2(e)). Significantly, the
decision caps the amount of credits a country can get from A/R in the CDM at 1
percent of that country’s base line emissions, for each of the five commitment period
years (that is, 1 percent times five). This quantitative cap effectively puts a limit on
the demand for sinks in the CDM -something which was said to have large
implications for the CDM and would further depress the expected price of carbon
sequestration from A/R in this market.
The conservation lobby -with Costa Rica and others- was appalled.

A/R and what had to be sorted out
The fact that the decision on sinks in the CDM specifies “non-permanence,
additionality, leakage, uncertainties, and socio-economic and environmental impacts,
including impacts on biodiversity and natural eco-systems” as issues that had to be
taken into account was, like everything else in the decision, a result of political
negotiations. It delimited what had to be addressed, and set the scope of the political
debate. This debate was to be further contained with the mutatis mutandis reference
to the decision on CDM in general, which gave a strong message that Parties could
not change anything that was not specific to these issues.
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Still, there was plenty to consider, including the definitions of afforestation
and reforestation -it was unclear if these definitions included agroforestry or natural
regeneration for example. What follows is a review of these most important issues
that had to be resolved, in order to give an idea of the complexities implied in making
a commodity out of carbon sinks and designing a global market for them.231 The
discussions were suffused with the sense, often explicitly stated, that in these highly
technical issues lay to a great extent the famous ‘environmental integrity’ of the
Protocol.232

Baselines
Any accounting of carbon sequestered by a specific project would first of all
have to determine a base from which to start counting, that is, a baseline on top of
which carbon uptake has increased as a result of the project.233 Doing this implies two
things: developing a reference scenario for future human activity on the site, and
estimating the carbon stock under this scenario. This is a problem shared by energy
projects as well, but in the case of land involving many people, making such
assumptions is difficult at best. Neither human nor natural activity is ever static; they
respond to a multitude of stimuli from various scales, and they have never been in a
blank state from which to start counting. In the case of conversion of agricultural or
231

In addressing these issues one by one I focus on the complexities mainly for A/R, but it’s
useful to keep in mind that all of them apply, and are even greater, in the case of avoided
deforestation (or forest conservation).
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Personal observation and notes.

Baseline is defined by the IPCC as: “A reference scenario against which any change in
greenhouse gas emissions or removals is measured.” IPCC. 2000. Land Use, Land-Use
Change and Forestry. Special Report. Summary for Policymakers. Appendix III: Glossary.
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cattle grazing land to plantations one may assume that, all things being equal,
existing human activity and carbon stocks would persist -the problem is of course
assuming this “all things being equal” not for one or two years, but for the duration of
the project, which can go from a couple of decades to sixty years and more. Then one
would have to calculate numerically the carbon uptake under this scenario.234
To address this question, some pilot projects established control plots with the
same characteristics as the project site before the project began, but this approach for
all projects would make them extremely expensive and is not always possible. Others
developed a scenario using site-specific information such as plans and inclination of
the landowners, as well as regional and national economic trends and policies.
Needless to say, extrapolating data from regional and national trends and then
forecasting for a land use project, even while taking into account its specific
particularities, is a speculative exercise and is always uncertain. A reforestation
project may have difficulty proving why the area would not have regrown under a
business-as-usual scenario, while the causes for farmers engaging in a land use
change may be based on immigration fuelled by government policies, or be related to
poor agricultural practices, or to all of the above combined. There is nothing much
negotiators can do in establishing general rules for this. The decision therefore states
that baseline methodologies are to be developed based on existing or historical
changes in the carbon stocks, those expected from land use that represents an
economically attractive course of action, or from the most likely land use at the time
the project starts. These approaches follow those agreed for other CDM energy

Imagine doing this for avoided deforestation, where one would have to calculate the level
of deforestation expected for this long period of time.
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projects, except for one option that applies to energy and not forests, which allows
for the establishment of the baseline according to average emissions of similar project
activities undertaken in the previous five years.
But besides the establishment of the baseline scenario, one of the key
discussions concerning baselines for A/R CDM projects was which of the carbon
pools -above-ground biomass, below-ground biomass, litter, dead wood and soil
organic carbon- and sources of emissions should be taken into account in establishing
the baseline and the actual net greenhouse gas removals achieved by project activities.
Accounting for all carbon pools could be prohibitively expensive, and some of them
might not represent much in terms of emissions –they could actually be acting as
small sinks. To address this, the decision allows project participants to choose not to
account for one or more carbon pools as long as they can prove that this exclusion
will not augment the reductions claimed.235 Thus if a pool is a sink, it doesn’t need to
be measured. But if it acts as a source, it must be measured lest it result in
overestimating the reductions achieved by the project.
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On project participants, see Chapter 6. As stated in the CDM Guidelines for preparing a
PDD, and in accordance with the usage of the term in the CDM and CDM A/R modalities and
procedures, a project participant is a Party involved, and/or a private and/or public entity
authorized by a Party to participate in an A/R CDM project activity (CDM-AR-PDD version
04 page 14). The Party authorizing a public or private entity does not necessarily have to be
the one where the entity is located but can be any Party participating in the project. What is
important is that only project participants may decide on the distribution of CERs. A common
problem of project proposals is that project participants are not clearly defined. The
certification and validation company DNV mentions cases where the project operator has not
been included as project participant or even been informed of the CDM proposal, and has
subsequently threatened to stop operation. Although it is not necessary to include the project
operator as project participant, a private agreement would ensure against this situation.
Designated National Authorities (DNAs), consultants and local municipalities do not
typically have a share in the distribution of CERs (Kamel 2005: 17). See Chapter 6.
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Moreover, in order to play it safe and provide a conservative account of
the baseline, and to prevent earning credits for avoided emissions that result only
from the displacement of the previous land use, the final decision states that
greenhouse gas emissions from activities on the land before the project was
implemented are not to be included in the baseline. In the case of conversion from
cattle grazing to plantations for example, the emissions from the cattle that would
occur had the cattle stayed and that are avoided by switching to trees, are not be
counted in the baseline. The definition for baselines, then, considers only the changes
in carbon stocks and a project scenario that equals the verifiable changes in carbon
stocks minus the increase in greenhouse gas emissions by sources resulting from its
implementation. But this, again, is easier said than shown.

Additionality
A related problem and major challenge for emission reduction projects under a
market for limiting greenhouse gas emissions is proving that the reductions would not
have taken place in a “business as usual” situation, that is, in a world without credits.
This is known as the problem of “additionality,” in the sense that all certified
reductions must be additional to what would have happened anyway.236 This sounds
more obvious than it is in practice and proving additionality became one of the most
difficult and controversial issues under the CDM. Part of the problem stemmed from

236

Protocol Article 12, paragraph 5(c) states that the emission reductions resulting from each
project activity shall be certified by operational entities [..] on the basis of, inter alia,
“reduction in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the
certified project activity.”
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ambiguities and inconsistencies in the definition of additionality, which was
sometimes understood as environmental additionality, sometimes as financial
additionality, and sometimes as both.
Financial additionality refers to the need to sort out projects that would have
taken place anyway in the absence of credits for emission reductions. This is tricky if
applied strictly: a switch from coal to gas could be considered non-additional because
it is cost-effective. Yet there are many reasons besides price why emission reduction
projects are not undertaken (see Baumert n.d.).237 Still, it was not possible to leave the
door open for business-as-usual. In terms of public funding the issue became linked to
developing countries’ fear that funding for climate change would come from reoriented overseas/aid/development budgets, instead of the already agreed-to “new and
additional funding.” There was some discussion early on about the need for a
financial test to prove that funding of CDM projects would be additional to official
development assistance (ODA), including the Global Environment Fund (GEF)
contributions.238 This was too controversial however, and only a reference was left in
the Preamble to the decision on the CDM (Decision 17/CP.7) (a location which
indicates its weak legal status), stating that public funding for CDM projects is not to
result in the diversion of ODA (Yamin and Depledge 2004: 177 and 184-5). It is then
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Most obviously, lack of information (often due to special interests and publicity campaigns
(or lack thereof)) and risk aversion -so-called non-price barriers (the best known example is
probably compact light bulbs.) Many have argued that taking advantage of these “nonregrets” opportunities (the famous “low-hanging fruits”) would be a boost to the climate
regime and an essential push for further emissions reductions.
238

Part of the problem here is that if public funds were used to fund CDM projects, resources
earmarked for sustainable development as prioritized by developing countries would be
distorted (not to speak of the perversion of using supposed development assistance to help the
donor meet its own mitigation commitments).
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up to the CDM Executive Board and to the COP/MOP to assess if Parties are
complying with this stipulation.239
While financial additionality may be a matter of yes or no, environmental
additionality requires a quantitative calculation of tons of carbon equivalent that
would result had there been no issuance of certified credits. In the case of A/R, as
with establishing the baseline, proving that the carbon sequestered would not have
taken place otherwise requires considerations of national conditions as well as
particular project histories and projections. These would have to encompass both local
specificities and regional trends –including financial investment flows, development
funding, legal and regulatory standards, current management practices, etc.- together
with particular politico-economic, cultural, and geophysical contexts. Because forests
and other biomass tend to grow back naturally if left undisturbed, additionality would
have to be calculated in excess of any natural regrowth, unless it was proven that the
land would be used for other purposes where this natural regrowth would be
artificially prevented.
But there are technical problems which calculations on additionality would
have to consider. In some wet areas, for example, an increase in plant biomass carbon
can lead to a decrease in soil organic carbon, possibly offsetting any gains in
sequestration made by the plants. This has been the case in certain grasslands of the
southwestern United States, where woody plant invasions of wetter grassland resulted

239

On the difficulties of separating out funding for sustainable development from “new and
additional” resources provided to the Conventions’ financial mechanism, see Yamin and
Depledge 2004, chapter 10.
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in a loss of soil organic carbon.

A similar problem has been pointed out for

intensively managed tree plantations which, once their productive life is over, tend to
diminish the natural regrowth capability of the soil. This would have to be taken into
account in the form of a higher baseline.
In the final decision on A/R (Decision 19/CP.9), a project is considered
additional “if the actual net greenhouse gas removals by sinks are increased above the
sum of the changes in carbon stocks in the carbon pools within the project boundary
that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM afforestation or
reforestation project activity” (paragraph 18, ibid.). The decision parallels that for
energy projects in that it leaves it up the Executive Board of the CDM to decide on a
case by case basis which projects are additional.241
Yet the issue remains controversial. It was revisited at COP/MOP 1 in
Montreal as many Parties and non-Parties had called for its reconsideration. The most
insidious unintended consequence would be that in order not to threaten the
additionality test, developing countries could hold back progressive energy and land
use policies. Christiana Figueres, for example, speaks of Costa Rica as being
penalized for its progressive climate related policies, and notes that Mexico City has
put on hold climate friendly policies “not to spoil CDM project opportunities” (see
Point Carbon 2004). Many, like Figueres, have argued that the current interpretation
of additionality is a disincentive for developing countries to institute sectoral
240

241

See Jackson et al. 2002.

Amongst the information required in the project design document (PDD) (the document to
be submitted detailing the proposed project activity), is:
(m) Information on sources of public funding for the project activity from Annex I
Parties which shall provide an affirmation that such funding does not result in a
diversion of official development assistance and is separate from and is not counted
towards the financial obligations of those Parties.
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decarbonizing policies. The problem is that additionality is defined as the opposite
of business-as-usual, and you can’t reward business-as-usual. It is yet to be seen how
they deal with this conundrum.

Base year
Although originally not part of the scope of discussions, when to start
counting, or defining the baseline year after which the definition of afforestation or
reforestation may apply, became an important point of contention. In principle, the
date was agreed in Marrakech to be 31 December 1989. This means that only land
that was under non-forested land-uses in the beginning of 1990 would be eligible to
apply for carbon sequestration credits. In subsequent meetings a couple of countries –
following a proposal by Canada- tried to move the base year to 2000. This move was
opposed by many ENGOs and many countries, worried that a more recent baseline
year would greatly increase the land available for sinks. Some also argued that
changing the agreed date would create perverse incentives to deforest today in order
to apply for credits for reforestation in the near future.242
Setting the base year at 1990 does restrict to a large extent the land where
carbon sequestration projects can take place. Many tropical countries, most notably
Indonesia -but to some extent also Costa Rica- saw massive forest loss in the 1990s
decade (in the case of Indonesia for example, mostly burnt in order to turn the land to
large oil palm and pulp plantations). The Climate Action Network (CAN) argued that,
given a general rate of deforestation of 10 million hectares per year since 1990,
moving the baseline year would add 100 million hectares to the area where such a
242
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project can take place.

So if the baseline year was moved to 2000, Indonesia,

the third largest forested country, would triple the area under which it could sell
credits for reforestation as part of the CDM. Because of the cap of 1 percent times
five of Annex I countries’ base year emissions that may be used in A/R projects, it
was argued that moving the baseline and increasing the land eligible for A/R under
the CDM would only drive the price of the credits down –generating over-supply in a
limited demand market. And this was deemed to be inconvenient both for addressing
rising emissions and for the creation of scarcity required for an efficient market.

Non-permanence
A biological carbon sink today may be a source of carbon dioxide tomorrow,
whether for natural or human-induced reasons, including climate change itself. This
was the one most commonly cited issue against the inclusion of sinks in the CDM,
and one that was only resolved by resorting to complicated accounting rules. It is
referred to as the problem of non-permanence, and any accounting of emissions
reductions from land use change would have to consider it. A major problem is the
long time required for carbon sequestration by trees, and the no-time in which the
carbon sequestered may be lost back to the atmosphere. Another one is the desire for
a market for emission reductions credits to make all credits fungible –whether
permanent or non-permanent.
Two main approaches were considered at the negotiations for accounting for
non-permanence in A/R activities: the insurance approach (proposed mainly by
Canada), and the temporary crediting approach (supported by the EU, Brazil and
243
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others). Other proposed options that did not last included buffers and ton/year
accounting.
Under an insurance approach, project participants could insure the CERs244
generated by the project (which implies paying a premium to the insurer); in case of a
loss during the project lifetime, plus an extra period of 10 years, the insurer would
have to replace the CERs with other permanent carbon credits, that is AAUs
(Authorized Assigned Units used for emissions trading and banking), ERUs
(Emission Reduction Units, credits under Joint Implementation), or RMUs (Removal
Units, from removals from LULUCF under Protocol Article 3.3 and 3.4). The
principal argument in favor of the insurance approach was that it could result in a
higher value for credits (provided that the cost of insurance remained low enough)
because they would have been considered permanent credits when issued. Moreover,
the insurer would have to acquire replacement credits, which means adding a captive
buyer to the market. However, a set of technical questions limited the validity of this
approach, including the uncertainty in the prices of CERs (with the consequent
difficulty for insurers to establish a fixed premium in long-term projects), and
institutional difficulties in developing countries relating to insurance markets (Wong
and Dutschke, 2003).

244

As noted in chapter 3, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are the credits issued under
the CDM. As explained in what follows, at COP 9 in Milan it was decided that those
permanent credits from energy projects would remain CERs, and those from sink activities
would be called tCERs or lCERs.
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The temporary approach, presented by Colombia based on a earlier idea by
Brazil,245 suggested that those carbon credits obtained by a developed country from
forestry projects would expire when the carbon is emitted to the atmosphere for
whatever reason. Then, the holding country would have either to reduce national
emissions by that amount or buy the same number of carbon credits from another
forestry project.
In the end, Parties agreed to a modified version of the temporary approach,
using two new types of CERs to deal with non permanence: Temporary CERs
(tCERs) and Long-term CERs (lCERs –also known as ul-CERs). For both types of
credits, verification is required every five years with the exception of the first
verification, which may be undertaken at a time selected by project participants.
tCERs are issued after each project verification in an amount equal to the certified net
increase in carbon stocks since the beginning of the project; they expire at the end of
the next commitment period (meaning that they can only be used for the compliance
period in which they were issued). If the trees are still there when the project is
verified, replacement tCERs can be re-issued. Instead, lCERs are also issued after
each verification but in an amount equal to the certified net increase in the carbon
stock since the previous verification of the project, so that if there has been an
increase since the last verification, more lCERs are issued, and if there has been a
decrease, the corresponding lost lCERs must be replaced with permanent credits.
They expire at the end of the project’s crediting period. Prior to their expiration date,
both tCERs and lCERs have to be replaced with AAUs, CERs, ERUs, RMUs (or
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This proposal was originally submitted in September 2000 and contained as a Colombian
submission in document FCCC/SBSTA/2000/MISC.8.
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other tCERs in the case of tCERs), but not with lCERs. In addition, lCERs must
be replaced when the obligatory five-year certification report is not provided.
Parties agreed that project participants must choose one of these two
approaches, which shall remain fixed for the crediting period, including any renewals.
The crediting period was established at either 20 years - which may be renewed at
most two times (up to 60 years), provided that for each renewal the baseline is
reviewed - or a maximum of 30 years. No banking is allowed, that is, all credits are to
be used for the commitment period for which they are issued.
Still, trying to solve the problem of non-permanence solely by accounting can
bring up other problems. For example, liability gets pushed forward in time. NGOs
and a few Parties feared that a situation could arise in which, once the lifetime of the
tCERs comes to an end and replacements are needed, there could be a spike in
demand for emission reductions, which would weaken further commitments, and
which might ultimately mean that in fact the promised and additional permanent cuts
would never materialize.246 To ensure that Parties were not too dependent on tCERs,
or that they would not accumulate too much debit for the future, Brazil for one
wanted a cleanup of accounts every now and then. For this reason, and to guarantee
that credits are replaced in a timely way, each national registry has to include lCERs
and tCERs replacement accounts for each commitment period.
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As a corrective to the Colombian proposal, environmental groups under CAN proposed a
five-year limit to the tCERs, with the possibility of renewal. This, they argued, would oblige
periodic verification and monitoring of the projects, which might otherwise go for a long time
unchecked. It would also make the projects more flexible for both developers and host
countries and does not require land to be ‘locked up’ in long-term contracts (Submission by
CAN on Issues Related to Modalities for Including Afforestation and Reforestation Under
Article 12. August 20, 2002). If the definition of forestry was changed in the second
commitment period, or carbon sinks no longer allowed after then, five-year tCERs could also
be adapted or terminated without penalty to the Parties involved.
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Leakage
Because projects don’t operate in a vacuum, an offset of emissions in one
place may result in an increase elsewhere, as when land is cleared for a plantation that
generates no employment and people are displaced, often clearing forest land in
another place, or when demand for timber, fuelwood or other goods is simply
relocated. This “externality” is referred to as “leakage,”’ and it can cross scales, from
local to international. Commercial plantations are particularly prone to leakage, which
is another reason why environmental groups want them out. The difficulty lies in
establishing the boundary of the project and in accounting for leakages of different
magnitude and type. Although it is impossible that all the consequences of an activity
be accounted for before the project even starts, this is a matter of real consequence for
the ecological and social integrity of the Protocol’s mechanisms. A study in the
United States of a large carbon sequestration program to convert agricultural land to
tree plantations found that the benefits from the offsets would eventually be lost, as
landowners responded by harvesting existing forests, converting unsubsidized land
back to agriculture, and decreasing replanting of forests after harvest (Alig et al.
1998). And under a market for credits, it is not enough to acknowledge leakage -it
must be quantified and reported.
During the negotiations, Norway introduced a text recommending an assumed
100 percent leakage default in cases where significant sources of leakage could not be
estimated nor prevented -a proposal that was supported by NGOs under CAN. Some
Parties, such as Canada and Bolivia, responded by proposing to account for positive
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leakage –that is, positive effects such as emulation of the project in a nearby area.
This was, according to some, merely a bargaining chip to ensure negotiating options
against this default 100 percent leakage.247 The final decision merely states that all
projects must account for potential leakage and include measures to minimize it.

Social and environmental impacts
The social and environmental impacts of sinks project under the CDM were
always an issue. At SBSTA 18, Tuvalu, on behalf of AOSIS, and the EU with
Norway and Switzerland, had each introduced a proposal detailing a list of topics that
had to be covered in the analysis of environmental and socio-economic impacts of
project activities. These issues entered the draft negotiating text at COP 9 as
“Appendix E” (see Appendix of this dissertation). They would become one of the
most contentious aspects of the rules for CDM A/R projects.
The discussion on Appendix E was one of the few instances where
negotiations turned to actual impacts of the projects on the ground -the one, and
perhaps the only, discussion of the effects of projects on people living where the
project is to take place. And it is interesting to compare the options and the outcome.
Whereas the EU’s proposal and language is more bureaucratic (it includes all those
words that states use and few people agree on what exactly they mean, such as
benefit-sharing, stakeholders, capacity-building, awareness raising, public
participation, as well as “evolution of rights on tenure and land use”), AOSIS’s
proposal is more straightforward and clear (displacement, damage or destruction,
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increase in disease and in noise or waste, changes in land tenure and in local
economy or employment).

Both of these options for social and environmental impact assessments were
strongly opposed by the majority of the G-77 and China (with the exception of
AOSIS) and by Canada, on the grounds that the definition of a standard list of
sustainable development criteria would impinge on national sovereignty. Many of
these countries also opposed it on more practical grounds, noting that such assessment
would significantly augment the project transaction costs -which were already
anticipated to be very high and which they -that is, the project developers in the host
countries- would have to bear. In practice, they argued, inclusion of Appendix E with
that long list of things to consider would mean that almost no projects would be
implemented. In response, AOSIS countered that the purpose of the list was to serve
as a “tool kit,” a guideline to help in gauging a project, with criteria that are
commonly used at international lending agencies such as the Asian Development
Bank, World Bank and others. The EU argued along the same lines.
This is a good occasion to catch a glimpse of the faces behind the
characteristically face-less Party positions at the negotiations. Specifically, it shows
how Ian Fry, the delegate from Tuvalu speaking on behalf of AOSIS, pressed, as he
consistently does, to include careful and rigorous consideration of social and
environmental impacts. It is he who on other occasions has advocated for recognition
of indigenous peoples’ rights or for addressing countries’ commitments under other
conventions and international agreements, from ILO to CBD and CCD. Because he
represents a very small island state, he can more easily get away with pushing ahead
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with his own convictions. But for that same reason, his proposals do not always
make it to the final text. Still, personalities loom large in explaining things, and he is
more influential than one would expect a delegate from tiny Tuvalu to be. He knows
the rules of the game, and this being the UN, where all Parties are in theory equal, his
ideas have to be taken into account -at least nominally. Although I have no doubt that
many delegates try to do as much, they often find it harder to push their line. In any
case, it is not easy to assume that their position is a result of their own personal
preferences, and only some people stand out. Fry is a good example of those who
negotiate for a state but do not have only the state’s interests in mind. And there are
others. This is perhaps an easy illustration of an obvious fact: understanding the
politics, economics and culture of the UN negotiations covers a great deal, but it is not
always enough to explain things in detail. One must add to that ad hominem
complexities.
Of course the EU, like Tuvalu and most other Parties, knew that clear rules for
social and environmental impact assessments were necessary if the Protocol’s flexible
mechanisms were to have any public credibility –in particular in regards to forestry
projects, which easily catch the popular imagination and emotion. Many NGOs had
made forceful statements in this regard and made it clear that they would expose and
bring disrepute to any attempt to bypass this most basic issue. 248 Moreover, AOSIS
has never supported sinks, always preferring to see real reductions in emission
sources. The actual context of the negotiations probably also played a part. These
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See Greenpeace’s statement on sinks in the CDM and the possibility to include large-scale
monoculture plantations or “environmentally and socially damaging projects”: “Such projects
should now, and most likely will, be opposed on the ground and investors should be held
accountable.” Greenpeace (Malte Meinshausen and Bill Hare). 2003. “Sinks in the CDM:
After the climate, biodiversity goes down the drain.” 19 th December 2003.
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came after an infamous break in the relationship between the EU and developing
countries at COP 8 in New Delhi. On that occasion, the EU and the G-77/China,
sometimes referred to as the “Green Group” for their productive and sustained
collaboration since COP 1 at Berlin, went back to their corners of the ring as the EU
insisted on mitigation and future commitments (a subject which developing countries
found unacceptable at that time), and developing countries insisted on adaptation and
sustainable development (Ott 2003). This break was greatly aided by the United
States’s and OPEC countries’ backstage peddling. Some of the distancing remained in
Milan, where the EU was perceived by some (the delegate from Mexico for example)
as having taken it upon itself to uphold the integrity of the Protocol (once salvaged
after the United States’ withdrawal with the approval of the Marrakesh Accords),
regardless of other considerations.
In any case, given the strong opposition of the G-77/China and a few others,
after extensive negotiations Appendix E was abandoned and in its place a more
general list of areas of enquiry for impact assessment were included as part of the
information required in the project design document (PDD). APPENDIX B: PDD for
A/R project activities under the CDM thus requires:249
[..]
(b) A description of the present environmental conditions of the area including a
description of climate, hydrology, soils, ecosystems, and the possible presence
of rare or endangered species and their habitats;
(c) A description of legal title to the land, rights of access to the sequestered
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In Decision 19/CP.9 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/3/Add.4) (originally FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2)
Modalities and Procedures for Afforestation and Reforestation Project Activities under the
CDM in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.
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carbon, current land tenure and land use;
[..]
(j) Environmental impacts of the project activity:
(i) Documentation on the analysis of the environmental impacts, including
impacts on biodiversity, natural ecosystems, and impacts outside the
project boundary of the proposed afforestation or reforestation project
activity under the CDM. This analysis should include, where applicable,
information on, inter alia, hydrology, soils, risk of fires, pests and
diseases;
(ii) If any negative impact is considered significant by the project
participants or the host Party, a statement that project participants have
undertaken an
environmental impact assessment, in accordance with the procedures
required by the host Party, including conclusions and all references to
support documentation.
(k) Socio-economic impacts of the project activity:
(i) Documentation on the analysis of the socio-economic impacts,
including impacts outside the project boundary of the proposed
afforestation or reforestation project activity under the CDM. This
analysis should include, where applicable, information on, inter alia, local
communities, indigenous peoples, land tenure, local employment, food
production, cultural and religious sites, access to fuelwood and other
forest products;
(ii) If any negative impact is considered significant by the project
participants or the host Party, a statement that project participants have
undertaken a socio-economic impact assessment, in accordance with the
procedures required by the host Party, including conclusions and all
references to support documentation.
(l) A description of planned monitoring and remedial measures to address
significant impacts referred to in paragraphs 2 (j) (ii) and (k) (ii) above;
(n) Stakeholder comments, including a brief description of the process, a
summary of the comments received, and a report on how due account was taken
of any comments received.
Under stakeholder comments, the decision on A/R emulates the decision for
CDM energy project activities, stipulating under the Validation and Registration
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requirements that a project’s preparation phase should be subject to a period of
local stakeholder comments and, prior to registration under the CDM Executive
Board, subject to 45 days of scrutiny by Parties, stakeholders and UNFCCC
accredited NGOs.250 Stakeholders are defined as “the public, including individuals,
groups, or communities affected, or likely to be affected, by the proposed A/R project
activity or actions leading to the implementation of such an activity.”251
Thus, Decision 19/CP.9, paragraph 12 and 12(b) and (c) under G:, states:
The designated operational entity selected by project participants to validate a
proposed afforestation or reforestation project activity under the CDM, being
under a contractual arrangement with them, shall review the project design
document and any supporting documentation to confirm that the following
requirements have been met: […]
(b) Comments by local stakeholders have been invited, a summary of the
comments received has been provided, and a report to the designated operational
entity on how due account was taken of any comments has been received.
(c) Project participants have submitted to the designated operational entity
documentation on the analysis of the socio-economic and environmental
impacts, including impacts on biodiversity and natural ecosystems, and impacts
outside the project boundary of the proposed afforestation or reforestation
project activity under the CDM. If any negative impact is considered significant
by the project participants or the host Party, project participants have
undertaken a socio-economic impact assessment and/or an environmental
impact assessment in accordance with the procedures required by the host Party.
Project participants shall submit a statement that confirms that they have
undertaken such an assessment in accordance with the procedures required by
the host Party and include a description of the planned monitoring and remedial
measures to address them;
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In relation to stakeholder involvement, South Africa, Norway and the EU advocated to
increase from 30 to 60 days the period to receive comments on the validation report by local
stakeholders, Parties and UNFCCC accredited NGOs (30 days is the period for stakeholder
comments for energy projects as per Decision 17/CP.7). But several Parties were opposed.
The period for comments was finally set at a compromise 45 days.
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See CDM-AR-PDD Guidelines Glossary, Version 04, page 14.
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In sum, the final decision simply states that the analysis of socio-economic
impacts “should include, where applicable, information on, inter alia,” local
communities, indigenous peoples, employment, land tenure, etc. (italics mine). If any
negative impact is considered significant, project developers need only present a
statement that the project participants have undertaken a socioeconomic impact
assessment in accordance with the procedures required by the host Party; the
designated operational entity (DOE) is only to verify whether this information has
been submitted, but is not to assess it. Stakeholder comments on the project need
merely be “invited” by project developers. As CAN said, “Let’s hope they’re home to
get the invitation and not working on subsistence agriculture in fields that might soon
be displaced by Eucalyptus.”252

In its final form, then, the text is open enough for all to agree and there are no
real requirements of consequence to address social and environmental impacts of the
projects. It is all in accordance with host Parties’ internal procedures, and no follow
up is required. Whether local people’s interests are taken into account will depend on
each specific project and on the amount of publicity and pressure civil society groups
may bring to bear on buyers and (especially) host countries.253 At the UN, sovereignty
rules: states are the ones negotiating, they uphold the right to decide.
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CAN, 7 December 2003. “Chair’s proposal for sinks: ‘Sinks –close to a decision???’”
(copy in files of author).
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In many ways this is redolent of how state and capital work in similar circumstances: power
is concentrated to make global decisions but the effects are then diffused by localizing and
spreading responsibility and liability, making it harder to follow up and address (see also
Strathern 2001).
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GMOs and Invasive Alien Species
A particular issue that became contentious towards the last days of the
negotiations was that of GMOs and invasive alien species (IAS). Referred by some
delegates off the record as a “non-issue,” the question of GMOs and IAS came into
the open on the third day of COP-9 formal negotiations, when Norway, which had
earlier proposed excluding these from project activities, introduced alternative text.
The text contained an option to use IAS and GMOs, provided their introduction had
been subject to advanced informed authorisation by a competent national authority of
the host Party, and that a risk analysis had been carried out in accordance with host
Party procedures –an option supported by Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and
Australia. The question was not openly discussed in the formal contact groups even
though a number of draft proposals were circulated and discussed informally by
delegates during COP 9. Yet, it was included in the Decision adopted by the COP, as
“[R]ecognizing that host Parties evaluate, in accordance with their national laws,
[potential] risks associated with the use of [IAS and GMOs in A/R project activities]”,
and likewise, that “Parties included in Annex I evaluate, in accordance with their
national laws, the use of [tCERs and/or lCERs] generated from [A/R] project
activities that make use of [IAS and GMOs]”. Support of this text earned “Fossil of
the Day” awards for Canada (twice), New Zealand (twice), China, Japan, Argentina,
France, and Ireland.254 Even Norway was awarded one, for it was found to deserve
“some friendly fire for temporarily chickening out on the clear GMO and IAS
“Fossil-of-the-Day” awards are given every day of the conference by the Climate Action
Network based on Parties’ performance in the negotiations. See www.fossil-of-the-day.org
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language.” Still, in their final statements, Australia and the United States voiced
their discontent over the singling out of GMOs in the Decision.255 And although the
United States is not a Party to the Protocol, its opposition resulted in the text being
moved to the preamble (again, where its legal status is weaker). They based this
opposition on the grounds of precedent setting. And even though this move makes the
reference to GM trees non-binding, Washington insisted on putting its concerns on the
record as "a miscellaneous document," as Harlan Watson, chief US negotiator said.256

Small-scale sinks
As negotiations progressed, it became increasingly clear that the rules for A/R
projects under consideration would result in high transaction costs that would hinder
participation by small producers and poor rural populations. There was soon
consensus that simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale projects, such as
those that already existed in the energy sector, targeted specifically for low-income
communities, would be necessary. However, a small-scale project in a dense tropical
forest in Nicaragua is very different from a small-scale project in a more sparsely
populated savannah landscape elsewhere. The discussion on small-scale therefore
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The United States opposition made the news: see, among others: Richard Ingham, “US
defends GM trees in row at UN climate talks.” Agence France Presse. December 10, 2003.
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Personal observation at the negotiations (see also UNFCCC records and report of the
meeting). There are no commercial species of GM trees yet, but that innovation may not be
too far away if there is the incentive under Kyoto to plant fast-growing trees that swiftly soak
up CO2.
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centered on finding single definition for small-scale that could fit most national
circumstances. 257
At COP 9, Nicaragua, together with Colombia, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Uruguay,
Chile and Mexico, put forward a proposal for small-scale and special projects under
the CDM, subject to simplified modalities and procedures. The original text defined
these special projects as those falling under any of the following categories:


Small-scale project activities, defined as those afforestation and reforestation
project activities that remove on the average less than 45 kilotons of CO2
equivalent per year (Kt CO2eq/year);



Smallholder and community project activities, defined as those afforestation and
reforestation project activities involving, as host country project participants, lowincome communities as defined by the host country, and remove on the average
less that 60 Kt CO2eq/year;



Environmental services project activities, defined as those afforestation and
reforestation project activities that remove on the average less than 60 Kt
CO2eq/year where more than 50% of the land area covered by the project activity
will be established as a protected forest for the protection of one or more of the
following: biological diversity, water, soil, cultural heritage, scenic beauty, and
human nutrition.258

There was prompt agreement on including reference to low-income communities,
as defined by the host country. Mention of environmental services, at least partly
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On what could count as small-scale, Chile, for example had proposed at COP 8 in New
Delhi at a minimum an area of 5,000 to 10,000 hectares, prompting CAN to accuse Chile of
disingenuously wanting to slip under the small-scale category large-scale mono-culture
plantations, one of the country’s main industries (ECO Newsletter, Volume CVIII, Issue #06).
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courtesy of Costa Rica, was soon dropped, since the discussion on protected areas
had already taken place under avoided deforestation and there was no time nor will to
engage in it again. It was the threshold for small-scale that divided countries, and with
particular nastiness the G-77/China. While a large number of countries supported the
45 Kgt CO2e threshold, China proposed a limit of 3 Kt CO2e. This limit prompted
accusations of China wanting to block small-scale sinks to favor energy projects,
since sinks projects would never stand a chance with this limit and the low price
expected from temporary crediting. Brazil was also accused of surreptitiously
obstructing any agreements on small-scale, in which neither India nor it were
interested,259 and using its power to speak on behalf of the G-77 to do little to defend
it. Significantly, the major ENGOs, who had been most active at the discussions on
large scale A/R, had dropped from the picture and their lobby representatives were
hardly present at the negotiations on small-scale.260
Because of the need to decrease transaction costs, other matters under negotiation
on small-scale sinks were the possibility of bundling projects, how to address leakage,
and other measures such as developing project categories which could be readily
used, elaborating a simplified project design document with simplified baseline and
monitoring methodologies, and offering a discount from CDM Executive Board
fees.261 Failing to reach agreement on all these issues at SB 20, the matter was
forwarded to COP 10 to be dealt with as a package.
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The technical paper prepared by the UNFCCC Secretariat explaining these issues is found
as document FCCC/TP/20004/2.
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Given China’s forceful position on the 3 Kgt CO2e limit, and the lack of
interest by Brazil and India, the final decision adopted at COP 10 established a
threshold of 8 Kgt CO2e for small-scale projects. Some compromise was made on
allowing this limit to be the average projected net for each verification period. But
any removals in excess of 8 Kgt CO2e per year would not be eligible. Besides, it was
agreed that these kinds of projects would be exempt from the 2 percent levy on CDM
projects to be used for adaptation; be entitled to a reduced fee to cover administrative
expenses of the CDM Executive Board; and be subject to simplified methodologies
using default factors. Other than that, the COP “invites Parties to provide support for
project participants interested in coordinating submission of several project activities,
with a view to reducing the costs of validation, verification, and certification” and
“invites relevant multilateral agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations to participate in preparing these activities” (Decision
14/CP.10).
The Africa Group and many Latin American countries expressed frustration at the
level of access and transparency of these discussions, as many important issues were
discussed in informal “friends of the chair” groups. Off the record, they also
expressed dismay at how the large developing countries had bullied the rest and
gotten away with a decision that gave small-scale sinks projects only the slimmest
chance.

Conclusion
Once adopted, everyone remarked how “finely balanced” the decision reached
on sinks under the CDM had been and what a delicate compromise it had entailed.
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Even CAN welcomed the “constructive elements” that were incorporated, such as
on non-permanence, increased comment period, certain Appendices and aspects of
monitoring and verification. They congratulated the co-chairs, in spite of “the serious
flaws on the decision text regarding GMOs, invasive alien species and MEAs,” for
their “vigilant efforts in pulling together a proposal derived from such divergent and
complex issues.”262
Indeed, reaching a compromise that would meet most countries’ concerns was
a most complicated affair. The most important concerns were ensuring that projects
could be proven to contribute to the integrity of the Protocol by removing tons of
carbon, and that rules were in place to uphold the credibility of the institution for any
other matter that may arise. The irony is that the more ecologically and socially sound
the requirements are, the greater the requirements for validation, monitoring,
verification and certification. These in turn increase transaction costs and make
carbon sequestration projects more expensive for the project developers. They are
thus hardly attractive in a market where other more simple, secure and profitable
products exist, such as simple efficient energy generation like hydroelectric plants or
methane capture -the social and environmental impacts of which are not to be
disdained. In fact, these latter kind of projects constitute already the majority of
projects under the CDM.
Ideally, what would really compensate for these problems is if projects were
designed to be sustainable in the long term. Many of those supporting sinks under the
CDM spoke of potentially several hundred years of carbon storage under agroforestry
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CAN paper, 7 Dec 2003. See also paper on opposition by Greenpeace, 19th Dec 2003 (copy
in file of author). MEAs refers to multilateral environmental agreements.
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projects for poverty alleviation or forest restoration, which, if found locally
beneficial and useful, could be maintained even if payments for credits were to stop.
This was contrasted with short rotation plantations of exotic species, which aim for
the cheapest achievable outcome and fail on most counts –long-term carbon
sequestration, biodiversity preservation, and social benefits. But for the most part, the
parties negotiating had no objections to large plantations. In fact, many of them saw
the logging industry as an important contributor to their countries’ sustainable
development. Others simply did not care to bother with small-scale forestry projects,
specially if they were placed to compete with projects in the energy sector. In any
case, when Parties negotiated the regulations for sinks in the CDM, the main concern
was with making the modalities and procedures as unassailable as possible in terms of
carbon removed. ENGOs, while strongly opposing large-scale monoculture
plantations, lobbied hard to have the most thorough rules, and once that was done,
they hardly participated in the design of special provisions for small-scale projects.
How this translates on the ground is the subject of the next Chapter.
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Chapter 6
The market for sinks: how it works

In early June 2006, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Secretariat sent a press release announcing that the market for emission
reductions under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) had passed the one
billion-ton mark. This meant that the CDM was, as of that date, estimated to generate
more than one billion tons of emission reductions by the end of 2012.263 This was
equivalent to the annual emissions of Spain and the United Kingdom combined. And
it had not even been seven months since the Kyoto Protocol was formally adopted.264
The climate change literature is full of quotations by economists saying that a
global carbon market could become the largest commodities market in the world. If
so, “the commissions alone could be worth many millions” (Goodell 2006). Indeed,
financial and investment research houses have begun to rate “carbon dogs” and
“carbon leaders,” and create a host of new instruments to make money speculating on
the how emissions will be reduced.265 Innovation has been particularly prolific in
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UNFCCC Press Release. Bonn, 9 June 2006. “Emission reductions from Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism pass the one billion tons mark.” The press release explained
that “More than 800 projects are presently in the pipeline, of which 210 are registered and
another 58 are requesting registration. Last year, only around 140 activities were registered or
being considered for registration.”
While socially conscious investing has a long history, and some investors have for some
time been putting their money specifically into environmentally-friendly companies, the idea
that a carbon-constrained future is in sight has led some of the “pure profit-and-loss players”
to purchase shares of low emitter companies and to short those of the big emitters, in the hope
that money will be made as climate change regulations go into effect (see Deutsch 2006).
Accordingly, some investment research houses have begun setting up carbon-tilted rating
scales that measure companies according to who will lose and who will win with new
emissions reduction rules (ibid.). One example of this is the “carbon beta basket,” a fund
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mechanisms and structures that reduce investment risk, which is still very much
the common denominator. As noted in the executive summary of the World Bank’s
and the International Emissions Trading Association’s (IETA) joint report, State of
the Carbon Market 2006, “innovative structures that managed both down-side and upside carbon price risk and reduced delivery risk began to emerge, which aligned
purchases of carbon with an interest in the underlying project, through equity, debt,
mezzanine finance, technology or operating agreements” (World Bank and IETA
2006: ii).266 A new climate services industry has developed involving (to a greater or
lesser degree) players in almost 150 countries and is now based, keeping with
tradition, in the City of London. And the new carbon market that it manages has
already shown its potential impact on other markets. In one instance in 2006 the stock
price of a chemical company in a developing country increased 35 percent in the eight
days after a proposed CDM methodology was approved by the CDM Executive Board
(World Bank and IETA 2006: ii). In another case, a power company in the EU saw its
created by Innovest Strategic Value Advisers in partnership with UBS, which holds 50 stocks
in five industries. In it, the fund managers buy and sell stocks on the basis of how the
companies would be affected by climate change regulations, and divide each industry
grouping of stocks between an equal number of “carbon leaders” and “carbon dogs.” So in the
electric utilities industry grouping, the FPL Group, specialized in renewable energy sources
such as wind, is a carbon leader, while A.E.P., one of the largest generators of power from
coal (and on whose board Richard Sandor, C.E.O. of the Chicago Climate Exchange sits), is
on the top of the list of carbon dogs. Interestingly, though, because the carbon beta basket
only measures costs incurred in relation to climate change regulations, a company which
decides to do something to lower its level of emissions –either by installing new low-emission
equipment or by buying offset credits- could end up with the carbon dogs. Conversely,
nuclear power plants could top the list of carbon leaders. This is precisely what happened in a
different but related exercise, where Exelon, the largest owner of nuclear plants in the United
States, was listed as a top beneficiary of carbon rules and therefore a good stock to buy in a
report in April 2006 by the investment research house Sanford C. Bernstein. In contrast, the
“carbon dog” A.E.P. rates high in the Ceres list, which is compiled by a coalition of
environmentalists and investors, for how its top management is addressing climate change.
Mezzanine financing refers to debt capital that gives a lender the right to convert to an
ownership or equity interest in the company in case of default (see
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mezzaninefinancing.asp October 6, 2006).
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stock price decline 16 percent when news leaked that the EU had been too
generous with its emission allowances (ibid.).267
With all this ferment, one would think that emission reduction credits are easy
to produce. Yet the process of coming up with a viable CDM project and complying
with all requirements to offer Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) for sale is
widely recognized as a most complex and time-consuming matter. It is technically
demanding, administratively cumbersome, and most of all, requires a lot of knowhow.268 Moreover, most of this knowledge is not readily available and has to be paid
for by hiring outside consultants. The data and arrangements needed to complete a
Project Design Document take many months to assemble. Besides, the host country’s
Designated National Authority has to prepare a letter of approval stating that the
project contributes to its sustainable development; all accounting and monitoring
methodologies have to be approved by the CDM Executive Board; individual legal
contracts between investor and project developers detailing who bears which risks
have to be specifically negotiated; and an environmental impact assessment might
need to be carried out. On the whole, getting a project off the ground could be a
267

The price of an allowance under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS) went in a couple of weeks in April 2006 from €31 to €8.60 (or from $37 to $10). See
Timmons, Heather. 2006. “Data Leaks Shake Up Carbon Trade” New York Times, Market
Place. May 16, 2006. See also Wynn, Gerard 2006. “CO2 Market on Brink as Price Continues
to Slide.” Reuters News, Planet Ark: April 28, 2006.
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Know-how is widely regarded as the most challenging problem for developing projects
and accessing the market, and is commented on in every presentation on the subject. Most
recently, and just to cite one simple recent example, during a side-event organized by the
UNFCCC at SB 23, a representative of AgCert (a leading business dedicated to the
production and sale of agriculturally derived emission reductions, headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland) noted the enormous difficulty interpreting modalities and procedures and the CDM
Executive Board’s guidance, and understanding documentation requirements. The presenter
pointed to the different rules in different countries and the difficulties with privacy concerns
of “farmers” (agribusinesses) to explain the necessity of expert guidance. He even suggested
watching Executive Board minutes and webcasts (personal observation and notes, May 2006).
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matter of two to three years and lots of working hours and money (Monroy and
Dutt 2005).269 The requirements are even more complicated and more timeconsuming for sinks projects.270
Businesses and NGOs alike have criticized this complex web of procedures,
even if for quite different reasons. The complexity is such that investment risk has
become the essential feature of the market, determining to a large extent the price paid
for carbon emission reductions. Clearly, this affects who has access to the market and
influences how resources are distributed and redistributed as a result of the production
and exchange of this new commodity. Understanding this in detail is the goal of this
chapter.
The chapter thus analyzes the different kinds of costs involved in the
implementation of a sinks project and who has to pay for them, and compares the
government-regulated and the voluntary versions of the new market in emission
reductions from sinks. It begins with an introductory glimpse at the overall state of the
so-called carbon market and addresses the details of how the market under the
269

This problem affects the current negotiations on the second commitment period, given the
business need for clarity on what will be the validity and value of CDM credits after 2013. As
noted by Hamilton and Kenber (2006): “Within 2–3 years CDM project proposals will start
drying up as returns will have to be achieved by 2012 and so become largely irrelevant.”
(2006: 7).
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Besides the longer crediting periods and expiring nature of the credits awarded, additional
requirements for sinks projects that are not needed for CDM energy projects include: precise
geographical location of the project activity in such a way that it can be uniquely identified;
legal title of the land and current land tenure and right of access to the sequestered carbon; a
list of the carbon pools selected; a description of the present environmental conditions of the
area; and an analysis of the environmental and socio-economic impact, which, if considered
significant by project participants, must include an environmental or socio-economic impact
analysis. Moreover, given changes in carbon stocks due to harvesting cycles and other
management activities, verification has to be done in such a way that it avoids coinciding with
peaks in carbon stored, and the period of time when the PDD is available for public
comments is lengthened to 45 days instead of 30. Note: I use here interchangeably the term
CDM sinks project with CDM afforestation or reforestation (A/R) project activity, as these
are the only two modalities allowed so far under the CDM.
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UNFCCC works, focusing on the CDM. I first examine how projects are
distributed globally by region and by sector, and then describe what it takes to do a
CDM sinks project, step by step. The point of this step-by-step account is to
understand what the project requirements and their costs are, and who pays them. It
shows how and why small-scale projects or those with wider participation will be
unable to enter the market. In the manner of a filière or commodity chain, and paying
particular attention to the time invested, the rate of return, and the risk involved in the
various activities, the section highlights the points at which profit is made and reveals
how opportunities and resources flow up to those already well placed, while other
“stakeholders” are further excluded.
Because the problems with the CDM market largely derive from government
regulation and have to do with the need to ensure the credibility of the UNFCCC, and
because future climate change mitigation measures are likely to include various sorts
of initiatives and markets, this section is followed by a brief analysis of the voluntary
market approach under the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), the greenhouse gas
allowances commodity market that is part of the Chicago Board of Trade. As an
example, it looks at emission reductions from a reforestation project in Costa Rica
that The World Bank bought through the CCX to offset emissions from its
Washington D.C. operations. In contrast to the complexity and costliness of
developing a CDM sinks project, under this voluntary but legally binding private
market, additionality is a non-issue, there are no clear consequences for noncompliance, and the baseline was conveniently determined in such a way that,
intentionally or not, it benefits the major corporations involved in the sector. This is
precisely the reason that many environmental organizations have not endorsed but
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instead criticized the CCX: it cannot claim responsibility for the emission
reductions, as in many cases these would have taken place without the allowance
market. Although Richard Sandor, CCX’s creator and C.E.O., refers to the CCX as
“the engine of an environmental revolution” (Goddell 2006), so far what it really
represents is a vehicle for gaining experience and claiming authority with the view to
accommodate anticipated regulations so that they serve the interests of those
companies involved. In this sense, it sheds light on one of the ways that capital moves
to ensure its continued power and how the unevenness is again reproduced, this time
at high levels of corporate influence. So while the CDM sinks project cycle hints at
accumulation by dispossession in the manner described by Harvey (2003, 2006; see
Introduction), the Chicago Climate Exchange stands as an example of accumulation
by re-position and repossession.

State of the carbon market
From the very beginning, volumes of emission reduction transactions have
consistently increased, more than doubling every year since 2001: from 13 million
tons of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) in 2001, to 30 million in 2002, to 70 million in 2003
(World Bank and IETA 2003). At that time (in 2003), Point Carbon, the greenhouse
gas market analyst, estimated that the value of contracts would increase towards $10
billion by 2007. This amount was reached just two years later, in 2005, as the
international carbon market transactions went from 94 million tons of CO2e in 2004,
worth €377 million (around $500 million), to a total of 799 million tons of CO2e,
worth €9.4 billion (approximately $11 billion) in 2005. This represents an eight-fold
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increase in volume and about 25 times larger financial values in 2005 compared to
2004. (Point Carbon 2006: 15). The exponential growth has continued: in the first
quarter of 2006 alone, overall transactions amounted to $7.5 billion, suggesting that
this new financial market would be valued by the end of 2006 at $25-30 billion
(World Bank and IETA 2006). As Timmons (2006) notes, the value of the entire US
wheat crop of in 2005 was $7.1 billion.271 And these are still the very early days.
The increase in activity follows the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol on
February 16, 2005, and the start of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) in January of that same year. Still, given the many uncertainties, the steep
rise in carbon credits under the EU ETS during just a few months came as a big
surprise: the price of a European Union Allowance (EUA) started around €8 in
January (that is, slightly more than $10), and went from there to over €30 (or circa
$38) before the summer. As Point Carbon reports, “carbon trading suddenly came on
the agenda in boardrooms across Europe” (Point Carbon 2006: v). Thanks partly to
this rise, the EU ETS brokerage and exchange market transacted an estimated 262
million tons of CO2e in 2005, at an estimated financial value of €5.4 billion (that is,
more than $6.4 billion) (ibid: 15).
And despite a resounding slump shortly after, the prospects for the future seem
rosy. In a wide and well-respected market survey report conducted by Point Carbon in
2006, survey respondents were “bullish on prices. Only 20 percent expect the EUA
price in one year to be lower than it was in December 2005. More than 70 percent
expect the price of an issued CER to increase over the same time period” (Point
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Granted, wheat prices are low.
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Carbon 2006: 42).

Perhaps more meaningfully, more than 40 percent of those

surveyed see carbon costs as very important for new investments in their industry
(ibid.).
Key to this ongoing market success is the government-mandated European
Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).273 Under the EU ETS, member states
develop National Allocation Plans setting caps and allocating EU emission
allowances (EUA) to sectors and individual installations mainly in five sectors: heat
and power (accounting for 55 percent of the allowances in the system); metals;
cement, lime and glass; oil and gas; and pulp, paper and packaging. These plans are
approved by the European Commission, which thereby sets an annual average cap for
the EU as a whole and distributes it among the member states. Germany holds the
highest number of allowances, followed by Italy, Poland and the UK (these countries,
together with France and Spain, have 71 percent of the total allowances in the
market). A total of 6.57 billion allowances were issued for the period 2005-2007 (EU
Environment MEMO/05/84),274 while some allowances are set aside for new
Point Carbon manages the largest carbon project database. Its calculations are based on
this database combined with a wide web-based survey and in-depth interviews with 67 key
market players (see Point Carbon 2006). In its market survey, Point Carbon also reports that
the market expects tighter allocations for EU ETS phase 2 (only 8 percent expect the
allocation for the next round to be looser than in the current phase), with 25 percent expecting
it to be much tighter. Furthermore, 24 percent expect there to be more internal abatement in
the next phase (Point Carbon 2006: 42) (See below).
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In 2005, the EU ETS was the largest market segment in financial value, although not in
terms of physical volumes. In total, 262 million EU allowances (EUAs), worth €5.4 billion
EUR were transacted through brokers and exchanges (79 percent of this through brokers). In
addition, Point Carbon estimates that the bilateral market (company-tocompany, not brokered or exchanged) did 100 million tons of CO2e, or €1.8 billion EUR.
(Point Carbon 2006: 15).
Note that the standard trading contract in the EU is for 1,000 tons, and trades are
commonly done in lots of 10,000 to 25,000 tons (Saltmarsh 2005). For how the EU ETS
works, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm
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installations (so-called New Entrant Reserves, which would be available in the
market later in the first trading period if left unused).275
In this manner, an average of 2.1 billion allowances are to be distributed every
year. More than 11,500 installations have commitments within the scheme (EU
Environment MEMO/05/84), accounting for approximately 44 percent of greenhouse
gas emissions within the EU (Point Carbon 2006: 9). Any deficit allowances on a
given year are transferred or surrendered in the second year to make up for
overshooting in the first. The penalty for missing the target in the 2005-2007 period is
€40 per ton of CO2e, besides having to purchase the deficit on the market.276
Installations with reduction obligations under the EU ETS may use CDM CERs
directly for compliance under the Linking Directive –all, except for sinks projects.
While to date only the EU has a comprehensive emissions trading system,
other countries –in particular Japan, New Zealand and Canada277- are considering
them. Besides, some countries have established procurement programs that buy
credits under the UNFCCC’s flexible mechanisms. Netherlands and Denmark have
well-known operational programs of this kind. Others have invested in funds of

A second phase will run from 2008 to 2012, and after that, it is expected that other sectors
will be added (including road and maritime transport and aviation) and that sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxide emissions will also be regulated (Saltmarsh 2005). Since it coincides with the
first commitment period and the beginning of the second under the UNFCCC, everybody
expects this will be the time when substantial trading starts. Now it’s more a matter of
“warming up.”
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At the current exchange rate in October 2006, this would be approximately $50.

The position of Canada has recently changed as a result of national elections and the
takeover of the Conservative Party as the head of government in late 2005.
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procurement, such as those established by the World Bank.

Although the bulk of the action is centered around the EU ETS and the
flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, some other operational greenhouse
gas trading systems are also quite active. The largest of these is the New South Wales
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme in Australia.279 Also worthy of note is the
voluntary Chicago Climate Exchange in USA -where most of the future growth is
expected (see Point Carbon 2006: 26).280 Regional initiatives for carbon trade
involving states and cities are sprouting in many places, notably in the United States
and Australia –the only two countries to have rejected the Kyoto Protocol.281
Meanwhile, the Asian branch of carbon trading will be courtesy of Asia Carbon
International which, with government backing, plans to open the first carbon credit
exchange in Singapore –the Asia Carbon Exchange- to trade up to 8 million tons of
credits per year from 2009 (Saltmarsh 2005).
What is the demand that justifies all this activity? Based on countries’ national

This refers to some of the various World Bank carbon funds, which include a portfolio of
project-based emission reductions purchased on behalf of governments and companies in
OECD countries. See The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit:
http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=Home&ItemID=24675
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According to Point Carbon, in 2005 the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement
Scheme in Australia totaled 78 percent of the physical volume in the other markets, and 93
percent of the financial value. (Point Carbon 2006: 26). But these were the early days of
carbon trading and the other markets were incipient.
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In Europe, besides the European Climate Exchange (ECX) (the European branch of CCX),
other markets to trade spot or futures contracts in emissions include Nord Pool in Oslo, the
European Energy Exchange in Leipzig, Powernext in France (now with ECX), and others.
[check relevance].
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See “Australian states reveal emissions trading plans” Carbon Finance News Update,
Volume 3 (8) August 2006. See also “California GHG bill leaning toward market.” Carbon
Finance News Update, Volume 3 (8) August 2006. And many others on the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
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communications and reports to the UNFCCC, figures for historic emissions
growth and projections, and assuming a business-as-usual scenario without new
policies or domestic trading systems, Point Carbon estimated that the overall gap for
the Protocol’s five-year commitment period (2008-2012) would be 5.54 billion tons
of CO2e.282 (Point Carbon 2005, 2006). The EU has the largest amount of tons to
reduce, but it is only 12.5 percent short of its Kyoto target.283 Meanwhile, as of 2005,
Canada was projected to be 46 percent short of the target and Japan 29 percent.
Overall, Spain, Italy, Canada, and Japan were expected to miss their Kyoto target by
at least 20 percent unless drastic action is taken (ibid.) Still, without credible policies
and measures, almost all countries were found to be short. Even with measures that
reduce this shortage by half, major buyer countries will likely be 9.5 percent off their
collective target, with a 548 million-ton shortfall to cover each year of the five-year
commitment period (ibid.).
Conveniently for those failing to meet their targets, the supply provided by the
Protocol’s flexible mechanisms is likely to comfortably cover this demand, with all
the “hot air” from Russia and some Eastern European countries and the great potential
for emission reduction projects in developing countries. The problems lie in how.
As noted by Point Carbon, “the carbon market is now to all extents a fully
operational commodity market. Volumes are large, but there is still room for
considerable growth. Prices are reacting to fundamentals, although policy decisions
still impact from time to time. All in all, the carbon market is a multi-billion euro
282

This is using 2010 as a reference year.

Within the EU, Spain and Italy have the biggest gap to fill, having undergone rapid
economic growth and rising emissions exceeding their burden sharing agreement under the
EU.
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industry which results in emission reductions that will help countries meet their
Kyoto targets.” Furthermore, “the issuance of EUAs to more than 10,000 installations
throughout Europe has in fact created a whole new currency, which can be used as
hard capital. In total, the three-year allocation is currently valued at more than €153
billion. The recent guidance for phase 2 indicates that the full five-year allocation for
the 2008-2012 period would be some 2,063 billion allowances per year which, given
current prices for December 2008 delivery, values the underlying assets in that phase
at more than €220 billion” (Point Carbon 2006: 28).
But (and this is the question posed by everyone), does it really work? And what
does it really do? In an attempt to answer this question, I now turn to the market under
the CDM, providing first a general overview, and then focusing on the specifics of the
projects.

The CDM carbon market
The high price paid for carbon emission reductions in Europe led to an
increase in the scale of investment in CDM projects. Point Carbon estimates that, in
2005, emission reduction purchase agreements (ERPAs) corresponding to 397 million
tons of CO2e were entered into. “Assuming payment on delivery and a 7% discount
rate, this is valued at €1.9 billion” (Point Carbon 2006: 22). These 397 million CERs
were contracted for future delivery at a volume-weighted average price of €6.70 per
CER (ibid.). The volumes transacted were more than three-times those of 2004, and
five-times those of 2003. In the first three months of 2006 alone, 79 million tons were
transacted, for a value of almost $0.9 million. The price of CERs has also escalated.
World Bank and IETA report an average price for CERs in primary market

234
284

transactions of $5.15 in 2004, increasing to $7.23 in 2005

and then soaring to

$11.45 per ton of CO2e in the first three months of 2006 (World Bank and IETA
2006: 21) -although this last figure is misleading since it corresponds to the threemonth spike in EUAs.285 By July 2006, according to the UNFCCC CDM website, a
total of 248 projects had been registered, with 10,235,616 CERs issued, and 460
million CERs projected to be issued by 2012.286 According to Point Carbon’s market
survey, more than 70 percent of the people surveyed expect the price of CERs to
increase in 2006 (Point Carbon 2006: 45).
This upbeat mood is shared by many. Although for a long time it was thought
that so-called “hot air” from Central European states with “economies in transition”
(EITs –see chapter one) would swamp the market, Joint Implementation has been
slow to pick up.287 Granted, this was due to an uncertain institutional framework, as
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Equivalent to Point Carbon’s figure cited above of €6.70.
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The price of a ton of CO2e has varied widely since the idea and practice of selling emission
removals was first introduced. In one study by Pearce and Bello from 1998, the range went all
the way from $2-3 to $400 (quoted in Landell-Mills and Porras 2002: 85). In 2000, the
average price of a credit for the Dutch government’s ERUPT 2000 tender was $8.30 USD per
ton of CO2e reduction. The following year this price dropped significantly, to $4.80 USD per
ton for the ERUPT 2001 tender (note that prices also vary with the crediting period; thus
while for the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund the crediting period is 20 years, for
CERUPT it is only 10 years) (de Coninck and van der Linden 2003: 19). In 2003, the average
price of CDM credits was in the range of $3-4 per ton of CO2e (ibid.). This increased,
particularly during 2005, as EU ETS market made its influence felt and as companies and
carbon funds became operational for purchasing credits. Still, prices vary greatly from project
to project depending on the distribution of risk between buyer and seller, and on what stage
the project is at. Contracts signed before the project has reached the PDD phase are less
expensive than those that are in the process of validation or have been approved by the CDM
Executive Board (Point Carbon 2006: 24). The time of delivery is also an factor: credits
delivered before 2007 when the first phase of the EU ETS ends are “currently fetching a
premium.” (ibid).
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See: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics

In terms of projects, in 2005 93 percent of the volumes in the market came through CDM,
at 397 million tons of CO2e, or € 1.9 billion EUR. In comparison, Joint Implementation (JI)
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important regulations were only recently agreed upon, and the market is likely to
soon catch up as host countries set up the required offices (see World Bank and IETA
2006: 24). Still, Point Carbon and other analysts suggest that “CDM is set to be the
project mechanism of choice, also in the future. Developing countries are indeed
taking their participation in the market seriously, and are years ahead of large Joint
Implementation (JI) sellers when it comes to project approval frameworks. […] It also
seems clear that the CDM will survive even without a successor agreement to the
Kyoto Protocol” (Point Carbon 2006: iv).

Every year, this good news has been announced in the World Bank’s and
IETA’s jointly prepared report on the State of the Carbon Market -with a caveat. The
2003 version, for example, reads: “The good news is that, unlike 2002, most of this
money now flows to World Bank client countries – about 90 percent – but the bad
news is that Africa and small developing countries have been essentially bypassed”
(World Bank News Release No. 22004/167/S). This has remained the case in every
report after that, with the most recent one, in 2006, reading: “A number of projects in
Africa appear in the UNFCCC PDD pipeline and a few transactions have taken place
in South Africa, Egypt and the Maghreb, representing about 2% of project-based
volumes. Despite these gains, Africa, as well as countries of Central Asia and the
Pacific, continues to be largely bypassed by the carbon market. The underrepresentation of these regions raises deep concerns about the overall equity in the

did 28 million tons, at € 95 million EUR. (Point Carbon 2006: ) Brazil alone is about the same
size as the total JI market (ibid: 23).
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distribution of the CDM market” (World Bank and IETA 2006: 28)

On distribution
Of the 248 registered CDM projects as of July 22, 2006, 51 percent of all
projects were located in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 45 percent in Asia and
the Pacific –the two regions accounting for 96 percent of all projects.288 Of these, 30
percent are in India (a total of 75 projects), followed by 23 percent in Brazil (58
projects). Mexico follows far away with only 8 percent (20 projects). Brazil and India
therefore alone account for over half of all CDM projects.289 When it comes to
numbers of CDM emission reduction purchase agreements (ERPAs),290 China, India
and Brazil are the main seller countries (Point Carbon 2006: 14).
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For these and all following numbers in this section, except where noted, see:
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics
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According to Point Carbon’s database, of the 10 host countries with the largest estimated
volume by 2012, China, India and Brazil are responsible for about 63 percent of the total
volume for all projects at PDD stage. This doesn’t mean that the various projects might not be
implemented after all, that they might be implemented later than stated in the PDD, or that
they will deliver fewer reductions than aimed for.
290
These are agreements signed by both seller(s) and buyer(s), as reported to Point Carbon in
2005.
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CDM Projects July 22, 2006
248 total
Project Distribution by Region
Others
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Asia and the
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All Other
39%

Mexico
8%

But the number of projects is not proportional to the number of CERs. Of the
72,012,040 expected average annual CERs generated from registered projects as of
July 2006, 35 percent will be coming from China, almost 19 percent from Brazil, 15
percent from the Republic of Korea, and close to 14 percent from India. China and
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Brazil therefore account for more than 54 percent of the total, and if Korea and
India are added, the four countries will be the source of 83.4 percent of all expected
CERs from registered projects to this date. There are important differences –the
Republic of Korea, with only five projects, is expected to generate 11,075.047
average annual CERs -or 15 percent of all registered CERs. Meanwhile, the whole of
Africa is host to a total of only five projects, and these amount to only 2 percent of
expected CERs.291
Expected Average Annual CERs from
Registered Projects, July 2006
All Other
17%
China
35%
India
14%

Brazil
19%

Korea
15%

In terms of the projects by sector, 52.77 percent are from energy industries (both
renewable and non-renewable sources), and 23.45 percent from waste handling and
disposal. Agriculture accounts for 13.36 percent. In terms of project types, 70 percent
291

According to the UNFCCC Secretariat, as of June 2006 there were 27 activities in the
CDM pipeline in Africa, of which 5 have been registered. This constituted a five-fold growth
within a year. “Whilst the mechanism is seeing very strong growth, the growth is still too
unevenly distributed amongst regions", said Janos Pasztor, acting coordinator for Project
Based Mechanisms with the UNFCCC Secretariat. Pasztor added that governments are
expected to address this issue at the UN Climate Change Conference in Nairobi in November
2006. (UNFCCC Press Release. Bonn, 9 June 2006). On the demand side, the CDM is
dominated by the private sector, mainly European and Japanese, driven by high EU ETS
prices, together with an increasing number of carbon funds (Point Carbon 2006: 24). Notably,
Canada is pretty much absent from the CDM market.
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of CDM volumes in 2005 came from a few large HFC-23 reduction projects in
China (Point Carbon 2006). The number of credits from the destruction of HFC-23
are likely to dominate in the future as well, given the enormous global warming
potential of this gas (14,000 times that of CO2) and the ease and low cost of
destroying it (see Chapter 1 on the basket of gases and global warming equivalences).
In regards to scale, of all projects registered, 60 percent are large-scale and 40
percent are small-scale. This refers only to projects, and not to the CERs generated,
which would obviously be skewed (there is a limit as to how many CERs can be
generated by a small-scale project. While the number of methodologies for all largeand small-scale projects approved corresponds roughly with the projects registered in
the case of energy, the CDM pipeline reports that, as of June 20, 2006, twenty-five
methodologies had been proposed for afforestation or reforestation (A/R) projects
(Fenhann, UNEP RISØ Centre 2006), with only three having been approved.292 Only
one methodology for small-scale sinks has so far been submitted. To date, there are
no approved A/R projects.293
In order to understand what some of the reasons for this highly skewed
distribution are, the chapter now turns to what it takes to complete a CDM sinks
project.
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According to the CDM Pipeline of June 2006, of the 25 methodologies submitted, 19 had
already received a verdict from the Executive Board, with the following results: ten of them
had to resubmit the PDD, in three the projects participants had to make some changes, and
two others were in the process of being recommended to make some changes. One was
withdrawn. For the complete table of approved A/R methodologies, see:
http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/ARmethodologies/approved_ar.html
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This is as of November 2006.
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The CDM project cycle for sinks
… [A] “time intensive, lawyer invented scheme, with benefits to a lot
of consultants” (one company’s description of the UNFCCC administration
and the CDM, quoted in Hamilton and Kenber 2006: 8)

Selling certified emission reductions from sinks begins with the completion of
a Project Design Document (PDD) by the so-called Project Developer or project
proponent.294 The completed PDD is then presented to a Designated Operational
Entity (DOE), which acts as the independent third party in charge of assessing and
validating the project, and to the host Party’s Designated National Authority (DNA),
which must issue a letter of approval confirming that the project activity contributes
to the host country’s sustainable development. As part of the validation process, the
PDD is made publicly available on the UNFCCC CDM website for stakeholder
comments for 45 days.295 After this time, the DOE prepares a validation report
indicating whether the PDD, as presented, meets the Kyoto Protocol’s and the CDM’s
criteria, and whether it is operational and primed for monitoring and reporting. If it
does, and the PDD is approved by the host country’s DNA, the PDD, together with
the validation report, an explanation of how stakeholder comments received were

Although strictly speaking these are not emission reductions but removals, all CDM
project activities accrue Certified Emission Reduction units (CERs). The difference is that, in
the case of A/R, these are either long-term CERs (lCERs) or temporary CERs (tCERs). See
Chapter 4 and below.
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For energy projects the time available for stakeholder comments is 30 days. Note that
stakeholders are defined under the UNFCCC as “the public, including individuals, groups, or
communities affected, or likely to be affected, by the proposed A/R project activity or actions
leading to the implementation of such an activity.” (CDM-AR-PDD Guidelines Glossary,
Version 04 page 14). See Chapter 5.
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taken into account, and the DNA’s letter of approval, are presented to the CDM
Executive Board with a request for registration. The validation report is then posted
on the UNFCCC CDM website. The registration is considered complete and final if
no request for review is made within eight weeks of reception (four weeks for smallscale projects) by either three CDM Executive Board members, or by one of the
Parties involved.296 At some point after this stage, if not earlier, negotiations will
likely proceed on the financing of the project and eventual sale of the CERs. A private
contract should be made detailing carbon credit ownership, the rights and obligations
of each participant (including the option to sell CERs to third parties), the project’s
insurance coverage and the rules for resolution of disputes between participants.297
Once the project is registered and underway, the project developer must
undertake periodic monitoring of the net removals from sinks according to a
monitoring plan previously identified in the PDD, and submit a monitoring report to
another DOE contracted to verify and certify the removals. To avoid conflict of
interests, this verifying and certifying DOE must not be the same one who undertook
the validation of the project, except in the case of small-scale projects or with the
explicit approval of the CDM Executive Board. The verifying and certifying DOE
will conduct periodic auditing of the monitoring results, review the conformity of the
project with the plan, and assess the achieved greenhouse gas removals in order to
produce a verification report and eventually a certification report. The first
verification and certification may be done at any time the project participants decide,
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Any review requested at this point should be related to issues associated with validation
requirements, and should be completed no later than at the second meeting of the CDM EB
following the request for review, with the conclusion of the review being communicated to
the project participants and to the public (Decision 17/CP.7, Article 41).
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See UNEP 2004, CDM: Information and Guidebook, page 49.
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and then every five years after that until the end of the crediting period either a
maximum of 20 years which may be renewed twice, up to 60 years, or a maximum of
30 years (see Chapter 4). Based on the verification report, the DOE certifies in writing
the net greenhouse gas removals by sinks achieved by the project since its start. Both
the verification and certification reports have to be made public. The certification
report constitutes a request to the Executive Board to issue the verified amount of
CERs generated by the project. The Executive Board then has 15 days to issue the
CERs, unless a Party involved in the project or three members of the Executive Board
request a review.298 The CERs will be moved to a pending account in the CDM
Registry developed by the UNFCCC Secretariat to keep track of all CERs, and from
there to the acquiring Party’s legal entity’s account according to the contract
previously agreed upon by buyers and sellers. As with all CDM projects except for
small-scale ones and those undertaken in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 2
percent of the achieved CERs go to the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund.299
This is a quick sketch of the general steps required to complete the process of
developing a CDM sinks project activity. I now turn to disaggregate the most relevant
steps of the procedure, focusing on the three main stages of project development: the
completion of the PDD by the project developer; the validation, verification and
certification of the project by the DOE; and the approval of the project by the host
country’s DNA.
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In this case, the review would have to do with cases of fraud, malfeasance or incompetence
of the DOEs.
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On this levy, see Chapter 3.
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1. The Project Design Document (PDD)

The PDD is a standard document necessary for all CDM projects that contains all
the information on the project activity and is submitted by the DOE for validation and
then to the CDM Executive Board for registration. The PDD exists only in English.301
During the validation phase, the PDD is made available on the internet for a limited
period of time for public comments. As noted earlier, besides basic technical data, the
information submitted in the PDD for A/R must include, inter alia: the precise
geographical location and project boundary allowing the unique identification of the
project; a description of the present environmental conditions of the area, including
the possible presence of rare and endangered species and their habitats; a description
of the legal title to the land, current land tenure and land use, and right of access to the
sequestered carbon; and a description of the technology and the know-how to be
employed by the project.
Besides, the PDD has to provide evidence that the land is not a forest at the
moment the project starts (by demonstrating that it is below forest national thresholds
of crown cover, tree height and minimum land area as communicated by the host
country’s DNA, and that it is not temporarily unstocked as a result of human
intervention -whether harvesting or natural causes- and is not covered with young

Because the complexity of the requirements for implementing a CDM A/R project have
been identified as the main stumbling block for project development by NGOs and business
alike, and I have argued that they are what largely determines access to the market, I here
give an outline of the information that is required to complete the PDD. It is somewhat
detailed so the reader gets an idea of the amount of work and information that the project
developer (assumed to be from the host country (usually Third world) needs to prepare a
project.
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As noted in Chapter 3, the only working language of the CDM Executive Board is English.
There are however instructions and guidance on filling the PDD in the six UN languages. It is
available for download in the internet at: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Documents.
301

244
natural stands or a plantation that would reach a crown density or tree height as
defined by national thresholds and with the potential to revert to forest without human
intervention). There should also be proof that the land was below the DNA’s national
threshold for forest definition on 31 December 1989 in the case of a reforestation
project, or for at least 50 years in the case of an afforestation one.302
On more technical grounds, the PDD has to specify the greenhouse gas emissions
that are expected to be released as a result of the implementation of the project
activity, such as those resulting from soil preparation, use of fertilizers, machinery
and other on-site vehicles, and determine the actual net removals and the baseline
giving a selection and justification of the carbon pools accounted (above-ground
biomass, below-ground biomass, dead wood, litter, and/or organic carbon in soils). It
must also include detailed baseline information, a description of the baseline
methodology to be applied, and an explanation of how and why this project is
additional.303 The baseline methodology may be among those already approved by the
CDM Executive Board but, if a new methodology is proposed, a separate form must
be completed. This form, called “Proposed New Methodology for A/R Project
Activities,” covers 21 pages of very detailed technical information. If just filling in
the standard PDD using an approved methodology is complicated (in terms of
justifying the choice and applicability of the methodology), proposing a new one for
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This can be done by either providing aerial photographs or satellite imagery complemented
by ground reference data, providing ground-based surveys (such as land use permits, land use
plans or information from the cadastre, property registry, and land use or management
registry), or if none of these options are possible, by providing a written testimony produced
following a participatory rural appraisal methodology.
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The latter explanation must include a description of the baseline scenario according to the
chosen methodology, a description of the project scenario, and an analysis showing why the
removals in the baseline scenario would likely be less than those in the project scenario.
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approval is something very few people are trained and able to do. As noted earlier,
as of June 2006, twenty-five methodologies for A/R had been submitted, with only 4
being approved.
The PDD must also provide a detailed description of the monitoring methodology
and plan, with precise identification of the data to be collected to monitor changes in
carbon stocks and emissions. This should include a description of formulae and/or
models used to monitor the estimation of removals, carbon stock changes and
emissions for each source and gas. There should also be information on how all this
data will be archived,304 the operational and management structures that the project
operator will implement to monitor the actual removals and any leakage, and the
quality control and quality assurance procedures undertaken for data monitored.
Moreover, the document must describe how leakage will be treated in the monitoring
plan (with identification of data to be collected to monitor it and formulae and/or
models used to estimate it for each greenhouse gas, source and carbon pool) as well as
the procedures for measures undertaken to minimize it.
Finally, the PDD must also include documentation on the analysis of the
environmental and socioeconomic impacts of the project, including impacts on
biodiversity and natural ecosystems and impacts outside the project boundary
(including information, where applicable, on hydrology, soils, risk of fires, pests and
diseases), and impacts on local communities, indigenous peoples, land tenure, local
employment, food production, cultural and religious sites, and access to fuel wood
and other forest products. If project participants or the host Party consider that any
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Monitoring data should be archived for two years following the end of the last crediting
period.
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negative impact is significant, an environmental and/or socioeconomic impact
assessment has to be undertaken in accordance with the procedures required by the
host Party, and, together with the conclusions and all references to support the
documentation, a description of the planned monitoring and remedial measures to
address it must be submitted. Note that the planned remedial measures need only be
submitted. There is no explicit follow-up of potential negative impacts under the
CDM project cycle. Similarly, the PDD must include a description of the process by
which comments by local stakeholders were invited and compiled, a summary of the
comments received (identifying the stakeholders who made them), and a report on
how due account was taken of the comments received.305
Besides this detailed list of data and technicalities that have to be resolved, by
the start of the crediting period the project has to be implemented, the training of the
personnel completed, the monitoring equipment installed, and the monitoring and
project management procedures put in place (Kamel 2005: 11). As stated in UNEP’s
PDD Guidebook, “experience has shown that the information needed to judge the
suitability of a project for the CDM is vast and can take months to assemble” (Kamel
2005: 7). “Also, the time required to assemble the relevant information increases with
the number and diversity of stakeholders involved and the complexity of the
information itself” (Kamel 2005: 7; italics mine). Working with numerous small
landowners clearly becomes a serious disadvantage. Moreover, the complexity and
305

The instructions for this section read: “An invitation for comments by local stakeholders
shall be made in an open and transparent manner, in a way that facilitates comments to be
received from local stakeholders and allows for a reasonable time for comments to be
submitted. In this regard, project participants shall describe an A/R project activity in a
manner which allows the local stakeholders to understand the proposed A/R project activity,
taking into account confidentiality provisions of the CDM modalities and procedures.”
(CDM-AR-PDD, version 04, page 30, G.1)
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difficulty of implementing a project is such that, although CDM project
developers were always assumed to be local people from the host developing
countries, a look at the projects so far approved by the CDM Executive Board reveals
that, in many cases, the projects are undertaken by organizations and institutions
(including research institutes) in developed countries.306 They are the ones who
develop the projects to the non-Annex I Parties, and, accordingly, appear as project
developers. Whatever income from this node of the chain that was meant to stay in a
developing country in the form of built capacity is in this way reduced, and projects
become one more foreign investment opportunity that leaves little capacity built or
value–added.

2. Validating, verifying and certifying the project: The Designated Operational
Entities (DOEs)
“DNV Certification is a leading independent greenhouse gas validator and
verifier operating globally. Sustainable development falls squarely within our
company’s missions since 1864: to protect life, property and the
environment.” Det Norske Veritas (DNV).307

The DOE is the entity officially approved by the COP/MOP based on a
recommendation by the CDM Executive Board to validate proposed CDM project
activities, and to verify and certify net anthropogenic removals by sinks. As
306

For the list of projects approved to date, see http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/index.html
See also CDM Pipeline, Fenhann 2006.
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In Chaudhary and Kumaraswamy 2005. Or to take it directly from the DNV web page
introduction: “Established in 1864, DNV is an independent foundation with the objective of
safeguarding life, property, and the environment and is a leading international provider of
services for managing risk.” See: http://www.dnv.com/certification/about_us/index.asp
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previously noted, to avoid a conflict of interests, the same DOE cannot verify and
certify removals from a project it has validated, unless approved to do all those things
by the Executive Board upon request. In Milan, COP 8 decided that the Executive
Board may designate operational entities on a provisional basis (Decision 21/CP.8).
As of June 2006, sixteen DOEs had been approved by the CDM Executive Board (see
Table below). None of them was originally from a developing country (unless one
counts PricewaterhouseCoopers-South Africa (PwC) as from a developing country).
Of these, four are from Japan, four from the United Kingdom, three are from
Germany, two are from South Korea, one from the Netherlands, one from Spain, and
the last one -PricewaterhouseCoopers-South Africa (PwC)- is listed as from South
Africa (see Fenhann, CDM Pipeline, UNEP RISØ Centre, 20 June 2006). One of
them, Det Norske Veritas (DNV), alone has validated more than 50 percent of all
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List of Designated Operational Entities (April 24, 2007)

Entity Name (short name)
Japan Quality Assurance Organization (JQA)
JACO CDM.,LTD (JACO)
Det Norske Veritas Certification AS (DNV Certification AS)
TÜV SÜD Industrie Service GmbH (TÜV-SÜD)
Tohmatsu Evaluation and Certification Organization Co., Ltd. (TECO)
Japan Consulting Institute (JCI)
Bureau Veritas Certification Holding S.A. (BVC Holding S.A.)
SGS United Kingdom Ltd. (SGS)
The Korea Energy Management Corporation (KEMCO)
TÜV Industrie Service GmbH, TÜV Rheinland Group (TÜV Rheinland)
KPMG Sustainability B.V. (KPMG)
British Standards Institution (BSI)
Spanish Association for Standardisation and Certification (AENOR)
TÜV NORD CERT GmbH (RWTUV)
Lloyd’s Register Quality Assurance Ltd (LRQA)
Korean Foundation for Quality (KFQ)
PricewaterhouseCoopers - South Africa (PwC)
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CDM projects coming through to the validation stage (Kamel 2005: 3).
Of those applications currently under consideration, José Domingos González
Míguez, Chair of the CDM Executive Board, reported in May 2006 at a UNFCCC
side-event on the CDM that of the 30 applications from DOEs and so-called
Applicant Entities being considered by the Board, 24 were from Annex I and 6 from
non-Annex I Parties (Asia and Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean). Only
one of the DOEs listed on the UNFCCC CDM website, TUV Industrie Service GmbH
TUV SUD GRUPPE (TUV Industrie Service GmbH TUV), is accredited to validate
A/R project activities.309 The Colombian Institute for Technical Standards and
Certifications (ICONTEC) in Bogotá, Colombia, was issued an indicative letter as an
applicant entity and is applying to certify afforestation and reforestation projects.
This small number of accredited DOEs and the lack of participation by
developing countries is the DOE process has partly to do with the process of applying
for accreditation as a DOE, which is complicated and expensive. The application
includes a non-reimbursable application fee of $15,000. To soften this, applicants
from non-Annex I Parties may pay 50 percent of this amount at the beginning
(application phase) if they state their inability to pay the full amount up-front, and the
other 50 percent once it is approved and in operation.310 As noted by Gracia (2005), of
ICONTEC, “For ICONTEC, the most challenging issue in pursuing the accreditation
process was the high cost involved. These costs include, among others, training, travel
arrangements for the accreditation team, and fees to the Executive Board. Although
they are considered as an investment, ICONTEC found that the return period is long,
considering the limited numbers of approved CDM projects and long accreditation
process” (Gracia 2005: 3; italics mine).
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And what does the DOE do? According to the UNEP RISØ Center PDD
Guidebook, prepared with DNV, the validation process should ideally not take more
than 40 days, including the 30 days of stakeholder comments (Kamel 2005: 9). In
practice however, this process takes on average 100 days, with no project having
taken less than 70 days (ibid.). Although two or three months might seem a long time,
it is only a fraction of the many months (up to a year or more) it takes a project
developer to complete a PDD. Significantly, this is the average for both full-scale and
small-scale projects, meaning that the advantages of the simplified modalities for
small-scale projects are not felt at the validation stage, and that it again is more
efficient to develop a large scale project for more credits.

The state’s approval: the Designated National Authority (DNA)
For a project activity to be validated and registered, the DNA of the involved
Parties must issue a statement noting that it has ratified the Kyoto Protocol and that it
voluntarily participates in the proposed CDM activity. In the case of the host country,
the statement should explicitly say that the project activity contributes to the Party’s
sustainable development. However, a project may be registered without the buyer
Party being involved. Only when acquiring CERs from an account within the CDM
Registry the buyer Party must submit a letter of approval to the Board in order for the
CDM Registry administrator to be able to forward CERs from the Registry to the
national registry of the Annex I Party. Thus projects can be developed and
implemented without a buyer Party, with the project developer doing so assuming all
the costs and risks.
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According to the UNEP PDD Guidebook, more than 80 percent of all
PDDs submitted for validation lack the letter of approval from the DNA, either
because the request was late and/or the DNAs don’t have in place the procedures for
approving CDM projects, or because some DNAs will only grant approval after
having seen the validation report,311 or because private investor or operator relations
may change during the validation process and in so doing alter the list of project
participants (Kamel 2005: 19).312
The lack of capacity in many of the poorest developing countries (in terms of
both institutions and personnel) is therefore an important inhibiting factor, so much
that it has led to capacity building efforts by development agencies financed by
industrialized countries. These are the kinds of transaction costs incurred by
governments (from the setting of rules and institutions to their application) which are
not quantified, as it is assumed to be part of their duty of promoting investment. They
are also one way the state subsidizes private markets. Accordingly, developed country
governments with an interest in the CDM market have had to put up resources to
ensure the existence of projects that, given high transaction costs, institutional
deficiencies and lack of capacity, would otherwise never make it. The role of the
state, both nationally and internationally through international development agencies
such as UNEP (CD4CDM), has again been crucial in promoting private investment
and energizing the market for emission reduction credits. The Dutch tender program,
for example, offered a reimbursement for baseline development to project developers
who passed the initial screening and were invited to elaborate a full proposal
(SENTER 2002, quoted in Michaelowa et al. 2003).313 Other governments also offer
partial coverage for preparing PDDs.314 Still, it is worth noting that the offer is usually
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to reimburse after preparation of the full proposal, so the up-front money has to be
found elsewhere.

The cost of a project
In a much cited study of transaction costs under the CDM, Michaelowa and
Stronzik (2002) provide a simplified sketch of the expenses incurred when developing
a project, according to whether these are fixed or variable and receding, and divided
into pre-implementation, implementation and trading stages.315 The following is a
modified and expanded version of their main outline generally adapted to A/R project
activities. It should, however, be borne in mind that it does not include the projects’
actual implementation and operation expenses, but focuses only on what are
understood as transaction costs incurred in presenting the project activity for approval
and eventual sale of CERs.

Pre-implementation costs
1) Formulation of the project and completion of a PDD: This includes the
design of the project, negotiation and consultation with stakeholders and
determining the baseline. The latter is probably the most costly step in
preparing the PDD, in particular for some carbon pools and greenhouse
gases such as NO2, and is likely to involve paying for an external
consultancy. Ecosecurities (2002) calculates the minimum cost of just
establishing a baseline for energy projects to be between £12,000 and
£15,000 (roughly between $22,800 and $29,500 USD). The costs are for
the most part variable but also fixed. Overall, the preparation of the PDD
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is usually the most time-consuming step of the whole process, taking
many months (up to two years) to complete.
2) DNA Approval: Refers to securing an official authorization from the host
country. In transaction cost studies this expense is often assumed to be
fixed but, depending on the host country, can be rather unpredictable and
in many instances may depend on informal political and social relations
and influence. As noted earlier, in the UNEP’s CDM PDD Guidebook,
DNA approval is identified as one of the most common pitfalls in
effectively presenting a PDD for validation, often delaying the process by
more than a month (Kamel 2005: 19).316 In terms of transaction costs, the
cost of a project will also vary greatly depending on how strict local
regulations are on the need for an environmental or social impact
assessment: the more rigorous, the more costly. This puts countries with
stringent environmental and/or social regulations at a disadvantage.
3) Validation: Requires contracting and paying the services of an accredited
DOE, which are fixed. As no DOE has yet been fully accredited from a
developing country as of June 2006, and only a few have applied, these
services normally include overseas travel costs for consultants and other
related fees. In their study on transaction costs for sinks projects, Locatelli
and Pedroni (2003) calculate that the cost of design and validating a
project can range from $40,000 to $200,000.
4) Review: Refers to waiting and reviewing the validation report prepared by
the DOE, and undertaking the recommended actions it may include. It
implies variable cost and time.
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5) Registration: The costs incurred by the CDM Executive Board in
reviewing the projects are covered by project developers in the form of a
registration fee, which follows a staggered structure. This ranges between
$5,000 for projects expected to result in less than 15,000 CERs per annum,
to $30,000 for projects generating more than 200,000 CERs per annum.317
This fee is not enough to cover the Executive Board’s operating costs,
which Michaelowa et al. calculate at €2.3 million including Executive
Board meetings and UNFCCC staff costs, as well as website
administration. Assuming 200 project proposals are dealt with, the Board
would need to charge €11,500 per project (or approximately $13,500)
(Michaelowa et al. 2003: 272). The Board can also charge fees for
issuance of CERs, and will likely do so to cover the budget shortfall. Still,
after many complaints that the CDM Executive Board was ill-suited to
manage a market of the expected scale of the CDM, a revision of various
decisions was undertaken in 2005 at COP MOP 1. This included a pledge
of increased funds specifically for the CDM from various Annex I
countries.318

Implementation costs:
1) Monitoring: Consists of the periodic data collection and monitoring of
leakage undertaken every five years to assure that any serious defaults or
shortcomings of the project are corrected in a timely manner. It is one of
the most resource-absorbing stages. According to Michaelowa and
Stronzik (2002), together with the determination of the baseline, the cost
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of monitoring alone represents 30 percent of the minimum fixed costs
for any CDM project. In the case of sinks, Locatelli and Pedroni (2003)
calculate the cost to be between $2,000 and $10,000 for each monitoring,
plus $0.10, $0.30, and $0.50 per hectare.
2) Verification: Entails contracting a different DOE to verify and report to
the Executive Board. As with the validation stage, it is likely to entail
overseas travel and other specialized fees for consultants from Europe or
Japan. Michaelowa et al. (2003) quote verification fees charged by SGS
for energy projects amounting to €17,000 for the first verification and
€8,500 for each subsequent one (approximately $20,000 and $10,000). For
sink projects, Locatelli and Pedroni (2003) found the overall costs of
verification to range between $15,000 and $75,000, with $45,000 as a midrange figure.
3) Review: The verification report completed by the DOE might require a
review and adjustments in order to be forwarded for certification to the
Executive Board. The time and costs will be variable.
4) Certification: Refers to the final issuance of CERs by the Executive
Board.
5) Enforcement: Refers to potential administrative and legal costs incurred
in case of departure from the originally agree upon contract.

To this, one would have to add costs incurred in negotiating and drafting the
specific legal contract with the buyer, which again, is likely to take time and requires
outside legal expertise. Ecosecurities (2002) calculates the legal and contractual
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arrangements minimum cost for energy projects to be between £15,000 and
£25,000 (or $29,500 and $47,500), but they’re likely to be much higher for sinks
projects as the time frame is longer and the delivery of a precise number of credits is
more uncertain and risky. Finally, there are also trading costs to consider –that is,
transfer and registry, or brokerage, and the costs of holding an account in the national
registry. Overall, according to Michaelowa and Stronzik (2002), the minimum fixed
costs for any CDM project amount to €150,000 (or a little over $148,000). To this one
would have to add the many variables which increase transaction costs, and which
happen to be what sink projects specialize in.

Transaction costs
Although it is not possible to calculate this with precision, and one would have
to take into account time and uncertainty at the most important steps (in particular
completing the PDD and negotiating the sale of credits), the highest share of
transaction costs is the result of contracting outside experts. In a report for PCFplus
(the research arm of the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund [PCF]) on transaction
costs for small-scale energy projects, De Gouvella and Soto (2003) find that
contractual costs to be paid to the DOEs represent 46 percent of total transaction costs
with the most simplified procedures and in the best case scenario (where the project
developer alone can address CDM issues and administrative aspects, the hired DOE is
local, the host country’s legislation on environmental impact assessment is not
stringent, and the crediting period is not renewed). These same costs reach up to 90
percent of total transaction costs in cases where a consultant has to be hired from an
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international consulting firm and other optimal conditions are not given (de
Gouvella and Soto 2003: 15).
Broken up in terms of salary costs, de Gouvella and Soto (2003: 13) estimate
that, including overheads and all types of costs in each case, these are as follows:
•

Monthly cost technician local Project Developer: $500 per month319

•

Monthly cost director local Project Developer: $1000 per month

•

Per day cost consultant: $140 per day

•

Per day cost local translator: $60 per day

•

Per day cost “local DOE”: $200 per day

•

Per day cost “international DOE”: $1000 per day
Even including air fare and travel-related expenses, this list shows that the cost

of hiring an international DOE is five times that of hiring a local one. While the local
technician makes almost $23 a day and the local director makes a little over $45 a day
in a month, the services of an international DOE costs $1,000 a day. To this, one
would have to add the cost of employing a local translator. Thus the cost of hiring a
DOE for one day is more than what the local director of the project makes in one
month. The local costs reflect the advantages of hiring Third World labor and
operating under free market rules. They display the logic of the “flexible
mechanisms” approach under the Kyoto Protocol and are the primary and the ultimate
means of how global uneven development is reproduced.

Allocating risk
The project-based market is very diverse, with unique risks inviting a
range of confidential transaction structures and legal terms defining
contracts. Price discovery is difficult and prices in this segment reflect
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the various risks associated with guaranteeing delivery of the
compliance asset when and where required.
(World Bank and IETA 2006: 1).

Besides the potential for technical failure, projects may go under at any of the
stages of the application and certification process. While preparing the PDD and at its
initial stage of development, the project may succumb for various reasons, ranging
from technical inconsistencies and lack of necessary data to problems with
stakeholders or DNA consent; at the validation stage, the DOE may find the
methodology inadequate and decline to validate the PDD; at the time of approval, the
CDM Executive Board may reject it and deny registration; upon implementation,
delays or vagaries may result in postponement or breakdown; and at the end of the
project, the expected emissions reductions may not be -or be only partly- verified or
certified.
The risks are so conspicuous and real that they have become an important
parameter for the price paid for carbon emission reductions. Some carbon brokers and
analysts have devised project categories based on risk to assist buyers of CERs in
designing a convenient contract and figuring out the right price to pay. Point Carbon,
for example, developed four forward CER contract categories that structure prices
based on how different risks are distributed between seller and buyer (Point Carbon
2006: 25). These are as follows:
1) For non-firm volume, where the buyer buys what seller delivers even if
emissions reductions turn out not to qualify as CERs, the average price
range is between €3 and €6 per ton of CO2e (or approximately $3.6 and
$7).
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2) For non-firm volume, where the contract contains preconditions (e.g.,
that the underlying project qualifies for the CDM): between €5 and €10
per ton of CO2e ($6 and $12).
3) For firm volume, where the contract contains preconditions (as above), as
well as usually strong force majeure clauses and high credit rating
requirements: between €9 and €14 per ton of CO2e ($10.7 and $16.7).
4) For firm volume, with no preconditions:320 between €12 and €14 per ton of
CO2e ($14.3 and $16.7).

Although the range is large and the price of CERs depends to a large extent on
specific risk factors, the great majority of forward CERs transacted fit categories 2 or
3. Clearly, it is project developers who are assuming the lion’s share of the risks. But
it is not only a matter of how much but when, as there is a difference between socalled “upstream” and “downstream” risks.321 Generally speaking, the more advanced
a project is in the project cycle, the less the odds of failure. In developing the project
and having it validated, registered and verified, project developers are taking
responsibility for the most risky and time consuming tasks. Instead, buyers come in at
a safer point which is closer to cashing time. “With sellers increasingly bearing
registration risks, the primary concern for buyers has moved downstream to project
performance, issuance of CERs and delivery into the buyers’ account” (World Bank
and IETA 2006: 32). Even if considerable, the risk for buyers of losing at these nodes
in the filière are much less than at any of the previous ones.
Moreover, the risk goes beyond the project cycle and extends to the longer term
market outlook as well. Given that the market ultimately depends on national
government regulation that in turn responds to international negotiations at the UN
level, uncertainty exists as to whether and how the market will continue after the first
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commitment period. As stated in a confidential note quoted by Hamilton and
Kenber, “In 2–3 years it will become irrelevant if there is not a post-2012 signal by
2008 or 2009”; project developers are the real ones taking the risk; speaking broadly
“no bank in the world will lend against CERs, full stop”322 (Hamilton and Kenber
2006: 8).

Access
A study by Michaelowa et al. on energy projects’ transaction costs based on
information from the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF),
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and the Swedish government among others, clearly
demonstrated that at price ranges between €1 and €5 per ton of CO2e, (or
approximately $1.20 and $5.80) “only projects classified as large and very large are
viable” (Michaelowa et al. 2003: 273).323 They quote a PCF statement that “any
project with a volume below €3 million of greenhouse gas benefits would not be
attractive due to transaction costs” (ibid). This means that at a minimum a project
would have to achieve 50 kilotons of CO2e reductions per year during 20 years to be
worth it. Assuming transaction costs of no more than 25 percent of total proceeds
from sales of credits, the cost threshold for a project would be €1 (or little over $1)
per ton CO2e (ibid.). For small-scale projects of between 2 and 20 kilotons CO2e per
year, transaction costs are estimated to reach up to €10 per ton of CO2e (that is, about
$12), while for micro-projects reducing less than 2 kilotons of CO2e per year,
transaction costs can be as high as several hundred dollars per ton of CO2e. (ibid.).
Similarly, Ellis et al. (2004) calculate that a small-scale energy project would have to
generate between 8 and 37 kilotons of CO2e during its whole crediting period –circa
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10 years- to be able to cover its transaction costs. Given that sinks projects accrue
temporary credits that will fetch a much lower price in the market (they have to
eventually be replaced), and that the limit of 8 kilotons of CO2e per year for A/R
projects of small scale is lower than it is for energy ones (15 kilotons CO2e per year),
the chances for small-scale sinks projects are dim indeed.324
This is confirmed by Locatelli and Pedroni (2003) in their study of transaction
costs in small-scale sinks projects. Using data from experts and certification agencies,
existing project case studies and a literature review, Locatelli and Pedroni (2003)
estimate transaction costs values specifically for sinks projects of:
•

$40,000, $120,000 and $200,000 for design and validation costs;

•

$2,000, $6,000 and $10,000 for each monitoring, plus $0.1, $0.3, and
$0.5 per hectare; and

•

$15,000, $45,000 and $75,000 for verification costs.

They then use a total of 7,776 parameters combined (different accounting
methods, different CER prices and variations in their rates, different transaction costs,
different values for risk and economic discount rates, and different verification
intervals) to calculate what would be the minimum area required for a project in
which the transaction costs would be at least equal to the revenues from CERs. Only
7.1 percent of the parameter sets make projects with less than 500 hectares worth it.
Their results also show that, under the ton-year accounting method (see Chapter 4)
assuming standard or average values for most parameters, a price of $3 per ton of
CO2, and a crediting period of 50 years, projects smaller than 100 hectares cannot
profit from the CDM (Locatelli and Pedroni 2003: 12). And even with transaction
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costs half of those, projects smaller than 500 hectares are out. Unfortunately,
depending on the type of project and method used for measuring the scale of 8
kilotons of CO2e per year, the maximum area of a small-scale project is found to
range between 200 and 6000 hectares (Locatelli and Pedroni 2006). Locatelli and
Pedroni further show that even if transaction costs were reduced by 20 or 50 percent,
the probability for a small-scale project being favored by simplified modalities and
procedures is less than 2 percent (2006: 639). Transaction costs would have to go
down by 80 percent for an 11 percent probability that small-scale project consider
participating.

Understanding transaction costs and built-in inequality
There are several factors worth noting in trying to understand how transaction
costs became the primary obstacle to developing CDM sinks projects, ranging from
the merely technical to more structural ones. First and most basically, there is the
nature of the scheme itself. As Michaelowa et al. (2003) point out, there is a
difference between cap and trade systems such as international emissions trading, and
baseline and credit regimes such as the CDM. In the design of cap and trade systems
the greatest work and effort is made at the beginning, as the goods are allocated, the
rules and procedures are decided, and the regulatory institutions are put in place. Once
this is done, these schemes mainly depend on an inventory analysis of the regulated
entities (see Sorrell and Skea 1999 in Michaelowa et al. 2003). Instead, credit regimes
require less effort at the beginning, but the onus of proof falls on each project, which
must demonstrate the achievements accomplished during its lifetime. It was precisely
to reduce transaction costs that the CDM was developed to work on a case-law basis,
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so that methodologies approved for one project serve, if they can be proven to
apply, for other analogous projects.325 The regime thus depends on a project-byproject analysis, and it is up to the project developer to supply all the evidence that
will attest to the project’s worth.
Moreover, because sinks in the CDM operate as a credit-based scheme in
which both investor and seller have an interest in exaggerating the success of the
project and downplaying any accounting or leakage problems, transparency,
monitoring and verification are critical for the whole system to have any credibility.
UN negotiators deciding on the rules of the market were acutely aware of this, and if
they forgot, the environmental NGOs engaged in the discussions were there to
constantly remind them. What’s more, since some of the negotiators were in fact the
future investors, the whole process was marked by what some observers characterized
as an “obsession with avoiding risk.”326 Some countries in the EU (the Netherlands is
a prime example) had already invested in pilot projects, and set up official
procurement programs (CERUPT and ERUPT in the Dutch case), and were
anticipating the need to buy more credits to comply with their emission reduction
commitments. They thus tended to shirk anything that might one day leave them
exposed and played it as safe as possible.
The direct consequence of this preoccupation with credible emission
reductions and the need to ensure transparency and reduce risks for the buyer (that is,
Annex I countries, which held more power during the negotiations) resulted in an
overly complex CDM project cycle. This complexity in turn meant that the up-front
costs required to design and implement a project were exceptionally high. At the same
time, with water-tight rules, the cost of verifying was lessened. In other words, the
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remarkably complicated set of rules increased ex-ante transaction costs and in so
doing decreased them ex-post. As a result, in complying with the requirements of a
project, developers bear the greatest burden, and this in turn eases the work of the
validating and certifying entities.
Yet precisely because credibility is of the essence, the work of monitoring and
verification acquires great value. And since this is being developed as part of the UN
system and is meant to work internationally, the task has to be undertaken by agencies
enjoying the highest levels of official recognition. These agencies charge accordingly
and as a result come to cash in on the bulk of the projects’ budgets.
This lack of correspondence of time and effort employed relative to profit
affects small and large projects disproportionately, since, for the most part,
certification costs are fixed by the certifiers, and tend to be rather independent of the
size of the project -or at least the relationship is not proportional.327 The combination
of the higher costs at the design phase, and the fixed costs of validation, verification
and certification, result in a persistent bias towards larger projects accruing more
credits. This also has to do with the establishment of credibility: as DNV explains, if
their fee were proportional to the amount of emission rights verified, their integrity
could be questioned (DNV 2002, quoted in Michaelowa 2003). What this translates
into, however, is that transaction costs represent an even greater proportion of the
total costs for small-scale projects –especially calculated as cost per ton of CO2-,
whereas they are easier to accommodate in larger projects.328 The bias in favor of
large projects is thus built in.
Moreover, transaction costs are heavily dependent on the context and on the
institutional framework (Heller 1999 in Michaelowa et al. 2003: 264). Developers in
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poor regions lack access to the tools and know-how necessary to complete a PDD.
A representative of an environmental and developmental NGO in Panama interested
in developing a sinks project explained that development of the baseline had to be
done in Argentina because the Panamians lacked the technical tools, doubling the upfront costs of developing the project (Lanchberry, personal communication). So even
though cheap land and labor make poor regions more attractive to investment, the cost
of fulfilling the requirements, particularly those of a technical nature, can and often do
cancel out any comparative advantage. This has been the perpetual story of most
African countries since independence from colonial rule, and is repeated again in the
case of climate change. In the words of Donnelly, President of the Greenhouse
Emissions Management Consortium: “You need a deal of a couple of million tons, at
a fairly high price of carbon, before money starts flowing to the landowners. No-one
has brought me a proposed CDM transaction that’s large enough” (Nicholls 2002,
quoted in Landell-Mills and Porras 2002: 101).

This was the story of a state-designed market meant to work internationally
under the auspices of the United Nations. Now I turn briefly to the market’s own
designed model, which has no great stated credibility concerns other than those
regarding market efficiency.

The Chicago Climate Exchange: “To Save the Planet”?
The idea of the Chicago Climate Exchange came from the US sulfur market to
Richard Santor, known as “the father of financial futures” for inventing interest-rate
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futures in the 1970’s (Goddell 2006).

It was he who, as part of the

Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Acid Rain Advisory Committee,
persuaded the EPA to hold the annual auction for sulfur dioxide allowances on the
Chicago Board of Trade.330 A little after that, while US negotiators were busy selling
the idea of carbon offsets trading to their UN world counterparts, Sandor started
working on the idea of an all-electronic exchange for carbon trading. In 2000 he
received a $450,000 grant from the Joyce Foundation and, with the help of around
100 people (power-industry executives, environmentalists, lawyers and so on) set out
to study the feasibility of a voluntary emissions-trading market (ibid.). Three years
later, in December 2003, after raising $25 million in a public offering in the
Alternative Investment Market (which is part of the London Stock Exchange), the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) opened for business. Corporations enlisted
included Ford, I.B.M. and other blue-chips, as well as American Electric Power
(A.E.P.), on whose board of directors Sandor sat (ibid.).
In the first month of operating the CCX, a total of 82,000 metric tons of CO2e
were traded at about $1 per ton (Goddell 2006). A year after that, according to
Sandor, CCX’s members had reduced 30 million metric tons of emission, or the
equivalent of what two big coal plants emit a year (ibid.). Although trading volumes
were lower in 2005 than in 2004 (from 2.24 million tons of CO2e in 2004 down to
1.45 million tons in 2005), they recovered in 2006, and the price per ton “across all
vintages” went from a weighted average of $1.95 to above $3.50 (with a spike of $5)
(World Bank and IETA 2006: 19). According to Santor, by May 2006, with more than
175 participants (besides A.E.P. and Ford, there were Motorola, Du Pont, RollsRoyce, I.B.M. Amtrak, Bayer Corporation, and various US states, cities and
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universities, as well as several big Brazilian and other multinational
corporations331), more than six million carbon allowances had been traded, for a price
between $3 and $5 per ton of CO2e (Goddell 2006).
While the World Resources Institute (WRI) has endorsed the CCX, other
environmental organizations are less enthusiastic. Although its transactions are
audited by N.A.S.D., a respected private securities industry regulator, and the CCX
has links to the EU ETS, where Sandor also runs the European Climate Exchange
(ECX)332, its credibility as a source of emission reductions is questioned. Given that it
is an incipient voluntary market, it makes sense to render the game appealing and not
punitive to attract players. Moreover, its goals are hardly ambitious. A reduction of
only 1 percent between 2003 and 2006 (the market’s first phase) is required from the
participating emitters, and emissions greater than 4 percent -today increased to 7
percent- past a company’s baseline are not even counted (Goddell 2006). The
emissions reduction goal has now increased, and new participants are invited to aim at
a 6 percent reduction below the baseline by 2010 (the end of phase II target) (World
Bank and IETA 2006: 19). But in any case, there are no explicit penalties for missing
the target (Goddell 2006). So for 2004, all members were found to be globally in
compliance with limited trading (World Bank 2006: 19).

Some critics have also questioned the choice of baseline after which changes
in the level of emissions are measured. Even though establishing a baseline will
always be problematic, the baseline chosen by CCX -an average of emissions between
1998 and 2001- happens to coincide with an increase in coal burning by A.E.P. (on
whose board Sandor sits) to compensate for the shutting down of a big nuclear plant.
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Like the Eastern European economies, a high baseline allows A.E.P. to count
reductions that would have happened anyway for other reasons, and this was
mentioned to Goddell (2006) as one of the reasons other big emitters have not joined
in (as a former executive of CCX said, “other big emitters had no interest in joining a
program that seemed designed to help A.E.P. look like a good corporate citizen”
[ibid]).

But perhaps the biggest problem is with additionality, particularly with what
falls under the category of LULUCF (see Chapter 5). As Goddell (2006) notes,
farmers in the United States were getting paid for avoided emissions resulting from
using no-till (or zero tillage) methods in farmland soils. But they had been no-tilling
for 14 years, and would likely continue to do so whether they were paid for the carbon
offsets or not. Meanwhile, Ford or any other emitter can use these as credits to emit.
As Goddell explains, “When I asked Sandor about this, he argued that it doesn’t
matter if these agricultural reductions are “real” or not, because they make up only a
small fraction of CCX’s overall reductions. “What’s important,” he told me, “is to
incentivize people who are doing the right thing” (Goddell 2006). Of course, as
Goddell further notes, the companies advertise and use the credits as if they were
indeed real. Hence, in the best case, CCX is mainly validating emission reductions or
removals that have already occurred; in the worst case, it is allowing for increases in
emissions through sophisticated green-washing; and in every case, it is making a
profit out of it.333

In June 2006, on the occasion of World Environment Day, The World Bank
announced that it had offset all the emissions produced by its Washington D.C.
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operations and business transportation tracked from its headquarters in that fiscal
year. The total of 22 kilotons of CO2e offsets came from a reforestation project in
Costa Rica undertaken by the Swiss company Precious Woods. The credits were
acquired and retired through the CCX. Precious Woods Holdings, a reforestation and
forest management company with operations in the Latin American tropics, was
enlisted in 2005 through the CCX, to “provide forest carbon offsets consisting of
reforestation on formerly degraded pasture land in Costa Rica, while also maintaining
existing natural forests” (Sandor and Kanakasabai 2005). This was done explicitly as
part of CCX’s “mission of establishing a standardized, transparent, broad-based
framework for greenhouse gases that includes carbon sinks such as forestry” and
reduces transaction costs (ibid.; italics mine).

There is probably much for which to commend the Precious Woods
reforestation projects. The process is certified by the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) and seems to follow high quality environmental and possibly also social
standards. But in terms of carbon offsets, there is no additionality whatsoever in the
projects as this is precisely Precious Woods’ business.
What’s more interesting, two of Precious Woods’ properties or fincas appear
as a World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund reforestation project in Nicaragua, in which the
Emission Reductions Purchase Agreement (ERPA) has been signed for a total of
174,796 ERPA tons of CO2e emission reductions.334 The spin abilities of the World
Bank are well known, including amongst experts of the CDM Methodology Panel in
charge of revising methodologies for projects,335 but it is instructive to consider them
briefly. On the World Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit web page, the project appears as a
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Nicaraguan project, Precious Woods appears as an “agro-forestry” company, and
“the potential risk of non-permanence is mitigated by the long term commercial
nature of the project, and by the critical importance of the additional revenue from the
carbon sequestration” (op. cit.). Thus the problem of non-permanence is nonchalantly
resolved by the fact that this is a successful commercial enterprise (and there is
therefore no risk that the trees will be simply cut and operations stopped), and by the
claim that the revenue from carbon sequestration is critical –never mind that the
company’s shares have been listed on the SWX Swiss Exchange since March 2002,
and the company proudly presents itself as a “world leader in the sustainable
management and use of tropical forests.”336 Moreover, even though teak will cover 95
percent of the plantation surface and supposedly “valuable” native wood species will
take up the remaining 5 percent, the project is presented as creating “a mosaic pattern
consisting of secondary forest, (native) single trees, teak and groups of newly planted
native trees” because some existing natural forest remnants and advanced secondary
forest and major single trees will remain.337
It is also interesting to see what the World Bank chooses when, for once, it is
itself a client looking to buy offset emissions. Even though its motto is “working for a
world free of poverty” (its stated mission is “global poverty reduction”) and it has its
own Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF), it went for safe sinks credits in
the voluntary, private market, buying from a large Swiss company (and Switzerland is
not exactly a “World Bank client” as Bank documents like to put it). Under these
terms, the project can only be justified as providing supposedly “valuable” direct
foreign investment (the neoliberal state’s main concern). However, the sustainable
development benefits on the ground really boil down to a few temporary employment

271
options, mainly for men, and stretching it out a bit, perhaps some (unavoidable)
basic technical training. So much for the World Bank’s constant preaching that carbon
offsets can contribute to poor countries’ sustainable development.
Going back to the commodity itself, the cost to Precious Woods of marketing
verified carbon offsets from reforestation is probably negligible,338 with most of it
being integrally absorbed by foreign technical and financial consultants and experts.
The commodity goes pretty cleanly from Precious Woods, through CCX, to the
World Bank, but in fact no additional greenhouse gas emission removals have taken
place, no local communities have particularly benefited, and nothing has been
produced, other than numbers and paper (arguably, more emissions). So even if the
World Bank doesn’t sell the offsets again at a profit but uses them for public imaging,
this fictitious capital has materialized in real increased capital primarily for the
financial sector and consultants and then for an already well-capitalized and
established industry, in addition to the advantages that derive from a good marketing
image.

Clearly though, the point of this effort goes beyond that of realizing value
from whatsoever. Sandor and the corporations he enlisted have assumed that the
market in greenhouse gas emission reductions will one day be mandatory and are
moving to assure “first-mover status.” This is what economists refer to as the “capture
theory of regulation,” which suggests that those producers who have most interest in
the regulation outcome tend to monopolize the process of regulation and use it to
prevent competition.339 As Goddell (2006) explains,

“in a few years, if a mandatory carbon-trading system is finally established in
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the United States, one of the most contentious issues in the design of that
system will be how companies that have already made reductions in their
emissions will be credited for those reductions — if indeed they are credited at
all. In other words, should a company like DuPont or I.B.M., both good
corporate citizens that have already made sizable cuts in emissions, be
required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions just as much as a competitor who
has done nothing? If they do get credit for those early reductions, how might
that credit be measured? For DuPont and I.B.M., hundreds of millions of
dollars could be at stake in how this question is resolved.”
This is where the target lies: “The bigger CCX gets, the more cities and states
it can get to join, the more likely it will be that carbon credits on the exchange will be
viewed as the de facto standard by politicians and others responsible for designing a
national system — and the more likely it will be that credits on the exchange, which
at the moment are only informally recognized among CCX participants, will be
grandfathered into a national system and granted full legal status as property rights.
“This is all about business,” one carbon-market veteran told me. “It has nothing to do
with the environment” (ibid).

In sum
Whether it is under the government-regulated or the voluntary-market version,
when we look at who has access to the new market in emission reduction credits from
land use change and forestry we see marginalization running across various scales: at
one extreme, pretty much the whole continent of Africa is left out; at another, poor
forest communities everywhere are left out. The two are linked, given the role played
by agriculture and forestry in most African countries’ productive activities, the
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number of rural poor, and their so-called “low energy and industrial footprints”
(World Bank and IETA 2006: 28). The fact that under the CDM only afforestation
and reforestation are allowed, that even for those limited categories the methodologies
and rules are remarkably complex, and that sinks are not included in the EU ETS
Phase I, results in the practical exclusion from the market of poor forest communities
the world over.
This is clearly nothing new under capitalism, but rather what characterizes it
most plainly. Here I presented only a detailed story of the how this new market works
and who, as a consequence, has access to it and is able to profit. But ironies and
contradictions abound. As noted throughout this chapter, given the stringent
conditions and high transaction costs for CDM projects, these are biased precisely
towards the kinds of projects so strongly opposed by the major environmental
NGOs.340 If only large-scale projects are eligible or able to bear the costs, many small
and poor countries, as well as community forest projects, will be left out and possibly
confronted with increased competitive pressures on their land and production. Largescale plantations, which are most often monocultures, tend to have negative effects on
the ecology and the local livelihoods of developing countries with dense rural
populations (see Chapter 4). As pointed out by Locatelli and Pedroni (2003), there is
also the problem of leakage, in that the sale of carbon credits biased to favor largescale plantations works as an incentive or subsidy to increase production and lower
prices, depressing competition and displacing or making forestry projects elsewhere
unworkable. This does no favor to either climate change mitigation or sustainable
development –whatever the definition used.
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Also ironic and contradictory is the fact that, as a result of the market
rules, most of the cost and effort of undertaking a CDM project now falls mainly on
people in the host country, given the cost of getting it registered and certified. So what
started out as a cost-effective mechanism to contribute to non-Annex I Parties’
sustainable development while helping industrialized countries make good on their
commitments, turned into a challenge for developing countries’ organizations seeking
to enter a small market and leave some value-added investment in place. This has to
do with the fact that every requirement -particularly in regards to transparency- is
made on the seller, not on the buyer. It was the buyer countries that held most power
during the negotiations. And yet, because buyers are the ones in need of the
reductions, more and more governments and companies in developed countries are
undertaking tasks that were originally meant to be done by the project developers, and
are providing all manner of funds to get the supply of credits from CDM projects
going. As noted in the State of the Carbon Market report of 2006, prepared by the
World Bank and IETA, “In an effort to reduce potential operational and performance
risks, many buyers are becoming more actively involved in the development of the
project as a means to deal with technology risks […] For instance, they offer extended
assistance during the early stages of the project or once it has started, participate in
the operation and maintenance of the project, or in the monitoring of the CER data”
(World Bank and IETA 2006: 32).
Clearly, the effect of accounting rules on which projects can be undertaken has
implications for equity. The filière analysis and attention to who has access to the
market at the various nodes and why this is so could help remediate the built-in
inequality and provide a better distribution of benefits -if only there is the will. But
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the solutions are not simple or without a reconsideration of prices paid and a
relocation of risk. A good example is the possibility established in the UNFCCC
decision on bundling small-scale projects to decrease transaction costs under certain
limited circumstances (see Chapter 5), which was explicitly meant to improve access
by low-income forest communities to the CDM market. But here again, the problems
are likely to be compounded as more people and more land leads to greater
complexity and risk in market terms. This is confirmed by the experience of the
Payment for Environmental Services in Costa Rica, to which the following chapter
turns.
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Chapter 7
On the ground: Costa Rica and the Payment for Environmental Services
Have you breathed your investment yet? Have you drunk your investment yet?
Have you admired your investment yet?341
Costa Rican Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy
But I was thinking of a plan to dye one’s whiskers green.
Lewis Carroll
By the mid 1980s, the small Central American republic of Costa Rica was
desperately seeking resources that would allow it to emerge from a crippling
economic crisis and one of the highest deforestation rates in the region. Ten years
later, the same Costa Rica was burnishing its reputation as a world leader in
environmental conservation, selling the first carbon offset credits in the international
market, and teaching the world about paying for the environmental services that
forests provide.
How this came about, what the Costa Rican Payment for Environmental
Services (PES) is and how it works is the subject of this chapter. The chapter thus
describes the Carbon Fund in Costa Rica, the first national system for the
international marketing and sale of carbon offsets, which gave way to the creation of a
national system for PES. Because carbon sequestration by trees was the only
environmental service that had a well-defined institutional structure for its
compensation based on the UNFCCC, the Costa Rican PES can be said to originate in
the sale of carbon offsets.
The PES is widely admired and presented as exemplar for very good reasons,
notably the focus on small- and medium-scale landowners and the linking of carbon
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offsets with other forest environmental services such as biodiversity, water
protection and scenic beauty. Yet, despite a nearly impeccable model, the reality of
PES on the ground offers a glimpse of the many problems inherent in the market for
carbon sequestration by trees. Like the market for sinks under the CDM, transaction
costs and risk allocation imply that the small-scale peasant farmers at which PES is
aimed and who need it most are excluded –either from the beginning, because they
don’t meet the requirements, or eventually, because it is unsustainable given the scale
of their economies. More troublesome, a survey of PES until 2001 showed that the
few small landowners who participated ran the risk of further impoverishment. At its
worst, the PES contract could result in serious loss for the peasant who, in case of
default, according to the law would have to pay back to the state the total amount
received for the expected environmental service, in addition to interest and damages
incurred. It is not hard to envision a scenario is which the continuous erosion and
impoverishment of small-scale peasant enterprises, combined with lucrative
opportunities afforded by planting trees for the sale of carbon offsets at a larger scale,
result in peasant farmers losing their land to wealthier landowners better able to profit
from PES or the CDM. Although judiciously aimed originally at addressing
deforestation and sustainable livelihoods, the PES contract contains the seeds of a
classic case of what Harvey (2003, 2006) describes as accumulation by dispossession.

Because Costa Rica is often presented as exceptional, the chapter addresses
the conditions that gave rise to the creation of the Carbon Fund and PES. Where do
they come from –in terms of ideas, institutions, and processes? What are their effects?
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Responding to this question involves briefly revisiting the history of Costa
Rica, from the creation of a modern welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s to the
economic crisis and structural adjustment of the 1980s, focusing on the processes and
institutions that provided the background for the Carbon Fund and PES. These include
the tradition of state involvement in the economy as part of the welfare state; the
1960s and 1970s agrarian policies that, while quelling unrest, did not manage to
redress a highly skewed land distribution; and the creation of semi-private institutions
with USAID funds after the 1980s crisis. From there I analyze the turn towards green
marketing that occurred in the 1990s as part of a strategy to capitalize on the
environmental “cluster” (Porter 2000), and the other conditions that enabled this turn,
in particular the existence of a coterie of scientists and environmentalists and the
distinctive amalgam of environmental organizations present in Costa Rica. This is
then followed by a description of the Costa Rican Carbon Fund and the PES,
including its history and how it works, first in theory and then in practice. The latter
involves looking at who has access to PES and how this access is maintained or lost.
The concluding thoughts are an attempt to address both the salutary aspects of PES
and the contradictions within it. What emerges will be taken up in the final conclusion
in light of the development of the international market for sinks under the UNFCCC.

The creation of a modern welfare state: the 1950s and 1960s
In the three decades after the 1948 civil war, Costa Rica saw the gradual but
solid consolidation of a welfare state upheld by democratic institutions. The
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nationalization of the banks and the abolition of the army in 1948, increased social
spending on health and education, and the constant expansion of state intervention in
the economy laid the ground work for years of social stability and constitutional
governments. These changes were accompanied at times with repression of the more
radical elements, in particular of communists and calderonistas after the civil war.342
But for the most part, social demands and unrest were met with the opening up of
spaces by the state, which, although easily qualifying as co-optation, absorbed real
and potential conflict and contributed to a widespread rise in the standard of living
and political stability.
Central among these reforms were state interventions in the economy through
subsidized credits from the national banking system in the 1950s, and protectionist
policies and tax breaks for industrialists, including multinational corporations and
foreign investors in the 1960s. This was the time of the creation of the Central
American Common Market (CACM), which was meant to stimulate importsubstitution industrialization and diversify production in order to reduce the
vulnerability of the small Central American economies to fluctuations in the prices of
one or two primary products (usually coffee and bananas), and save foreign exchange
which otherwise always left the country to pay for imports. The complications of
doing this in such small domestic markets meant that the consolidation of the five
Central American republics was essential to increase the size of the market and justify
the diversification of products. More than 100 companies were formed in Costa Rica
between 1963 and 1975 as a result of the state’s incentives and policies. These
interventions included support for cooperatives (23 coffee cooperatives were founded
between 1963 and 1972), inexpensive credits and the promotion of domestic markets.
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The CACM started unwinding after the 1969 “soccer war” between Honduras
and El Salvador (see Durham 1979), delaying payments for Costa Rica’s exports and
contributing to its debt crisis. As the Costa Rican economy slowed in the 1970s, again
the state intervened, this time more directly, by establishing and managing its own
industrial and services enterprises under the Costa Rican Development Corporation
(CODESA), as well as numerous agencies and “autonomous institutions” addressing
issues that ranged from low-income housing to community development and health
care. Public and state employment tripled between 1950 and 1970. In the latter year,
the 51,000 employees in the state’s payroll comprised 10 percent of the work force
(Molina and Palmer 1997a: 86). This number was to grow to 20 percent in the next
ten years (Edelman and Kenen 1989: 188).
This active role in the state in the economy and especially the investments in
health and education meant that by the end of the 1970s life expectancy was at 70
years and literacy rates were 90 percent; social security coverage extended to threequarters of the working population and unemployment did not reach 5 percent.
Overall, the 1960s is sometimes called “the golden age” of distributed growth
(Bulmer-Thomas 1987). Yet this golden age eventually had three main losers: peasant
farmers producing traditional crops, forests, and workers (Molina and Palmer 1997a:
89).
Agrarian policy in Costa Rica in the 1960s and 1970s
In the 1960s coffee exports still accounted for half of Costa Rica’s foreign
income. Aided by increased use of pesticides and fertilizers, coffee production
intensified and multiplied, so that the area dedicated to coffee production tripled
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between 1950 and 1970. Banana production grew likewise with the introduction
of more resistant varieties and more intensive use of agrochemicals, land and labor.
Although the banana sector goes back to the 1900s, the Costa Rican government
authorized the entrance of the Standard Fruit Company in 1956, and other foreign
companies in 1965.343 Sanctions on Cuban sugar after the Revolution and the rise of
fast and frozen food in the United States also contributed to the growth of sugar and
cattle production. These incentives for capital investments in agriculture deepened
land concentration, exacerbating highly skewed land distribution, especially as banana
plantations spread and cattle ranches continued their expansion in the Northwest.
Peasant farmers responded to the increasing requirements for machinery and
technical equipment by organizing cooperatives. But except for the cases of rice and
dairy where they associated with well connected industrialists, these ventures were
not very successful (see Masis 1989). In contrast to the country’s image as a land of
poor but equal yeoman farmers, land concentration and landlessness was prevalent.344
Cattle ranches in particular generated landlessness as they expanded, with the total
number of landless families going from 14,000 to 17,421 between 1963 and 1973.
And with the increase of landlessness, came an increase in land conflicts. In the seven
years between 1963 and 1970, the number of land conflicts was 2,203, mostly in areas
of cattle and banana expansion (Molina and Palmer 1997b: 22).
Conflict over land has a complex background is Costa Rica, dating to the civil
war. The outright support of the civil war’s winning party (the PLN345) by the smalllandholding peasantry of the Central valley, the steadfast opposition to the same party
by agricultural laborers under the Communist-backed banana labor unions, and the
influence in government of large landholders, meant that, although there were many
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soft loans for peasant producers, peasant issues did not receive priority attention
after the civil war. This fact was masked by the agricultural frontier, which provided
an escape valve.
But then in 1961, amidst growing concern in the United States for leftist moves
inspired by the Cuban revolution, the “Alliance for Progress” was launched. This USsponsored “massive hemispheric aid program” (Edelman and Kenen 1989: 126)
promulgated agrarian reforms in the region as a means to quell more radical calls for
change.
As talk of agrarian reform grew and the frontier’s closing neared, land invasions
multiplied. This prompted landholders under attack to press the government to pass
the agrarian reform law. The law, passed on October 14, 1961, placed heavy emphasis
on “respect for private property” and the obligation of the state to fully compensate
prior to expropriating any land based on the owner-declared value of the property for
tax purposes. As a consequence of this policy, every expropriation ended up
contributing to national indebtedness. And for this same reason reform was limited
(see Seligson 1980).
Still, the Costa Rican government responded to peasants’ claims for access to
land and better conditions as it usually did with all other issues, that is, by establishing
in 1962 a government agency in charge of agrarian reform, the Instituto de Tierras y
Colonización (ITCO) (Institute of Land and Colonization), later known as Instituto de
Desarrollo Agrario (Institute of Agrarian Development) or IDA.346 Since 1968 ITCOIDA has promoted a program called “Asentamientos Campesinos” (Peasant
Settlements) with which it officially aims to “respond to pressure points by means of
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rural lands that have been insufficiently exploited and the settlement of families
on parcels appropriate for rational exploitation, and ensure the welfare of the affected
population constituting the pressure point” (ITCO 1968: 2). The financing for this
program initially came from the issuance of state bonds and a loan from the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID).
As of July 2001, IDA had distributed 788,000 hectares, buying more than 500
farms, to accommodate more than 68,000 families (IDA, Department of Planning and
Statistics, personal communication).347 The problem is that some of the land bought
was not suitable for agriculture. In the Northeast for example, in the mostly tropical
forest areas, it was not uncommon for a large landowner to pay for clearing the forest,
cash in on the trees, and then abandon the land, because it was unfit for intensive
agriculture or plagued by low productivity. The abandoned land would then be
invaded by poor landless peasants, at which point the landowner and IDA would
come to an agreement for compensation and expropriation. In this way, the peasants
got to stay on the land, IDA did its job of quelling unrest and distributing land to poor
peasants, and the landowner made a good deal (and possibly moved elsewhere for
another good deal).
This was however bound to create larger problems down the road and it
became one of the main contradictions of the PES. According to IDA’s mandate, the
land it distributes is supposed to be “grade A” –that is, suitable for annual crops.
Peasants who receive land from the IDA sign a contract whereby they commit
themselves to work the land and make it agriculturally productive. If they fail to do
so, they risk losing it to some other land-hungry peasant. The reality, as noted, is that
IDA often acquired land suitable for forest because it was agriculturally unproductive
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and cheap, and then distributed it to poor peasant farmers as if the land was good
for agriculture. As peasants tried various forms of productive activity, they
accumulated more debt. One of the best options was usually small-scale cattle
ranching, for which more forest had to be cleared. And even this was not always an
option: the grass is so wet and thin that cattle often broke their bones (personal
communication). Allowing the land to revert back to forest was clearly the best -and
often the only- option ecologically, but was not an option economically. This is what
the payment for the environmental services through reforestation came to address. But
because the land was supposed to be for agriculture, peasants who had received their
land from IDA were not allowed to apply to the PES. This was to turn into one of the
major problems of complying with the goal of incorporating small and medium
landowners into the payment of environmental services scheme, and is further
explained below.

The 1980s: structural adjustment and the “free market miracle”
In the meantime, under import-substitution industrialization, the economic
expansion continued. More than one hundred companies were formed between 1963
and 1975. These however, were mostly owned by foreign capital (Molina and Palmer
1997b: 23). The government’s protectionist policies made no distinction whether the
new industry used local or imported materials. In fact, tax benefits often favored
imports. In 1976, 75 percent of the raw material used by industry had to be imported.
For every $100 of industrial output the country imported $80 in inputs and machinery.
So despite the import-substitution industrialization goal of decreasing the drain of
foreign exchange, the reality was that imports in machinery and inputs led to a growth
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in the trade deficit. This kind of industrialization was clearly not integrated into
the local economy and as such failed to provide the expected necessary incentives,
instead contributing to national debt.
The crisis was soon to be felt. Between 1978 and 1981, prices for agricultural
inputs went up by 600 percent, leading to a rise in average production costs of 310
percent. At the same time, food prices rose only 180 percent (Edelman 1999: 93). The
number of peasant organizations and activity increased in tandem: between 1970 and
1978, only four organizations were created; in 1979-82, another ten were founded; but
in the seven years between 1983 and 1990, 126 were registered with the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security. Many more probably applied but did not obtain legal
status (Edelman 1999: 255-256). With the onset of the 1980s debt crisis, Costa Rica
became the first country to default on its international loans, and the first one to
plunge into structural adjustment programs.
The much touted “free-market miracle” in Costa Rica was largely a result of
Washington’s careful handling of IMF, World Bank and International Development
Bank (IDB) prescriptions for the country, and most importantly, of the country’s
earlier reformist state policies (Edelman and Monge Oviedo 1993). Thirty years of
investing on health and education gave Costa Rica advantages in adapting to neoliberal globalization. Besides, given its geopolitical location, between Sandinista
Nicaragua and Noriega’s Panama, Costa Rica’s various structural adjustment
programs were considered with much strategic sensitivity (Edelman 1999). Although
the “remedy” of structural adjustment was as bitter as in so many other countries, it
was here softened, directly and indirectly, by vast additional resources via USAID.
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Between 1982 and 1984, USAID thus became the shadow Ministry of the
Economy (Molina and Palmer 1997b: 29), financing programs in Costa Rica for
almost US $380 million, and donating almost $150 million. And its involvement
continued throughout the decade, setting up institutions to implement the export-led
growth model it was promoting. As with all other structural adjustment programs,
social spending was cut back and public companies were replaced by private ones.
But many times this included also the creation of new nonpublic organizations,
ranging from agricultural schools to export promotion offices, that duplicated
functions of public sector institutions and that were show-cased as examples of
private sector efficiency (Edelman 1999: 78). These types of institutions were to play
a crucial role in the sale of carbon offsets.
The Office for Joint Implementation, or OCIC (Oficina Costarricense de
Implementación Conjunta), in charge of the promotion and sale of carbon emissions
reduction units (so-called Certifiable Tradable Offsets [CTOs]) and of any matter
relating to climate change policy under the Kyoto Protocol, is precisely one of these
institutions. OCIC is a “strategic alliance” between the Ministry of Environment, the
Foundation for the Development of the Cordillera Central (FUNDECOR), the Costa
Rican Association of Energy Producers (ACOPE), and the Coalition for Development
Initiatives (CINDE). This alliance was made possible by funding from the Costa RicaUSA Foundation, which was formed with USAID resources as this latter arm of the
US government officially ended its activities in Costa Rica.348
CINDE (Coalición de Iniciativas para el Desarrollo) in turn was founded with
money from the United States to provide funds for nontraditional export projects,
training, private-sector “educational” activities, and opening new markets abroad
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(Edelman 1999: 79).

This office duplicated –though with a much larger budget-

many of the functions of the government export promotion office, CENPRO, and
played a key role in establishing and staffing a new Ministry of Exports (ibid.).
Another agency that came to duplicate the functions of well-established Costa
Rican institutions whose funds were being cut as a result of structural adjustment, and
which has played an important role in the sale of carbon offset credits, is the EARTH,
Escuela de la Agricultura de la Región Tropical Húmeda (Agricultural School for the
Region of the Humid Tropics). Located on the road to the poor Caribbean port of
Limón, in an immense and preciously manicured garden that looks more like a fancy
golf course in a tropical island, the EARTH is a private school with the same
programs as the University of Costa Rica, or CATIE, Centro Agronómico Tropical de
Investigación y Enseñanza (Center for Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher
Education Center). With funds from the Kellogg Foundation, it was one of the most
controversial of the USAID “parallel state” institutions. It is also the only institution
to have completed a sale of emission reduction units outside of the PES framework, as
part of a deal with the Port of Rotterdam to grow trees in an abandoned banana
plantation to absorb the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the expansion of the
Dutch port.350 This arrangement was handled without the oversight of the Costa Rican
Ministry of Environment, leading to tense relations between the school and the
ministry.351 The deal, however, was not renewed, because the Dutch Ministry then
hired an intermediary firm to negotiate the carbon sequestration transactions, which
sought to impose extremely stringent conditions. Under its terms, it would have been
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necessary to commit the land for 40 years and use it as collateral in case of breach
(that is, they would lose the land should they fail to deliver).

The 1990s: Greening Costa Rica
While tenuously recovering from the economic crisis, in the second half of the
1980s Costa Rica had already a well established reputation as a stable democracy for
its position in Central America and for its role in securing peace in Nicaragua through
the Central American Peace Accords that resulted in the 1987 Nobel Peace prize
award to president Oscar Arias. Some years later, to the image of “Costa Rica the
peaceful” was added the one of Costa Rica “the world leader in conservation.” Like
Costa Rica’s legacy of rural democracy, the ‘green republic’ “is a curious blend of
legend and truth that has taken on a life of its own and become an entrenched political
ideology” (Edelman and Kenen 1989: 3).
As noted earlier, peace in Costa Rica was greatly aided by the influx of money
and resources that arrived from the United States with the intention of presenting it as
a showcase for liberal, democratic policies in opposition to communist Cuba,
Sandinista Nicaragua, and the various other liberation movements in Latin America.
The political stability of the region allowed a large number of researchers to work
there and establish scientific and academic institutions with international connections
and prestige, many with an environmental focus, such as CATIE, the Central
American chapter of the IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of
Nature352) and most notably, the Organization of Tropical Studies –but significantly,
not a Greenpeace office, against which the National Legislative Assembly voted
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unanimously (Van den Homberg 1999: 194).

Today, more than a hundred local

and international environmental NGOs have branches in the country (Honey 2003).
This contributed to the existence of what has been called the “conservation
cartel”: a small group of committed scientists and public advocates, foreign and
national, who occupied important positions in government and education and were
able to shape government policy –both administrative and legal decisions (see Evans
1999). Their influence was clearly felt in the terms in which the matters relating to the
environment were discussed. In a very small country where everybody knows each
other, or is related to each other, it was not that hard for some of these people to
exercise their influence.
One key member of the cartel, for example, was Karen Olsen, the wife of José
Figures Ferrer, twice President of Costa Rica (1953-58 and 1970-74) and the one who
abolished the army, nationalized the banks and is credited with being the architect of
the social democratic welfare state. Born in Denmark and raised in the United States,
Karen Olsen was already among the group of five who attended the World Summit in
Rio in 1992, led by then Costa Rican President Rafael Calderón Fournier. Other
important figures include Joseph Tosi, who founded the Organization of Tropical
Sudies; Gerardo Budowski, who trained a whole generation in progressive forestry at
CATIE; and more recently, Daniel Janzen, who has worked for decades consolidating
the Guanacaste National Park in a manner that does not exclude the local population
and has been involved in various attempts at selling carbon offset credits for forest
restoration.
Most of the foreign-born members of the cartel were tropical biologists and
scientists who had spent decades studying in Costa Rica (such as Daniel Janzen), or
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expatriates (some of them naturalized) who acquired land to be established as
nature reserves, some of it later incorporated into the National Park system (examples
include Archie Carr, Joseph Tosi, Alexander Skutch, Olof Wessberg and Karen
Morgensen, Amos Bien, and many others.) Many of them had studied in the United
States (Gerardo Budowski got his Ph.D. from Yale; René Castro went to Harvard;
Javier Baltodano to the University of California, Berkeley; and Alvaro Ugalde and
Mario Boza took training courses in U.S. national parks),354 or were trained by
someone in Costa Rica who had done so (Boza with Budowski and Kenton Miller in
CATIE). But to understand what is specifically Costa Rican in all of this (I believe
that in a fundamental way this is Costa Rican, and cannot be considered solely an
imported model or a direct child of US conservation) it is important to remember that
most of the Costa Ricans in the cartel then and now were first trained at the
University of Costa Rica. René Castro, the ideologue behind Payment for
Environmental Services, was actually a student leader at the University of Costa Rica,
known for its progressive politics and activism (and from where many of the
country’s leaders are drawn).
These committed individuals are largely responsible for the establishment of
Costa Rica's national park system. Officially created in 1969, the system grew
rapidly, and today Costa Rica proudly claims that more than 25 percent of its territory
is under some form of protection. While the percentage of national parks and other
strictly protected areas is around 13 percent, and some of the rest is protected more on
paper than in reality (see below the case of the Caño Negro Wildlife Refuge), this vast
area is complemented by hundreds of private nature reserves.
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Both a consequence and a cause of this government investment in nature was
the explosion of ecotourism starting in the early 1990s. Driven by Costa Rica’s
infrastructure, combined with the country’s reputation as safe and green (in contrast to
other Central American countries, even though they may be, like Panama, richer in
biodiversity), the number of foreign visitors nearly doubled and gross receipts grew
more than 11-fold between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s (Honey 2003).355 By 1994
tourism had supplanted banana and coffee exports as the country’s leading source of
foreign exchange, with ecotourism and nature-based attractions leaving by 2000 over
$600 million in the country (ibid.).356 But besides ecotourism, the success of Costa
Rica’s image as a responsible steward of its natural graces had other linked benefits.
In the early 1990s the Netherlands paid US banks $5 million for $33 million of Costa
Rican debt. In return, the Costa Rican Central Bank assigned $10 million in colones
for reforestation programs.357 Although not many such transactions materialized,
these debt-for-nature swaps added to the sense that environmental conservation could
indeed be profitable.

Investing in the environmental ‘cluster’
This turn was apparently part of a concerted effort to increase foreign
investment in Costa Rica after the 1980s crisis. Tourism promotion was based on the
“cluster theory,” which centers on the importance of “clusters,” or “geographic
concentrations of interconnected companies” (Porter 2000) in a particular location for
an economy to secure competitive advantage. Basically, the theory posits the idea that
competitive economies (whether national, state or local) function thanks to a range of
related marketable goods and services that command a market, as opposed to just one
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or two disconnected export commodities.

The classic examples are Silicon

Valley and Hollywood. Accordingly, in 1996, Harvard Business School, the Central
American Institute of Business Administration (INCAE) and the Central American
Bank of Economic Integration (CABEI), initiated a three-year project to analyze
regional policies and provide strategic policy advice to the governments of Costa
Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.359 The project, called
“Central America in the 21st Century: A Strategy for International Competitiveness
and Sustainable Development,” was led by Jeffrey Sachs, then director of the Harvard
Institute for International Development (HIID); Professor Felipe Larraín, project
director at HIID; Eduardo Doryan, director of the Latin American Center for
Competitiveness and Sustainable Development at INCAE; and the guru of cluster
theory, Michael E. Porter, from the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness of
Harvard Business School. The project initially identified four clusters “with the
potential to produce world-class industries” (The Washington Times, March 24, 2000)
in Central America: tourism, maquila (apparel manufacturing), forestry and agroindustry. In furthering these results, a second phase of the project singled out
biodiversity and anything environmental as prime strengths of the region (Kaimowitz,
personal communication).360 Another report prepared by INCAE, together with the
Central American Commission for Environment and Development (CCAD) and HIID
in 1998, provided goals for land use until 2020 and drew attention to the potential for
carbon capture in Costa Rica (see Rodriguez and Corrales 1998).361

Costa Rica’s environmental organizations
If the cluster theory is correct in pointing to the importance of enabling
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cooperative settings to develop competitive ventures -of which the greening of
Costa Rica is a prime example- understanding where PES and the market in carbon
sequestration by trees came from also calls for looking not only at public sector
promotion, but also at the environmental organizations that existed in Costa Rica.
Following Van den Homberg (1999), these organizations can be divided in three: the
most important group is deeply tied to the government; the second most important is
very technically oriented; and the most radical or socially engaged group has been
rather effectively contained or co-opted –and reportedly, not always by peaceful
means.362

1) The government-initiated or “promoted sector” of environmental
organizations, is the most influential and secures the largest number of
resources –between 75 and 90 percent of international contributions and
access to debt-swap funds. It was the national government that formed some
of these when, due to IMF restrictions on aid to the government, Alvaro
Umaña (Environmental Minister with Arias [1986-1990]) was forced to
engage in “full-time fundraising” in Washington. They are the smallest group
(five or six most important organizations), and have no interest in forming
alliances with other groups. They are Fundación Neotrópica (Neotropica
Foundation), Fundación Parques Nacionales (National Parks Foundation),
and the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio) (National Biodiversity
Institute).
2) Technocratic groups are more numerous than the government-initiated ones,
but have fewer resources. They are largely service-oriented, often
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internationally affiliated, and possess valuable technical expertise they
offer to the government. Most are independent, but institutionally stable and
somewhat influential. They do establish relations with other groups. Examples
of this type of organization are the Organization for Tropical Studies, the
Tropical Scientific Center (Centro Científico Tropical) and CEDARENA. They
carry out smaller-scale projects but manage to have several running at the
same time. EARTH, IUCN, and the Caribbean Conservation Corporation
(CCC) can also be considered part of this group, but there are others. They
have been instrumental in shaping PES and the Carbon Fund insofar as they
provide guidance, assessment, personnel and, most importantly, credibility to
the government agencies.
3) Base groups are more diverse, local, and have few or no resources. They are
also more likely to lack legal status. Examples include COECO-La Ceiba and
ASCONA, both known formerly as the Asociación Ecologista Costarricense,
AECO (Costa Rican Ecology Association). These base groups are now
grouped under the Federación Costarricense para la Conservación del
Ambiente (FECON) (Costa Rican Federation for the Conservation of the
Environment). Of all the organizations, they have been the most critical of
PES, citing irregularities in the management of the projects and
inconsistencies in their conceptualization -such as paying for biodiversity
through tree plantations which are usually monocultures. Some have ties to
well-known international organizations. COECO-La Ceiba for example, is the
Costa Rican chapter of Friends of the Earth. The government often dismisses
these groups as radical environmentalists.
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Envisaging a Niche: Costa Rica’s PES
The idea –and the success of the idea- of the sale of the service of carbon
sequestration at an international level is owed without a doubt to Costa Rica,
and not to other countries.
Franz Tattenbach, December 1998.363

Origins
It all started during the government of José María Figueres Olsen, son of
twice-president José Figueres Ferrer and Karen Olsen de Figueres, a prominent
member of the original “conservation cartel” (see above). His Minister of the
Environment, René Castro, set up in June 1994 (just a few months into his term) an
office of Joint Implementation within the Ministry (Oficina de Implementación
Conjunta) (OCIC), headed by Franz Tattenbach.364 The OCIC was established by the
Ministry together with what they called “the non-governmental specialized technical
sector,” represented by the Costa Rican Trade and Development Board, or Coalition
for Development Initiatives (Coalición de Iniciativas para el Desarrollo, CINDE), a
private organization specialized in attracting foreign investment (see above); the
Costa Rican Association of Energy Producers (ACOPE); and the Foundation for the
Development of the Central Volcanic Cordillera (FUNDECOR), also headed by
Tattenbach.365 Its funds came partly from the Costa Rica-USA Foundation, in turn
constituted with USAID funds. OCIC’s mission was to develop the procedures and
mechanisms to market emission offset credits, and to promote the use of technologies
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions –including forest sinks. It was also to be in
charge of all climate change negotiations.
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Two months after the establishment of OCIC and a few months after Costa
Rica ratified the UNFCCC in 1994, Costa Rican president Figueres Olsen and then
US Vice-president Al Gore signed the first bilateral joint implementation agreement
in the Western Hemisphere, titled “Letter of Intention for Sustainable Development,
Cooperation and Joint Implementation.”366 Like Costa Rica, the United States had set
up an office to oversee carbon offset projects, known as the US Initiative on Joint
Implementation (USIJI). In the first round of submissions to the Pilot Project Phase of
the USIJI that year, six of the thirty projects received were from Costa Rica. Of these
thirty, only seven were approved; three of them were Tico (that is, from Costa
Rica.)367 By 1997, of the fifteen projects counted by the USIJI, eight were from Costa
Rica. All of them were initiated by the private sector, with the government limiting its
role to their approval. The dominance of Costa Rica at this early stage of the market
was thus well established.
One of these projects was the Klinki Forestry Project, or KLINKIFIX, which
involved planting up to 6,000 hectares of Klinki pine.368 With a total cost of $3.8
million, it was meant to last forty years –the time it would take the trees to absorb
1.968 million tons of CO2. Initiated by the Cantonal Agricultural Center of Turrialba,
it counted as its main partner the Newton Treviso Corporation, a private company in
Mystic, Connecticut which, “for over 25 years, has been working with the Cantonal
Agricultural Center of Turrialba to develop farm crops.” As a previous indication of
its success, the Newton Treviso Corp. advertised “the establishment of macadamia nut
as a new crop in Costa Rica, placing Costa Rica among the top four world producers
of this nut.”
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Dr. Hester Barnes, Project Coordinator from the Newton Treviso Corporation,
had this to say about the project:
We believe that only through the active participation and involvement of
farmers in Latin America can we make significant contribution to the
atmospheric carbon and global warming. While farmers may have been
responsible for the original changes in land use -destroying the tropical forest
to plant crops or graze cattle- today they also represent the best potential for
reforestation of those same lands, once cleared by their grandfathers.369

Other projects from this first phase of the emissions market were the
BIODIVERSIFIX Forest Restoration Project in Guanacaste (which included the
WETFIX and the DRYFIX projects) under the guidance of Daniel Janzen; and the
ECOLAND-Esquinas National Park, in the Osa peninsula.
But the most ambitious one was CARFIX, in the Central Volcanic
Conservation Area, undertaken by FUNDECOR and designed by Franz Tattenbach.
With almost 2,000 independent farmers involved, CARFIX would serve as a model
for the subsequent nation wide PES. It was designed to last twenty-five years and fix
over two million tons of CO2. It would do this by regenerating 26,355 acres of forests,
managing 50,640 acres, and reforesting 13,666 acres. A private timber investment
company from the Southeast of the United States was meant to finalize the deal and
provide the funding.
Ironically, according to William Alpizar, who has been an executive of OCIC
since its creation, it was the success of these early projects that became the main
hurdle to further develop the market – in his words, “ese éxito se volvió cuchillo para
el propio pescuezo” (“that success became a knife [scalpel/blade] at our own throat”)
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(personal communication). Alpizar explained that by setting a high standard and
allowing the industrialized countries to bargain for more, these projects complicated
matters for new ones. It was at this moment that the government saw that the potential
benefits of joint implementation would be concentrated in a few hands, and that these
would not be those mostly contributing to the government’s forestry and energy
policies. So a decision was made to create a portfolio of projects directly
commerciable by the state. They called these “umbrella-projects” (proyectos
sombrilla) because they incorporated all the smaller projects.370 They were divided in
two: Protected Areas Project (PAP), and the Private Forestry Project (PFP). It was
around these two umbrella-projects that the PES would develop, aided by initial funds
from the World Bank of half a million dollars to launch the market and to pay for
international certification, and to develop the software to account for the carbon
sequestered.
In order to transact with these larger, more inclusive projects, the government
then created its own brand of credits, called Certified Tradable Offsets (CTOs). These
were financial instruments designed to be traded in an open market. They were
defined as a specific quantity of greenhouse gas emission reductions, expressed in
carbon equivalent units, that have been or will be reduced. In issuing one CTO, the
Costa Rican State commits itself to sustain the validity of the reduction for 20 years,
guaranteeing additional compensations in case discrepancies are observed with the
certified reductions. They are thus pre-certified by an independent third party and
fully transferable. Therefore “an AIJ investor does not need to get tied to a project.”
The investors simply buy the offset credits. In the spring of 1997, CTOs went up for
sale at the Chicago Stock exchange, and in May of that year, on the occasion of his
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official visit to Costa Rica, President Clinton became the first recipient of the first
CTOs.371 All of this was done well before the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, on
December 10, 1997.372
Meanwhile, newspapers in Costa Rica explained the sale of air as a natural
exchange between over-consuming industrialized countries with a deteriorated
environment, and developing ones –such as Costa Rica- whose economy based on
agriculture and protected forests made them “great producers of oxygen.” The
headlines included, among others, “The Sale of Air Brings Costa Rica 444 Million
Colones” (La Nación, February 13, 1997); “Panama Could Sell Air: Would Follow
Costa Rica’s Steps” (La Nación, June 29, 1998); and “The Sale of Oxygen Enters the
Chicago Stock Exchange” (El Financiero, May 15, 1998).
It was from this market opportunity for the sale of carbon offsets that emerged
the idea of a more holistic payment for environmental services.

How it works
“Costa Rica is evolving as a testing ground for the hypothesis that markets can
be used to drive sustainable development.”373
FUNDECOR and MINAE.

It is widely recognized by government officials and others that PES originated
as an alternative to forestry incentives in the context of structural adjustment
programs that mandated a reduction in government expenditures and subsidies.374 As
such, PES was first established in the Forestry Law # 7575, approved in April 1996. It
is based on the idea that owners of forests provide services to the world and to the

300
local community that are not recognized and for which they receive no
compensation. Because of this, the costs of maintenance of these natural resources are
borne by private landowners or the government, with uncertain results.
Under the PES program, the law recognizes four main services: climate
change mitigation through carbon sequestration, biodiversity, watershed protection,
and scenic or natural beauty. There is one well-known table, reproduced in every
brochure or paper dealing with the topic, that neatly explains the logic behind PES.
The first column lists various environmental services that forests provide. The next
column, with the heading “Principal Beneficiaries,” is divided into three: Owner,
Country and World. Small “Xs” fill out the different boxes, according to which party
benefits from the service and who, in consequence, should pay for the benefit. Thus,
carbon sequestration and biodiversity are benefits provided to the world, and
watershed protection and scenic beauty mostly benefit the country.

Type of Benefit

Principal Beneficiaries
Owner

Country

World

Carbon sequestration

x

Biodiversity

x

Watershed protection

x

Scenic beauty

x

x

The trick then is to figure out how to bill these unaware beneficiaries for the
service they liberally enjoy. The government has been working on this problem for
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some time and there exist now some projects to charge, for example, a certain
amount of money to those industries that consume large quantities of water (such as
the brewery) for the protection of the hydrological resource; or to tourist agencies for
the natural beauty they sell. Biodiversity is a bit of a problem, because, although
Costa Rica has the first arrangement in the world whereby a foreign pharmaceutical
company (Merck) pays for bioprospecting done in the country in exchange for patent
rights, it is a private arrangement. Only InBio (Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad,
National Biodiversity Institute), the research institute that secured the deal and
undertakes the prospecting on its property, gets paid.375
What makes the Costa Rican model of PES even more attractive is that it was
designed to be internally sustainable. A provision in the Costa Rican law states that
one third of the 5 percent tax on fossil fuels recovered by the state would be allocated
to the program. This was meant as recognition of the “polluter pays principle,” but
most importantly, it would allow Costa Rica to avoid depending fully on an external,
uncertain and incipient market. In theory, this would add up to $19.8 million per year
for the PES. However, based on constitutional principles of “unique accounting” and
“centralized tax collection” (“caja única”) requiring all tax revenues to be part of the
national budget, the revenue in fact never makes it to the PES program. The money
goes first through the Ministry of Finance and is allocated according to political
economic priorities dictated by the overall government budget deficit. The amount
thus collected for the PES has in fact never been fully channeled to that purpose. But
the model is good.
At the receiving (or producing) end, a private landowner signs a contract with
the state whereby the landowner sells its right to sequester carbon. This is facilitated
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by an intermediary forestry service organization or agency, in charge of preparing
the contract, developing a management plan (whether for forest conservation, forest
management or reforestation), overseeing the project, and, if all goes well, passing the
check to the owner. The details and reality of this are described in what follows.

Access to PES376
The Costa Rican PES has been rightfully praised for its creativity and
ambition. It not only aspires to be sustainable on a national level, being financed
mainly by internal sources (in part though a tax on hydrocarbons and eventually other
industries), but one of its main goals is the incorporation of small and medium-size
landowners into sustainable forestry activities.377 Although this is a new experiment
and is being fine tuned, it is possible to understand how it functions and what some of
its effects are. What follows is a study of access to PES considering the provisos of
the law and its application in the field based on several audits and independent
studies, complemented by observations made in the field between October 2000 and
November 2001.378 It shows how small and medium-size landowners have actually
been little favored by the PES program. Some of the reasons are more obvious and
manageable than others and, although they generally reflect the existing social
inequity, unless they change, PES will simply perpetuate that inequality.

On distribution: small, medium- and large-scale owners
Most of the official reports on PES have emphasized that many of the
contracts have been for small- and medium-scale projects. Yet there is a difference
between the number of projects approved, and the percentage of the total area
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allocated –the latter being a clearer indication of resource distribution, since
payment is made by the hectare. Of the total projects between 1995 and 1997, 35.2
percent were for less than 20 hectares; 38.9 percent had an area of between 20 and 99
hectares; and the remaining 25.9 percent were projects for over 100 hectares. All
told, the projects involving less than 20 hectares represented only 3.9 percent of the
total area awarded with PES; those between 20 and 99 hectares represented 24.1
percent; and 72 percent of the areas financed represented projects over 100 hectares
(CECADE 1999: 39).
To put it another way, projects involving less than 50 hectares represented
60.6 percent of the total projects approved, although they in fact accounted for only
15.9 percent of the total hectares with PES; projects with areas ranging from 51 to
150 hectares covered 21.2 percent of the projects and 23.8 percent of the hectares;
while projects with over 150 hectares, although they only came to 18.2 percent of the
operations, received 60.3 percent of the total approved area.
Predictably, women’s participation is very low. In hectares, it represents 6
percent of the total, although the number of contracts is 12.5 percent for forest
conservation, 15.34 percent for forest management, and 13.37 percent for
reforestation (data from the Proyecto Estado de la Nación based on the annual
FONAFIFO report for 1999). This reflects the trends for land held by women on a
national level. Shortage of information, difficulty in accessing technical support and
the lack of land titles have consistently decreased women’s participation. This gender
inequality is taken into consideration in FONAFIFO’s most recent plans, mainly in
the Ecomarkets Plan.379
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Global versus Individual
In order to incorporate small- and medium-scale producers, PES law allows
for so-called global projects, in which, in order to reduce costs, a number of owners
may apply for PES jointly as an organization. The problem is that, since payment is
per hectare, the amount allotted is the same for an individual project as for a global
one, even though the latter benefits a greater number of people. Obviously, it is harder
to work several projects at the same time, not only in terms of paperwork (although
the procedure can be simplified) and supervision of land plots, but also in personal
terms. It will always be easier and more affordable for the organization in charge of
developing PES management plan to work with a single owner of, for example 100
hectares, than with 20 owners of five hectares each. This is all the more so since the
forestry organization developing PES projects only charges a percentage of the total
amount of PES, and, when it comes to global projects, is responsible to the state for
the observance of the contract –in contrast to the individual projects, where the
beneficiary is directly responsible.
For most of the year 2000, it was the Centros Agrícolas Cantonales (Cantonal
Agricultural Centers) that had been working with small- and medium-scale owners.
However, the deterioration of some of these centers in regards to their involvement in
PES was obvious in 2001. In many cases, the centers had disintegrated due to
administrative problems -sometimes, but not always, caused by corruption (although
this was not a particularity of Cantonal Agricultural Centers; both regional
agricultural centers and independent organizations were also charged with
corruption.) Despite the importance of these organizations in incorporating small-
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scale producers, the law does not establish any kind of additional support for
them, and their importance has decreased dramatically over time.
Similarly, although much of the increase in secondary forest growth and
plantations is attributed to small- and medium-scale owners organized into
cooperatives or associations, many of these community forestry organizations are now
facing financial and administrative problems.380 During field interviews, I found a
certain resentment against the government and against some NGOs for having used
the participation of small landowners to their advantage, without showing any real
interest in their involvement through the local cooperatives. The peasant-farmers that
have organized in this way feel that, once again, “the government promises and gives
support only to take it away when one is hooked.”381
For example, the law stipulates that the organizations applying for PES must
have “an adequate organizational structure” (Manual de procedimientos, Ley Forestal
No.7575, art. 6.2.3.) However, the law is not clear on how such organization is to be
judged, and the use of such a general term is applied to peasant organizations,
development associations, cooperatives and foundations with very diverse resources
and structures. In the case of ASCOMAFOR (Asociación Comunal de Manejo
Forestal, Communal Association for Forest Management), an association made up of
five small associations of producers and women in IDA settlements, the authorities
rejected the application for PES because the organization did not have such a structure
–which they were told must include, among other things, an accountant, an
administrator, a forestry technician and vehicles at their disposal. This was so despite
the fact that the people in charge of sub-regional offices of MINAE were well
acquainted with the people of ASCOMAFOR and knew it was a poor peasant
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farmers, association with a solid reputation as a small, participatory organization,
without the slightest problem of corruption.382
Thus the trend has clearly been toward a greater number of individual projects
and many fewer global ones. These decreased from 73.2 percent of the total number
of projects approved in 1995, to 57.9 percent in 1997. In contrast, individual projects
accounted for 58.1 percent of the total area designated in 1995, and 70.3 percent in
1997. By 1999, 90.1 percent of the contracts were individual, with an area of 79.1
percent, while global contracts accounted for 9.9 percent and a total of 20.9 percent of
the area.383

The problem of land titles
Perhaps the greatest problem for the small- and medium-scale owners is the
need for a land title, which excludes proprietors who owe IDA money as part of the
land distributed and or inputs for agriculture, and those in areas with uncertain title to
the land. In the beginning, the Forestry Act allowed untitled lands to be included, as
long as the petitioner provided proof of ownership. This proof could be established
by a number of means, including a certified, notarized letter, information ad perpetua
memoria, information documenting formal possession, or, lacking these, a sworn
statement by the owner, the adjoining landowners and two witnesses certifying
ownership, and an official inspection visit. But then Decree No. 27694-MINAE
published on March 12, 1999 cancelled this option.384 In so doing, the decree
ironically excluded PES from many areas that had been declared environmental
reserves or refuges. Although the state simply has no resources to purchase or
expropriate the land, declaring the areas reserves or refuges plainly prevents
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landowners from acquiring land titles and applying for PES. This is the case in the
Transboundary Biological Corridor and the Caño Negro Wildlife Refuge, where
families that settled there years ago cannot obtain land titles and cannot receive PES
because the place has been declared a protected area. These lands are not apt for
cultivation and can hardly sustain cattle raising. As a consequence, the families tend
to be very poor and, without PES, they have only incentives for cutting down the
trees. These are the very lands that should be a priority in terms of PES for forest
protection because they are areas that have already been declared of national interest
by the State, and there are no resources available from the Ministry (monetary or
human) to buy them and care for them.
The issue of IDA settlements is even more awkward. In 2001, MINAE
announced that all agrarian reform beneficiaries wanting to participate in PES should
request authorization from IDA. Yet IDA denied most applications, arguing that the
institute buys “grade A” lands -that is, those suitable for annual crops. Not all of the
representatives or leaders of IDA agree with this: IDA’s legal office has declared that
PES is not compatible with IDA’s mission. Still, some officials have refused
permission without offering any other explanation.385 Even within IDA it is
acknowledged that the lands distributed were not the best for crops in any case. And
that makes sense: in the North, for example, many of the lands distributed by IDA
were taken from squatters occupying underused or abandoned farms –many times
precisely because they were not good lands. The banana companies, moreover, did
buy fertile lands in this region, putting pressure on the price of remaining land and
fanning speculation. Thus most of the farms purchased by IDA were cattle ranches
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with serious agrological limitations, requiring large investments –which are
obviously beyond the means of poor peasant farmers— in order to make them
productive.
The problem was a serious one as of 2001, since, while IDA refused
permission to receive PES or incentives for reforestation and obliged peasant farmers
to cultivate the land to comply with the distribution program, MINAE forbade the
change in land use for the same plots because they were categorized as not apt for
agriculture, but only for forestry. The result was more often than not illegal logging,
the loss of the forest and gradual change of land use and, eventually, the abandonment
of the farm, with the peasant ending up as poor or more impoverished than before.
Then there was the case of forest reserves in peasant settlements which were
retained in IDA’s name. Although by law these reserves were to go to MINAE, lack
of resources meant that they did not, and therefore no one took responsibility for
them. In the Northern Zone alone, there were almost 4,000 hectares of woods in
forestry reserves on peasant settlements that were officially owned by IDA, but which
were effectively looked after by the community of peasant farmers. This was done
with great effort and without any support –from PES or any other source.
Unsurprisingly, it was not always successful and added pressure and created conflict
between IDA’s settlers. It was clear in 2001 that if the issue of the IDA reserves was
not resolved soon, they were destined to disappear in the very short term.

Lien on property
A major problem affecting access to PES by small- and medium-scale
landowners was the lien put on their property when they signed a PES contract.
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Although in principle it is understandable that the state should ensure, at least for
some time, the conservation of the forest or plantation for which it is paying a service,
lack of information and imprecision in the law resulted in banks considering the lien
as a mortgage on the land, leading them to refuse all requests for loans until the lien
notice was removed.386 Although there were attempts to clarify this situation, the fact
is that as soon as peasants hear the word lien (afectación a la propiedad) they lose all
interest in PES.
Indeed, after years of structural adjustment and free market policies, there are
very few peasants who are not in debt or with outstanding credits.387 Land is almost
the only guarantee for obtaining loans to invest in the farm or use in case of need,
since it can be mortgaged. That is partly why struggles over land have not ceased, in
spite of the fact that it is very difficult to make a decent living from it. In this
situation, a PES lien should be seen more as an additional guarantee that the
beneficiary will answer for the property, if nothing else, then to avoid trial for breach
of PES contract and having to return PES funds. In fact, one of the great achievements
of the Forestry Act lies in establishing the trees and the forests as assets within the
National Banking System. This was a problem that hopefully will be resolved in
practice, and there was in 2001 already better communication between the banks, the
National Property Registry and FONAFIFO – although as usual, the most difficult
part seems to be to establish such communication with the landowners.

Procedures and costs
One of the obstacles mentioned most frequently in relation to PES was delays
in the disbursement of funds.388 In the case of reforestation, which depends on the

310
reproductive and growth cycle of trees, this delay is especially problematic. The
decrees regulating the program, as well as the approval of contracts and the payments
were often quite late and did not take into account the specific needs of a plantation,
such as time to make or hire nurseries and the rainy season for planting. Such delays
tend to benefit large landowners, who can bear the cost; they often eliminate small
owners who are at risk if the plantation does not work out.
With regard to the cost, the law establishes a maximum of 18 percent of the
project as the fee for the services rendered by the intermediary agency in charge of
developing a PES management plan, including any administrative cost. However,
some of these agencies charge more by passing on to the proprietor some costs such
as lawyer’s fees (see Baltodano 2000). Thus, in the Northern Zone, for example, the
processing costs range between 22 and 25 percent (ibid.). This cost increases over
time, since the prices paid under PES remain fixed for the five years the contract lasts,
while the processing costs tend to go up with inflation. For example, in 1999, the
amount paid for forestry protection went up by 20 per cent when the accumulated
inflation was over 65 per cent (CECADE 1999: 44). The rule remains: the smaller the
area available for PES, the less profitable the project, so that for forestry conservation
projects of less than 20 hectares, the transaction and implementation costs absorb
nearly all of the income. The problem is that most of the forested areas in Costa Rica,
outside of protected areas and indigenous reserves, are a mosaic of small plots.

Knowledge and training: a problem of sustainability
A problem that may prove even more insidious is the concentration of
knowledge in the intermediary forestry service agencies that develop PES contracts,

311
because not only are they in charge of supervising the conservation, forest
management or reforestation plan for the duration of the contracts, but they must also
oversee all the procedural and administrative requirements. Their role is important,
and their services have clear and consequently important practical advantages, both
for the better-off landowners, who do not live on their farms and have other
employment, and for those with few resources, who must go back and forth to the city
to prepare the paper-work required for PES and who are often unable to absent
themselves from the tasks on the land. But leaving it all to the intermediaries does not
generate any skills and knowledge among the small- and medium-scale landowners
who live on the land. When it comes to reforestation, this affects the quality of the
plantations, as can be seen by the high percentage of deficient pruning when there is
no technical assistance or supervision on the part of the forest manager or other
officials (CECADE 1999: 80). This in turn has repercussions for the economic
viability of the project and the permanent incorporation of those producers into the
sustainable forestry sector. These deficiencies are both the cause and the consequence
of the fact that local participation in decision making is so low, and they affect all of
the activities that are part of PES. The study by CATIE and CIFOR (2000) shows
that, although Costa Rica has generated a large amount of forestry information, this is
not available to most landowners.

Conclusion
The most prestigious carbon brokerage firm has told me: there is no other
carbon in the world with the quality of the carbon being offered by Costa Rica.
Franz Tattenbach, 1998.389
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In contrast to the image of developing countries as passive recipients of
whatever market opportunities they are allowed, the history of PES and the Carbon
Fund in Costa Rica show that not only was the Costa Rican government an active
mover in the creation of the international market for carbon offsets, but that it also
designed a domestic market to take advantage of the perceived international demand
to suit its development goals.
Tattenbach speaks easily about the “high quality” of Costa Rican carbon
offsets. After all, as he himself willingly admits, he is paid to sell. Yet it is true that no
other country has such a far-reaching and sophisticated system to sell carbon emission
reductions. In fact, no other country has a program at the national level, much less one
that is an intrinsic part of its national environmental policy. What makes it even more
special is that it is a national strategy created as a means to finance long-term
sustainable environmental development –and not the other way around (promoting a
new export product which will ideally one day allow pursuing sustainable
development). Tattenbach has always insisted that the sale of carbon offset credits is
not something to “fatten the country’s export line,” but an opportunity to finance a
Costa Rican environmental agenda of sustainable development that would otherwise
be very hard to afford. His point is that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
constitutes more than anything a “subproduct” of forests and silvicultural activities,
whose financial profitability in the present markets is not doing so well. These
activities are mainly forest conservation, forest management, and small-scale
reforestation by small landowners. The sale of emission reductions in those cases
raises the level of profit enough to assure the maintenance of the benefits they provide

313
-above all protecting biodiversity and water resources. These benefits in turn add
value to other productive activities, such as ecotourism and the hydroelectric industry.
Moreover, with this program, Costa Rica makes access to the international
market in greenhouse gas emissions the most democratically open, since, at least in
theory, it is possible for everybody to participate via the PES program administered
by FONAFIFO. As Tattenbach says, Costa Rica is the largest buyer of carbon
reduction emissions: nobody in the world is buying more or faster than FONAFIFO
is.
But perhaps the most important aspect of it all is that the Costa Rican
scientific capabilities and know-how, which made the development of the program
possible in the first place, are reinvested in Costa Rica. This is precisely one of the
things that makes the carbon “high quality”: the amount of scientific research and
monitoring that has already gone into assessing the carbon absorbed in different
ecosystems and situations.390 Other reasons that make this carbon high quality are,
according to Tattenbach, the total backing of the government, the fact that the
reductions in emissions are assured by the scale of the project, and the transparency of
the process -something that is really quite unique. To quote again Tattenbach selling
his product:
“The added value that results from the scientific knowledge incorporated in
each ton of Costa Rican carbon in the market is 100 percent national. In the
other countries, a large part of that added value migrates with the hired foreign
scientists.”391

Unfortunately, the market is not necessarily looking for “high quality carbon.”
So Costa Rica has begun capitalizing on what is perhaps its most valuable asset, one
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that it can still capitalize on when the market goes elsewhere for cheaper credits,
that is, know-how. The lack of brain drain is a significant contributor to Costa Rican
development. Castro and Tattenbach know it well and they are actively selling this
know-how to their Latin American neighbors. Members of OCIC as well as scientists
have served as consultants on PES to many countries in the region, in particular
Nicaragua and Puerto Rico (personal communication). And there is much pride on
this vernacular ingenuity –the “made in Costa Rica” approach, on which Tattenbach
eloquently insists:
“In other countries, projects are and will be undertaken as they are discovered
by international NGOs that do not divulge very well the general methodology
of work nor the operating technique. Instead, in Costa Rica, the effort is
strictly national, endogenous: with national professionals in forestry,
biological and economic science… and therein lies, I believe, an important
part of our success.”392
At another scale, there is the question of PES and local development. The
areas generating most of the timber in Costa Rica are characterized mainly by poor
populations, few schools or health centers, and minimal opportunities for employment
or training. This is not to say that logging is the direct cause of this
underdevelopment. The reason that there is a forest to be exploited is precisely
because of lack of access and roads, combined with small concentrations of
population. But the fact is that timber activity has not generated opportunities or
important changes contributing to local development. While logging is an important
form of primary or primitive accumulation, where natural capital is easily converted
into money capital this capital –whether raw or processed- exits the area and is
accumulated outside the region, leaving behind little more than depletion. The PES
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Program was conceived as a way to overcome this, but for the reasons that have
been pointed out and other structural ones, there remains much to be done.
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Concluding thoughts
A thousand-times-told tale

The story of the creation of a market for emission offsets by trees is one that is
well-known and in many ways predictable: it tells how the production and trade of a
new commodity resulted in reproduced inequality and the further marginalization of
those people who, for social and ecological reasons, it made most sense to
incorporate. In recounting this story I sought to detail how it unfolded, through the
creases of so much inbuilt inequality and according to principles and values such as
market efficiency and pragmatism that left little space to question the paradoxical
results. This was not an inexorable outcome. And still, what at first appeared as the
unintended consequences of understandable positions or defendable decisions,
resulted in a surprisingly coherent picture of the logic of capitalism and the intrinsic
contradictions it entails. This points to another recurring story and familiar problem:
that of the relation between concrete actions and abstract structures. In this section I
will try to review some of the incongruities that resulted from the creation of a market
for sinks focusing on areas where the study of the particular can add to the
understanding of the general. I address mainly three elements of various types that
determined this story: the UN and the tacit reality of the negotiations; the rule of
pragmatism and efficiency; and the creation of scarcity and standardization under a
market approach. The emphasis in each case is on how specific elements and
disjunctures result in a coherent general picture of the reproduction of inequality
under capitalism.
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On the UN and the nature of negotiations
“…a true bureaucracy (in the pejorative sense of that word) will never be
interested in the validity of the results, but in the validity of the process
producing the results” (Galtung 1986: 6).
The complexity of climate change is compounded. Like other environmental
problems, it knows no geographic boundaries and needs cooperative and coordinated
action by states to limit its effects, yet this goes against the foundations of
international law, which is based on “concepts of state responsibility, sovereign
equality, and the paramountcy of state consent” (Yamin and Deplege 2003: 2). But in
addition, climate change cuts across scales not only on account of space but also of
time, and is characterized by scientific uncertainty (involving complex interactions
between the Earth’s atmosphere, the biosphere and the oceans over time and the
impact of human activities upon them). This implies potentially huge damages and
costs that are impossible to calculate, and entails vast discrepancies between those
responsible for the damage and those mostly affected by it.
And still, the international community has managed to negotiate two treaties
in less than a decade to deal with the issue: the UNFCCC in 1992, and Kyoto Protocol
in 1997-the latter binding. These agreements, and particularly the Kyoto Protocol,
have come to share the complexity of the issue itself and become inaccessible to
everyone except those involved in the negotiations. The rules are increasingly
technical and have produced specialized experts who know in detail only particular
topics. Very few people have an understanding of the whole picture. Even assuming

318
one could read all the documents, they are impossible to understand without a
knowledge of the institutional practices and procedures, both formal and informal,
behind the negotiations.393 As Bodansky notes regarding the difficulty of interpreting
the UNFCCC (and other international agreements):
“Words are debated and selected as much for their political and for their legal
significance. Indeed, proposed formulations often took on a talismanic quality,
only distantly connected to the actual meaning of the words. Linguistic
debates became a proxy for political confrontation, with success or failure
measured not just by the substantive outcomes, but also by the inclusion or
exclusion of particular terms. For example, developing and developed
countries argued for hours over whether economic development should be
characterized as “essential” or a “prerequisite” for developing countries’
response measures. Delegations often sought to introduce identical language
in different parts of the Convention or to move language from one part of the
Convention to another, not to effect particular legal consequences, but to
highlight certain provisions for political reasons” (Bodansky 1993: 492-493).

The elusive fairness
All men are equal before the law, but they are no longer equal after it
(quoted in Collier 1975: 126).

In principle, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiations, like most other
UN processes, are set up to ensure equality of representation and opportunities. So, at
least in the context of formal negotiations, the United States has exactly the same
rights and responsibilities as Niue or Bhutan. It is one of the few fora where Parties’
interests are equally heard and, as Tuvalu has proven several times, individuals can
exert an influence in the process not proportional to the power of the nation they
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represent.

394

Yet as anthropologists have noted, redistribution and reciprocity can

also reinforce inequality where the exchanges made result from different valuation of
the goods exchanged between partners with different needs (see Orlove 1977, in Wolf
2001: 164; see also Mauss 1990 [1950]). This inequality is reinforced and reproduced
in myriad ways –starting with the most insidious and obvious one, that of the use of
English as the common language for negotiations when official translation to the six
UN languages is not available, and for drafting the texts.395
UN institutional practices and procedures are highly ritualistic and selfreferential. And under the rituals it is easier to hide real inequalities.396 Although the
process is political, the manner is by default legal. This international legal system
generates frustration among delegates from developing countries, because, “while
promising the rule of law in terms of procedural issues, [it] does not provide
substantive guidance. There is a fear that legal principles of justice and fairness are
not being developed, and instead the international legal system provides an arena for
realpolitik, which then gets institutionalized by the legal power of precedents.”397
Thus, the international legal process appears to merely ensure a “‘polite order’ within
which the ‘rules of the jungle’ operate” (Gupta 2001, 142; see also Gupta 2000a).
Furthermore, the highly formal and ritualistic manner of international
negotiations in the UN fora is eccentric and complicated to learn. Delegates from poor
countries are “socialized” into the process, but for the most part their involvement
remains a formality (Gupta 2001). During the negotiations, the less compromising
option for the delegates, and often the only one available when they lack explicit
guidelines from the home government, is keeping quiet. Even when a certain general
mandate has been approved by their government, because the negotiations proceed
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rapidly and often unpredictably (given the large number of parties involved and
complexity of issues addressed), it is very hard to have a position on everything.
Delegates thus often accept things by default to avoid being further exposed.
Moreover, developing country delegates dedicate most efforts to analyze developed
countries’ proposals, suspicious of what they entail, leaving them little time to
elaborate their own proposals. The group of G-77 and China’s only common position
is generally a defensive one. As one delegate told Gupta, “We mistrust the North and
we spend all our time analyzing their agenda rather than preparing ours” (Gupta 2001:
142). This attitude often generates frustration on the other side of the table: developed
country delegates often lose patience and faith in frequently ill-prepared negotiators
who respond most often on the defensive. Bias is thus reproduced, and mistrust bred.
A lot has to do with the importance accorded to climate change and
environmental issues in general in most developing countries: it is not high on the
agenda given other more pressing social problems and few resources. The sense is
that, unlike the perception in industrialized countries of climate change as a common,
scientific and technological problem, climate change in most developing countries is
perceived as symptomatic of a more systemic problem to do with unequal distribution
and development, caused largely by industrialized countries (Gupta 1997).

On disjoints and the decision-making process
The disjoints and gaps that characterize the decision-making process are
numerous and pervasive. They are part of the rules of procedure as well as inherent in
the structure of the negotiations. The division of work between ministerial input and
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the technical negotiations is one of them. Ministerial input is limited to specifying
key issues of highest importance to national interests and to the final trade-offs once
the options have been boiled down to the minimum and compromise is needed; the
rest is the job of bureaucratic negotiations, which define and pare down the options as
legal text (see Grubb and Yamin 2001). This often results in contradictions between,
on the one hand, what governments are able to obtain in the broader context of
negotiations on emission reductions (or wider world politics) based on what they
perceive to be in their interest, and on the other, what technical and legal experts
come up with. This then has to be further confronted and made compatible with what
the peer-reviewed scientific literature and experts linked to the IPCC consider
acceptable and sound knowledge.
This disjuncture is magnified when looking up close at the reality of the
negotiations, in that many of the delegates actually negotiating have different
backgrounds. Although many have some sort of scientific training, they are not
always specialists in the subject matter. The principal negotiator on sinks under the
CDM for Brazil for example, José Domingos Gonzalez Miguez, is an energy
specialist. And although the early negotiations were covered for Costa Rica by Franz
Tattenbach, who is has extensive experience in forestry projects, the head of the
delegation for many years now is Paulo Manso, a meteorologist. These are two of the
countries with the highest stakes and capacity in forestry issues. Even the Greenpeace
representative on LULUCF had no strong background in forestry science or terrestrial
biology.
This lack of specialized knowledge resulted sometimes in surprising blunders.
In Milan for COP 9, for example, once the draft text on afforestation and reforestation
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under the CDM had been adopted by the contact group, the representative of the
secretariat for the UN Convention for Biological Diversity (CBD) present at the
negotiations went to correct both Greenpeace and the Norwegians for their text on
GMOs and invasive alien species. The text had been agreed upon and nobody had
noticed that in fact the way it was written it went against the CBD convention (to
which all Parties of the UNFCCC were also signatories), and would have the opposite
effect from that desired. It turned out that nobody in the contact group knew the
correct term, which is invasive alien species, not alien invasive species -the problem
being invasive, not alien.398
One example of how the numerous disjunctures in the decision-making
process contribute to the reproduction of inequality is the case of funding for
adaptation to climate change. The problem stems partly from the UNFCCC definition
of climate change as a result of the human-caused increase in atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases (see Pielke Jr. 2005). Although the UNFCCC
contemplates a number of funds for special needs related to climate change (including
the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund, the latter financed by
the 2 percent levy on all transactions under the CDM [see Chapters 4 and 5]), these
resources are very hard to access. This is because any country wishing to use them for
an adaptation to climate change project (for example in flood control) would have to
distinguish between the human-caused aspect, and aspects stemming from natural
environmental variations or standard underdevelopment deficiencies such as those in
infrastructure and institutions. Adaptation to climate change under the UNFCCC
definition does not include water management or biodiversity conservation for
example. Besides, these projects are usually part of local and national development
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projects. But funding from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which
manages the funds, can only go to cover the additional harm caused by humaninduced climate change. Calculating the portion and cost of this, and finding someone
to co-finance the rest, is extremely difficult, so the funds are, in practical terms, often
basically out of reach.399

On the rule of pragmatism and efficiency
The attitude and logic that characterized the creation of a market for sinks is
part of the general move towards neoliberal approaches starting in the 1980s, which
became more evident in environmental policies during the 1990s. This move has
included notorious controversies on the possibilities of social participatory approaches
to environmental protection as they had been tried before, and the hardly concealed
recent backlash amongst conservation organizations towards more preservationist
policies (see Chapin 2004). It surprises no one anymore that not a single indigenous
representative or some kind of local organization sits on the board of any of the big
conservation organizations, while a large number of corporations (some quite
disreputable) do.
The neoliberal move is distinguished by the idea that markets are an integral
part of the solution to any environmental (or other) problem. This idea goes
unchallenged in the case of climate change which, given the many and different
sources and effects of greenhouse gas emissions, appears as a regulator’s nightmare.
The market’s “natural” instinct for maximizing profit is thus portrayed as the engine
of innovation and progress, and the ultimate source of efficiency in allocating effort.
As Dan Dudek, chief economist at Environmental Defense, a nonprofit advocacy
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group, put it, “The beauty of carbon trading is that it takes a primal human
impulse — greed — and redirects it toward saving the planet rather than destroying
it” (quoted in Goodell 2006).
In fact, the market might be quite efficient at lowering the costs of reducing
emissions for certain individual private companies. As a place and way of trading
goods, markets might make it cheaper for single entities to get what they need -in this
case, compliance with regulations. One could even argue that the spread of gains –in
which consulting agencies, government organizations, non-governmental
organizations, research centers and brokers of all kinds, all profit- further justifies it.
But this effectiveness has nothing to do with efficiency in environmental or
ecosystemic terms. Its measure is money, not the environment or greenhouse gas
concentrations. There is an assumption that, if a market is efficient for reducing costs,
it must be efficient for addressing environmental problems, and for that matter, for
everything. This is quite a jump. Cost-effectiveness is, however, uncontested. As
Gupta says, “The open-mindedness with which equity is being dealt with can be
contrasted with the rigidity with which cost-effectiveness is covered in the literature”
(Gupta 2001: 135). This is also why the Stern Report (2006), prepared by former
World Bank economist Sir Nicholas Stern at the request of British Prime Minister
Tony Blair in November 2006, making the case for taking prompt action on climate
change as a matter of cost-effectiveness, was welcomed with such fanfare.
But perhaps what is most attractive in the market approach to reducing
emissions is that, as Goodell says, “Best of all, it helped transform the problem of
reducing pollution from a moral issue into a pragmatic one” (Goodell 2006). And
anything that gets rid of moral dilemmas or morality is most welcomed. The ideology
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of political realism permeates the whole approach to climate change: that the
world is as it is and one should focus on what is possible rather than on what should
be achieved (see Gupta 1997). This alone serves to eliminate developing countries’
positions in the negotiations and excludes alternative points of view, which are
relegated to wishful thinking, when not dismissed as naive or idealistic.400

On creating scarcity to create a market
As noted in the Introduction, perhaps the most important expression of a
market is the creation of conditions of scarcity that ensure that the goods have value.
This was vital but most complicated in the case of something like carbon
sequestration from trees and vegetation, which happens anyway, everywhere. The fear
that sinks credits would “flood the credits market” was often explicitly stated, and
resulted in the cap on CDM sinks credits to 1 per cent of the five-year commitment
period (equivalent to 5-6 percent of the total greenhouse gas emission reductions by
Annex I countries in the first commitment period), and to the restriction to
afforestation and reforestation project activities.
But scarcity was also assured by making the rules complex, the modalities
difficult to apply to projects, and the transaction costs high.401 Again, it was explicitly
brought up in the negotiations when discussing the baseline year, which some Parties
wanted to move for arguably good reasons (see Chapter 5). All of this was partly
intentional: there was the clear sense that rules could not be too lax lest CDM projects
would saturate the market and obliterate the incentive to reduce emissions at home.
But to some degree it was also unintentional, a result of the concern for credibility.
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Creating scarcity is in fact something that the business sector involved in
the climate talks has continuously demanded, calling for “credible constraints” and
clarity. As stated by the World Bank and IETA, “reducing climate risk and promoting
investment in clean energy systems is a long-term venture requiring billions of dollars
of annual investment. This will require long-term solutions, long-term capital and
long-term legally binding constraints” (World Bank and IETA 2006: ii; italics
mine).402 Similarly, the “Business Views on International Climate and Energy Policy”
survey, prepared by the UK Business Council for Sustainable Energy and The
Climate Group, reports:
There is a unanimous view that mandatory caps (within ETS) are the critical
element to providing scarcity and driving demand within carbon markets;
there was a strong preference, often assertively made, for absolute targets over
a longer time period. The key question for business is: how short (constrained)
is the market going to be? (Hamilton and Kenber 2006: 6).
Producing for the global market also entailed standardizing products and
processes insofar as possible. This is central to how saleable sinks were defined: the
definition of forest was based on canopy cover, whereas a fairer definition would
have to distinguish between biomes; a single year was established as the base-year for
all afforestation and reforestation projects everywhere, despite hugely divergent
recent histories of land use and deforestation in the different regions; and so on (see
Chapters 4 and 5). Norms and standards are necessarily a “technological abstraction
outside of time and place, (developed) in a social and ecological vacuum” (Rocheleau
1999, quoted in González and Nigh 2005: 46). These norms and standards are then
translated into a structure of incentives that does little or nothing to distinguish
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between high quality and marginal or poor reforestation activities. In fact, it
results in a policy that encourages monoculture plantations, and does not recognize
tree farming of mixed stands –for wind barriers, fuel, shade, posts, lumber, as well as
fruit and nuts. These and similar processes of fragmenting and standardizing further
explain how it is that small, independent, alternative projects are left out.

The paradoxical reality of the decisions and capital involution
Where just a few years ago the word “sink” used to refer to a conception of
nature as a “free good” where pollutants are readily absorbed, some sort of garbage
bin (Hajer 1995: 28; Harvey 1996: 378), now sinks are goods to be paid for. Sinks
have thus become another example of the abstraction, the simplification and
interchangeability needed to make tradable commodities that is so typical of
capitalism. Petroleum pumped out of the ground in the Middle East or elsewhere
blows out of someone’s tailpipe in a road race somewhere in Europe, and a tree in
southern Mexico or Costa Rica comes to “stand for” that emitted carbon -a stunning
example of the universal fungibility of things under capitalism.
What is perhaps the more outstanding contradiction is that after great lobbying
efforts by environmental NGOs on the principles and modalities of afforestation and
reforestation projects under the CDM, and the emphasis on “safeguarding the
integrity of the Protocol,” the resulting decision favors precisely the kinds of projects
that these self-proclaimed environmental stewards most adamantly opposed. By
abstracting carbon from the natural process of which it is part, and putting a price on
it, the decision on sinks under the Protocol makes nothing of critical relations –both
social and environmental.
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The resulting increased marginalization occurs at diverse scales: not only
are smallholders and low-income communities in developing countries left out, but so
are whole regions. The discrimination has become so blatant and embarrassing that at
COP 12 in Nairobi, Kenya, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the
launching of the “Nairobi Framework,” an initiative by six UN agencies to help
developing countries, particularly in Africa, participate in the Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism. 403
But the paradox of sinks is not unlike that which affects funding for other
development projects: that it is precisely those projects with various social and
environmental components and benefits that are harder to finance by the international
development institutions set up to do so. Because despite the love of talk on
synergies, these projects have in practice to be approved by various departments (or
so-called “focal areas”) not made to work together.404 So the more integrated and rich
a project, the more difficult it is to finance; the more human-free and
environmentally-restricted, the easier and more lucrative.
Ultimately, however, the problem might be one of the actual inefficiency of
the market to address climate change. Because the market will always seek the leastcost opportunity, in a context of fungibility and flexibility like the one provided by a
basket of gases with different global warming potentials, and a net approach to
accounting for emissions, the money –and reductions- will go to the “low-hanging
fruits”: that is, the projects that provide the maximum amount of emission reduction
credits at the lowest cost. This leaves unaddressed the transformation in the energy
matrix that is really needed in a timely manner to stabilize concentrations of
greenhouse gases. The destruction of HFC-23 is a perfect example. With a global

329
warming potential around 11,000 times that of carbon dioxide, and a cost of
destruction of less that $ 0.5 cents per ton of CO2e, a large number (if not the largest
number) of emission reduction credits from the CDM are from HFC-23 destruction.
These projects do reduce emissions of a potent greenhouse gas, but they leave the
energy infrastructure untouched. Yet it is precisely the energy infrastructure, with its
long-lived investments, that needs to be revolutionized in order to affect the
necessary, timely changes in the consumption of fossil fuels. More problematically,
crediting the destruction of HFC-23 can provide an incentive to artificially increase
the production of HCFC-22, an ozone-depleting gas regulated in industrialized
countries under the Montreal Protocol that is also a greenhouse gas not covered by the
Kyoto Protocol.405 But the market alone would first exhaust the cheapest and simplest
options, and only then would it be forced to invest in more radical changes. This
would take a lot more time than is safe in the case of climate change. Furthermore,
given its narrow, fragmented and profit-seeking logic, the market approach leaves
other problems in its wake that have to be constantly corrected by state regulations.
This is where the idea of capital involution is evidenced. The repetition of a
discrete, simplistic pattern in confined space results in increased density and
entrapment. Instead of opening up options, it generates new problems. Of course
every new constraint opens up possibilities in a dialectical process. But as long as the
approach taken is narrow (as the CO2e credit-based market approach under the Kyoto
Protocol is), the real cause of the problem will be left unaddressed, while the efforts
go to tinkering with the convoluted arrangements.
This involution is reflected in nature, in the way that capital produces nature:
fragmented, uneven, incoherent. Large-scale monoculture plantations of fast-growing
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temperate species in tropical ecosystems, managed by one big corporation based
elsewhere while local people are displaced, cancels options that make more social and
ecological sense. This is not evolution in any sense of the word.
Still, I have tried to stress throughout this dissertation that this is not the result
of some abstract mode of production, in the same way that there is no such thing as an
abstract “free” market. Clearly, these are inextricably bound up with and shaped by
legal regimes that derive from specific decisions and processes. 406 Besides, presenting
capitalism as an abstract mode of production that reproduces inequality makes the
responses to it harder to envision. Here I have tried to detail how capitalism was
promoted, codified, legalized and installed by specific regimes and processes,
governed by specific ideas and values of efficiency and growth. Sometimes people are
tied up with these processes in a way that recalls rituals, where actors are caught up in
the form. Still, the outcome is not inexorable.
If we can abstract labor, it is not so surprising we can abstract a gas absorbed
by trees in the simple process of breathing and then trade it as a commodity. This is of
course a fiction, just like the idea of the free individual and the free market are
fictions. They way they pile up and reproduce towards ever increasing complexity
that is nevertheless not transformative is what I have called involution. In their
involution they generate other such fictions and continuous ensnarement. A world
divided in such discrete, abstract entities, is doomed to frustration if not failure
because things are simply not found in isolation. Trees are part of social and
ecological systems, and any attempt at separating them is delusional. The chances are
that it will result in an accounting or fictional game where, as in liberal economic
theory, reality will be called up only when the theory fails.

331
Appendix
Proposals for Appendix E of the Annex on modalities and procedures for CDM A/R
on social and environmental impacts of project activities.407
APPENDIX E
Option 1 (proposed by the EU, Norway and Switzerland)
1. For the preparation of the project design document, this appendix
outlines issues to be addressed in the analysis of environmental and
socio-economic impacts of afforestation and reforestation project
activities under the CDM, as required under paragraphs X, Y and Z of
appendix B of the present annex.
This is to facilitate the preparation by the designated national authority
of national guidelines, as appropriate, or to be used as a default list if
guidelines are not available or are being developed.
2. For the analysis of environmental impacts, including possible impacts
on biodiversity and natural ecosystems, taking into account relevant
multilateral environmental agreements such as the Convention on
Biological Diversity, the Ramsar Convention, and the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification, the following topics are to be
addressed:
(a) Present environmental status of the area, including a
description of soils, climate, vegetation, fauna, habitats and
rare and/or endangered species as described in national and or
global red lists (e. g. IUCN);
(b) Infrastructural developments if extensive (e. g. construction of
roads, nurseries, etc.) and their possible impacts;
(c) Species selection, origin and processing of reproductive
material and silvicultural systems envisaged;
(d) Soil protection and measures for soil preparation and
fertilization;
(e) Forest protection (e. g pest management, fire control);
(f) Appropriateness and safety of the use of chemicals;
(g) Expected effects on the hydrological system (run-off, water
table, watershed, reservoir, riparian zone);
(h) Expected effects on biodiversity and ecosystem integrity
within the project area and adjacent ecosystems;
(i) Monitoring and remedial measures for major project impacts.
3. For the analysis of socio-economic impacts the following topics are to
be addressed:
(a) Present and expectable evolution of rights on tenure and land
use;
(b) The needs of indigenous and forest-dwelling peoples;
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(c) Definition of responsibilities including those of primary
stakeholders, project developers and host country authorities;
(d) Stakeholders’ involvement and integration in decision and
management processes, access to information on the project
and public participation [in accordance with Article 6 of the
Convention];
(e) Benefit-sharing, taking into consideration local communities;
(f) Effects on local communities and their employment, market
access and food production;
(g) Inclusion of social and cultural impacts of the project,
including capacity-building, awareness raising and safety of
working conditions.

Option 2 (proposed by Tuvalu, on behalf of AOSIS)
1. This appendix addresses the potential environmental and socioeconomic impacts that need to be considered in the preparation of the
project design document and during the monitoring phase of the
afforestation and/or reforestation project activities under the Clean
Development Mechanism.
2. Issues to be addressed include:
(a) Present description of the environmental conditions of the
project area including; vegetation, wildlife, soils, water quality
(b) Present description of socio-economic conditions of the
project and surrounding area including;
i.
current land tenure of project area,
ii.
an account of the human habitation within project
area and surrounding the project area,
iii.
current land use of project area
(c) Description of potential environmental impacts resulting from
project activity, both within and outside the project boundary,
including:
i.
soil erosion, soil compaction, loss of soil
nutrients;
ii.
water contamination , including increases in
turbidity;
iii.
loss or reduction in the number of indigenous
plant and/or animal species and/or their habitats
(in terrestrial and aquatic species);
iv.
increases in the occurrence of fires
v.
contamination of soil and water through use of
chemicals
vi.
changes in air quality (including increases in dust
and smoke)
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vii.
changes to the local climate
(d) Description of potential socio-economic impacts resulting
from the project activity, both within and outside the project
boundary, including:
i.
changes in land tenure and/or land use;
ii.
displacement of local communities or indigenous
peoples;
iii.
damage to or destruction of religious or cultural
sites of local communities and indigenous
peoples;
iv.
changes to local economy or employment;
v.
increases in noise and/or waste;
vi.
changes in the production and/or supply of food,
medicines and fuelwood;
vii.
increase in diseases
3. Consideration of the potential environmental and socio-economic
impacts should take into account the obligations of the host country and/or
acquiring TRECER Annex I Party with respect to other relevant multilateral
environment agreements.
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List of abbreviations

AAU Assigned Amount Unit
ACOPE Asociación Costarricense de Porductores de Energía. Costa Rican
Association of Energy Producers.
AGBM Ad Hoc Working Group on the Berlin Mandate
AIJ Activities Implemented Jointly
A/R Afforestation and Reforestation
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States
ARD Afforestation, Reforestation and Deforestation
ASCOMAFOR Asociación Comunal de Manejo Forestal. Communal Association of
Forest Management.
CACM Central American Common Market
CAN Climate Action Network
CCX Chicago Climate Exchange
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CER Certified Emission Reductions
CINDE Consejo de Iniciativas para el Desarrollo. Counsel of Initiatives for
Development. (Costa Rican Trade and Development Board -according to OCIC’s
translation.)
COP Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC)
COP/MOP Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (Kyoto
Protocol)
CoW Committee of the Whole
CSA Certificados de Servicios Ambientales. Costa Rican Certificates of
Environmental Services.
CSE Center for Science and Environment
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CTOs Certified Tradable Offsets
DNA Designated National Authority
DOE Designated Operational Entity
DNV Det Norske Veritas
EIT Economies in Transition
ENB Earth Negotiations Bulletin
EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
ERU Emission Reduction Unit
EU ETS European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme
EUA European Union Emission Allowance
FCCC Framework Convention on Climate Change
FONAFIFO Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal. National Fund for
Forestry Finance
FUNDECOR Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Cordillera Volcánica Central.
Foundation for the Development of the Central Volcanic Mountainrange (?)
G-77 Group of 77 (developing) Countries
GEF Global Environment Facility
GM Genetically Modified
GMO Genetically Modified Organism
HFCs Hydrofluorocarbons
IAS Invasive Alien Species
INBIO Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad. National Biodiversity Institute.
INC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
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JUSSCANNZ Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, and
New Zealand
lCER Long-term Certified Emission Reduction
LDCs Least Developed Countries
LUCF Land Use Change and Foresty
LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Change and Foresty
MEA Multilateral environmental agreement.
MINAE Ministerio de Recursos Naturales y Energia. Costa Rican Ministry of
Natural Resources and Energy.
OCIC Oficina Costarricense de Implementación Conjunta. Costa Rican Office of
Joint Implementation.
ODA Official Development Aid
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAP Proyecto de Areas Protegidas. Protected Areas Project. [Originally “Proyecto de
Consolidación Territorial y Financiera de los Parques Nacionales y Reservas
Biológicas de Costa Rica,” “National Proposal for the Territorial and Financial
Consolidation of Costa Rican National Parks and Biological Reserves”]
PCF Prototype Carbon Fund
PDD Project Design Document
PFP Proyecto Forestal Privado. Private Forestry Project
PSA Pago de Servicios Ambientales. Payment for Environmental Services
QELROs Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objective. After Kyoto, the
term used was QELRCs: Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction
Commitment)
RMU Removal Unit
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
tCER Temporary Certified Emission Reduction
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UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP United Nations Environmental Program
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (also Climate
Convention or the Convention)
UNFF United Nations Forum on Forests
USIJI United States Initiative on Joint Implementation
WMO World Meteorological Association
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Glossary
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A/R. Stands for Afforestation and Reforestation, the only two activities from the
land use and forestry sector that can be accounted and credited under the CDM.
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). The pilot phase for Joint Implementation, as
defined in Article 4.2(a) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, that allows for project activity among developed countries (and their
companies) and between developed and developing countries (and their companies).
AIJ is intended to allow Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change to gain experience in jointly implemented project activities. There is
no crediting for AIJ activity during the pilot phase. A decision remains to be taken on
the future of AIJ projects and how they may relate to the Kyoto Mechanisms. As a
simple form of tradable permits, AIJ and other market-based schemes represent
important potential mechanisms for stimulating additional resource flows for the
global environmental good. See also Clean Development Mechanism and emissions
trading.
Adaptation. Adjustment in natural or human systems to a new or changing
environment. Adaptation to climate change refers to adjustment in natural or human
systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. Various types of adaptation can
be distinguished, including anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private and public
adaptation, and autonomous and planned adaptation.
Adaptive capacity. The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including
climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of
opportunities, or to cope with the consequences.
Additionality Reduction in emissions by sources or enhancement of removals by
sinks that is additional to any that would occur in the absence of a Joint
Implementation or a Clean Development Mechanism project activity as defined in the
Kyoto Protocol Articles on Joint Implementation and the Clean Development
Mechanism. This definition may be further broadened to include financial,
investment, and technology additionality. Under “financial additionality,” the project
activity funding shall be additional to existing Global Environmental Facility, other
financial commitments of Parties included in Annex I, Official Development
Assistance, and other systems of cooperation. Under “investment additionality,” the
value of the Emissions Reduction Unit/Certified Emission Reduction Unit shall
significantly improve the financial and/or commercial viability of the project activity.
Under “technology additionality,” the technology used for the project activity shall be
the best available for the circumstances of the host Party.
Aerosols. Solid or liquid particles suspended within the atmosphere (see "sulfate
aerosols" and "black carbon aerosols"). Particles of matter, solid or liquid, larger than
a molecule but small enough to remain suspended in the atmosphere. Natural sources
include salt particles from sea spray and clay particles as a result of weathering of
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rocks, both of which are carried upward by the wind. Aerosols can also originate
as a result of human activities and in this case are often considered pollutants. See
also Sulfate Aerosols. (EPA).
Afforestation. Planting of new forests on lands that have not been recently been
forested. According to Decision 11/CP.7, “‘Afforestation’ is the direct humaninduced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years
to forested land through plating, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of
natural seed sources.” Decision 11/CP.7 Annex A 1(b)) [see same decision for other
basic definitions (revegetation, cropland management et al.)]
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): A coalition of some 43 low-lying and
small island countries, most of which are members of the G77, that are particularly
vulnerable to the potential adverse consequences of climate change such as sea-level
rise, coral bleaching, and increased frequency and intensity of tropical storms.
Allocation. Under an emissions trading scheme, permits to emit can initially either
be given away for free, usually under a ‘grandfathering’ approach based on past
emissions in a base year or an ‘updating’ approach based on the more recent
emissions. The alternative is to auction permits in an initial market offering.
Annex I Party Group of countries included in Annex I (as amended in 1998) to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, including all the
developed countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
and economies in transition. By default, the other countries are referred to as nonAnnex I countries. Under Articles 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) of the Convention, Annex I
countries commit themselves specifically to the aim of returning individually or
jointly to their 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2000. They are 40
countries plus the European Economic Community: Australia, Austria, Belarus,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Economic
Community, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United States.
Annex A: A list in the Kyoto Protocol of the six greenhouse gases and the sources of
emissions covered under the Kyoto Protocol. See also "Basket of Gases."
Annex B: A list in the Kyoto Protocol of 38 countries plus the European Community
that agreed to QELRCs (emission targets), along with the QELRCs they accepted.
The list is nearly identical to the Annex I Parties listed in the Convention except that
it does not include Belarus or Turkey.
Annex II countries. Group of countries included in Annex II to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, including all developed countries in the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Under Article 4.2(g) of
the Convention, these countries are expected to provide financial resources to assist
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developing countries to comply with their obligations, such as preparing national
reports. Annex II countries are also expected to promote the transfer of
environmentally sound technologies to developing countries.See also Annex I, Annex
B, non-Annex I, and non-Annex B countries/Parties.
Annex B countries/Parties. Group of countries included in Annex B in the Kyoto
Protocol that have agreed to a target for their greenhouse gas emissions, including all
the Annex I countries (as amended in 1998) but Turkey and Belarus.
Anthropogenic. Derived from human activities.
Anthropogenic emissions. Emissions of greenhouse gases, greenhouse gas
precursors, and aerosols associated with human activities. These include burning of
fossil fuels for energy, deforestation, and land-use changes that result in net increase
in emissions.
Assigned amounts (AAs). Under the Kyoto Protocol, the total amount of greenhouse
gas emissions that each Annex B country has agreed that its emissions will not exceed
in the first commitment period (2008 to 2012) is the assigned amount. This is
calculated by multiplying the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 by
five (for the 5-year commitment period) and then by the percentage it agreed to as
listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., 92% for the European Union, 93% for
the USA).
Assigned amount unit (AAU). Equal to 1 tonne (metric ton) of CO2-equivalent
emissions calculated using the Global Warming Potential.
Banking. According to the Kyoto Protocol (Article 3.13), Parties included in Annex I
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change may save excess
emissions allowances or credits from the first commitment period for use in
subsequent commitment periods (post-2012).
Basket of Gases. This refers to the group six of greenhouse gases regulated under the
Kyoto Protocol. They are listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol and include:
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Base Year. Targets for reducing GHG emissions are often defined in relation to a
base year. In the Kyoto Protocol, 1990 is the base year for most countries for the
major GHGs; 1995 can be used as the base year for some of the minor GHGs.
Baseline. The baseline (or reference) is any datum against which change is measured.
It might be a “current baseline,” in which case it represents observable, present-day
conditions. It might also be a “future baseline,” which is a projected future set of
conditions excluding the driving factor of interest. Alternative interpretations of the
reference conditions can give rise to multiple baselines.
Baseline Emissions. The emissions that would occur without policy intervention (in a
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business-as-usual scenario).
Berlin Mandate. A ruling negotiated at the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1),
which took place in March, 1995, concluding that the present commitments under the
Framework Convention on Climate Change were not adequate. The Berlin Mandate
established a process that would enable the Parties to take appropriate action for the
period beyond 2000, including a strengthening of developed country commitments,
through the adoption of a protocol or other legal instruments. (EPA).
Biomass. The total mass of living organisms in a given area or volume; recently dead
plant material is often included as dead biomass.
Bubble. An option in the Kyoto Protocol that allows a group of countries to meet
their targets jointly by aggregating their total emissions. The member states of the
European Union are utilizing this option.
Capacity building. In the context of climate change, capacity building is a process of
developing the technical skills and institutional capability in developing countries and
economies in transition to enable them to participate in all aspects of adaptation to,
mitigation of, and research on climate change, and the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol flexible mechanisms.
Carbon Cycle. The global scale exchange of carbon among its reservoirs, namely the
atmosphere, oceans, vegetation, soils, and geologic deposits and minerals. This
involves components in food chains, in the atmosphere as carbon dioxide, in the
hydrosphere and in the geosphere. (EPA). The term used to describe the flow of
carbon (in various forms such as as carbon dioxide) through the atmosphere, ocean,
terrestrial biosphere, and lithosphere.
Carbon dioxide (CO2). A naturally occurring gas, and also a by-product of burning
fossil fuels and biomass, as well as land-use changes and other industrial processes. It
is the principal anthropogenic greenhouse gas that affects the Earth’s radiative
balance. It is the reference gas against which other greenhouse gases are measured
and therefore has been assigned a 100-year GWP of 1 (i.e., the warming effects over a
100-year time frame relative to other gases) (see carbon dioxide equivalents, or
CO2e). Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have been increasing at a rate of about
0.5% per year and are now about 30% above preindustrial levels.
Carbon dioxide Equivalent (CO2e). A metric measure used to compare the
emissions from various greenhouse gases based upon their global warming potential
(GWP). Carbon dioxide equivalents are commonly expressed as "million metric tons
of carbon dioxide equivalents." The carbon dioxide equivalent for a gas is derived by
multiplying the tons of the gas by the associated GWP. For example, the GWP for
methane is 24.5. This means that emissions of one million metric tons of methane is
equivalent to emissions of 24.5 million metric tons of carbon dioxide. Carbon may
also be used as the reference and other greenhouse gases may be converted to carbon
equivalents. To convert carbon to carbon dioxide, multiply the carbon by 44/12 (the
ratio of the molecular weight of carbon dioxide to carbon). (EPA). (CO2e) The
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emissions of a gas, by weight, multiplied by its "global warming potential."
Carbon dioxide (CO2) fertilization. The enhancement of the growth of plants as a
result of increased atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. Depending on their
mechanism of photosynthesis, certain types of plants are more sensitive to changes in
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. In particular, plants that produce a threecarbon compound (C3) during photosynthesis—including most trees and agricultural
crops such as rice, wheat, soybeans, potatoes, and vegetables— generally show a
larger response than plants that produce a four-carbon compound (C4) during
photosynthesis—mainly of tropical origin, including grasses and the agriculturally
important crops maize, sugar cane, millet, and sorghum.
Carbon Pool. A Reservoir. A system which has the capacity to accumulate or release
carbon. Examples of carbon pools are forest biomass, wood products, soils, and
atmosphere. The units are mass (e.g. tC).
Carbon Sequestration. The uptake and storage of carbon. Trees and plants, for
example, absorb carbon dioxide, release the oxygen and store the carbon. Fossil fuels
were at one time biomass and continue to store the carbon until burned. (EPA)
Carbon Sinks. Processes that remove more carbon dioxide from the atmosphere than
they release (carbon sequestration). Both the terrestrial biosphere and oceans can act
as carbon sinks.
Certified Emission Reduction (CER) Unit. Equal to 1 tonne (metric ton) of CO2equivalent emissions reduced or sequestered through a Clean Development
Mechanism project, calculated using Global Warming Potentials. See also Emissions
Reduction Unit. A CER can be sold or counted toward Annex I countries' emissions
commitments. Reductions must be additional to any that would otherwise occur.
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Greenhouse gases covered under the 1987 Montreal
Protocol and used for refrigeration, air conditioning, packaging, insulation, solvents,
or aerosol propellants. Since they are not destroyed in the lower atmosphere, CFCs
drift into the upper atmosphere where, given suitable conditions, they break down
ozone. These gases are being replaced by other compounds, including
hydrochlorofluorocarbons and hydrofluorocarbons, which are greenhouse gases
covered under the Kyoto Protocol.
CINDE. Consejo de Iniciativas para el Desarrollo. Counsel of Initiatives for
Development. (Costa Rican Trade and Development Board -acc. to OCIC’s
translation.)
Clean Development Mechanisms. Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the
Clean Development Mechanism is intended to meet two objectives: (1) to assist
Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in
contributing to the ultimate objective of the convention; and (2) to assist Parties
included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation
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and reduction commitments. Certified Emission Reduction Units from Clean
Development Mechanism projects undertaken in non-Annex I countries that limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, when certified by operational entities designated by
Conference of the Parties/Meeting of the Parties, can be accrued to the investor
(government or industry) from Parties in Annex B. A share of the proceeds from the
certified project activities is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of
climate change to meet the costs of adaptation. One of the three market mechanisms
established by the Kyoto Protocol.
Climate Change Climate change refers to a statistically significant variation in either
the mean state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for an extended period
(typically decades or longer). Climate change may be due to natural internal processes
or external forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the
atmosphere or in land use. Note that the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, defines “climate change” as: “a change
of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate
variability observed over comparable time periods.” The UNFCCC thus makes a
distinction between “climate change” attributable to human activities altering the
atmospheric composition, and “climate variability” attributable to natural causes.
Climate variability thus refers to changes in long-term trends in the average climate,
such as changes in average temperatures. So whereas in IPCC usage, climate change
refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a
result of human activity, in UNFCCC usage, climate change refers to a change in
climate that is attributable directly or indirectly to human activity that alters
atmospheric composition.
Climate Feedback. An interaction mechanism between processes in the climate
system is called a climate feedback, when the result of an initial process triggers
changes in a second process that in turn influences the initial one. A positive feedback
intensifies the original process, and a negative feedback reduces it.
Climate scenario. A plausible and often simplified representation of the future
climate, based on an internally consistent set of climatological relationships, that has
been constructed for explicit use in investigating the potential consequences of
anthropogenic climate change, often serving as input to impact models. Climate
projections often serve as the raw material for constructing climate scenarios, but
climate scenarios usually require additional information such as about the observed
current climate. A “climate change scenario” is the difference between a climate
scenario and the current climate.
Climate System (or Earth System). The climate system is the highly complex system
consisting of five major components: the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the
cryosphere, the land surface and the biosphere, and the interactions between them.
The climate system evolves in time under the influence of its own internal dynamics
and because of external forcings such as volcanic eruptions, solar variations, and
human-induced forcings such as the changing composition of the atmosphere and
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land-use change.
Climate variability. Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and
other statistics (such as standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the
climate on all temporal and spatial scales beyond that of individual weather events.
Variability may be due to natural internal processes within the climate system
(internal variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic external forcing
(external variability). See also climate change.
Commitment Period. The period under the Kyoto Protocol during which Annex I
Parties' GHG emissions, averaged over the period, must be within their emission
targets. The first commitment period runs from January 1, 2008 to December 31,
2012.
Conference of the Parties (COP). The supreme decision-making body comprised of
the parties that have ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It
meets on an annual basis. As of February 2003, it is comprised of 189 countries. The
first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-1) was held in Berlin in 1995,
followed by COP-2 in Geneva 1996, COP-3 in Kyoto 1997, COP-4 in Buenos Aires
1998, COP-5 in Bonn 1999, COP-6 Part 1 in The Hague 2000, and COP-6 Part 2 in
Bonn 2001, COP-7 in Marrakech 2001, COP-8 in New Delhi 2002, COP-9 in Milan
2003, COP-10 in Buenos Aires 2004, COP-11 in Montreal in 2005, COP-12 in
Nairobi in 2006. COP-13 will be held in Bali.
CTO. Costa Rican Certified Tradable Offsets.
Deforestation. Conversion of forest to non-forest. For a discussion of the term forest
and related terms such as afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation, see the IPCC
Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000b).
Economies in transition (EITs). Countries with national economies in the process of
changing from a planned economic system to a market economy.
Ecosystem. A system of interacting living organisms together with their physical
environment. The boundaries of what could be called an ecosystem are somewhat
arbitrary, depending on the focus of interest or study. Thus, the extent of an
ecosystem may range from very small spatial scales to, ultimately, the entire Earth.
El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). El Niño, in its original sense, is a warmwater
current that periodically flows along the coast of Ecuador and Peru, disrupting the
local fishery. This oceanic event is associated with a fluctuation of the intertropical
surface pressure pattern and circulation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, called the
Southern Oscillation. This coupled atmosphere-ocean phenomenon is collectively
known as El Niño Southern Oscillation, or ENSO. During an El Niño event, the
prevailing trade winds weaken and the equatorial countercurrent strengthens, causing
warm surface waters in the Indonesian area to flow eastward to overlie the cold
waters of the Peru current. This event has great impact on the wind, sea surface
temperature, and precipitation patterns in the tropical Pacific. It has climatic effects
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throughout the Pacific region and in many other parts of the world. The opposite
of an El Niño event is called La Niña.
Emissions. In the climate change context, emissions refer to the release of
greenhouse gases and/or their precursors and aerosols into the atmosphere over a
specified area and period of time.
Emissions Reduction Unit (ERU). Equal to 1 tonne (metric ton) of carbon dioxide
emissions reduced or sequestered arising from a Joint Implementation (defined in
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol) project calculated using Global Warming Potential.
Emissions reductions generated by projects in Annex B countries that can be used by
another Annex B country to help meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
Emissions trading. A market-based approach to achieving environmental objectives
that allows, those reducing greenhouse gas emissions below what is required, to use
or trade the excess reductions to offset emissions at another source inside or outside
the country. In general, trading can occur at the intracompany, domestic, and
international levels. The IPCC Second Assessment Report adopted the convention of
using “permits” for domestic trading systems and “quotas” for international trading
systems. Emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol is a tradable quota
system based on the assigned amounts calculated from the emission reduction and
limitation commitments listed in Annex B of the Protocol.
Emissions scenario. A plausible representation of the future development of
emissions of substances that are potentially radiatively active (e.g., greenhouse gases,
aerosols), based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about
driving forces (such as demographic and socio-economic development, technological
change) and their key relationships. Concentration scenarios, derived from emissions
scenarios, are used as input into a climate model to compute climate projections. In
IPCC (1992), a set of emissions scenarios were used as a basis for the climate
projections in IPCC (1996). These emissions scenarios are referred to as the IS92
scenarios. In the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, new emissions
scenarios—the so-called SRES scenarios—were published.
Externalities. By-products of activities that affect the well-being of people or damage
the environment, where those impacts are not reflected in market prices. The costs (or
benefits) associated with externalities do not enter standard cost accounting schemes.
(IPCC)
Fluorocarbons. Carbon-fluorine compounds that often contain other elements such
as hydrogen, chlorine, or bromine. Common fluorocarbons include
chlorofluorocarbons and related compounds (also know as ozone depleting
substances), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorcarbons (PFCs).
Forest. A vegetation type dominated by trees. Many definitions of the term forest are
in use throughout the world, reflecting wide differences in bio-geophysical
conditions, social structure, and economics. For a discussion of the term forest and
related terms such as afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation: see the IPCC
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Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000b).
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). See UNFCCC.
General Circulation Model (GCM). A global, three-dimensional computer model of
the climate system which can be used to simulate human-induced climate change.
GCMs are highly complex and they represent the effects of such factors as reflective
and absorptive properties of atmospheric water vapor, greenhouse gas concentrations,
clouds, annual and daily solar heating, ocean temperatures and ice boundaries. The
most recent GCMs include global representations of the atmosphere, oceans, and land
surface. (EPA).
Global Warming Potential (GWP). The index used to translate the level of
emissions of various gases into a common measure in order to compare the relative
radiative forcing of different gases without directly calculating the changes in
atmospheric concentrations. GWPs are calculated as the ratio of the radiative forcing
that would result from the emissions of one kilogram of a greenhouse gas to that from
emission of one kilogram of carbon dioxide over a period of time (usually 100 years).
Gases involved in complex atmospheric chemical processes have not been assigned
GWPs due to complications that arise. Greenhouse gases are expressed in terms of
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
presented these GWPs and regularly updates them in new assessments.
Greenhouse Effect. The insulating effect of atmospheric greenhouse gases (e.g.,
water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, etc.) that keeps the Earth's temperature about
60°F warmer than it would be otherwise. Greenhouse gases effectively absorb
infrared radiation, emitted by the Earth’s surface, by the atmosphere itself due to the
same gases, and by clouds. Atmospheric radiation is emitted to all sides, including
downward to the Earth’s surface. Thus greenhouse gases trap heat within the surfacetroposphere system. This is called the “natural greenhouse effect.” Atmospheric
radiation is strongly coupled to the temperature of the level at which it is emitted. In
the troposphere, the temperature generally decreases with height. Effectively, infrared
radiation emitted to space originates from an altitude with a temperature of, on
average, -19°C, in balance with the net incoming solar radiation, whereas the Earth’s
surface is kept at a much higher temperature of, on average, +14°C. An increase in the
concentration of greenhouse gases leads to an increased infrared opacity of the
atmosphere, and therefore to an effective radiation into space from a higher altitude at
a lower temperature. This causes a radiative forcing, an imbalance that can only be
compensated for by an increase of the temperature of the surface-troposphere system.
This is the “enhanced greenhouse effect.”
Greenhouse Gas (GHG). Greenhouse gases are those gaseous constituents of the
atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific
wavelengths within the spectrum of infrared radiation emitted by the Earth’s surface,
the atmosphere, and clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect. Water vapor
(H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), and ozone (O3)
are the primary greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere. Moreover there are a
number of entirely human-made greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, such as the

347
halocarbons and other chlorine- and bromine-containing substances, dealt with
under the Montreal Protocol. Besides CO2, N2O, and CH4, the Kyoto Protocol deals
with the greenhouse gases sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and
perfluorocarbons (PFCs).
"Hot Air”. A situation in which emissions (of a country, sector, company or facility)
are well below a target due to the target being above emissions that materialized
under the normal course of events (i.e., without deliberate emission reduction
efforts). Hot air can result from over-optimistic projections of growth. Emissions
are often projected to grow roughly in proportion to GDP, and GDP is often projected
to grow at historic rates. If a recession occurs and fuel use declines, emissions may
be well below targets since targets are generally set in relation to emission
projections. If emission trading is allowed, an emitter could sell the difference
between actual emissions and emission targets. Such emissions are considered hot air
because they do not represent reductions from what would have occurred in the
normal course of events.
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). These chemicals (along with perfluorocarbons) were
introduced as alternatives to ozone depleting substances in serving many industrial,
commercial, and personal needs. HFCs are emitted as by-products of industrial
processes and are also used in manufacturing. They do not significantly deplete the
stratospheric ozone layer, but they are powerful greenhouse gases with global
warming potentials ranging from 140 (HFC-152a) to 12,100 (HFC-23). (EPA).
Ice Core. A cylindrical section of ice removed from a glacier or an ice sheet in order
to study climate patterns of the past. By performing chemical analyses on the air
trapped in the ice, scientists can estimate the percentage of carbon dioxide and other
trace gases in the atmosphere at that time. (EPA)
INC. Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee. The body in charge of negotiating
the text of the UNFCCC between 1990 and 1992, set up by the UN General Assembly
in resolution 45/221 (1990).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IPCC was established jointly by
the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological
Organization in 1988. The purpose of the IPCC is to assess information in the
scientific and technical literature related to all significant components of the issue of
climate change. The IPCC draws upon hundreds of the world's expert scientists as
authors and thousands as expert reviewers. Leading experts on climate change and
environmental, social, and economic sciences from some 60 nations have helped the
IPCC to prepare periodic assessments of the scientific underpinnings for
understanding global climate change and its consequences. With its capacity for
reporting on climate change, its consequences, and the viability of adaptation and
mitigation measures, the IPCC is also looked to as the official advisory body to the
world's governments on the state of the science of the climate change issue. For
example, the IPCC organized the development of internationally accepted methods
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for conducting national greenhouse gas emission inventories. (IPCC).
Invasive species. An introduced species that invades natural habitats.
Joint Implementation. A market-based implementation mechanism defined in
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, allowing Annex I countries or companies from these
countries to implement projects jointly that limit or reduce emissions, or enhance
sinks, and to share the Emissions Reduction Units. JI activity is also permitted in
Article 4.2(a) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See
also Activities Implemented Jointly and Kyoto Mechanisms.
Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the Third Session of the Conference of
the Parties to the UNFCCC in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. It contains legally binding
commitments, in addition to those included in the UNFCCC. Countries included in
Annex B of the Protocol (most countries in the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, and countries with economies in transition) agreed to
reduce their anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride) by at
least 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.
Land use. The total of arrangements, activities, and inputs undertaken in a certain
land cover type (a set of human actions). The social and economic purposes for which
land is managed (e.g., grazing, timber extraction, and conservation).
Land-use change. A change in the use or management of land by humans, which
may lead to a change in land cover. Land cover and land-use change may have an
impact on the albedo, evapotranspiration, sources, and sinks of greenhouse gases, or
other properties of the climate system, and may thus have an impact on climate,
locally or globally. See also the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use
Change, and Forestry.
Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF): Land uses and land-use
changes can act either as sinks or as emission sources. It is estimated that
approximately one-fifth of global emissions result from LULUCF activities. The
Kyoto Protocol allows Parties to receive emissions credit for certain LULUCF
activities that reduce net emissions.
Leakage. Refers to emissions occurring elsewhere as a result of the establishment of
a LULUCF activity. It occurs for example when people are displaced and demand for
timber or fuelwood is simply relocated, leading to land clearance and increased
emissions elsewhere. As defined in decision 19/CP.9 (Afforestation and reforestation
project activities under the CDM), leakage “is the increase in greenhouse gas
emissions by sources which occurs outside the boundary of an afforestation or
reforestation project activity under the CDM which is measurable and attributable to
the afforestation or reforestation project activity.” (Decision 19/CP.9 Annex A 1(e)).
Lifetime (Atmospheric). The lifetime of a greenhouse gas refers to the approximate
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amount of time it would take for the anthropogenic increment to an atmospheric
pollutant concentration to return to its natural level (assuming emissions cease) as a
result of either being converted to another chemical compound or being taken out of
the atmosphere via a sink. This time depends on the pollutant's sources and sinks as
well as its reactivity. The lifetime of a pollutant is often considered in conjunction
with the mixing of pollutants in the atmosphere; a long lifetime will allow the
pollutant to mix throughout the atmosphere. Average lifetimes can vary from about a
week (sulfate aerosols) to more than a century (CFCs, carbon dioxide).
Meeting of the Parties (to the Kyoto Protocol) (MOP). The Conference of the
Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change will serve
as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP), the supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol, but
only Parties to the Kyoto Protocol may participate in deliberations and make
decisions.
Megatonne (Mt). One million (106) tonnes. Greenhouse gas emissions are often
measured in megatonnes. (Australia)
Methane (CH4). A hydrocarbon that is a greenhouse gas with a global warming
potential most recently estimated at 24.5. Methane is produced through anaerobic
(without oxygen) decomposition of waste in landfills, animal digestion,
decomposition of animal wastes, production and distribution of natural gas and oil,
coal production , and incomplete fossil fuel combustion. The atmospheric
concentration of methane has been shown to be increasing at a rate of about 0.6% per
year and the concentration of about 1.7 parts per million by volume (ppmv) is more
than twice its preindustrial value. However, the rate of increase of methane in the
atmosphere may be stabilizing. (EPA).
Metric Ton. Common international measurement for the quantity of greenhouse gas
emissions. A metric ton is equal to 2205 lbs or 1.1 short tons. (EPA)
Mitigation. An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks
of greenhouse gases.
Montreal Protocol. The Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer
was adopted in Montreal in 1987 and entered into force in January 1989 to phase out
the use of ozone-depleting compounds such as methyl chloroform, carbon
tetrachloride, and CFCs. CFCs are potent greenhouse gases which are not regulated
by the Kyoto Protocol since they are covered by the Montreal Protocol.
Nitrogen fertilization. Enhancement of plant growth through the deposition of
nitrogen compounds. In IPCC reports, this typically refers to fertilization from
anthropogenic sources of nitrogen such as, man-made fertilizers and nitrogen oxides
released from burning fossil fuels. (IPCC).
Non-Annex I countries/Parties. The countries that have ratified or acceded to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that are not included in
Annex I of the Climate Convention. See also Annex I countries. Developing countries.
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Ozone layer. The stratosphere contains a layer in which the concentration of
ozone is greatest, the so-called ozone layer. The layer extends from about 12 to 40
km. The ozone concentration reaches a maximum between about 20 and 25 km. This
layer is being depleted by human emissions of chlorine and bromine compounds.
Every year, during the Southern Hemisphere spring, a very strong depletion of the
ozone layer takes place over the Antarctic region, also caused by human-made
chlorine and bromine compounds in combination with the specific meteorological
conditions of that region. This phenomenon is called the ozone hole.
PAP. Proyecto de Areas Protegidas. Protected Areas Project. Originally “Proyecto de
Consolidación Territorial y Financiera de los Parques Nacionales y Reservas
Biológicas de Costa Rica,” “National Proposal for the Territorial and Financial
Consolidation of Costa Rican National Parks and Biological Reserves.”
Party. A state (or regional economic integration organization, such as the European
Union) that agrees to be bound by a treaty and for which the treaty has entered into
force.
Photosynthesis. The process by which plants take carbon dioxide (CO2) from the air
(or bicarbonate in water) to build carbohydrates, releasing oxygen (O2) in the process.
There are several pathways of photosynthesis with different responses to atmospheric
CO2 concentrations.
ppm or ppb: . Parts per million. A unit of concentration for a particular substance
(e.g., CO2). Abbreviations for "parts per million" and "parts per billion," respectively
- the units in which concentrations of greenhouse gases are commonly presented. For
example, since the pre-industrial era, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide
have increased from 270 ppm to 370 ppm.
Pool. See reservoir.
Positive Feedback: A process that results in an amplification of the response of a
system to an external influence. For example, increased atmospheric water vapor in
response to global warming would be a positive feedback on warming, because water
vapor is a GHG.
Project participants: As stated in the CDM Guidelines for preparing a PDD, and in
accordance with the usage of the term in the CDM and CDM A/R modalities and
procedures, a project participant is a Party involved, and/or a private and/or public
entity authorized by a Party to participate in an A/R CDM project activity (CDM-ARPDD version 04 page 14).
QELRC (Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Commitment): Also
known as QELRO (Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objective): The
quantified commitments for GHG emissions listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.
QELRCs are specified in percentages relative to 1990 emissions.
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Radiative Forcing. The term radiative forcing refers to changes in the energy
balance of the earth-atmosphere system in response to a change in factors such as
greenhouse gases, land-use change, or solar radiation. The climate system inherently
attempts to balance incoming (e.g., light) and outgoing (e.g. heat) radiation. Positive
radiative forcings increase the temperature of the lower atmosphere, which in turn
increases temperatures at the Earth's surface. Negative radiative forcings cool the
lower atmosphere. Radiative forcing is most commonly measured in units of watts
per square meter (W/m2).
Ratification: After signing the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol, a country must ratify
it, often with the approval of its parliament or other legislature. In the case of the
Kyoto Protocol, a Party must deposit its instrument of ratification with the UN
Secretary General in New York.
Reference scenario. See baseline.
Reforestation. According to Decision 11/C.P.7, “‘Reforestation’ is the humaninduced conversion of non–forested land to forested land through plating, seeding
and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land that was
forested but that has been converted to non-forested land. For the first commitment
period, reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation occurring on those lands
that did not contain forest on 31 December 1989” (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1) (see
Annex). Replanting of forests on lands that have recently been harvested.
Reservoir. A component of the climate system, other than the atmosphere, which has
the capacity to store, accumulate, or release a substance of concern (e.g., carbon, a
greenhouse gas, or a precursor). Oceans, soils, and forests are examples of reservoirs
of carbon. Pool is an equivalent term (note that the definition of pool often includes
the atmosphere). The absolute quantity of substance of concerns, held within a
reservoir at a specified time, is called the stock. The term also means an artificial or
natural storage place for water, such as a lake, pond, or aquifer, from which the water
may be withdrawn for such purposes as irrigation, water supply, or irrigation.
Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: The United
Nations staff assigned the responsibility of conducting the affairs of the UNFCCC. In
1996 the Secretariat moved from Geneva, Switzerland, to Bonn, Germany.
Sequestration: The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir
other than the atmosphere. Biological approaches to sequestration include direct
removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through land-use change,
afforestation, reforestation, and practices that enhance soil carbon in agriculture.
Physical approaches include separation and disposal of carbon dioxide from flue
gases or from processing fossil fuels to produce hydrogen- and carbon dioxide-rich
fractions and longterm storage in underground in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, coal
seams, and saline aquifers. See also uptake.
Silviculture. Development and care of forests.
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Sink. Any process, activity or mechanism that removes a greenhouse gas, an
aerosol, or a precursor of a greenhouse gas or aerosol from the atmosphere. A
reservoir that uptakes a pollutant from another part of its cycle. Soil and trees tend to
act as natural sinks for carbon.
Stock. See reservoir.
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). A permanent body established by the
UNFCCC that makes recommendations to the COP on policy and implementation
issues. It is open to participation by all Parties and is composed of government
representatives.
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).A permanent
body established by the UNFCCC that serves as a link between expert information
sources such as the IPCC and the COP.
Sustainable Development. Development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. (IPCC)
Stakeholders are “the public, including individuals, groups, or communities affected,
or likely to be affected, by the proposed A/R project activity or actions leading to the
implementation of such an activity.” (CDM-AR-PDD Guidelines Glossary, Version
04 page 14).
Targets and time tables. A target is the reduction of a specific percentage of
greenhouse gas emissions from a baseline date (e.g., “below 1990 levels”) to be
achieved by a set date or time table (e.g., 2008 to 2012). For example, under the
Kyoto Protocol’s formula, the European Union has agreed to reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions by 8% below 1990 levels by the 2008 to 2012 commitment period.
These targets and time tables are, in effect, an emissions cap on the total amount of
greenhouse gas emissions that can be emitted by a country or region in a given time
period.
Thermohaline Circulation. Large-scale density-driven circulation in the oceans,
driven by differences in temperature and salinity. (IPCC).
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The
landmark international treaty unveiled at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED, also known as the "Rio Summit"), in June
1992. The FCCC commits signatory countries to stabilize anthropogenic (i.e., humaninduced) greenhouse gas emissions to 'levels that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system'. The FCCC also requires that all
signatory parties develop and update national inventories of anthropogenic emissions
of all greenhouse gases not otherwise controlled by the Montreal Protocol. (EPA).
The Convention was adopted on 9 May 1992 in New York and signed at the 1992
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro by more than 150 countries and the European
Community. It contains commitments for all Parties. Under the Convention, Parties
included in Annex I aim to return greenhouse gas emissions not controlled by the
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Montreal Protocol to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The Convention entered into
force in March 1994.
Uptake. The addition of a substance of concern to a reservoir. The uptake of carboncontaining substances, in particular carbon dioxide, is often called (carbon)
sequestration. See also sequestration.
Water Vapor. The most abundant greenhouse gas, it is the water present in the
atmosphere in gaseous form. Water vapor is an important part of the natural
greenhouse effect. While humans are not significantly increasing its concentration, it
contributes to the enhanced greenhouse effect because the warming influence of
greenhouse gases leads to a positive water vapor feedback. In addition to its role as a
natural greenhouse gas, water vapor plays an important role in regulating the
temperature of the planet because clouds form when excess water vapor in the
atmosphere condenses to form ice and water droplets and precipitation. (EPA)
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